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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the impact of revolution upon slavery in the Atlantic world, 
focusing upon the period of profound and unprecedented change and conflict in the 
Bahamas during the final decades of the eighteenth century. It argues that the 
Bahamian experience can only be satisfactorily understood with reference to the 
revolutionary upheavals that were transforming the larger Atlantic world in those 
years. 
From 1783, the arrival of black and white migrants displaced by the American 
Revolution resulted in quantitative and qualitative social, economic and political 
transformation in the Bahamas. The thesis assesses the nature and significance of the 
sudden demographic shift to a non-white majority in the archipelago, the development 
of many hitherto unsettled islands, and efforts to construct a cotton-based plantation 
economy. It also traces the trajectory and dynamics of the complex struggles that 
ensued from these changes. During the 1780s, émigré Loyalist slaveholders from the 
American South, intent on establishing a Bahamian plantocracy, confronted not only 
non-white Bahamians exploring enlarged possibilities for greater control over their 
own lives, but also an existing white population determined to defend their own 
interests, and a belligerent governor with a penchant for idiosyncratic antislavery 
initiatives. 
In the 1790s, a potentially explosive situation was inflamed still further as a 
new wave of war and revolution engulfed the Atlantic. The various ways in which 
Bahamians responded to the prospect of the new possibilities seemingly opened up by 
the Haitian Revolution would have lasting consequences. 
Whilst engaging critically with both the detail and general interpretive 
tendencies of existing Bahamian historiography, the thesis seeks to demonstrate the 
manifold, complex, and contingent nature of the relationship between the eighteenth-
century revolutions and the Atlantic slave system. As such, it aims to show the 
potential of an Atlantic history integrating local and more general perspectives to 
facilitate a more nuanced and fully transnational account of the ‘Age of Revolution’. 
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Introduction 
 
In the spring of 1788, a sequence of strange events unfolded on the island of Abaco, in 
the Bahamas. On Sunday 4 March, the planter Richard Pearis was having dinner with 
friends at his estate at Spencer’s Bight, one of several settlements recently established 
on Abaco by Pearis and other American Loyalist émigrés, when proceedings were 
interrupted by the arrival of Samuel Mackay, captain of the Bahamian governor’s 
schooner, the Shearwater. Mackay declared that he was looking for contraband corn, 
and demanded the keys to the plantation house and cellar. Pearis refused, asking 
Mackay ‘repeatedly to show his Authority, and Warned him at his peril from breaking 
or attempting to force any of [his stores], or to molest any of my property’. In 
response, after threatening ‘to make everyone present Prisoners’, Mackay ‘went to his 
Boat and brought up Armed White Men and Negroes whom he placed [as] Sentrys’ 
around the estate. He then had ‘Armed Negroes with an Axe’ break down the doors to 
Pearis’s stores, and seized 401 bushels of corn ‘in the King’s Name.’1 
 Many details of what happened next are ambiguous. It is clear that in the wake 
of this episode large numbers of the people held as slaves at Spencer’s Bight 
‘absconded’; Pearis lost at least two of his own slaves, and reported that ‘some of our 
Neighbours are left without their House Servants, and all have more or less of our 
slaves gone to the Woods’.2 What remains uncertain is why this mass flight happened, 
what the motives of the runaways were, and the precise role, if any, played by the 
crew of the Shearwater in provoking it. 
Several weeks later, Pearis stated that the slaves ‘who have been retaken, or 
come in, uniformly declare that they were misled by Captain Mackey and his Crew 
who told them he had the Governor’s Authority to carry them to Nassau [the colonial 
capital] and that all the Rebel Property Negroes would be made free.’ Petitioning the 
                                                 
1
 Affidavit of Richard Pearis, 16 May 1788, CO23/29/304–5; Pearis to William Coleman, Spencer’s 
Bight, 16 May 1788, CO23/29/303. Before the American Revolution, Pearis had been a substantial 
landowner, first in Virginia, then in South Carolina. During the War of Independence, after being 
arrested and imprisoned by the Charleston council of safety in 1775, he served in various Loyalist 
provincial corps, attaining the rank of lieutenant colonel by 1780. See Lydia Austin Parrish, ‘Records of 
some Southern Loyalists. Being a collection of manuscripts about some eighty families, most of whom 
immigrated to the Bahamas during and after the American Revolution’, Harvard University, Houghton 
MS. AM 1547 (photocopy typescript in BDA; cited hereafter as ‘Parrish, “Records”’), 419–20; Sandra 
Riley, Homeward Bound: A history of the Bahama Islands to 1850 with a definitive study of Abaco in 
the American Loyalist plantation period (Miami: Island Research, 1983), 253, n. 8. 
2
 Pearis to Coleman, Spencer’s Bight, 16 May 1788, CO23/29/303. 
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governor for assistance, other white residents of Spencer’s Bight were still more 
explicit, claiming that ‘many of their slaves… came in open day before your 
Memorialists faces, and put their baggage on board said Mackay’s boat’.3 According 
to Pearis, Mackay displayed a letter of authority signed by the governor, ‘but would 
neither Read it himself or allow it to be done by any Person present.’ Nonetheless, 
some accounts of the proceedings quoted this letter as advising Mackay that ‘if you 
should be in want of assistance you can get six or eight of the armed Negroes in the 
woods’, including one ‘poor wounded fellow’ who had been ‘shot in the very Act of 
presenting his musket at a white man’.4 
 Of course, it is scarcely surprising that those slaves ‘who have been retaken, or 
come in’, should prefer to ‘uniformly declare that they were misled by Captain 
Mackay and his Crew’, rather than admit their own responsibility for eloping. Reports 
of what happened all stress that many slaveholders had been left ‘even without their 
household-servants’. Many such people would have been waiting at the Pearis dinner 
table when they were presented with the novel and exciting spectacle of those ‘armed 
Negroes’ from the Shearwater inverting the usual racial hierarchy at their masters’ 
expense.5 
 The presence of the other rebels who had already taken to the woods suggests 
that pre-existing social tensions at Spencer’s Bight were also at work. Certainly, the 
slaves seem to have showed little hesitation in seizing the opportunity to escape when 
they were prevented from boarding Mackay’s vessel. Nor did they prove in any great 
hurry to return to their owners once he had left. A month later, the ‘Planters and other 
Inhabitants’ of Spencer’s Bight were contemplating the complete breakdown of their 
incipient plantocracy. Fearing ‘nothing less than an insurrection of their Slaves, and 
                                                 
3
 Pearis to Coleman, Spencer’s Bight, 16 May 1788, CO23/29/303–4; ‘Memorial of the Planters and 
other Inhabitants of the Island of Abaco, residing at Spencer’s Bight’, 6 May 1788, in William Wylly, A 
Short Account of the Bahama Islands, their Climate, Productions, &c. To which are added, Some 
Strictures upon their relative and political Situation, the Defects of their present Government &c. 
(London, 1789), 40. Contemporary spellings of Mackay’s name are inconsistent. 
4
 Pearis to Coleman, Spencer’s Bight, 16 May 1788, CO23/29/304; the extracts from Mackay’s letter 
of authority are quoted, with comments on the ‘poor wounded fellow’ and the caveat ‘whether genuine 
or not is uncertain’, in [William Wylly], ‘A short Account of the Bahama Islands, their Climate, 
Productions &c…’, Add. MSS 6058, f. 50, note e, and also in an annotated copy of the 6 May 
Spencer’s Bight Memorial at CO23/29/283–4. This was one of several notes omitted from the printed 
version of Wylly’s Short Account. The emphases are Wylly’s. 
5
 Pearis to Coleman, Spencer’s Bight, 16 May 1788, CO23/29/303–4 (emphasis in original); Wylly, 
Short Account, 22; ‘Memorial of the Planters and other Inhabitants of the Island of Abaco, residing at 
Spencer’s Bight’, 6 May 1788, in Wylly, Short Account, 40. 
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eventually to be obliged to relinquish their houses and plantations’, they called on the 
governor for ‘such speedy relief as their critical situation requires.’6 
 By 20 May, word had reached the colonial authorities at New Providence of 
‘the Slaves upon Abaco… having taken up arms’, and the governor consulted with the 
colonial Council as to how to deal with the situation. Concluding that ‘bringing the 
said Negroes to this Island for the Purpose of their being tried would be attended with 
great Expense and difficulty and would be perhaps impracticable’, the governor 
decided ‘upon going there in person,’ to set up a tribunal acting under ‘a special 
Commission’ from the Council.7 
However, the purpose of this ad hoc court was not to punish the Abaconian 
rebels, but rather, ‘to enquire into the claims of freedom set up by Negroes’. The 
governor’s subsequent report to the Secretary of State in London stated that ‘upon our 
arrival at Abaco all the outlying Negroes came in except five or Six who are supposed 
to have got off the Island. Those that were entitled to their freedom were declared so, 
and the others returned peacefully to their owners.’8 
At one level, this episode is merely an instance of how black people in the 
Bahamas directly contested their enslavement, in a way that seems to offer at least a 
modest parallel to the insurrectionary and maroon modes of resistance practised more 
often and on a much larger scale in other sites of Atlantic slavery. But the affair 
throws up other issues that are more intriguing and tantalising. Did Mackay really 
come to Spencer’s Bight that Sunday to incite ‘Acts of open rebellion’ among slaves, 
and, if necessary, to consort with armed outlaws? If so, did he merely ‘spread such 
Confusion among our Negroes’ in order to facilitate his seizure of the allegedly 
smuggled goods, or did he genuinely carry a mandate from the royal governor of the 
Bahamas for issuing to the slaves ‘a general invitation… to desert the service of their 
Owners, and appear to claim their freedom’? Why, indeed, did the governor 
subsequently adopt such a conciliatory approach towards people whom he might more 
readily have been expected to ruthlessly hunt down and punish?9 
                                                 
6
 ‘Memorial of the Planters and other Inhabitants of the Island of Abaco, residing at Spencer’s 
Bight’, 6 May 1788, in Wylly, Short Account, 40–41 (emphasis in original). 
7
 Wylly, Short Account, 22–3 (Wylly’s emphasis); Journals of the Council, 20 May 1788, 
CO23/28/26–7; Earl of Dunmore to Lord Sydney, Nassau, 18 July 1788, CO23/27/164–5. 
8
 Dunmore to Sydney, Nassau, 18 July 1788, CO23/27/165. 
9
 Wylly, Short Account, 22; Pearis to Coleman, Spencer’s Bight, 16 May 1788, CO23/29/303; Wylly 
to Evan Nepean, Rye, Sussex, 27 September 1789, CO23/29/273. 
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These events have not gone unnoticed by historians. However, the existing 
historiography consists of brief and sometimes confused accounts that generally tend 
to downplay the ambiguities and complexity of what happened at Spencer’s Bight.10 
Typically, scholars have emphasised that of thirty applicants to the court convened on 
Abaco to examine claims to freedom, twenty-nine are said to have been ‘ajudged to be 
Slaves’. In the absence of any official documentation of the proceedings of the 
tribunal held at Spencer’s Bight, this summary of its proceedings is derived solely 
from William Wylly’s 1789 pamphlet, A Short Account of the Bahama Islands, a text 
whose overt and unashamed partisanship renders its reliability at least open to 
question.11 On this basis, historians usually regard the affair primarily as evidence of 
the ‘duplicity’ of a governor who was thoroughly complicit in the suppression and re-
enslavement of blacks who dared to challenge the colonial slave regime.12 
Aside from the manner in which it downplays all the other indications of the 
governor’s having played a far more ambiguous role, this reading would certainly 
have bemused Wylly himself. Writing self-consciously as an advocate for the 
Bahamian slaveholding class, Wylly’s Short Account sought to show how a despotic 
governor, acting out of personal hostility, venality, and misplaced sympathy for black 
people, had established ‘an unconstitutional Tribunal’ administered by ‘the most 
improper persons’, whereby ‘the Planter has… been robbed of his property, by 
arbitrary decisions.’ Regarding the events at Spencer’s Bight, Wylly was actually 
pointing out that even after the governor ‘gave a general invitation to the Negroes to 
come in and claim their freedom’, almost all were supposedly found to be slaves ‘even 
by this Court, held under the Governor’s immediate inspection.’13 
                                                 
10
 See for instance Riley, Homeward Bound, 175–6; Michael Craton & Gail Saunders, Islanders in 
the Stream: A history of the Bahamian people, I: From aboriginal times to the end of slavery (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1992), 187; Sylvia R. Frey, Water from the Rock: Black resistance in a 
revolutionary age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 186; Michael Craton, ‘The 
Ambivalencies of Independency: The transition out of slavery in the Bahamas, c. 1800–1850’ in 
Roderick A. McDonald, ed., West Indies Accounts: Essays on the history of the British Caribbean and 
the Atlantic economy in honour of Richard Sheridan (Kingston: University of the West Indies Press, 
1996), 278–9; Whittington Bernard Johnson, Race Relations in the Bahamas, 1783–1834: The 
nonviolent transformation from a slave to a free society (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 
2000), 70. 
11
 On the problems of Wylly as a source see pp. 33–4 below. 
12
 Wylly, Short Account, 22; Riley, Homeward Bound, 176; this interpretation is perhaps most 
forcefully stated in Craton, ‘Ambivalencies of Independency’, but is apparent to varying degrees in all 
of the works cited in n. 10 above. 
13
 Wylly, Short Account, 22–3 (Wylly’s emphasis). 
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As these remarks might suggest, Spencer’s Bight has to be situated within the 
broader trajectories of Bahamian history. The eruption of ‘open rebellion’ that Sunday 
can be seen as the climax of an ongoing and sometimes violent conflict between 
slaveholders and their bondspeople that had dogged the settlements at Abaco from 
their inception half a decade earlier. By the end of the 1780s, it was becoming evident 
to all concerned that plantation slavery would not prove feasible on the island. 
The affair also emerged out of, and ultimately intensified, an increasingly 
bitter political contention among white Bahamians over the colonial state’s apparent 
support for black efforts to contest enslavement and obtain freedom. At one level, this 
study explores how these themes were played out in the Bahamas during the 1780s 
and 1790s. It traces the dynamic interactions of the initiatives and conflicting agendas 
of a diverse array of protagonists, including non-whites, slaveholders, and agents of 
the imperial government. In the process, I aim to provide a fuller and more 
satisfactory account of how and why the dramatic expansion and refinement of the 
Bahamian slave regime in those decades coincided with a remarkable and 
unprecedented contestation of the legitimacy of enslavement in the colony. 
Understanding what happened at Spencer’s Bight also requires an appreciation 
of the consequences of the American Revolution for the Bahamas. Without reference 
to the tortuous and winding road that white and black settlers had travelled from what 
was by then the United States to Abaco, the meaning and evident resonance of 
Mackay’s allusion to ‘Rebel Property Negroes’ necessarily remain obscure. Similarly, 
the governor’s role in the affair needs to be considered in light of his own 
revolutionary history. A decade earlier, as Virginia’s last royal governor, John 
Murray, fourth earl of Dunmore, had conceived of ‘armed Negroes’ as potential 
agents of British imperial power, declaring ‘Servants, Negroes, or others, 
(appertaining to Rebels,) free.’14 Then too, as at Spencer’s Bight, slaves fled from 
their owners in response to his actions, which in turn provoked outrage and 
indignation from slaveholders. 
Historians have often seen the sequence of revolutionary crises that engulfed 
the Atlantic world from the 1770s onwards as a relatively peripheral phenomenon for 
the Bahamas and even the British West Indies more generally, one whose ‘effects 
                                                 
14
 Proclamation by Lord Dunmore, 7 November 1775, CO5/1353/335. 
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were not always obvious or direct and were never fundamental.’15 In recent years, 
Bahamian historiography in particular has instead emphasised the importance of more 
gradual, evolutionary developments, driven largely by local factors. To be sure, the 
explosive intensity of the American, French, and Haitian Revolutions has no direct 
counterpart in the Bahamian experience. The ‘Age of Revolution’ was a ‘messy, 
ambiguous, and complicated story’,16 and so were its manifestations in the Bahamas; 
but they were tangible and pervasive all the same. It is my contention that, as well as 
Spencer’s Bight, a great deal else that occurred in the late eighteenth-century Bahamas 
can be rendered more intelligible when considered in terms of this influence. 
In turn, an exploration of Bahamian history can cast new light on the 
revolutionary upheavals that would profoundly affect both the discourses and realities 
of power, empire, race, and slavery for people on both sides of the Atlantic and 
beyond from the 1770s onwards. For instance, when considered in the context of his 
sustained and hugely acrimonious involvement in the contentious status of African 
Americans in the Bahamas, Dunmore’s appeal to slaves in Virginia begins to look like 
rather more than the act of cynical expediency that historians have usually believed it 
to be.17 More generally, this study seeks to illustrate how the Bahamian perspective, 
by at least partially sidestepping the spatial and temporal constraints imposed by better 
known historiographical traditions, can facilitate a better appreciation of the 
formidable scope, complexity and diversity of the Revolutionary Atlantic. 
                                                 
15
 Michael Craton, Testing the Chains: Resistance to slavery in the British West Indies (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1982), 161. 
16
 Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution: The unruly birth of democracy and the 
struggle to create America (New York: Viking Penguin, 2005), xviii. 
17
 See pp. 66–7 below. 
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I: Slavery and the Atlantic Revolutionary Crisis 
 
There had been sporadic condemnations of slavery in the Americas from at least the 
mid-seventeenth century.18 The enslaved themselves, of course, contested New World 
slavery from its inception whenever and however they could, and had not always done 
so without allies. Most obviously, the endemic threats of insurrection and marronage 
imposed tangible constraints on slaveholders’ pretensions to a position of absolute 
domination.19 
But prior to the 1760s, a daunting confluence of political and economic 
interests, ideology, and power largely succeeded in rendering the mass exploitation of 
enslaved black labour an apparently insuperable facet of the Atlantic world.20 Then, in 
the course of that ‘overwhelming and bewildering concatenation of events’ that is 
conventionally subsumed under the rubric of ‘the American Revolution,’21 this 
formidable aegis of material and discursive structures was subjected to intense stress 
and disruption. As its fault-lines were exposed, the prospect of challenges to slavery 
of a kind that had hitherto seemed, if not simply ‘unthinkable’,22 either literally or 
politically all-but suicidal, took on a novel air of plausibility. 
 One such challenge came from the emergence of abolitionism as an active 
political campaign. Critiques of Atlantic slavery had been quietly developing and 
                                                 
18
 See for instance Tyranipocrit, Discovered with his whiles, wherewith he vanquisheth (Rotterdam, 
1649); ed. Andrew Hopton (London: Aporia Press, 1990), 30–31; J. Philmore [pseud.], Two Dialogues 
on the Man-Trade (London, 1760). On the latter see David Brion Davis, ‘New Sidelights on Early 
Antislavery Radicalism,’ WMQ 3rd ser., 28:4 (October 1971), 592–4. 
19
 Eugene D. Genovese, From Rebellion to Revolution: Afro-American slave revolts in the making of 
the modern world (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979), 1–71; Michael Craton, ‘The 
Rope and the Cutlass: Slave resistance in plantation America’, in Empire, Enslavement and Freedom in 
the Caribbean (Kingston: Ian Randle, 1997), 185–95; Robin Blackburn, The Making of New World 
Slavery: From the baroque to the modern 1492–1800 (London: Verso, 1997), 256–8, 322, 344–50; 
Richard Price, ed., Maroon Societies: Rebel slave communities in the Americas (3rd edn., Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
20
 David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution 1770–1823 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1975), 39–49, 84–6; idem, Slavery and Human Progress (New York: OUP, 1984), 
72–82; Robin Blackburn, The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery 1776–1848 (London: Verso, 1988), 3–20, 
35. 
21
 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism 
(rev. edn., London: Verso, 1991), 80; Anderson uses this expression to describe the French Revolution. 
22
 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the production of history (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1995), 70–107. 
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gaining currency in Europe and America for much of the eighteenth century.23 Indeed, 
several historians have argued for the existence of a ‘diffuse if inert antislavery 
consensus prevailing among certain Anglo-American intellectuals’ by the late 1760s.24 
What these critiques generally lacked, however, was a means of translating antislavery 
ideas into effective practice in the present or near future. Christopher Brown’s 
observation that ‘an antislavery movement did not have to happen in Britain’ is 
equally applicable to the eighteenth-century Atlantic world as a whole. The American 
Revolution’s trajectory and outcome generated a fortuitous convergence of 
circumstances that enabled a substantial constituency in Britain and North America to 
consider abolitionism not only as a personal and national moral imperative, but also as 
a cause that was politically plausible, and even expedient.25 
 But beyond this, the American Revolution offered compelling evidence of how 
the existing order of things might be radically transformed within the compass of 
historical time by human agency. The sense for contemporaries of a ‘blasting open of 
the continuum of history’ is readily apparent in Tom Paine’s assertion that ‘we have it 
in our power to begin the world over again.’26 The very fact of the Revolution did 
much to broaden antislavery’s horizons of possibility, and not merely for white 
Americans and Britons. Enslaved African Americans noted with interest the 
vehemence with which their masters ‘resolved to die freemen rather than to live 
Slaves’; as early as 1766, in the wake of the Stamp Act crisis, reports in Charles 
                                                 
23
 David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture (New York: OUP, 1966), 291–
445; Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British abolitionism (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 34–101; Laurent Dubois, A Colony of Citizens: Revolution 
and slave emancipation in the French Caribbean, 1787–1804 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2004), 59–62. 
24
 Brown, Moral Capital, 114; cf. the similar but somewhat broader formulation in Davis, Age of 
Revolution, 272. 
25
 Brown, Moral Capital, 211 (my emphasis). 
26
 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 193; Anderson paraphrases a formulation from Walter 
Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, tr. Harry Zohn (London: Fontana, 1973), 264, 263; 
[Thomas Paine], Common Sense (2nd edn., Philadelphia, 1776), 87. For a discussion of how American 
Revolutionary political discourse defined freedom in terms of ‘individuals’ ability to act in secular time 
and shape their circumstances’, see François Furstenberg, ‘Beyond Freedom and Slavery: Autonomy, 
virtue, and resistance in early American political discourse’, Journal of American History, 89:4 (March 
2003), 1295–1330 (quotation at 1296). 
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Town, South Carolina, of black people echoing white demands for “Liberty” 
prompted a week of martial law in the city.27 
 Of course, as the Abbé Raynal warned the ‘nations of Europe’ in the 1776 
edition of the hugely influential Histoire des deux Indes, ‘your slaves stand in no need 
either of your generosity or your counsels’ in order to appreciate the lived reality of 
‘the sacrilegious yoke of their oppression.’28 The mounting alarm with which 
mainland colonial slaveholders contemplated ‘the menace of a vast slave population 
struggling to arm itself’ in the mid-1770s reflected in part their very real conviction 
that ‘the love of liberty is so natural to us all’.29 
 But for the enslaved, any ‘attempt to gain our freedom or natural right’ 
directly, and especially by force, was hazardous in the extreme; very often, it was ‘kill 
or be killed’, as the militant black abolitionist David Walker put it, and it was 
therefore critical to wait ‘until you see your way clear’.30 John Dunn observes that 
‘revolutions are definitionally failures of political control by an existing ruling elite’: 
they happen ‘only when… the “upper-classes” cannot carry on in the old way’.31 It 
was primarily in this sense that the American Revolution facilitated slave resistance, 
by dividing masters against themselves, disrupting the elaborate mechanisms of 
                                                 
27
 ‘Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms’, 6 July 1775, in Julian P. Boyd et 
al., eds., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 34 vols. to date (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1950–) (cited hereafter as Jefferson Papers), 1:217; Peter H. Wood, ‘“Liberty is Sweet”: African-
American freedom struggles in the years before white independence’, in Alfred F. Young, ed., Beyond 
the American Revolution: Explorations in the history of American radicalism (DeKalb: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 1993), 159. 
28
 Guillaume T.F. Raynal, A Philosophical and Political History of the Settlements and Trade of the 
Europeans in the East and West Indies, tr. J. Justamond, 4 vols. (London, 1776 edn.), 3:172. This and 
the subsequent passages from Raynal quoted below do not appear in the original version, Histoire 
Philosophique et Politique des établissemens et du commerce des Europeéns dans les deux Indes, 6 
vols. (Amsterdam, 1770), or the 1774 Amsterdam edition. On the significance of Raynal’s Histoire in 
antislavery discourse, see Davis, Problem of Slavery in Western Culture, 13–21, 417–21; Dubois, 
Colony of Citizens, 64–6. 
29
 Jeffrey Robert Young, Domesticating Slavery: The master class in Georgia and South Carolina, 
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control and repression, and opening up possibilities for novel alliances transcending 
the normally unyielding lines of race and class. 
 By 1776, Raynal believed that ‘the Negroes only want a chief, sufficiently 
courageous, to lead them to vengeance and slaughter’, and from 1775 onwards, 
thousands of enslaved black people mobilised themselves in the British cause, 
encouraged by officials and soldiers like Lord Dunmore. As émigrés from the 
victorious United States in the 1780s, these African Americans would journey around 
the Atlantic, to Florida, Nova Scotia, London, Sierra Leone, the Caribbean, and the 
Bahamas. The subsequent histories of all these places would be complicated by their 
continuing efforts to ensure that this ‘black Loyalist’ diaspora would be one of 
freedom rather than slavery, and the varying enthusiasm with which the rulers of the 
British empire supported their aspirations.32 
 Although American historians have recognised that their ‘nation was the child, 
not the father, of our revolution’, this has rarely deterred them from approaching that 
revolution principally in terms of what Edmund Morgan deemed ‘the central question: 
How did the United States come into being as a nation dedicated to principles of 
liberty and equality?’33 Those principles were, of course, largely framed so as to 
exclude that ‘motley rabble of saucy boys, negroes and molattoes, Irish teagues and 
out landish jack tarrs’ who had contributed so much to the revolution. But in the 
context of a profoundly interconnected Atlantic world, knitted together by the 
circuitous transoceanic transmission of power, people, and commodities, revolution 
was not readily restricted to such arbitrary national bounds. The revolutionary crisis 
quickly overflowed both the newly-restricted meaning of the word ‘America’, and the 
chronological limits of the Thermidorian ‘repudiation of everything that Americans 
had fought for’ at Philadelphia in 1787.34 
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 French and Spanish involvement in the Revolutionary War meant that the 
conflict’s latter phases were played out as much in the Caribbean, another heartland of 
Atlantic slavery, as in North America. For the French monarchy, the cost of this rare 
victory over its longstanding British antagonist was to prove disastrous, and ultimately 
fatal. Meanwhile, freer trade with an independent United States helped fuel a 
spectacular boom in the greatest Caribbean sugar colony, French Saint-Domingue, 
encouraging both the autonomist leanings of planters frustrated with their own 
mercantilist shackles, and the importation of ever greater numbers of enslaved 
Africans.35 
 In the 1790s, developments in Europe and the Americas would spectacularly 
feed back upon one another to result in ‘the outbreak of revolution in the heart of 
Afro-America’. Raynal’s call for a ‘great man… whom nature, perhaps, owes to the 
honour of the human species’, a ‘new Spartacus, who will not find a Crassus’, was to 
find a seemingly uncanny fulfilment in the emergence of Toussaint Louverture, who, 
along with veterans of the American Revolution such as André Rigaud, orchestrated 
the destruction of slavery in perhaps its most brutal, and certainly most prosperous 
setting.36 
 Around the world, contemporaries were struck by what seemed the 
unprecedented scope and magnitude of a crisis that was soon referred to as ‘an age of 
Revolutions, in which every thing may be looked for.’37 To describe the bewildering 
complexity of ‘the dynamics of the age, where events did not unfold in a linear 
                                                 
35
 Andrew Jackson O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British 
Caribbean (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), esp. 137–237; C. A. Bayly, The 
Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914: Global connections and comparisons (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2004), 95–6; David Geggus, ‘The Effects of the American Revolution on France and its Empire’, in 
Jack P. Greene & J. R. Pole, eds., The Blackwell Encyclopedia of the American Revolution (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Blackwell, 1991), 525–6; David Patrick Geggus, Slavery, War, and Revolution: The British 
occupation of Saint Domingue 1793–1798 (Oxford: OUP, 1982), 11, 15–16; Laurent Dubois, Avengers 
of the New World: The story of the Haitian Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 
33; Blackburn, Making, 449–51. 
36
 Julius Sherrard Scott, III, ‘The Common Wind: Currents of Afro-American communication in the 
era of the Haitian Revolution’, (PhD dissertation, Duke University, 1986), 122; Raynal, History (1776 
edn.), 3:173. For discussions of the evidence for the involvement of Rigaud and others in the American 
Revolutionary War see Dubois, Avengers, 65–7; Geggus, Slavery, War, and Revolution, 22. On the 
Haitian Revolution generally see also C. L. R. James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and 
the San Domingo Revolution (1938; London: Penguin, 2001 edn.); Carolyn E. Fick, The Making of 
Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution from below (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1990); 
Thomas O. Ott, The Haitian Revolution, 1789–1804 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1973). 
37
 Thomas Paine, Rights of Man: Being an answer to Mr. Burke’s attack on the French Revolution 
(London, 1791), 162; cf. Bayly, Birth of the Modern World, 86–8, and also the remarks of Bahamian 
Loyalist John Wells in 1796, quoted at p. 211 below. 
 18
process of gradually or suddenly escalating power but in chaotic patterns that took 
differing forms in different places’, observers resorted to idioms of natural and 
elemental force: they spoke of the ‘tempête révolutionnaire’ and the ‘Levelling 
Influenza’. Slaveholders especially were quick to apprehend the role in the 
revolutionary crisis of what the Jamaican legislature termed ‘the ruder Multitudes on 
This Side of the Western Ocean’, seen later by its Bahamian counterpart as ‘an odious 
combination of the darkness, ferocity, vices, and superstitions of all colours and all 
nations.’38 
 Historians who have sought to depict this ‘Age of Revolution’ as ‘a single 
revolutionary movement’ have seldom had much to say about slavery in general, or 
about Haiti in particular. Although purporting to be about ‘the transformation of the 
world’, Eric Hobsbawm’s The Age of Revolution was at least open about the degree to 
which ‘its perspective is primarily European’.39 But even scholars writing about the 
‘Revolutionary era’ of what they termed the ‘Atlantic Civilization’ were largely silent 
on the subject. On learning that in 1794 ‘France… became the first state in the world 
to forbid slavery’, and that ‘this measure rallied the Negroes to the French side’, 
readers of Jacques Godechot’s France and the Atlantic Revolution might well be 
slightly bemused at the revelation that the French had hitherto possessed African 
slaves, and indeed a colonial empire in the Caribbean.40 
 Inevitably, these were primarily synthetic works, and such ‘formulas of 
erasure’ were largely a fair reflection of the wider historical literature of the time. This 
historiography was the product of a world shaped and dominated by European power, 
whose pervasive, multiple and subtle influences often transcended ‘historians’ claimed 
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political preferences’.41 At a time when it could be asserted without qualification that 
‘the colonization of North America and the republican government of the United 
States constitute perhaps the greatest, certainly the boldest, enterprises of European 
mankind’, it was easy to assume that both ‘the revolution that the world forgot’ and 
‘the brutal modernity of the plantation economy’ were ‘mere disturbances on the 
margins of history: an anomaly, a more or less bothersome irregularity in the march of 
progress and the unfolding of individual liberties’.42 
Contemporaries often found it easier to appreciate that, as ‘an Englishman and 
a Man of Humanity’ put it in 1789, slavery and empire constituted ‘a link… of the 
commercial chain, that cannot now be broken, without disjointing the whole system 
which has been forming for this century past, to aggrandize this country beyond any 
other in Europe’. Academic understanding of the importance of slavery, empire, and 
the Atlantic to what Hobsbawm called ‘the evident progress of eighteenth-century 
capitalism and civilization’ in the 1960s has, since then, grown considerably.43 
 In recent years, studies of the British and other empires have increasingly 
proceeded from ‘the premise that historians and critics should address metropole and 
colonies as interrelated analytic fields’. In widely varying ways, they have sought to 
‘take sufficient account of the impact of developments “out there” on… those “in 
here,”’ not the least important of which was ‘the unique, predatory, and ubiquitous 
presence of slavery in British societies in this period’.44 
 A parallel historiographical current has been the convergence of ‘a new form 
of imperial history’ with other developments in the study of slavery, the black 
diaspora, and colonial American societies, in an approach treating the Atlantic as a 
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‘viable unit of analysis within which we can understand the destruction and 
emergence of empires, the movement of people, the evolution of new cultural forms, 
and the circulation of ideas’.45 This ‘Atlantic world’ was constituted by the 
‘kaleidoscopic movements of people, goods, and ideas’ via ‘interwoven, complex, and 
multitudinous’ political, economic, and cultural networks, that criss-crossed the ocean 
and could also ‘protrude deep into the continents of the circum-Atlantic rim’.46 
 A growing number of works exploring the Haitian Revolution’s wider Atlantic 
impact and significance – in Europe as well as America – have appeared since the 
1990s,47 and many writers have traced the linkages between the development of the 
British Atlantic and Britain’s more longstanding revolutionary history.48 Indeed, these 
perspectives would seem to offer a basis for a more satisfactory account of the Age of 
Revolution as a whole, conveying both the scope of its chaotically dynamic and 
thoroughly transnational and transcultural trajectories, and the role of empire, slavery, 
and enslaved people at the heart of the process. 
 However, the form in which Atlantic history has ‘emerged as a distinct 
subfield, or even subdiscipline, within the historical profession’ poses considerable 
obstacles to such an undertaking. It would, inevitably, be a ‘circum-Atlantic history’, 
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an approach that ‘remains the most challenging enterprise for Atlantic historians.’49 
There is a widespread feeling that the Atlantic world is a ‘system of networks’ that are 
‘so complex, so numerous, that they can only be illustrated, not catalogued, 
enumerated, or fully summarized’, or at least that ‘the time is not ripe for a 
comprehensive treatment of Atlantic history in its fullest sense’.50 
 The belief that future developments in Atlantic history ‘will be archival, not 
synthetic’ of course reflects a more general historiographical trend away from the kind 
of integrative, overarching studies attempted by Hobsbawm, Palmer and Godechot.51 
For scholars influenced by postcolonialism, there is, perhaps, a particular ambivalence 
about the ‘Age of Revolution’, with its intimate connections to ‘the political and 
epistemological models of Enlightenment and modernist Europe’ that are widely seen 
to have facilitated the hegemony of ‘a Eurocentric particularism parading as 
universalism’.52 The revolutionary crisis also coincided with the emergence of a black 
Atlantic perspective emphasising ‘conceptions of modernity… founded on the 
catastrophic rupture of the middle passage rather than the dream of revolutionary 
transformation’, and nowadays even the most radical thinkers are prone to accept that 
‘even if we wished to bring these narratives together, it would be impossible.’53 
Some historians have indeed questioned the overall significance of revolution 
for antislavery and slave resistance, partly in reaction to Eugene Genovese’s From 
Rebellion to Revolution. Genovese’s teleological take on Marxism certainly looked 
rather like an attempt ‘to universalize Eurocentric historical experience to the rest of 
the world’, not least in terms of its preoccupation with securing ‘a place in the modern 
system of nation-states’ as the defining characteristic of the Haitian Revolution’s 
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modernity.54 However, attempts at establishing an alternative trajectory of ‘phases of 
resistance and acculturation’ driven by primarily internal dynamics have often seemed 
equally schematic and over-generalised.55 Arguments that ‘abstract European ideas 
stood little chance of gaining general currency among Caribbean slaves’ rely on a 
rather narrow conception of revolutionary influence, defined in terms of the normative 
status of such discourses. As Michel-Rolph Trouillot has argued, the ‘the key tenets of 
the political philosophy that became explicit in Saint-Domingue/Haiti’ were 
necessarily expounded in the first instance by ‘victorious practice’ precisely because 
their radicalism transcended that of the European Enlightenment.56 In any case, it 
seems increasingly clear that slaves’ ‘wonderfull Art of communicating Intelligence 
among themselves’, that could ‘run severall hundreds of Miles in a Week or Fortnight’ 
over land and sea, played a key role in the proliferation of revolutionary influences.57 
It will probably come as little surprise that I generally find more convincing 
the work of those scholars who have sought to present the new challenges to slavery 
that developed from the 1770s in terms of the broader revolutionary crisis, doing so 
very much in Atlantic terms well before this became ‘all the rage’.58 Nonetheless, 
such treatments were principally concerned with, and derive much of their narrative 
force and momentum from, the demonstration of how and why it became possible, as 
it apparently had not been before, for such challenges to succeed.59 But, as sceptics 
have often observed, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that revolution could also 
present opportunities for slaveholders to consolidate or extend their sway. Whatever 
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terminal date one prefers for the Age of Revolution, there is no doubt that Atlantic 
slavery emerged from it very much alive. If slaveholding henceforth had to be 
defended and justified in a more active way than previously, revolution had also 
furnished new instruments for undertaking those tasks.60 
As David Brion Davis observes, ‘if the American Revolution could not solve 
the problem of slavery, it at least led to a perception of the problem.’ Given that ‘the 
legal and moral validity of slavery’ had been ‘a troublesome question in European 
thought from the time of Aristotle’, it might be more accurate to say that the Atlantic 
revolutionary crisis made the problem impossible to ignore.61 But further, it led people 
to think that a solution was possible, even necessary, and to act accordingly. 
The nature of this solution, however, remained very much in the balance as the 
final ‘battle’ of the American Revolution was being fought in Nassau.62 Was it to take 
the form of a defiant insistence that ‘slavery is right, and ought to be extended’; or of 
a metropolitan act of ‘econocide’; or would the new Spartacus ‘lift up the sacred 
standard of liberty’ with ‘fire and sword’ as he ‘avenged America’? These questions 
could only be resolved in the years to come, in the playing out of a series of distinct 
but intersecting struggles, waged in places such as the United States, Britain, Saint-
Domingue, and in a ‘hitherto obscure Colony’ called the Bahama Islands.63 
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II: Bahamian Histories 
 
The Bahamas archipelago, situated between the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic 
Ocean, is a 200 mile wide chain of islands stretching down southeastward on a course 
roughly parallel to the northern coast of Cuba for a length of nearly 600 miles, from 
the straits of Florida to within a hundred miles of Hispaniola, and roughly bisected by 
the Tropic of Cancer. Although there are as many as 2,700 islands and cays within a 
sea area of 100,000 square miles, the total land area is less than 6,000 square miles, 86 
percent of which is contained within the nine largest islands.64 (see map at p. 309). 
 Humans first reached the Bahamas no later than 600CE, and the roots of 
modern Bahamian society stretch back to the arrival of settlers of English and African 
descent in the mid-seventeenth century.65 For most of its existence, that society has 
been characterised by underdevelopment, marginality, and a chronic poverty 
punctuated by sporadic bursts of fortuitous and short-lived prosperity. 
Until relatively recently, the development of historical writing about the 
Bahamas might be said to have largely mirrored this pattern.66 A few episodes were 
deemed noteworthy, such as Christopher Columbus’s first landfall in the New World, 
and the islands’ central role in the heyday of Atlantic piracy. But even these fleeting 
moments of interest were usually deemed the stuff of dramatic stories and colourful 
anecdotes, rather than the material of serious study. From the perspective of a history 
concerned principally with the rise and fall of nations and empires and the deeds and 
thoughts of great men, the Bahamas generally seemed to have little to offer. For 
nineteenth-century writers, the three centuries following the arrival of Columbus were 
a period in which ‘these islands had continued almost in a desert state’, a casual 
assessment that served as both a statement and explanation of Bahamian 
insignificance.67 
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Bahamian historiography remained a sparse and patchy field well into the 
second half of the twentieth century. In the face of a blatantly Anglocentric colonial 
education system and the absence of higher academic institutions, the most substantial 
contributions generally came from outsiders. Their interest in the Bahamas was 
usually derived from the pursuit of relatively obscure facets of other, better 
established histories.68 
It probably did not help matters that the Bahamas were so long the domain of 
an imperial history within which their significance more or less paralleled their status 
within the British empire: by the mid-nineteenth century, a marginal part of a marginal 
region, at most a place of comfortable quasi-exile where inconvenient but important 
personages might be safely ignored.69 
The end of the colonial relationship with Britain and achievement of national 
independence helped to catalyse what Prime Minister Lynden Pindling described in 
1975 as Bahamians’ ‘deeply felt need… to gain some knowledge of their ancient and 
historic roots’.70 To some degree, perhaps, the absence of the kind of protracted 
struggle for independence that might have provided a political basis for a distinct 
Bahamian national identity gave greater urgency to efforts to identify a valid source of 
nationalism in cultural and historical fields. At any rate, the 1970s saw the start of a 
new wave of historical writing on the Bahamas. This work, very much informed by 
the dramatic shifts in scholarly approaches to the study of slavery and imperialism in 
the New World, and the emergence of the new social history, sought to reorient 
Bahamian history towards the experience of the non-white and enslaved people who 
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constituted the great majority of Bahamians, both in the present, and for most of the 
colonial period.71 
Surely the most substantial and impressive product of this new Bahamian 
historiography has been Michael Craton and Gail Saunders’ two volume Islanders in 
the Stream. Subtitled ‘a history of the Bahamian people’, Islanders sought to offer 
Bahamians ‘an authentic social history, one that will search, feel, and declare the true 
bedrock, roots, and groundswell of their special identity, and thus help to protect it for 
the future.’ Craton and Saunders identify the unique archipelagic geography of the 
Bahamas, specifically ‘the ubiquity of the sea and its hugely greater determining 
influence when compared with the land and its meager resources’, as the primary 
influence on the islands’ history. They endeavour to trace the ways in which 
Bahamians have creatively responded to the ‘common environmental and ecological 
factors that encouraged migrants… to forge distinctively Bahamian creole variants of 
their original cultures.’72 
 The result is a self-conscious emphasis, even in the face of such ostensibly 
radical breaks as the genocidal depopulation of the ‘indigenous’ Lucayans, upon what 
are deemed the essential continuities of Bahamian history. That history is presented 
largely as a process of ‘demographic and cultural evolution’, principally driven by 
internal dynamics. Craton and Saunders are certainly aware of the wider regional and 
imperial backdrops against which their story unfolds, but these perspectives serve for 
the most part only to provide a general context and a comparative frame for the 
exposition of Bahamian distinctiveness.73 
 Most other recent scholarship has followed a similar approach. Howard 
Johnson has made effective use of concepts from Caribbean historiography, most 
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notably Sidney Mintz’s formulation of the transition to ‘proto-peasantry’ among 
Jamaican slaves in the nineteenth century. But if anything, Johnson stresses continuity 
and downplays external influences even more than Craton and Saunders.74 In his 
work, even the significance of formal slavery’s abolition in the 1830s is circumscribed 
by an argument for the extent to which ‘the evolution of new arrangements for slave 
labour… prefigured post-emancipation labour systems.’75 
 Especially in the last decade or so, plantation excavations have yielded fresh 
insights into Bahamian slavery. Drawing on sociological and anthropological 
perspectives, archaeologists such as Laurie A. Wilkie and Paul Farnsworth have 
sought to explore how enslaved people used material culture to construct their 
identities, and in particular to maintain and reformulate African cultural legacies.76 
But thus far, this work has refined and complemented the historical perspective, rather 
than drastically revising it. Indeed, its focus upon detailed investigations of specific 
slaveholdings has, if anything, served to reinforce the turn towards a locally-oriented 
social history. 
 The fruits of this turn have been considerable. It has produced a far richer 
understanding of the experience of enslavement in the Bahamas, and in the process 
has yielded a fuller appreciation of the extent of Bahamian distinctiveness. But a 
tendency towards ‘de-eventalization’ was an implicit corollary of the turn towards a 
kind of social history that aimed at ‘transcending the individual and the particular 
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event’ by an emphasis on environment, continuity and the long durée.77 This work has 
largely concentrated on slavery in the nineteenth century, for which there is far more 
substantial evidence than earlier periods, especially the sort of quantitative data 
required for the cliometric techniques used by Craton and Saunders.78 
 The problem is that a great deal of what is so distinctive about nineteenth-
century Bahamian society – a black majority living mainly on the Out Islands within a 
‘decayed plantation system’, who exercised substantial control over their own lives 
and labour in the context of formal slavery and the dominance of an aggressively 
racist ‘agrocommercial bourgeoisie’79 – is scarcely in evidence, if at all, prior to the 
1780s. The period between 1783 and roughly 1800 saw profound demographic, 
economic, social, political and cultural changes that touched upon virtually all aspects 
of Bahamian life to a greater or lesser extent. Even the supposedly constant influence 
of geography did not emerge unaltered; before 1783, only five islands in the 
archipelago had any substantial human population. By the nineteenth century, 
settlement had been extended hundreds of miles to the southeast, encompassing at 
least eight additional islands.80 
 Older Bahamian historiography had a straightforward explanation for these 
developments. They were the work of the Loyalist émigrés who came to the islands in 
the 1780s in the wake of the American Revolution. Up to the mid-twentieth century, 
these people were routinely portrayed as ‘sturdy pioneers and political organizers’, 
who ‘were culturally and socially superior to the native-born Bahamians’. With their 
‘driving ambitions to re-make their fortunes and to assume positions of leadership in 
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the government’, the ‘invigorating arrival of the Loyalists’ was held to have 
inaugurated ‘the modern era of the history of the Bahamas’.81 
 Such depictions ‘of a rather splendid era controlled by a well-born and gentle-
blooded people’ bore a notable resemblance to the Loyalists’ own view of things; they 
also provided a convenient foundation myth for their descendants in the white 
oligarchy that dominated Bahamian life until the mid-twentieth century.82 
 Since the power of the ‘Bay Street Boys’ was undermined by the ‘quiet 
revolution’ of the 1960s, Bahamian historians have increasingly distanced themselves 
from the ‘self-propagated myth that the White Loyalists totally transformed the 
Bahamas’.83 In part, they have done this by arguing that ‘the Loyalists were as much 
transformed by the Bahamas as vice versa.’84 Of course, if the émigrés changed a 
great deal in adapting to the Bahamas – as they undoubtedly did – this leaves room for 
the Bahamas themselves to have altered considerably as well. Essentially, this well-
worn formulation is a way of avoiding the issue of discontinuity. Although sometimes 
conceding that what was ‘in many respects a vital qualitative as well as quantitative 
change’ occurred in the 1780s and 1790s, the new Bahamian historiography has given 
much more attention to the nineteenth century, when the results of this change were a 
point of departure rather than a focus of investigation in their own right. 
                                                 
81
 Wilbur H. Siebert, ‘The Dispersion of the American Tories’, Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 
1:2 (September 1914), 197; A. Deans Peggs, A Short History of the Bahamas (Nassau: Deans Peggs 
Research Fund, 1959), 18; Thelma Peters, ‘The American Loyalists and the Plantation Period in the 
Bahama Islands (PhD dissertation, University of Florida, 1960), 51; Wallace Brown, The Good 
Americans: The Loyalists in the American Revolution (New York: William Morrow, 1969), 220. See 
also Thelma Peters, ‘The Loyalist Migration from East Florida to the Bahamas Islands’, FHQ, 40:2 
(October 1961), 123–41; idem, ‘The American Loyalists in the Bahamas Islands: Who They Were’, 
FHQ, 40:3 (January 1962), 226–40. 
82
 H. Maclachlan Bell, Bahamas: Isles of June (London, c.1934), 50. In a scathing and brilliant 
dissection of the Bay Street regime, Gordon Lewis observed in 1968 that the Bahamas ‘have been 
influenced, overwhelmingly, by the traditional colonial English way of life brought over by the Loyalist 
refugees fleeing the American Revolution, with its sense of property amid the psychology of Southern 
slavery’. The Growth of the Modern West Indies (1968; new edn., Kingston: Ian Randle, 2004), 324. 
83
 Michael Craton, ‘Loyalists Mainly to Themselves: The “Black Loyalist” diaspora to the Bahamas, 
1783–c.1820’, in Verene A. Shepherd, ed., Working Slavery, Pricing Freedom: Perspectives from the 
Caribbean, Africa and the African diaspora (Kingston: Ian Randle, 2002), 44. On the Bahamian 
transition to majority rule and independence during the 1960s and 1970s, see Doris L. Johnson, The 
Quiet Revolution in the Bahamas (Nassau: Family Islands Press, 1972); Colin A. Hughes, Race and 
Politics in the Bahamas (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 95–194;  Craton & Saunders, Islanders, 
II, From the ending of slavery to the twenty-first century (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), 
316–62. 
84
 Craton & Saunders, Islanders, 1:xx; cf. Michael Craton, ‘Hopetown and Hard Bargain: the 
Loyalist transformation in the Bahamas’, in Ralph Bennett, ed., Settlements in the Americas: Cross-
cultural perspectives (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1993), 252; Craton, History of the 
Bahamas, 162; Peters, ‘American Loyalists and the Plantation Period’, 52. 
 30
 Craton and Saunders freely acknowledge that ‘in principle, we have rejected 
the history of successive governors and other prominent individuals, partisan 
squabbles, wars, and laws, in favor of general social themes.’85 So too have most of 
their colleagues. This has meant that in recent years, new research on the 
consequences of the late eighteenth-century migrations has been largely the preserve 
of writers who still present the Loyalists on their own terms, as ‘brave and industrious 
planters’ or ‘the eighteenth-century version of the seventeenth-century Plymouth 
Pilgrims’.86 This study aims to provide a fuller account of how and why the Bahamas 
changed in the last decades of the eighteenth century. It seeks to rescue those changes 
from the old narrative of Loyalist agency, without downplaying or marginalising their 
very real significance for Bahamian history. 
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III: Methods, Sources, and Chapter Outline 
 
The Loyalists certainly did seek to reshape Bahamian society in a certain way, and 
from their arrival in the islands, they tried very hard to accomplish this. In 
approaching the Loyalists’ agenda for the Bahamas, I have found it very useful to 
think in terms of the distinction between ‘societies with slaves’ and ‘slave societies’ 
that Ira Berlin and others have applied to the study of Atlantic slavery. In this formula, 
slave societies, are those where ‘slavery stood at the center of economic production,… 
the master-slave relationship provided the model for all social relations’, and 
slaveholders constituted the ruling class. By contrast, in societies with slaves, slavery 
existed alongside other modes of labour and subordination, and ‘slaves were marginal 
to the central productive processes’. The development of societies with slaves into 
slave societies was generally driven by the use of slave labour to produce highly-
profitable, exportable commodities. Slaveholders thereby came to dominate the 
economy and establish their social and political hegemony, as had occurred in the 
American South and much of the Caribbean from the mid-seventeenth century 
onwards.87 
 At the start of the 1780s, the Bahamas was a society with slaves; the Loyalists, 
who predominantly originated in Georgia and South Carolina, sought to build a 
plantation slave society in the islands, and to establish themselves as a plantocratic 
ruling class. But, as Berlin notes, while ‘some societies with slaves passed rapidly into 
slave societies… others moved slowly and imperfectly through the transformation’, 
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while ‘yet other societies with slaves never completed the transition’.88 In some 
respects, the Loyalists did not manage to fulfill their agenda for the Bahamas at all, 
and in others their success was temporary at best. They failed because there were 
multiple actors and influences at work, operating in directions that were sometimes 
tangential to, and sometimes in direct opposition to the Loyalists’ goals. They 
interacted in complex and contingent ways, to produce an outcome that cannot be 
wholly ascribed to any single set of protagonists or factors. 
 This process was manifestly not a closed dynamic, internal to the Bahamas. 
The catalyst for it, of course, was the massive and relatively sudden influx of African 
Americans and Loyalists from 1783. But throughout the period, a succession of 
further new arrivals repeatedly shifted the balance of forces, introduced new players, 
and altered the terms of contestation. Lord Dunmore’s appointment as governor of the 
Bahamas in 1787 would throw the Loyalists on to the defensive; from the 1790s, a 
second group of black émigrés entered the scene and threatened to change the rules of 
the game altogether. 
 What these external irruptions had in common was their revolutionary origin: 
Loyalists, African Americans and Dunmore were displaced by American 
independence, while ‘French Negroes’ appeared in the Bahamas as a result of the 
Haitian and French Revolutions. The consequences of revolution were mainly 
transmitted to the Bahamas via Atlantic imperial networks: the crisis of the British 
empire in North America propelled the émigrés of the 1780s to the islands. In the 
following decade, the circum-Caribbean once again became the cockpit of a war that 
was both imperial and revolutionary, and so made the Haitian Revolution an 
immediate problem – or opportunity – for Bahamians. 
 Nonetheless, the influence of revolution was far from straightforward. Its 
implications could be very different, even contradictory. The American Revolution, 
for example, on the one hand facilitated Loyalist efforts to establish plantation slavery 
in the Bahamas. On the other, it introduced thousands of African Americans who had 
spent years trying to get out of the Southern slave regime, and whose status, in the 
wake of British efforts to disrupt Southern slavery, remained decidedly ambiguous. 
Telling this story is largely a matter of taking relatively familiar elements and 
recontextualising them to cast them in a different light. At one level, it involves 
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juxtaposing events in the Bahamas with the histories of slavery and the American and 
Haitian Revolutions. In the Bahamas, it necessitates tracing out a pattern of complex 
connections and intersections between economic and political developments and the 
efforts of both free and unfree black people to control their own lives within the 
context of slavery. That the full extent of these connections has rarely been 
appreciated owes something to an approach to social history that largely failed to 
challenge the assumption that politics, and even the economy, were the domain of the 
white elite. Ironically, establishing the lives of non-white people as a valid field of 
historical enquiry in its own right has perpetuated the obfuscation of their role in 
shaping Bahamian society as a whole.89 
Addressing this issue has not been made any easier by the prevalence of source 
material produced by elite, slaveholding Loyalists; their voluminous newspapers, 
memorials, pamphlets and correspondence are an invaluable resource, but one that 
inevitably prioritises what its authors did and thought. 
The most problematic Loyalist sources, however, are not those that merely 
reflect their producers’ perspectives, but those proffering ready made and seductively 
intelligible accounts of what was happening in the Bahamas. This is especially the 
case with William Wylly’s 1789 Short Account of the Bahama Islands. Wylly was a 
veteran of the Georgia King’s Rangers, who initially went to New Brunswick at the 
end of the Revolutionary War, before becoming a cotton planter in the Bahamas in the 
mid-1780s. He was also an English-trained lawyer and King’s Counsel, and from 
1787 was briefly Bahamian Solicitor General, before quarrelling with the Chief 
Justice and Governor Dunmore. In virtually everything Wylly wrote about the 
Bahamas in this period, he was arguing the case of Loyalist slaveholders against their 
opponents, most often Dunmore and his supporters. The Short Account was explicitly 
written as part of an unsuccessful effort to persuade London to recall the governor.90 
It is also the only printed account of the conflict between Dunmore and the 
Loyalists, and its status among Bahamian historians has been analogous to its author’s 
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reputation as ‘the most popular Man in the Government.’91 Lydia Austin Parrish chose 
to ‘quote freely from this book as I know of no other that is more reliable’. A more 
recent study described Wylly, preposterously, as ‘conscientious, credible and non-
partisan’. Other writers have acknowledged the ‘obvious animus in Wylly’s account’, 
but in practice place a similarly uncritical reliance on it.92 
By all accounts Wylly was a highly-accomplished lawyer, and he was 
generally careful to avoid specific, verifiable untruths. Where statements of concrete 
fact can be extracted from his writing and checked against other sources, they usually 
turn out to be correct. But Wylly also used all the tricks of his trade to spin the facts to 
the best possible effect. At times, he could bend the truth a long way, especially when 
writing, as in the Short Account, for an audience without firsthand knowledge of the 
Bahamas. 
To give one example, Wylly claimed that by 1789, the political conflicts in the 
colony were ‘between the Governor, Council and Assembly (who form a most 
oppressive and contemptible oligarchy) on the one side, and every man who dares 
think for himself, on the other’. This formula manages to directly suggest – but not 
quite explicitly state – that Bahamians were overwhelmingly united against Dunmore. 
Islanders in the Stream then claims, without this equivocation, that Dunmore’s 
conduct had the effect of ‘uniting all local whites in a party against his government’.93 
The trouble is that, as will be shown below, this is simply untrue; throughout his 
governorship, Dunmore enjoyed substantial popularity and political support among 
non-elite, non-Loyalist native Bahamians.94 Nonetheless, as will be apparent, I have 
drawn on Wylly quite extensively in what follows, principally for evidence of Loyalist 
attitudes to the Bahamas, to slavery and to Dunmore. But I have tried to approach him 
critically, with an appreciation that he is a thoroughly partisan source, and, whenever 
possible, without giving his claims the benefit of the doubt. 
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 That the Loyalists’ outlook has continued to find an echo in modern Bahamian 
historiography is partly a consequence of the limited interest in the politics of the 
period in recent times. In shifting their research interests to social history, Bahamian 
historians have left themselves still heavily reliant on the older literature that was 
more instinctively sympathetic to the white émigrés. But it also reflects the very real 
unevenness of the sources. The people who opposed the Loyalists, or who were the 
targets of their criticism, such as non-whites and ‘conch’ Bahamian whites were, for 
the most part, far less concerned, and far less able, to produce direct traces of their 
perspectives in their own words, and if they did, they were less likely to be 
preserved.95 
 Where possible, I have sought to compare Loyalist accounts with those of their 
opponents, but it rarely is possible. In the main, such people have to be approached 
not through what they said, but through their actions. And even they usually have to 
be teased out of a disparate assortment of evidence produced by other people. As well 
as Loyalist sources, I have made considerable use of various colonial records – 
governors’ despatches, reports, official documents, statutes, a smattering of court 
records, and the journals of the Bahamian Assembly. 
 Much of this is relatively well-known material, such as Class 23 of the 
Colonial Office papers at the National Archives in London, but it also includes a lot of 
previously under-utilised sources. George Chalmers, colonial agent for the Bahamas 
from 1792–1823, left an enormous collection of papers, including a great deal of 
correspondence with Bahamians and other pertinent documents, which is now 
scattered between various repositories on both sides of the Atlantic.96 In the Bahamas, 
the surviving record books of the colonial Registry Office, held by the Registrar 
General’s Department, contain a wealth of documentary evidence that has gone 
largely untapped for decades. I have also gleaned information from sources that are 
well known in other contexts, such as Bryan Edwards’ History of the West Indies and 
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Olaudah Equiano’s Interesting Narrative, as well as parliamentary reports and British 
and American newspapers. 
 Eighteenth-century quantitative evidence has been surprisingly neglected in 
Bahamian historiography considering the emphasis on such sources for the nineteenth 
century. In the case of demography, this is probably because of the difficulty of the 
material, which is dispersed between different sources, and presented in bewilderingly 
disparate ways. Study of Bahamian manumission records, on the other hand, has been 
limited by the incompleteness of the main source for this period, and I was very 
fortunate in this respect to find an alternative version of the same document in the 
Bahamas Department of Archives.97 While I have made considerable use of this data, 
especially the latter, I have tried to do so in conjunction with parallel qualitative 
sources whenever possible, and to avoid over-interpreting it. For certain kinds of 
evidence, such as runaway slave advertisements, I have concluded that quantification 
is largely inappropriate in the Bahamian context.98 
 Evidence for what was happening on the Out Islands in this period is notably 
limited, which goes some way towards explaining why most accounts of the Loyalist 
plantation economy pass so directly and swiftly from its inception to its decline. I 
have largely avoided trying to fill this gap by referring to the substantially richer 
nineteenth-century material, which includes the only extant Bahamian plantation 
journal and slave narrative.99 Unfortunately, the context of such accounts, written long 
after the decline of the eighteenth-century cotton economy, is so different as to be 
misleadingly anachronistic. In part, I have tried to address this problem by piecing 
together some unfamiliar or wholly new sources, such as the reports of Anglican 
missionaries, and a unique letter, written in 1796 by a semi-literate English overseer 
on Long Island. But I have also drawn on studies of the plantation system of the 
eighteenth-century South Carolina and Georgia lowcountry from whence most of the 
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people who built the Bahamian cotton economy came, and the wider literature 
approaching plantation slavery from the standpoint of labour history.100 
 Notwithstanding its limitations, all of this amounts to a rather substantial body 
of evidence, a large portion of it manuscripts; the relevant CO23 files alone amount to 
somewhere in the region of 4,000 double-sided folios, organised by year, but mostly 
not calendared or indexed. The volume of Loyalist-related material alone can seem 
daunting; simply keeping track of who individual Loyalists were, and what they did 
and said, both in the Bahamas and North America, is an important but involving 
process. In this respect, I am enormously indebted to the compilers of various 
biographical and genealogical resources on Loyalists generally and in East Florida, 
and to those historians of Bahamian Loyalists who adopted a prosopographical 
approach.101 
 Arranging and organising this material satisfactorily poses considerable 
challenges. The elaborate web of intersections between different actors and factors 
that I seek to illustrate would be all-but impossible to convey via a wholly linear 
narrative. Conversely, a primarily thematic structure would struggle to convey the 
dynamic nature of this complex pattern of interactions, and moreover, in dealing with 
the detail of specific events, is continually at risk of violating the principle that 
‘something that causes something else generally comes before it in time, not after’.102 
 Instead, I have tried to combine, or at least juxtapose elements of each. The 
overall arrangement of what follows is broadly though not rigidly chronological. Each 
chapter addresses distinct issues, but in exploring them, I have varyingly emphasised 
narrative and thematic approaches as seemed most effective and appropriate. 
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Chapter one begins by looking at efforts to reconcile the centrality of freedom 
in eighteenth-century ideas about Britishness with the imperial realities of African 
slavery and territorial expansion overseas from the 1760s. It argues that the North 
American imperial crisis facilitated, and was in turn complicated by, the emergence of 
a hitherto largely latent hostility towards slavery and slaveholding within sections of 
mainstream metropolitan opinion. As crisis turned to civil war and revolution in the 
mid-1770s, this hostility fed into a complex dynamic of slave resistance, slaveholders’ 
anxieties, rumour and political tension that would see imperial officials and soldiers, 
especially Dunmore, make offers of freedom to which African Americans in the South 
enthusiastically responded. The second chapter examines how their involvement in the 
post-war Loyalist diaspora affected the uncertain status of these African Americans, 
especially in the context of the initial relocation of Loyalists from the lower South to 
East Florida. When the latter colony was ceded to Spain in 1783, those émigrés were 
uprooted once again. After surveying the state of the Bahamas at this point, I address 
the considerable distance between Loyalist rhetoric and the reality of how and why so 
many people came to settle in the islands in the 1780s. The ways in which these 
migrations catalysed efforts to transform the Bahamas are discussed in chapter three. I 
argue that the revolutionary legacy of disruption to the black émigrés’ enslaved status 
had enormous political and economic implications for Loyalist slaveholders’ attempts 
to establish a Bahamian plantocracy, as well as facilitating the ability of non-white 
people to shape and control their own lives. By the later 1780s, mounting resistance 
and social tension prompted Lord Dunmore, governor from the end of 1787, to 
embark on the remarkable course of action explored in chapter four. From 1788–93, 
Dunmore sought to fulfil the British government’s Revolutionary War promises of 
freedom to African Americans in the Bahamas, precipitating an embittered political 
struggle with Loyalist slaveholders. After presenting new evidence for the extent of 
these liberatory initiatives, I reassess Dunmore’s attitude to slavery and black people 
in Virginia and the Bahamas in terms of the conservative antislavery impulses 
discussed in chapter one. The fifth chapter traces how, during the 1790s, the 
continuing political, economic and social effects of all these developments were 
affected by the unfolding revolution in Saint-Domingue and the resumption of 
imperial conflict in the Atlantic, culminating in 1797 with an insurrectionary plot by 
French and Bahamian slaves whose brutal suppression marked the unification of 
Bahamian whites under a slaveholding elite. After delineating both the results, and the 
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very real limits of this elite’s hegemony in the nineteenth century, the conclusion 
considers what fresh insights the Bahamian experience seems to offer on the 
revolutionary crisis of Atlantic slavery. 
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Chapter One 
The Problem of Revolution in the Age of Slavery 
 
In 1770, the British Atlantic empire formed a trans-oceanic capitalist nexus of trade, 
commerce and production that incorporated Europe, America and Africa within a 
notionally unitary mercantilist framework. In the process, it ‘ground out the lives of 
millions of captives in an implacable commercial frenzy’. The labour of nearly 
900,000 Africans in the West Indies and North America generated huge profits from 
the seemingly limitless European markets for staple commodities such as sugar, 
tobacco,  and rice.1 Yet, throughout the eighteenth century, freedom was a central 
theme in British political thought and culture, and was widely regarded as a key 
marker of national identity. This chapter begins by examining why Britons long 
remained untroubled by this apparent contradiction, and how, from the 1760s, 
increasingly authoritarian attitudes to an enlarged empire could give rise to both more 
inclusive conceptions of imperial rule, and to an identification of slaveholding as 
distinctively un-British. It then traces how these tendencies turned African 
enslavement into a highly-charged issue in Britain’s deteriorating relationship with its 
mainland American colonies in the 1770s. The second section relates how this 
development would be explosively played out in the course of the American 
Revolutionary War, as enslaved African Americans explored novel opportunities to 
seek their freedom as part of the British effort to subdue the colonial rebellion. This 
counter-revolutionary enterprise of course proved unsuccessful, but in the subsequent 
exodus of its protagonists to the Bahamas and other parts of the British empire in the 
1780s, the emancipatory possibilities it had opened up remained very much alive. 
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I: An Empire for Liberty? 
 
Arguing the case for conciliatory measures towards the recalcitrant North American 
colonists in March 1775, Edmund Burke told the House of Commons that the ‘fierce 
spirit of Liberty is stronger in the English Colonies probably than in any other people 
of the earth’. In the same year, Burke’s view was echoed in less elevated tones by a 
British visitor to America, who declared that ‘they are all liberty mad’.2 
 This strident, nigh-on obsessive concern with freedom was one of the signs of 
American distinctiveness and difference that seemed increasingly apparent to 
metropolitan Britons in the years after the Seven Years War.3 Conversely, for the 
colonists themselves, it was an expression of their British heritage, and certainly, the 
English were as likely as Americans to think of ‘this country as the sanctuary of 
liberty, the sacred temple consecrated to our common faith’.4 
 For contemporaries, there was no inherent contradiction between freedom and 
empire; rather, ‘liberty was… the single most important element in defining a larger 
Imperial identity for Britain and the British Empire.’ Unlike the despotic empires of 
other European powers, ‘stained with acts of oppressive violence, of cruelty, injustice 
and peculation’, Britain’s was uniquely ‘a free and virtuous empire, founded in 
consent and nurtured in liberty and trade’. Freedom was widely considered the 
foundation of the British empire, and the ultimate cause of its remarkable success. For 
Burke, it was ‘the true act of navigation,’ the ‘sole bond, which originally made, and 
must still preserve, the unity of the empire.’5 
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 The freedom extolled by Burke and other Britons was couched in explicitly 
national and exclusive terms. ‘Liberty according to English ideas, and on English 
principles’ was the birthright of the ‘free-born Englishman’, something that made ‘the 
chosen race’ different from, and better than other peoples.6 It was also very much 
defined in relation and opposition to ‘slavery’, considered by John Locke as early as 
the seventeenth century to be ‘so vile and miserable an Estate of Man’, as to be 
‘directly opposite to the generous Temper and Courage of our Nation.’7 Slavery was 
the ‘absolute political evil’ in eighteenth-century British political discourse, but it was 
also ubiquitous, ‘a weed that grows in every soil.’ As Burke put it, ‘slavery’ was 
something the colonists ‘can have any where… They may have it from Spain, they 
may have it from France, they may have it from Prussia.’ As such, slavery was well 
placed to serve as a defining antithesis of Britishness: it was only the shortest of jumps 
from a strident insistence that ‘Britons never will be slaves’ to the assumption that 
slaves could not be Britons.8 
  There was, of course, a considerable incongruity between a rhetorical 
devotion to freedom and abhorrence of slavery, and the imperial reality of the 
enslavement and brutal exploitation of hundreds of thousands of Africans. Samuel 
Johnson’s famous jibe at the hypocrisy of ‘yelps for liberty’ from ‘the drivers of 
negroes’, directed at the American rebels, was equally applicable to the British 
‘Empire of liberty’.9 But for the most part, eighteenth-century Britons lived with this 
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gulf between practice and avowed principles, just as Thomas Jefferson could 
simultaneously possess both a ‘heartfelt hatred of slavery’, and hundreds of unfree 
African Americans.10 
 The contradiction was readily disregarded. The British usually invoked 
‘slavery’ as ‘a term referring to a specific political condition… characteristic of the 
lives of contemporary [Europeans]’, especially the Catholic subjects of the absolutist 
Bourbon monarchies. The parallel with the mass enslavement of Africans in the 
British empire was rarely acknowledged before the American Revolution, when ‘most 
in Britain had tended to think of colonial slavery and the Atlantic slave trade as 
unfortunate and distasteful but beyond the power of anyone to address effectively.’11 
 Somewhat ironically, the prevalence of this attitude was facilitated and 
reinforced by the application of liberty ‘on English principles’ to the empire. One such 
principle was the sanctity of private property, considered to be not only a foundation 
of British commercial success, but also the basis of the ‘independence’ necessary for 
membership of the ‘political nation.’ In turn, the latter’s right of ‘self-government’ by 
elected representatives was enshrined in the invented tradition of the ‘ancient’ 
constitution, regarded across all shades of political opinion as the fundamental basis 
and guarantee of English liberty.12 
 Hence, the settler colonists of North America and the West Indies considered 
themselves equal partners in an imperial project based on their freely-given consent. 
They exercised far more autonomy than the colonies of the other European empires, 
and considered their legislative assemblies to possess a sovereignty equal to and 
distinct from that of the Westminster parliament, whose jurisdiction overseas was 
notionally confined to the regulation of foreign and inter-colonial trade.13 
 In consequence, whereas slaveholding in the Spanish and French empires was 
at least theoretically subject to metropolitan supervision and regulation, eighteenth-
century British slavery was governed by local laws promulgated by the colonial 
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assemblies and often formulated directly by the planters themselves. Such slave codes, 
usually concerned almost exclusively with controlling the enslaved, typically afforded 
slaveholders a near-absolute freedom from legal constraints.14 
Even if many of the people in Britain responsible for imperial administration 
did not entirely concur with colonial assertions of constitutional autonomy, as far as 
slavery was concerned, such ideas went unchallenged in practice for most of the 
eighteenth century. Over time, London’s policy of ‘salutary neglect’ (which of course 
did not preclude actively suppressing colonial attempts to restrict the transatlantic 
slave trade) coalesced into ‘customary rights that insulated slavery from external 
attack.’15 
Those rights also helped metropolitan Britons not to notice the extent of their 
own complicity in the Atlantic slave system. For most people in Britain, the nation’s 
pivotal role in slavery was something experienced indirectly, via the consumption of 
commodities like sugar and tobacco, and the profits that flowed into port cities like 
London, Liverpool and Glasgow. Euphemisms such as the ‘African’ and ‘West 
Indian’ trade, and the impersonal mechanisms of capitalist financial investment, 
served to obfuscate the vicious realities of ‘a circuitous commerce’, enabling the 
British to assume that slavery had little to do with themselves.16 Rather, responsibility 
for this ‘very great and shocking evil’ lay overseas, with morally degenerate American 
and West Indian slaveholders, ‘the refuse of the jails of Europe’, whose ‘levity, 
brutality, and baseness’ could not but ‘justly expose them to the contempt of the 
vanquished.’17 
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Lord Chief Justice Mansfield’s 1772 ruling on the case of James Somerset, 
apparently confirming chattel slavery’s incompatibility with English law, was greeted 
with widespread public acclaim. Not without justification, historians have often cited 
the case as the first tangible achievement of British antislavery, both a harbinger of 
and a catalyst for the rise of mass-abolitionism in the 1780s.18 But Granville Sharp’s 
undoubted sympathy with the plight of slaves was coupled with widely shared 
anxieties about ‘the dangerous increase of slaves in this Kingdom.’ Fears of racial 
contamination overlapped with Sharp’s dread that England might become ‘as base, 
wicked and Tyrannical as our colonies.’ Thus, at least for those eager to be convinced, 
Mansfield’s hedged and ambiguous judgement reaffirmed the façade of a clear, tidy 
dividing line between British liberty and colonial slavery.19 While the Somerset 
decision drew British attention to the evils of slavery, it did so in a largely self-
congratulatory way, that avoided questioning conventional assumptions about the 
virtue of empire in general. Blame for slavery could be safely ascribed to the moral 
failings of other people, people whose Britishness was open to question, such as 
slaveholders, Americans and West Indians. 
At the end of the Seven Years War in 1763, Britain had emerged as perhaps 
the world’s first truly global power. Britons on both sides of the Atlantic could view 
their stunning victories across the world as a resounding vindication of ‘Liberty on 
English principles’. But the process of grappling with the novel problems posed by 
this ‘dangerous triumph’ would undermine the complacent equation of empire with 
freedom.20 
The vast territorial gains made by 1763 rendered the traditional fiction of a 
relatively homogenous empire peopled mainly by ethnic Britons increasingly 
untenable. What had been considered a distinctively British empire based on trade, 
settlement and sea power was now augmented by an empire of territorial conquest 
more reminiscent of ancient Rome and the contemporary Spanish and Portuguese 
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dominions.21 A diverse array of hitherto alien peoples, including tens of thousands of 
Native Americans and French Canadians, and millions of Asians, now fell within the 
ambit of British power. How that power was to be exercised, and the broader question 
of what role would be played in the empire by people whose language, culture, 
religion, socio-economic organisation and legal and political traditions seemed 
radically different from British norms, would command the attention of those 
concerned with imperial governance over the following decades.22 
For the most part, the answers they formulated had a distinctly authoritarian 
cast. To imperial administrators and officials it was largely self-evident that the new 
colonists were not British, and certainly could not be treated as willing or equal 
participants in the empire. As such, they were neither entitled to nor suitable for ‘that 
equal communion of privileges founded on legislative institutions, which constitutes 
freedom upon English principles’. Something rather like nineteenth-century Crown 
Colony government was instituted in the short-lived African colony of Senegambia, 
founded in 1765. Guy Carleton, governor of Quebec, observed in 1768 that ‘the 
British form of government, transplanted into this continent, will never produce the 
same fruits as at home… in the American forests.’ Administration by a royal governor 
and an appointed Council was accordingly established by the 1774 Quebec Act. 
Whereas the latter provoked heated controversy in Britain and America, it was 
generally accepted that in Asia, ‘the British must operate a despotism’, since ‘virtually 
no one believed that… Protestant truth, free government or the common law had any 
application to India for the foreseeable future.’23 
If such peoples were not ‘freeborn Englishmen’, there could be little doubt that 
they had become ‘Subjects of the Crown of Great Britain’, a status that ‘retained [or 
perhaps re-invented] the quasi-medieval connotations of a personal bond between 
individual and lord.’ In 1765, James Otis could write of the existence ‘of five millions 
of his majesty’s American subjects, white, brown, and black.’ This ‘civic analogue of 
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the relation between parent and child’ informed a paternalism that in some respects 
anticipated the nineteenth-century discourse of an imperial mission to civilise and 
improve primitive peoples. Burke insisted that ‘all political power which is set over 
men… ought to be some way or other exercised ultimately for their benefit.’ If empire 
could not immediately extend the sphere of freedom, then it should be validated by 
‘promoting, the wealth, the number, the happiness, of the human race.’ The Bishop of 
Oxford spoke of the Church of England’s duty of ‘conciliating, civilising, and 
instructing the barbarous nations of North America.’24 
Such paternalism informed various measures taken during the 1760s and 1770s 
that aimed at conciliating the new subject peoples. The Quebec Act recognised French 
civil law and guaranteed religious toleration for Catholics. Francophone Catholics in 
Grenada were admitted to legislative and judicial office and exempted from the Test 
Acts. Parliamentary investigation and regulation of the East India Company began to 
develop from the 1770s. The Royal Proclamation of 1763, and the subsequent 
attempts to supervise the North American frontier directly from London, represented 
an attempt, albeit a largely unsuccessful one, to restrict the encroachment of settlers 
and speculators upon Native American lands in the trans-Appalachian West.25 Of 
course, such steps were also very much in line with British strategic interests. Efforts 
to incorporate and protect the interests of the empire’s non-British subjects were 
intended to reduce the threats of rebellion and conflict with the older colonies. 
Subjectship implied a relationship of mutual duties and responsibilities, and 
providing opportunities for the conquered to contribute to the imperial project was a 
well-established method of utilising such people’s particular talents while 
simultaneously cementing their allegiance. In the 1760s, a strikingly successful 
example of this practice was afforded by the Scottish Highlanders. Regarded after the 
1745 Jacobite rising as an alien, barbaric, and dangerously disloyal people, 
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Highlanders’ distinctive culture and social organisation had been brutally suppressed. 
But by the Seven Years War, their martial zeal and clan traditions were being enlisted 
in the service of empire. William Pitt the Elder boasted to parliament in 1766 of how 
he ‘drew into your service’ this ‘hardy and intrepid race of men’, who had ‘served 
with fidelity as they fought with valour and conquered for you in every part of the 
world.’ James Wolfe observed more cynically that the Highlanders were ‘hardy, 
intrepid, accustom’d to a rough Country, and no great mischief if they fall. How can 
you better employ a secret enemy than by making his end conducive to the common 
good?’26 
This kind of approach to the problem of integrating conquered peoples could 
also help facilitate new thinking about the status of ‘strangers’ already present in 
Britain’s older ‘marchlands’.27 In 1772, the first concrete proposal for the gradual 
emancipation of slaves in the British empire was published anonymously by Maurice 
Morgann, who during the previous decade had been successively employed as private 
secretary to the president of the Board of Trade, undersecretary responsible for 
America in the Southern Department, and cabinet emissary to Quebec. Morgann’s 
Plan for the Abolition of Slavery had first been formulated as a policy memorandum 
soon after the peace of 1763. It received little or no ministerial attention, and was 
‘thrown aside, and almost forgotten’, until its anonymous publication in 1772.28 
The scheme, calling for the British government to purchase annually a number 
of African children who would be educated in Britain, before being settled as free 
adults in the newly acquired and sparsely-populated territory of West Florida, was at 
once hugely ambitious and remarkably naïve. Morgann was certain that ‘both 
experience and the nature of man… forbid us to suppose that there is any original or 
essential difference in the mental part, however our bodies may be varied by colour.’ 
He anticipated not only the eradication of slavery, but complete social and cultural 
assimilation, and even phenotypical homogenisation through intermarriage. This went 
far beyond the scope of mainstream nineteenth-century abolitionism. But Morgann’s 
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vision of ‘an united people of various habit and complexion’ was to be realised purely 
through the force of example. The commercial success of the West Florida colony 
would demonstrate to all that slavery was economically inefficient as well as unjust, 
without the need for further state intervention or coercion.29 
If establishing the empire upon ‘the sure foundation of equality and justice’ 
constituted a worthwhile end in itself, Morgann also had less altruistic objectives in 
mind. In the first instance, eliminating slavery would remove the perpetual threat to 
colonial security posed by a disaffected servile population. In language strikingly 
reminiscent of Raynal, Morgann warned that if nothing was done to redress slaves’ 
manifest grievances, they would one day ‘throw off at once the yoke of tyranny to 
revenge their wrongs in the blood of their oppressors.’30 
But as ‘the black subjects of Britain’, Africans might instead play a unique and 
valuable role in the development of the imperial project. At present, the empire was  
‘restrained by climate’ insofar as Europeans were supposedly physically unsuited to 
life in the tropics. Establishing ‘colonies of free Negroes… perfectly attached and 
dependent, such as… might act in the hot climates with unabated vigour’ would 
remove this obstacle. Thus armed with both moral and material superiority, Britain 
could ‘stretch forth, with irresistible power, her sable arm through every region of the 
Torrid Zone’, ‘shake the power of Spain to its foundations’, and ascend to ‘the seat of 
unenvied and unlimited Dominion.’31 
 The Somerset case inspired Morgann to offer up his proposal for public 
scrutiny, and his thinking very much paralleled Sharp’s efforts to reconcile antislavery 
with a patriotic and conservative political outlook.32 In 1772, Morgann acknowledged 
that ‘too warm a zeal’ might have ‘transported him too far into speculation’ in his 
musings upon how antislavery projects might be married to schemes of imperial 
aggrandisement.33 But within a few years, British policymakers and soldiers faced 
with revolutionary crisis in America would be contemplating how the king’s black 
subjects might be enlisted to fight simultaneously for their own freedom and for the 
preservation of the empire. 
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 Morgann’s insistence that ‘a colony, as far as respects the ends of its 
formation, should be considered as wholly subservient to the mother country’ was 
very much in line with an attitude becoming increasingly prevalent in official circles. 
The idea of a single, unitary British empire had begun to take shape in the second 
quarter of the eighteenth-century. After 1763, it gained increasingly common currency 
as London’s administrators and politicians assumed a more active role in the 
governance of that empire, and became less tolerant of colonial opposition and 
autonomy.34 
 This centralising tendency had manifold roots. The view of the colonies as 
‘outposts of British economic or strategic power’ had always had its adherents, and 
some in Whitehall had been convinced of the need to curb the autonomy of the old 
settler colonies since at least the 1740s. George III’s initial determination to 
personally manage the government as ‘King-in-Parliament’ can be seen as signalling a 
new intent to strengthen central authority. The instability and rapid turnover of his 
early ministries arguably meant that increasing initiative was devolved upon senior 
departmental officials who already favoured a shift of power back towards London.35 
For some contemporaries, the new reality of an empire of direct rule over non-
Europeans generated fears that British overseas conquests had ‘brought with them not 
only Asiatic luxury, but I fear Asiatic principles of government’.36 Some scholars have 
argued that the experience of governing extensive non-English speaking populations 
after 1763 gradually became incorporated within the informal corpus of common 
presumptions and perspectives that comprised imperial policy, and so encouraged 
‘more authoritarian experiments’ elsewhere.37 Certainly, as far as many North 
Americans were concerned, the Quebec Act had established ‘in a neighbouring 
province… a despotism dangerous to our very existence’.38 
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Widespread resistance in the mainland American colonies to measures 
clarifying or augmenting metropolitan authority only served, for the most part, to 
bolster British determination to assert the unqualified sovereignty of the Westminster 
parliament over the colonial legislatures. The resulting dynamic of mutual 
intransigence fuelled the escalation of an imperial crisis that would culminate in civil 
war and revolution.39 
With a few notable exceptions, it may well be true that ‘no one had set out to 
question the institution of chattel slavery’ in the course of the disputes that gave rise to 
the American Revolution.40 But from an early stage, slavery was an implicit and 
uncomfortable factor in the unfolding trajectory of the American crisis. 
As we have seen, slaveholding was one of several characteristics that 
metropolitan Britons increasingly came to emphasise in defining the colonists as 
distinctively ‘American’, a people who were less than fully British, but undoubtedly 
just as much subordinate to the sovereignty of King-in-Parliament as any of the 
empire’s other subject peoples.41 From the 1760s onwards, Americans resident in 
London, such as Benjamin Franklin, were worrying that the prevalence of this image 
of the colonists in Britain would ‘encourage those who would oppress us, by 
representing us as unworthy of the Liberty we are now contending for.’ Such concerns 
were amplified by the Somerset case, as the nation ‘piqu’d itself on its Virtue[,] Love 
of Liberty, and the Equity in its Courts in setting free a single Negro.’ By 1775, 
hardliners on the American question such as William Innes could defiantly assert in 
the House of Commons that it was ‘absurd to say, that a people who import slaves, 
and are despotic over them… have a right to the freedom which the Inhabitants of this 
country enjoy. The North American spirit and practice in this respect have surely 
nothing in them similar to what prevails in Great Britain.’42 
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Conversely, when Americans denounced a metropolitan design to ‘enslave 
them’, they drew upon ‘a specific meaning’ of ‘slavery as a political concept’ derived 
from the English ‘Country’ tradition.43 But it is hard to believe that the literalness and 
sheer enthusiasm with which colonists invoked the term did not owe something to the 
presence of African Americans who offered an unavoidable reminder of what 
enslavement might mean.44 
John Adams certainly suggested as much when, denouncing the Stamp Act in 
1765, he insisted that ‘We won’t be their Negroes.’ Even a self-proclaimed friend of 
America like Burke could believe that the Southern colonies were ‘by far the most 
proud and jealous of their freedom’ on account of their possessing ‘vast multitudes of 
slaves’, since ‘in such a people the haughtiness of domination combines with the spirit 
of freedom, fortifies it, and renders it invincible.’45 
 In its July 1775 ‘Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms’, 
written by Thomas Jefferson, the second Continental Congress described Britain’s 
‘cruel and impolitic Purpose of enslaving these Colonies’ as a design for ‘a Part of the 
human Race to hold an absolute Property in, and an unbounded Power over others… 
as the Objects of a legal Domination never rightfully resistible, however severe and 
oppressive.’46 The implications of such language were not easy to miss, especially 
when combined with ideas about natural and universal rights to liberty. At least one of 
Virginia’s planter elite, Landon Carter, supposedly presumed that the adoption of the 
Declaration of Independence would entail setting his slaves free.47 
 Awareness of these contradictions prompted ‘a haphazard, uneven, loosely 
connected, though mutually reinforcing efflorescence of antislavery impulses and 
gestures’ that would eventually contribute to the gradual extinction of slavery in the 
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Northern states.48 In the context of the imperial crisis of the 1770s, however, the 
‘tension between values and practices’ was more readily addressed in a manner that 
could also serve broader American principles and interests. Slave imports were 
suspended by a resolution of the Continental Congress in 1774 as part of the colonial 
boycott of trade with Britain, and henceforth the Atlantic slave trade was singled out 
for attack by American commentators and politicians. Highlighting London’s role in 
‘suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or restrain’ the ‘execrable 
commerce’ of the Atlantic slave trade lent a tone of moral superiority to more 
obviously self-interested assertions of the colonies’ right to regulate and control their 
own trade.49 
 Supporters of the British government were quick to respond in kind. The 
hypocrisy of American slaveholders was derided and condemned by figures such as 
Samuel Johnson, John Wesley, Ambrose Serle, John Lind, John Shebbeare and Josiah 
Tucker. Precisely because both sides were so complicit in the practice of colonial 
slavery, the issue of culpability offered virtually limitless scope for partisan rhetorical 
warfare, generating a rapidly escalating dynamic of tit-for-tat accusations and 
denunciations. In the process, during the mid-1770s, chattel slavery became 
established within mainstream anglophone political discourse ‘as an archetype of 
injustice.’50 
Hence, in December 1775, the idealistic MP for Hull, David Hartley, a 
supporter of the American cause, could introduce a bill granting all North American 
slaves the right to trial by jury, intended not only ‘as an auspicious beginning to lay 
the first stone of universal liberty to mankind,’ but also as a means whereby the 
colonies might ‘re-establish peace and harmony with the parent state.’ As Christopher 
Brown observes, ‘few moments better illustrate how inadequately the self-professed 
“friends of America” understood the nature of the developing revolution in North 
America or the place of slavery in colonial society.’ But in naively assuming that ‘no 
American could hesitate an instant to comply with’ his proposal, Hartley did no more 
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than take the antislavery sentiments in the rhetoric coming from both sides at face 
value.51 
 For all that men such as Wesley, Johnson and Tucker sincerely despised 
slavery in itself, these writers were principally concerned with demonstrating the 
moral bankruptcy of American claims to ‘that equality’ and ‘those unalienable rights, 
with which… God is declared to have endowed all mankind.’52 Thus, in the context of 
the revolutionary crisis, attacking slavery could contribute to the larger end of 
defending and preserving the integrity of the empire; antislavery became directly and 
practically identified with imperial patriotism. 
 The ways in which opposition to slavery could be informed and facilitated by 
an aggressively conservative attitude to imperial governance are readily apparent in 
the thinking of Reverend James Ramsay of Saint Christopher, who emerged as a 
leading figure in the first phase of British abolitionism during the 1780s, after 
spending much of the 1770s formulating ‘a plan for the education and gradual 
emancipation of slaves in the West Indies’ that was submitted to leading English 
bishops in 1778.53 Ramsay was convinced that ‘the chain of slavery has been 
fashioned and applied by the hand of liberty’; the colonists had claimed an 
unrestricted freedom for themselves, and had abused this great privilege to deprive 
others of their liberty. The colonial slave codes amounted to the ‘negation of law’ by 
effectively removing all limits to the power of slaveholders. To Ramsay, ‘the 
wickedness of British American slavery clinched the case against colonial self-
governance.’ American rebels who, ‘contending so nobly for the natural equality of 
mankind, hold near half a million of negroes in perpetual bondage’, were motivated 
by principles of ‘profligacy, Atheism, ingratitude, and oppression’ that ‘must naturally 
end in absolute tyranny, or… a contemptible oppressive oligarchy.’54 
Reforming slavery would therefore necessarily be part of a larger project of re-
structuring the empire along more centralised and authoritarian lines. ‘True liberty’ in 
Ramsay’s view was necessarily conditional, insofar as members of the community 
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must recognise that they were organically and reciprocally bound together within ‘the 
natural unity of the state.’ To mediate their interests, and so facilitate ‘the 
advancement of the common good’ was ‘the sole responsibility’ of ‘properly 
constituted authority.’55 That authority resided exclusively with parliament and the 
sovereign, not ‘the absurdity and contradiction of various, jarring legislators’ in the 
colonies, who had shown themselves ‘neither competent, or inclined, to introduce 
such legislation as humanity solicits.’ 
Ramsay hoped that British victory in North America would provide ‘an 
opportunity of annulling all the little colony-systems, and extending that 
indiscriminating supremacy of law, which takes place in Albion alone.’56 In the event, 
however, it was only in the wake of American independence that abolitionism would 
take off in Britain as a serious movement. The war cast previously unquestioned 
assumptions about British liberty in a novel and unflattering light. The trauma of 
defeat undermined the existing political order, and lent additional impetus to demands 
for reform. For those of a religious mindset, such as Granville Sharp, the war’s 
outcome could easily be interpreted as an alarming sign of divine disfavour, and an 
apocalyptic harbinger of worse punishment to come.57 
Sentiments like this helped to make a moderate and respectable abolitionism 
(directed, of course, primarily at the transatlantic slave trade) seem like a timely, 
feasible and prudent step to wide sections of public and political opinion by the 1780s. 
The campaign served to reaffirm the nation’s benevolence and commitment to liberty, 
whilst also validating the legitimacy and representative capacity of parliament. With 
(cautious) support at the highest levels of government, and led largely by the likes of 
Ramsay and Wilberforce, people possessed of ‘an almost obsessive concern with 
idealizing hierarchical order’, abolitionism was a respectable and relatively safe outlet 
for the popular appetite for reform, offering ‘a mode of political participation which 
did not directly threaten the sources or structure of political power.’58 
By advancing the process initiated by Sharp of ‘converting antislavery into a 
defence of traditional authority’, therefore, the American Revolution helped to make 
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abolitionism in the British empire a politically plausible project.59 The ultimate 
extinction of British slavery was far from certain in the 1780s, but the institution 
would henceforth be subject to unprecedented challenge and scrutiny from the 
metropole. 
However, amidst the chaotic, multi-focal, ‘self-intensifying’ process of 
revolution itself,60 the rulers of the British empire had briefly contemplated more 
immediate and drastic action. A month before Hartley’s proposal was defeated in the 
House of Commons, another man for whom, like Ramsay, ‘denunciation of colonial 
slavery implied no taste for a freer or more equal society’, had made common cause 
with another group of Americans contemplating ‘the alternative of chusing an 
unconditional submission… or resistance by force’.61 In November 1775, John 
Murray, earl of Dunmore and royal governor of Virginia, proclaimed ‘all indented 
Servants, Negroes, or others… free that are able and willing to bear Arms… for the 
more speedily reducing this Colony to a proper sense of their Duty, to His Majesty’s 
Crown and Dignity.’ The following month, Dunmore’s ‘Ethiopian Regiment’ of 
liberated slaves, nearly 300 strong, fought the Virginia militia at the battle of Great 
Bridge. By the time Dunmore abandoned the Chesapeake in July 1776, between 800 
and 1,000 African Americans had answered his proclamation.62 Many more would 
escape from slavery to seek the protection of the royal armies in the course of the 
Revolutionary War; in total, perhaps as many as 30,000 black people served as 
soldiers, sailors, and in various auxiliary roles in North America and the Caribbean.63 
With the end of the conflict, they would struggle to make good the promise of 
freedom for which they had risked and suffered so much.
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II: ‘Like a Snow Ball in Rolling…’: Slavery, War, and Freedom in Revolutionary 
America 
 
The confusion and inconsistency of the British stance towards enslaved African 
Americans during the American Revolutionary War and the imperial crisis that led up 
to it paralleled the ambiguous and contradictory position of slavery in an empire 
avowedly devoted to freedom. From 1775 onwards, many British politicians, soldiers 
and imperial officials increasingly came to perceive slavery as a potential American 
weakness, that might be exploited to secure both moral and strategic high ground. 
Government-sponsored pamphleteers could cast the colonists as hypocrites merely by 
drawing attention ‘to the slaves of these assertors of liberty.’ Reliance on the labour of 
a large and disaffected servile class rendered the Southern colonies, in particular, 
potentially vulnerable to wartime economic dislocation and social upheaval.64 But on 
the other hand, well-established practical and ideological concerns mitigated against 
interfering with American slavery: fear of exacerbating the ubiquitous danger of revolt 
in the West Indies; the voices of powerful interest groups at home and in the loyal 
colonies; ties of racial solidarity to the people still widely thought of as ‘our American 
brethren’;65 and the risk of alienating loyal Americans who were often slaveholders 
themselves. 
 In practice, it frequently proved hard to formulate any specific or coherent 
policy when ministers in London were barely able to keep pace with the rapidly 
unfolding and constantly shifting course of developments in America. The 
concentration of military efforts on the South from 1778 was clearly informed in part 
by the widespread assumption that the presence of so many slaves in Georgia, the 
Chesapeake and the Carolinas would discourage and inhibit colonial resistance. 
Ultimately, of course, such a strategy was ‘practical rather than moral’, but the British 
were rarely in a position to play a machiavellian role, coldly and cynically calculating 
how to best take advantage of the aspirations of enslaved African Americans.66 More 
often, their actions were essentially improvised and opportunistic responses to the 
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urgent contingencies of a situation with a volatile and unpredictable momentum of its 
own. Much depended on the initiatives of commanders on the ground, some of whom 
showed far more enthusiasm for subverting and undermining American slavery than 
did the government they represented. But at times, the dynamic trajectory of 
revolution, fuelled by a complex interplay of slave unrest, tension, rumour, confusion, 
and deep-rooted social and racial anxieties, threatened to overwhelm the capacity of 
its individual protagonists to shape the course of events. At critical phases, such as the 
invasions of Georgia and South Carolina in 1778–9, and above all in the period 
between the winter of 1774–5 and the Declaration of Independence, it was frequently 
the slaves themselves, ostensibly the participants with the least freedom of action, who 
seemed to be most effective at manipulating developments to suit their own ends. 
From late in 1774, as the imperial crisis advanced towards its denouement in 
the wake of the Coercive Acts, there were reports of disturbing behaviour by slaves in 
both Northern and Southern colonies. In September, African Americans in Boston 
were said to have ‘got an Irishman to draw up a petition’ addressed to the city’s 
recently appointed governor, General Thomas Gage, commander-in-chief of British 
forces in North America. They offered to ‘fight for him, provided he would arm them 
and engage to liberate them if he conquered.’ A month later, James Madison related 
how slaves in one Virginia county had ‘met together & chose a leader who was to 
conduct them when the English Troops should arrive – which they foolishly thought 
would be very soon & that by revolting to them they should be rewarded with their 
freedom.’ Discussing the importance of ‘proper precautions… to prevent the 
Infection’, Madison considered it ‘prudent such attempts should be concealed as well 
as suppressed.’67 
Actual risings were harder to keep secret: in December, two slaves were 
burned alive for leading a revolt in St. Andrew parish, Georgia, in which at least seven 
whites were killed or seriously wounded.68 Around the same time, ominous rumours 
began to circulate concerning British intentions towards American slaves. In 
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November, Sir William Draper had suggested in the London Public Advertiser that in 
the event of an American ‘attempt to debauch our Seamen and Soldiers by Premiums 
to encourage Desertion’, Britain might ‘Proclame Freedom to their Negroes, then how 
long would they be a People?’69 Although Draper was a British officer, who had 
actually commanded African slave troops raised by the East India Company during 
the expedition to capture Manila in 1762,70 his remarks seem to have been no more 
than a typical rhetorical swipe at colonial slaveholders, and were certainly a long way 
from being a fully worked-out proposal. Nevertheless, exaggerated reports of them 
generated alarm across the Atlantic. In December, Virginian Arthur Lee wrote from 
London to his brother Richard Henry Lee that the idea ‘meets with approbation from 
ministerial People.’ The following month, William Bradford advised Madison that his 
‘fear with regard to an insurrection being excited among the slaves seems too well 
founded.’ Evidence that ‘such a scheme is thought on & talked of’ had appeared in the 
form of ‘a letter from a Gentleman in England… read yesterday in the Coffee-house, 
which mentioned the design of administration to pass an act (in case of a rupture) 
declaring [“]all Slaves & Servants free that would take arms against the 
Americans.”’71 
Reports of such a plan continued to circulate in the months that followed, 
spreading an anxiety among whites that helped to validate the hopes and expectations 
of slaves themselves, and made it harder for British officials to ignore the potential of 
the idea. This process quickly took on a momentum of its own, as these developments 
fed back into and lent weight to the original rumours. 
In his speech for conciliation of March 1775, Burke claimed to the House of 
Commons that ‘it has been proposed, I know,’ to subdue ‘the high aristocratick spirit 
of Virginia and the Southern Colonies… by declaring a general enfranchisement of 
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their slaves.’ Around the same time, General Gage had warned John Stuart, Indian 
superintendent for the Southern District, that if South Carolinians were to ‘proceed 
much greater lengths it may happen that your Rice and Indigo will be brought to 
market by negroes instead of white People–’.72 
By the spring, the actions of blacks in Virginia were helping to propel the 
deteriorating relations between the governor and the colonists to crisis point. In April, 
several slaves were hanged in connection with conspiracies in four different counties. 
On the 21st, two days after the fighting at Lexington and Concord, Governor Dunmore 
sent a detachment of sailors to seize powder from the Williamsburg magazine, on the 
grounds of ‘the apprehensions which seemed to prevail throughout this whole 
Country, of an intended insurrection of the Slaves, who had been seen in large 
numbers in the night time about the Magazine’. The next day, an angry and armed 
crowd gathered outside the gubernatorial palace. An enraged Dunmore then ‘swore by 
the living God that… if any Injury or insult was offered to himself… he would declare 
Freedom to the Slaves, and reduce the City of Williamsburg to Ashes.’ Already, 
‘some Negroes (by one of his Servants) had offered their Service’. As paramilitary 
independent companies appeared across the colony, prospects of reconciliation 
between Dunmore and the ‘greatly alarmed and exasperated’ Virginian whites rapidly 
receded. On 1 May, Dunmore advised Secretary of State Lord Dartmouth that in the 
event of violent resistance to his authority, it was his ‘fixed purpose to arm all my own 
Negroes and receive all others that will come to me whom I shall declare free’. He 
was confident that ‘I could raise such a force from among Indians, Negroes and other 
persons as would soon reduce the refractory people of this colony to obedience’.73 
South Carolina, hitherto seemingly the colony least inclined towards open 
rebellion against the crown, was thrown into uproar by the arrival on 3 May of a letter 
from Arthur Lee describing a ‘black plan before Administration’ to ‘grant freedom to 
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such Slaves as should desert their Masters and join the King’s troops’.74 On the 29th, 
the South Carolina Gazette printed a letter from London dated 10 February, claiming 
that ‘there is gone down to Sheerness, seventy-eight thousand guns and bayonets, to 
be sent to America, to put into the hands of N*****s, the Roman Catholics, the 
Indians and Canadians.’ Charleston was awash with rumours that the ship bringing the 
new royal governor, Lord William Campbell, was also carrying 14,000 muskets, to be 
issued to slaves who were to be incited to revolt.75 
Word of Dunmore’s threat had spread across the South by early June, and ‘the 
dread of Instigated Insurrections’ reached new heights during the summer.76 As armed 
militia patrolled the streets of Charleston day and night, de facto political control 
shifted from the royal authorities, suspected of complicity, to the Provincial Congress 
and Charleston General Committee ‘in an instant, without violence or debate’.77 A 
free black pilot, Thomas Jeremiah, was arrested for alleged collusion with the British. 
At his trial in August, witnesses reported that in May or June, Jeremiah had spoken to 
other African Americans of ‘the great war coming soon… to help the poor Negroes’, 
and had tried to send arms to a runaway in preparation for a rebellion.78 
In St. Bartholomew parish of South Carolina’s Chehaw County, at the 
beginning of July, a court of ‘Justices & Freeholders… were under the disagreeable 
necessity to Cause Exemplary punishm[en]ts’ to be inflicted on the ‘Principal leaders’ 
of an ‘Infernal design’ for ‘a General Insurrection’. These ‘leaders’ were a group of 
slaves who had ‘been preaching for two Years last past to Great crouds of Negroes.’ 
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One of these preachers, George, was heard to say that ‘the old King had rece[ive]d a 
Book from our Lord by which he was to Alter the World (meaning to set the Negroes 
free) but for his not doing so, was now gone to Hell.’ But now, ‘the Young King, 
meaning our Present One… was about to alter the World, & set the Negroes Free.’79 
Around the same time, ‘a deep laid Horrid Tragick Plan’ was discovered in 
North Carolina. Slaves in the Tar River area had planned to rise on 8 July, killing their 
masters and burning houses as they went, until they reached ‘the Back Country where 
they were to be received with open arms by a number of Persons there appointed and 
armed by Government for their Protection, and as a further reward they were to be 
settled in a free government of their own.’ Claims that Governor Josiah Martin ‘had 
formed a design of arming the Negroes and proclaiming freedom to all such as would 
resort to the King’s standard’ were rife. The commander of Fort Johnston on Cape 
Fear was alleged to have ‘given Encouragement to Negroes to Elope from their 
Masters &… promised to protect them.’ Martin had done little to dispel such rumours 
with his insistence that ‘nothing could ever justify the design, falsely imputed to me, 
of giving encouragement to the negroes, but the actual and declared rebellion of the 
King’s subjects.’80 
As with almost all slave conspiracies, a definitive assessment of the true scope 
and motivation of would-be rebels in 1774–5 is impossible; the sources inevitably 
shed a great deal more light upon how whites responded to their own fears, rather than 
‘their slaves’ unfathomed purposes’.81 In South Carolina, especially, the insurrection 
scares do seem to have at least partly conformed to Bertram Wyatt-Brown’s 
formulation of a ‘mass ritual’ serving as ‘a celebration of white solidarity’, in the 
context of acute political tensions.82 Nonetheless, that thousands of African Americans 
did fight for their freedom during the Revolutionary War lends credence to the view 
that at least some of these incidents were rather more substantive affairs. 
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Some historians have suggested that ‘there is every reason to suppose that 
[slaves] had access to revolutionary ideology’, and perhaps even that they ‘were swept 
up by the force of ideological energy.’ While there is no doubt that many African 
Americans were aware of colonial assertions of principles of natural rights and 
equality, and denunciations of British tyranny and designs of ‘enslavement’, the 
evidence is rather more ambiguous regarding how black people interpreted such 
rhetoric. Although slaves in Massachusetts repeatedly couched petitions for freedom 
in terms of Patriot discourse, elsewhere, rather than ‘yearning to become fully 
American’, black people proved more likely to identify the agents of royal oppression 
as possible allies in their own struggle for freedom.83 
Indeed, not only did African Americans repeatedly aver their readiness to 
support the British cause, they did so well in advance of any positive indications of 
British receptiveness to such overtures. In all likelihood, many slaves proceeded on 
the calculation that an enemy of the slaveholders was a potential friend. Precisely 
because the odds were invariably stacked so heavily against rebel slaves, plausible 
claims of external succour were often invaluable tools for mobilising support for any 
such undertaking. In particular, the idea of fighting as part of an established army was 
a far more attractive proposition than the usually suicidal course of insurrection. 
 Stories of various kinds of royal sympathy and support appear again and again 
in the background to slave revolts across the Atlantic world. The ‘bizarre royalism 
displayed by many of the slave insurgents’ during the first phase of the Haitian 
Revolution presents perhaps the most obvious parallel with the American 
Revolution.84 Both apparently fictitious, and more or less mythologised versions of 
real monarchs, such as George’s ‘Young King’, could serve as foci of this recurring 
phenomenon, which has been often noted, but never really satisfactorily accounted 
                                                 
83
 Frey, Water from the Rock, 49–51; Gary B. Nash, The Forgotten Fifth: African Americans in the 
Age of Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 18–21; Kaplan, ‘“Domestic 
Insurrections’”, 249; Nash, Unknown American Revolution, 150. 
84
 Geggus, Haitian Revolutionary Studies, 36, 62–6; see also idem, ‘The French and Haitian 
Revolutions, and Resistance to Slavery in the Americas: an Overview’, Revue Français d’Histoire 
d’Outre-mer, 76 (1989), 116–7; idem, Slavery, War, and Revolution, 43, 199, 303, 442, n. 165; Dubois, 
Avengers, 106–9; Gene E. Ogle, ‘The Trans-Atlantic King and Imperial Public Spheres: Everyday 
politics in pre-revolutionary Saint-Domingue’, in Geggus & Fiering, eds., World of the Haitian 
Revolution, 79–96. 
 64
for.85 The influence of African concepts of kingship is a tantalising idea, albeit one for 
which ‘explicit evidence is lacking.’86 Comparisons can be drawn with ‘revolutionary 
traditionalists’ elsewhere, such as those in nineteenth-century Naples who fought ‘not 
for the reality of the Bourbon kingdom… but for the ideal of the “good old” society 
naturally symbolized by the ideal of the… “good old” king.’87 
From the perspective of the enslaved, it is easy to imagine the allure of the idea 
of a royal authority, standing above and beyond that of the slaveholding class, and 
thereby refuting the latter’s pretensions to absolute and unlimited power. In styling 
themselves as subjects of the king, slaves asserted the qualified and subordinate nature 
of masters’ claims over them.88 Of course, such thinking chimed closely with the 
British attitudes towards the structure of power and the role of non-whites within the 
empire that had been developing since the 1760s. Thus, when African Americans 
professed their adherence to a benign and paternal monarch in the 1770s, many British 
officials found it easier to take them seriously. 
By the summer of 1775, as rumours of slave rebellion contributed to the rapid 
deterioration of royal authority in the South, Gage warned London that ‘things are 
now come to that Crisis, that we must avail ourselves of every resource, even to raise 
the Negros in our cause.’89 Dunmore had already abandoned Williamsburg for a man-
of-war at Yorktown, where he was quietly welcoming runaway slaves.90 In July, the 
Continental Congress listed ‘Schemes… formed to excite Domestick Enemies against 
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us’ in its list of grievances justifying the colonists’ resort to force. A month later, 
another letter from London to Philadelphia claimed that ‘the Ministry have thoughts of 
declaring all your negroes free, and to arm them.’91 
 Thus far, the British government had made no public response to the 
proposals coming from the likes of Gage and Dunmore. Apparently the first airing of 
a definite metropolitan proposal to strike at colonial slavery came as late as October, 
when William Henry Lyttleton, former governor of South Carolina and Jamaica, told 
the House of Commons that he ‘was against any conciliatory offers being made’, since 
‘the honour of the nation required coercive measures’ for ‘strengthening the hands of 
government’. Observing that ‘the southern colonies… were weak, on account of the 
number of negroes in them’, he suggested that ‘if a few regiments were sent there, the 
negroes would rise, and embrue their hands in the blood of their masters.’92 
Lyttleton’s sanguinary assessment of the prospects for military intervention in the 
South was echoed by the ‘melancholly Account of the State of Georgia and S. 
Carolina’ related to John Adams in September. Two Georgians warned Adams that, 
were the commander of a token British expeditionary force to ‘proclaim Freedom to 
all the Negroes who would join his Camp, 20,000 Negroes would join it from the two 
Provinces in a fortnight.’93 
By November, Dunmore was ready to put such predictions to the test. 
Following a successful skirmish at Kemp’s Landing, on the 14th he finally issued the 
proclamation written a week earlier, and openly embarked on the course he had been 
contemplating and threatening since the end of April.94 As the seeming confirmation 
of a year’s worth of ever-more intense speculation, expectation and dread, Dunmore’s 
proclamation had an electrifying effect on whites and blacks across North America. 
Several hundred slaves had reached him by December. Three luckless runaways were 
hanged after boarding what they mistakenly thought was a British ship, and professing 
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‘their resolution to spend the last drop of their blood in lord Dunmore’s service.’95 A 
widely reprinted story from Philadelphia related how an African American had 
refused to yield the pavement to a white woman, telling her ‘Stay, you d–––d white 
bitch, till Lord Dunmore and his black regiment come, and then we will see who is to 
take the wall.’96 
The Virginia Gazette declared that ‘not in the legions of horrid hell, can come 
a devil more damn’d in evils, to top D*****e.’ His actions were branded ‘treason 
against the State’ by one Virginian, ‘for which such men as Lord Dunmore, and even 
Kings, have lost their heads.’97 George Washington declared Dunmore an ‘Arch 
Traitor to the Rights of Humanity,’ driven by ‘motives of Resentment… to a degree 
equal to the total destruction of the Colony.’ Edmund Rutledge took the view that the 
proclamation served ‘more effectually to work an eternal separation between Great 
Britain and the Colonies,– than any other expedient, which could possibly have been 
thought of.’98 
His status as ‘the first full-fledged villain’ of ‘American patriotic tradition’ has 
cast a long shadow over historical assessments of Dunmore.99 For a long time, the 
Revolutionary generation’s verdict received an uncritical echo in American 
historiography. George Bancroft concluded that ‘no royal governor showed more 
rapacity in the use of official power’. C. R. Linglley considered him ‘a pedant, a 
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cynic, barbarous in manners and sentiments, lacking in genius, irreligious, coarse and 
depraved.’100 More recent scholarship generally either sidesteps the question of 
motivation,101 or has been at pains to stress how the ‘orthodox mind’ of this ‘standard 
issue Scots-Hanoverian imperialist [was] handicapped by a rigid sense of duty, [and] a 
political tin ear’.102 He offered freedom to slaves, but ‘Dunmore was no champion of 
emancipation’; his actions were ‘rooted in expediency rather than humanitarian 
zeal.’103 Even in the context of a more or less explicit apologia for the British empire’s 
involvement in Atlantic slavery, the best that Niall Ferguson can find to say about 
Dunmore is that his offer of freedom to black Virginians ‘was not entirely 
opportunistic.’104 Most recently, Philip D. Morgan and Andrew Jackson 
O’Shaughnessy have played down his significance, arguing that when ‘considered in 
context, Lord Dunmore’s famous proclamation… represented the culmination of an 
existing trend rather than a dramatic departure,’ and that ‘furthermore, it was not a 
particularly radical statement.’105 
Of course, the notion of arming slaves did not originate with Dunmore, even, 
as we have seen, in the context of the American Revolution. Nor was he in any sense a 
rogue agent pursuing a maverick approach of his own; he informed both Gage and the 
Secretary of State of what he intended well in advance of the proclamation, and there 
is no evidence that either disapproved or tried to stop him. Dunmore was necessarily 
acting largely on his own initiative, but he did so from a frame of reference consistent 
with significant currents in the mainstream of imperial policy. His assessment of the 
situation facing him in 1775 resembled that of Gage and other British officials, who 
were themselves moving towards comparable responses. In turn, the increasing 
willingness of such individuals to consider a strategy of appealing to and mobilising 
slave dissent should be understood in light of the ways that British attitudes to empire 
and to slavery had developed over the preceding decade. Although some Britons, 
especially those with commercial ties to the Atlantic slave system, professed shock 
                                                 
100
 Both quoted in Coke, Royal Commission, 211. 
101
 See for example Quarles, ‘Lord Dunmore as Liberator’; Wood, ‘“Liberty is Sweet’”. 
102
 Mullin, Flight and Rebellion, 136; Schama, Rough Crossings, 75. 
103
 Sylvia R. Frey, ‘Between Slavery and Freedom: Virginia blacks in the American Revolution’, 
JSH, 49:3 (August 1983), 387; Frey, Water from the Rock, 63. 
104
 Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain made the modern world (London: Penguin 2004 edn.), 101. 
105
 Morgan & O’Shaughnessy, ‘Arming Slaves in the American Revolution’, 189. 
 68
and outrage at the arming of slaves, people such as Lind and Ramsay insisted that ‘the 
rebellion of America, against the laws and rights of the mother-country… cuts off 
every pretence of complaint, for their slaves having been stirred up against them.’106 
 Nevertheless, Dunmore was surely the most enthusiastic British advocate of 
turning enslaved African Americans into the king’s soldiers during the Revolutionary 
War. Of course, he was the first to actually do so, and although the approaches of 
black Virginians in April 1775 drew his attention to the possibility, there are also hints 
that the idea may have taken shape in his imagination over a much longer period. In 
1772, he had observed that Virginia’s slave population were ‘attached by no tie to 
their masters or to the country’, and that therefore ‘it is natural to suppose their 
condition must inspire them with an aversion to both, and therefore are ready to join 
the first that would encourage them to revenge themselves’. He noted that ‘the people 
with great reason tremble at the facility that an enemy would find in procuring such a 
body of men… by which means a conquest of this country would inevitably be 
effected in a very short time.’107 
 Morgan and O’Shaughnessy are undoubtedly justified in emphasising the 
longstanding precedents for the military use of slaves, and as they observe, the 
practice was actually more common in the Caribbean than on the mainland during the 
Revolutionary War.108 But Dunmore’s proclamation was surely a far more drastic 
step. It was one thing to conscript trusted slaves, usually with their masters’ consent, 
either for service overseas or to defend a colony against foreign invasion. It was quite 
another to declare them free, and incite them to run away from owners who were 
ostensibly fellow Britons. And it was still another to have them take up arms against 
those owners, wearing uniforms inscribed with the potent slogan ‘Liberty to 
Slaves’.109 Dunmore directly acknowledged and invoked African-American desires 
both for freedom, and the chance ‘to revenge themselves’, in a way that would be 
inconceivable in the West Indies before the Haitian Revolution. 
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Far from being someone who simply ‘could not comprehend the scope of the 
Revolution in Virginia,’110 the strategy that Dunmore pursued in 1775 demonstrated a 
nuanced grasp of the dynamics and tensions at work in Virginian society. As he 
observed to Dartmouth, with evident satisfaction, threatening the colonists with the 
arming of slaves had ‘stirred up fears in them which cannot easily subside, as they 
know how vulnerable they are in that particular.’ This weakness was acknowledged a 
few days later by James Madison, who warned that ‘if we should be subdued, we shall 
fall like Achilles by the hand of one that knows that secret.’111 But Dunmore was not 
concerned exclusively with slaves; it is easily forgotten that his proclamation was also 
addressed to the indentured servants who constituted the bottom tier of white 
Virginian society. In December 1774, he had predicted that the ‘middling and poorer 
sort’ of colonists ‘will suffer much sooner’ than the ‘people… of fortune’ from the 
effects of the embargo on trade with Britain. He expected that ‘the lower class of 
people… will discover that they have been duped by the richer sort’, who might be 
inclined towards ‘taking the shortest mode of supplying themselves’. The ‘quarrels 
and dissensions’ that would result might well ‘raise partisans of government.’112 
Michael McDonnell, noting how the Revolutionary situation generated 
political divisions that overlaid and reinforced existing class tensions, suggests that 
‘among the very lowest class of whites, Dunmore’s Proclamation was perhaps even 
more welcomed.’113 Certainly, the manager of George Washington’s Mount Vernon 
plantation was confident that ‘if there was no white Serv[an]ts in this Family I should 
be under no apprehension about the Slaves’. Washington himself succinctly expressed 
the anxieties of the Virginian elite. His great fear was that if Dunmore was not 
‘instantly crushed’, then ‘like a snow Ball in rolling, his army will get size–some 
through fear–some through promises–and some from inclination joining his Standard.’ 
But in this well-known passage, Washington refers to what he considered to be the 
principal and immediate threat, that of poorer whites joining the governor. He only 
then went on to warn that ‘that which renders the measure indispensably necessary, is, 
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the Negros; for if he gets formidable, numbers of th[e]m will be tempted to join who 
will be affraid to do it without.’114 
Hence, for Washington, the ultimate danger was that the disaffection of 
plebeian whites would catalyse the escalation of slave resistance. In this way, 
Dunmore’s proclamation raised the spectre of a multi-racial lower class coalition that 
had haunted the imaginations of Virginia’s rulers since the time of Bacon’s 
Rebellion,115 and which had a wider resonance in the context of Patriot fears regarding 
Tory-directed mobs composed of the ‘lower sort,’ both black and white.116 It was this 
prospect that underpinned Washington’s belief that ‘if… that Man is not crushed 
before Spring, he will become the most formidable Enemy America has,’ and that ‘the 
fate of America a good deal depends on his being obliged to Evacuate Norfolk this 
Winter.’117 
Although the proclamation ‘set off a complex chain of events that precipitated 
a major crisis for patriot leaders’, directly fuelling intense concern over the loyalties of 
poorer whites on Maryland’s Eastern Shore as well as in Virginia, Dunmore 
ultimately failed to make good Washington’s dire predictions. Through a vigorous 
campaign of threats, misinformation and exemplary punishments, the Virginians did 
their best to impede the flow of slaves answering his call to arms. A lack of 
reinforcements and supplies, combined with the decimation of his forces by smallpox 
and the defeat at Great Bridge, served to limit the immediate military impact of 
Dunmore’s actions, until he was eventually driven out of the Chesapeake altogether in 
July 1776.118 
However, in the wake of Dunmore’s proclamation, there were growing 
indications that the South might be on the brink of a major uprising. North Carolina 
was convulsed by rumours that Dunmore was planning an invasion, and that his 
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agents were working to incite the slaves. The Committee of Inspection in Maryland’s 
Dorchester County reported that ‘the insolence of the Negroes… is come to such a 
height, that we are under a necessity of disarming them’; on one occasion, eighty guns 
along with other weapons were confiscated.119 In Charleston, growing numbers of 
runaway slaves found a haven on Sullivan’s Island in the mouth of the harbour, 
commanded by the British warships to which Governor Campbell had retreated in 
September. It was widely believed that Campbell was ‘harbouring & protecting… 
those Villains,’ and probably also abetting their ‘nightly Sallies[,]… robberies and 
depredations.’ By the time a successful punitive expedition could be mounted in 
December, as many as 500 people were estimated to be on the island, many of whom 
were ultimately evacuated by the British.120 The arrival of a Royal Navy flotilla at the 
mouth of the Savannah River in 1776 had similar effects on Georgia’s black 
population. Several hundred slaves told Governor James Wright, by then himself a 
fugitive from Savannah’s Council of Safety, that ‘they were come for the King.’ By 
March, Patriot officers had decided that ‘it is far better for the public and the owners’ 
for the 200 runaways gathered on Tybee Island to be killed if they could not be easily 
captured, in order to ‘deter other negroes from deserting.’121 
For the colonists, such incidents only served as further proof of a ‘Settled plan’ 
to instigate ‘Tories & Negro Slaves to rise in our Bowels.’122 However, the course of 
events during the winter of 1775–6 indicates that a ‘settled plan’ was precisely what 
was lacking. British responses to slave unrest were generally hesitant and cautious, 
and there was certainly no attempt to emulate Dunmore, although several people 
suggested comparable measures in this period. Captain John Dalrymple recommended 
raising a force of indentured servants, convicts, and ‘the bravest & most ingenious of 
the black Slaves’ from Chesapeake ports in Virginia, Maryland and Delaware. 
Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell called for the recruitment of 1,400 ‘stout 
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Active Negroes’ from the West Indies, whose deployment on the mainland would, he 
confidently predicted, trigger massive desertions from among the local slaves.123 
Clearly, ideas about undermining slavery, and even arming slaves, were being widely 
discussed in official circles. But the submission of such proposals by individual, and 
relatively junior officers, strongly indicates that the ministry had made no definitive 
policy decisions on the issue. 
Widespread assumptions about the strength of Loyalism in the South probably 
mitigated against the sort of strategy of all-out social disruption adopted by Dunmore, 
who repeatedly pleaded in vain for reinforcements. With military efforts initially 
concentrated on the Northern colonies, the British largely missed whatever 
opportunity there might have been to exploit the widespread unrest that Dunmore’s 
proclamation had triggered in the South. When an expedition against Charleston, 
under the command of Sir Henry Clinton, was finally mounted in June 1776, it came 
to grief against the guns of Fort Moultrie, newly-erected on the same Sullivan’s Island 
where escaped slaves had been massing a few months earlier.124 
Shortly afterwards, plans for a serious insurrection in Jamaica’s Hanover 
Parish were discovered. This elaborate and extensive conspiracy had been timed to 
coincide with the withdrawal of troops destined for North America from the island. 
The prominence of creole slaves in its leadership and organisation was noted with 
concern; they were widely assumed to have been inspired by the table talk of masters 
who had ‘been too careless of Expressions’ in commending the American rebels ‘for 
Encountering Death in every form, rather than submit to Slavery let its Chains be ever 
so gilded.’125 If nothing else, the Hanover Parish plot was a dramatic reminder of the 
risks involved in any attempt to interfere with slavery. It would be over two years 
before the British again sought to mobilise the disaffection of the enslaved. 
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At the end of 1778, British forces led by Archibald Campbell invaded Georgia; 
until the end of the war, the South would be the main focus of British operations on 
the mainland. The American victory at Saratoga, and above all the intervention of 
France, soon followed by Spain, had widened the scope of the conflict, threatening a 
more general crisis of the British Atlantic empire. For London, defence of the West 
Indian colonies was now paramount, and it was not feasible to sustain offensive 
campaigns in New England whilst simultaneously transferring men to the Caribbean. 
In this situation, the South was prioritised as a potential source of food and other 
essential supplies for the West Indies. Furthermore, persistent confidence in Southern 
Loyalism raised hopes of raising extensive provincial forces, enabling Georgia and the 
Carolinas to be held with only a limited commitment of British regulars.126 
In the South, African-American initiatives quickly forced British commanders 
to confront the issue of slavery. Henry Laurens estimated that 5,000 Georgian slaves 
had run away by the time Savannah fell to Campbell’s men in January 1779. Over the 
next two years, many more blacks flocked to the redcoated armies that occupied 
Georgia and South Carolina, and advanced as far north as Virginia.127 
The inconsistent and uncertain British response to this unprecedented exodus 
was shaped by diverse and often contradictory imperatives. Welcoming the slaves of 
rebels might undermine the American war effort, and intimidate Patriot slaveholders 
into neutrality; such people were also a potential source of much needed ancillary 
manpower. Thus, in June 1779, Clinton, by then commander-in-chief in North 
America, formally offered African Americans who ‘desert[ed] the Rebel Standard… 
full security to follow within these lines any Occupation which [they] shall think 
proper.’ He went so far as to ‘strictly forbid any Person to sell or claim right over any 
Negroe, the property of a rebel, who may take refuge with any part of this Army.’ If 
Clinton’s proclamation did not explicitly refer to a change in legal status, the British 
army did raise the prospect of a route out of bondage for the thousands of Southern 
blacks who would act as pioneers, scouts, guides, and military labourers.128 
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As we have seen, Campbell was a longstanding enthusiast for the use of slaves 
as soldiers; Clinton himself expressed feelings of ‘tenderness & humanity’ for the 
Black Pioneers he had commanded in New York, who he was determined should ‘be 
intitled (as far as depends upon me) to their freedom’ at the end of the war. On 
occasion, usually in emergencies, the British armed slaves in the Southern campaign. 
Most notably, several hundred African Americans fought during the 1779 siege of 
Savannah, where their performance impressed participants from both sides.129 
However, the British generals never seriously contemplated the kind of war of 
liberation anticipated by slaves at the outset of the conflict. An indiscriminate appeal 
to all slaves risked alienating the white Loyalists whose active support formed a 
central plank of the Southern strategy. The very presence of the British army had 
caused massive economic disruption in the lower South, as slaves abandoned the 
plantations and Patriot planters fled their estates. The aim of re-establishing royal 
government in Georgia and South Carolina was hardly consistent with giving further 
encouragement to social upheavals that threatened the complete collapse of the 
plantation system. By 1780, the scale of slave desertions to the army in South Carolina 
led Clinton to issue orders for ‘such arrangements as will discourage their joining us.’ 
Not long afterwards, the military authorised the Charleston Board of Police to begin 
returning runaways to masters who had sworn the oath of allegiance to the crown. On 
at least one occasion, British troops efficiently crushed an incipient slave rebellion.130 
The thousands of African Americans who were taken by the army from 
abandoned or plundered estates were generally considered to be spoils of war whose 
title effectively devolved on the captors like any other booty. In theory, they might be 
sold, hired out, or put to work for the benefit of the military, or used to compensate 
Loyalists whose own property had been confiscated. In practice, many such people 
were undoubtedly sold for private gain or claimed as personal property, especially 
when they were seized by the irregular Loyalist units whose conduct in the latter 
stages of the war was often little removed from outright banditry. South Carolina 
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merchant John Cruden was appointed commissioner of sequestered estates, 
responsible for a hundred plantations and more than five thousand slaves 
‘sequestered’ by the British. These estates were intended to produce provisions that 
would reduce the army’s dependence on its long and precarious transatlantic supply 
line, whilst simultaneously generating profits that would go towards the support and 
compensation of white Loyalists. Cruden sought to maintain traditional plantation 
discipline, and the nominal wages due to the labourers were in practice absorbed by 
the ‘unavoidable Charges, and great’ incurred by Cruden for their maintenance.131 
For the most part, then, the British army in the South offered the enslaved a 
precarious refuge, and only when doing so offered clear military advantages. Black 
aspirations to freedom were usually considered a force to be exploited, accommodated 
or contained as expediency demanded. The self-interested cynicism that all-too often 
pervaded British attitudes was most starkly illustrated by the fate of the slaves who 
took flight en masse to join Cornwallis’s army on its final march through Virginia in 
1781. In a vain effort to conserve food supplies, they were driven out of the besieged 
British position at Yorktown, to face re-enslavement, or death from disease or 
starvation.132 
However, the latter stages of the war also offered glimpses of the sort of more 
expansive possibilities that had seemed on the brink of realisation in 1775. Brigadier 
General Alexander Leslie took command of Charleston’s embattled British garrison in 
November 1781, and began forming black military units soon afterwards. By April 
1782, there were 700 black soldiers, including the much-feared Black Dragoons, 
described by the scientist and inventor Benjamin Thompson, then commanding a 
Loyalist cavalry regiment, as the ‘Seapoy Troop.’133 
Dunmore, ordered back to America in anticipation of the successful 
subjugation of Virginia only to learn on his arrival at the end of 1781 of Cornwallis’s 
surrender, found himself with time to spare that he devoted to devising fresh ideas for 
‘making the wealth and riches of the enemy the means of bringing them to obedience’. 
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He claimed that ‘every one that I have conversed with think[s], and, I must own, my 
own sentiments perfectly coincide with theirs, that the most efficacious, expeditious, 
cheapest, and certain means… is in employing the blacks.’ Not only could slaves be 
employed ‘on much easier terms’, they were ‘perfectly attached to our sovereign’, and 
also ‘from my own knowledge of them… they are as disciplined as any set of raw men 
that I know of.’ 
In February 1782, he wrote to Clinton endorsing a proposal by Cruden to raise 
a new army of ten thousand slaves drawn from the sequestered estates for the 
reconquest of the South. Cruden had noted ‘the eagerness… in the generality of the 
people under my direction to have arms put in their hands on the incursions of the 
enemy’, and was confident ‘that they might be employed to the utmost advantage.’ He 
observed, in tones reminiscent of Dunmore’s Virginia strategy writ large, that 
‘striking at the root of all property… must bring the most violent to their senses’. 
 Recognising the controversy such a measure would provoke, Cruden argued 
that ‘embodying the most hardy, intrepid, and determined blacks’ would make slave 
resistance less likely. He was at pains to stress that the soldiers would be ‘only 
changing one master for another; and let it be clearly understood that they are to serve 
the King for ever.’ Dunmore, however, insisted on the need for generous cash 
bounties on enlistment, ‘a promise of freedom to all that should serve during the 
continuance of the war’, and raised the possibility of blacks being gradually promoted 
to non-commissioned officers.134 
Whether this rather unlikely scheme could have altered the course of the war at 
this point is doubtful. But arming so many African Americans on such terms would 
surely have dealt a formidable blow to the plantation system in the lower South, 
already devastated by disease, massive losses of slave labour, and the impact of a war 
characterised by ‘a savage, fratricidal violence that tore the fabric of society.’135 
In any case, by 1782, after Cornwallis’s surrender at Yorktown, the British 
government and high command had already accepted defeat on the mainland. The 
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fleeting prospect of the ‘empire for liberty’ waging war against slavery had passed for 
the time being. But what remained very much in the balance was the fate of the 
thousands of African Americans for whom Britain had seemed to represent their best 
chance of realising the American Revolution’s message of freedom. 
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Chapter Two 
The Diaspora of Defeat 
 
As the Revolutionary War gradually ground to an end on the mainland after 
Yorktown,  Sir Guy Carleton, British commander-in-chief in North America from 
April 1782, was charged with superintending an unprecedented movement of people 
out of the territory of the United States. Somewhere between 60–100,000 Loyalists 
left the former thirteen colonies in a migratory web that spanned the full scope of the 
British Atlantic world.1 For the white émigrés, the trauma of Britain’s defeat was 
followed by that of involuntary exile. For African Americans, the prospect of leaving 
behind the mainland slave regimes was bound up with uncertainties as to how far 
Britain would go in peacetime to honour the ambiguous commitments made by its 
commanders. This chapter traces the multiple routes by which several thousand of 
these people eventually came to the Bahamas. It first examines the very different 
experiences of émigrés from New York and the lower South. The latter included 
substantial numbers of slaveholders, keen to re-establish as much as possible of their 
old way of life, including the enslavement of the African Americans who travelled 
with them. Their initial efforts to do this, in East Florida, were largely frustrated, first 
by the chaos this sudden influx of people precipitated, then by the decision to return 
the colony to Spain in 1783. Attention then focused on the Bahamas, adjacent to 
Florida and newly-restored to British rule. The society that had developed there by 
1783, in many respects profoundly different from the rest of English-speaking 
America, and especially from the plantation societies of the South and the Caribbean, 
is examined in the second section. The final section examines how Loyalists from East 
Florida, in spite of their initial ambivalence about the Bahamas, succeeded in 
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subsuming a rather longer and more diverse sequence of migrations within a narrative 
of their own dynamic impact on the islands. 
 80
I: Exile and Emancipation: The Loyalist Diaspora in Black and White 
 
For African Americans who had willingly or unwillingly thrown in their lot with the 
forces of the crown, the period leading up to the withdrawal of the British army from 
New York, Savannah, and Charleston was an anxious time, in which the heady 
prospect of making good their escape from slavery was juxtaposed with stark 
reminders of the vulnerability and uncertainty of their position. Years later, Boston 
King, an escaped slave from South Carolina, would recall how a rumour that ‘all the 
slaves… were to be delivered up to their masters’ had ‘filled us all with inexpressible 
anguish and terror, especially when we saw our old masters coming from Virginia, 
North-Carolina, and other parts, and seizing upon slaves in the streets of New-York, 
or even dragging them out of their beds.’2 
With the war won, American slaveholders were determined to recover as many 
as possible of the thousands of slaves lost to flight and plunder. From George 
Washington downwards, authorities in the new republic insisted that the terms of the 
preliminary articles of peace of November 1782 prohibited the British from removing 
any blacks, who should be treated as fugitive slaves and returned forthwith to their 
original owners.3 
Especially in view of the ambiguous language of the Philipsburg proclamation, 
the repudiation of any commitment to Britain’s erstwhile African-American allies 
would have been a tragic but unsurprising development. However, Carleton 
disavowed any notion that ‘the King’s minister could deliberately stipulate in a treaty 
an engagement to be guilty of a notorious breach of the public faith towards people of 
any complexion.’ With London’s support, he defiantly insisted that in ‘the case of 
Negroes who had been declared free previous to my arrival… I had no right to deprive 
them of that liberty I found them possessed of.’4 Carleton’s stance was undoubtedly 
shaped by a personal and military sense of decency and probity, but it also illustrated 
how sections of British public and official opinion regarding slavery had developed in 
the course of the American Revolution. A document discussing the evacuation of 
blacks from North America asserted that simply by virtue of reaching the British 
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army, escaped American slaves had become free, ‘the British Constitution not 
allowing of slavery but holding out freedom and protection to all who came within.’5 
By insisting to Washington that ‘prior Engagements binding the National Honour… 
must be kept with all colours’, Carleton reasserted Britain’s tarnished claim to be the 
true home of ‘liberty on English principles.’6 
In New York, the evacuations, conducted under Carleton’s supervision, were 
meticulously recorded in a document known as the ‘Book of Negroes’, with claims to 
freedom assessed by a Board of Inquiry that admitted black testimony. During 1783, 
approximately three thousand ‘black Loyalists’ were transported from New York after 
being issued with certificates of freedom, or ‘free passes’.7 Most of these people 
initially took up the offer of land in Nova Scotia, but over the following decades their 
dogged efforts to realise and maintain their hard-won freedom would generate a 
diaspora stretching across the Atlantic to London and West Africa and even to the 
Pacific.8 
Between August and October 1783, around 1,000–1,500 Loyalists left New 
York to establish settlements on the Bahamian island of Abaco.9 The ‘Book of 
Negroes’ lists 95 African Americans who travelled in August on the first two 
transports, the Nautilus and the William. All of these people were described as being 
either ‘born free’ or ‘formerly the property of’ named individuals. However, they were 
                                                 
5
 ‘Précis relative to Negroes in America’, c. 1783, CO5/8/112–4, quoted in Schama, Rough 
Crossings, 150–51. Schama tentatively attributes this document to Carleton himself. However, it may 
conceivably have been the work of Carleton’s secretary during 1782–3, Maurice Morgann, the author 
of the emancipation scheme discussed at pp. 48–9 above. Morgann’s administrative role in the British 
evacuations of New York, and the possible influence of his antislavery convictions upon Carleton, have 
thus far escaped scholarly attention. 
6
 Carleton quoted in Schama, Rough Crossings, 146 (emphasis in original). 
7
 Copies of the record of the New York émigrés, known as the ‘Inspection Roll of Negroes’ or ‘the 
Book of Negroes’, exist in a number of British and American archives, and much of the document is 
now widely available online. It has also been published as Graham Russell Hodges, ed., The Black 
Loyalist Directory: African Americans in exile after the American Revolution (New York: Garland, 
1996). 
8
 On the ‘Black Loyalist disapora’, see Ellen Gibson Wilson, The Loyal Blacks (New York: Putnam, 
1976); James W. St. G. Walker, The Black Loyalists: the search for a promised land in Nova Scotia and 
Sierra Leone 1783–1870 (London: Longman, 1967); Hodges, ed., Black Loyalist Directory; Pulis, ed., 
Moving On; Mary Beth Norton, ‘The Fate of some Black Loyalists of the American Revolution’, JNH, 
58:4 (October 1973), 402–26; Schama, Rough Crossings; Cassandra Pybus, Epic Journeys of Freedom: 
Runaway slaves of the American Revolution and their global quest for liberty (Boston: Beacon Press, 
2006). 
9
 Riley, Homeward Bound, 135–47, 248, n.31; Craton & Saunders, Islanders, 1:182–5.  
 82
recorded against the ‘names of persons in whose possession they are now’.10 In a 
subsequent return of Loyalists who embarked for Abaco, the 403 blacks are described 
simply as ‘servants’. As we shall see, this system of indentured apprenticeship could 
all-too easily be translated into a form of bonded labour amounting to effective or 
even literal re-enslavement.11 
Far more African Americans left the United States in British transports from 
Savannah and Charleston between July and December 1782, including the great 
majority of those who would eventually come to the Bahamas.12 These people, far 
from Carleton’s personal scrutiny, in the heart of what remained defiantly slave 
societies, faced a far more precarious situation than that of the New York émigrés. 
The evacuations from the lower South were inevitably conducted in the context of ‘a 
bitter contest for possession of the bondmen in British lines: between patriots and 
loyalists, loyalists and the military, the banditti and the privateers.’ American 
slaveholders and state authorities, anxious to secure the restoration of the thousands of 
slaves they had lost to flight and seizure during the war, vociferously demanded the 
right to inspect shipping prior to departure. Many Loyalists expected to receive 
compensation for property confiscated by the Patriots in the shape of blacks held by 
the army, whose officers pursued their own lucrative illicit traffic in slaves in the 
months leading up to the final evacuations.13 
In South Carolina, an exasperated General Leslie, struggling to balance these 
conflicting interests in a manner consistent with Carleton’s ‘humane commands’, 
negotiated an accord with state Governor John Matthews that American-owned slaves 
‘now in my Power, shall be left here, and restored to their former Owners,… except 
such Slaves as may have rendered themselves particularly obnoxious by their 
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Attachment and Services to the British Troops, and such as have had specifick 
Promises of Freedom.’14 The precise grounds on which African Americans were to be 
deemed ‘obnoxious’, however, remained open to very divergent constructions, and 
this fragile agreement rapidly broke down.15 
 Furthermore, the ultimate legal status of ‘obnoxious’ blacks was not resolved, 
but deferred pending an ‘immediate Application… to the Commander in Chief for his 
Directions concerning them.’16 The extent, if any, of British obligations to the 
sequestered slaves was especially problematic, and never fully clarified.17 Although 
some free passes were issued to blacks in the South, there was apparently no 
systematic registration of the status of African Americans leaving Charleston and 
Savannah of the kind compiled in New York.18 In the absence of such documentation, 
hundreds, and possibly thousands of black émigrés found themselves in an ambiguous 
position, in which entitlement to freedom remained a possibility, alongside the 
prospect of effective or actual re-enslavement by white Loyalists determined to 
replace the land, slaves and other property they had lost during the war. 
 The initial destination for the bulk of Southern Loyalist émigrés was East 
Florida, the last remaining British mainland colony outside Canada. Ceded to Britain 
by Spain in 1763, East Florida had remained an underdeveloped and thinly settled 
colony prior to the American Revolution, inhabited by no more than 3,000 people, of 
whom around two-thirds were black, concentrated around the town of St. Augustine, 
and the St. Marys River area on the border with Georgia. Slaves and indentured 
servants produced rice, indigo, corn and naval stores. In the course of the war, several 
thousand Loyalist refugees and fugitives of various kinds from Georgia and the 
Carolinas had entered the colony, although relatively few permanently settled there. In 
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1782 Governor Patrick Tonyn estimated the population at 4,000 prior to the arrival of 
the evacuees from Savannah.19 
 By April 1783, somewhere between 7,500 and 13,000 émigrés from Georgia 
and South Carolina had come to East Florida.20 An analysis of one listing of 7,579 of 
these refugees indicates a broad cross-section of the societies they had left behind. 
Predictably, those Loyalists who can be traced to backcountry areas owned fewer than 
average slaves. Of 1,347 white households, slightly more than two-thirds possessed no 
slaves at all, while just 12 men accounted for over 35 percent of all the slaves 
enumerated. Strikingly, just 44 free African Americans were recorded among the 
4,519 blacks listed.21 
 A number of black Loyalists, especially soldiers, certainly left the United 
States and enslavement, independently of the main evacuations. One group who 
eventually received land in Nova Scotia probably travelled to East Florida as part of 
the provincial corps units that initially formed the new garrison of the colony. Some 
were recruited from South Carolina for military service in the West Indies, forming 
the basis of what would eventually become the West India Regiments. Others became 
maroons operating on the periphery of the plantation zone. As late as 1787, a hundred-
strong maroon band, still styling themselves ‘the King of England’s Soldiers’, were 
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raiding plantations in Georgia and South Carolina from a fortified camp in the 
swamps around the lower Savannah River.22 
 However, although many of them were surely among the people evacuated to 
East Florida, the sequestered slaves and other ‘obnoxious’ blacks remain largely 
unaccounted for. It seems likely that most were effectively in the possession of white 
Loyalist slaveholders, both during the migration and afterwards, but after the 
evacuation of Charleston, references to these two categories of African Americans, 
whose status had caused the British authorities such vexation, abruptly cease. 
Nevertheless, the brief history of Loyalist East Florida affords fleeting glimpses of a 
colony in which the fallout of the American Revolution had resulted in a marked 
blurring of the line between slavery and freedom. 
 The aftermath of war, and the sudden influx of homeless and often destitute 
people caused massive disruption in East Florida. Lawlessness and banditry were 
endemic, and with the arrival of the news that Britain had provisionally agreed to 
return the colony to Spain, the situation descended towards chaos.23 In May 1783, one 
resident reported that ‘the whole of the People in the Province are in the utmost 
Confusion, nothing going on but robbing and plundering’. By September, following 
the removal of the regular garrison, Governor Tonyn admitted that ‘Government in its 
feeble disabled condition’ had all but lost control, with the inhabitants in a state of ‘the 
utmost consternation.’ Since the end of the war, the colony had been subjected to the 
‘depredations’ of ‘rapacious, lawless and abandoned men, collected in the back 
country between this and Georgia’. Previously ‘checked only by awe of the Troops’, 
these banditti were now likely to ‘be joined in a general ravage by the lower sort of 
people of no property ever ready to take advantage of confusion and riot.’ The result 
would be that ‘the settlements will be exposed, and the Negroes plundered, from 
incentive motives of poverty, and the facility of conveying them to the back countries 
out of reach of all governments’. Tonyn also worried that the response of Florida’s 
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Creek and Chickasaw Indians to the British withdrawal ‘may be very alarming and 
dreaded’; one chief was reported to have sworn ‘Vengeance against the King that gave 
away their Country.’24 
During the final months of British occupation, some Loyalists professed 
themselves ready to ‘die with our Swords in our hands, for we are almost driven to 
despair’. The provincial corps troops were on the brink of mutiny, with some 
declaring that ‘they will rather die than be Carried to Hallifax to be discharged’. Some 
of them were said to have formed a plan ‘to burn the barracks, plunder the Town & 
take Possession of the Fort, to arm all the Negroes & to put every white Man to Death 
that opposed them keeping the Country to themselves.’25 
Amidst this state of general disorder, there was little scope for Loyalists to 
establish a stable and secure regime for the management and exploitation of enslaved 
labour. The uncertainty of land tenures discouraged large scale commercial planting, 
and  slaves were frequently hired out, or employed solely in subsistence cultivation. 
Many ran away, or were seized by the banditti.26 
In addition, the colony was inundated with what Tonyn called ‘a considerable 
influx of transient people from Georgia and Carolina, to recover their property in 
Negroes.’ In view of the ‘cruel and unrelenting severity with which they have treated 
the Loyalists who have gone into these states’, Tonyn considered himself justified in 
‘retaining Negroes they claim’.27 Another writer stated more explicitly that the 
Americans were ‘taking the Negroes that have been plundered from them during the 
War’, and went on to observe that ‘this has hurt many of them that were never legally 
condemned.’ Criticising Tonyn’s unwillingness to cooperate with the Americans, 
South Carolina Loyalist Dr. James Clitherall noted that the governor had ‘refused to 
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surrender even those negroes who were without owners and had not been condemned 
by the court of admiralty.’28 
Almost the first action of the new Spanish governor of East Florida, Vicente 
Manuel de Zéspedes, following his arrival in July 1784, was to seek ‘a prompt and 
efficacious remedy’ for the problems arising from the confused and almost lawless 
situation of the colony’s black population. The proclamation that Zéspedes issued on 
26 July was principally concerned with ‘the repeated stealing of negro and mulatto 
slaves in this province, their escape from their legitimate owners, and their 
concealment and protection by evilly disposed persons.’ However, it also required 
‘every vagrant Negro without a known owner or else a document that attests his 
freedom’ to register for a work permit. This provision acknowledged the presence in 
East Florida of a stratum of blacks who were unable to prove themselves free, but who 
in practice were not enslaved.29 At least 251 such people are known to have been 
issued permits to work in East Florida, most of them supposedly ‘fugitives from 
English-speaking masters.’30 
Furthermore, Zéspedes appears to have suspected that many black people in 
East Florida were held as slaves by Loyalists who possessed only the scantiest proof 
of legal entitlement to them. His proclamation allowed twenty days for ‘every 
person… who has in his power any Negro or Negroes, free mulatto, mulattoes, 
fugitive slaves, or slaves without known owners, to declare them’ to the Spanish 
authorities. That this measure was primarily directed at those Loyalists still to leave 
the colony is indicated by the further warning that no slave was to be shipped out of 
the colony without a written permit from the governor, on pain of their forfeiture to 
the Spanish crown.31 
The Loyalist response to Zéspedes’ proclamation is itself revealing. Charleston 
printer John Wells, by then in Nassau, published an entirely untrue report in his 
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Bahama Gazette that the blacks who had registered to receive work permits had been 
summarily shipped to Havana.32 East Florida Chief Justice James Hume expressed his 
concern that the proclamation ‘would operate against those negroes who had joined 
the British standard by invitation of generals, or commanders, and had thus become 
Free, though many of them could produce no certificate of manumission.’33 The 
sincerity of Hume’s concern for the plight of these people was somewhat called into 
question when he went on to acknowledge ‘that five out of every six slaves in the 
province were held without title deeds, that purchasers of negroes were never given 
bills of sale, and that masters could show nothing better than parole sales and 
possession.’34 
Attempting to reconstruct a coherent overall picture of the situation of émigré 
blacks in Loyalist East Florida from this tantalisingly fragmented evidence is 
inevitably a somewhat fraught undertaking. Many years ago, Joseph Lockey suggested 
that effectively East Florida at this time contained ‘four classes of Negroes’, 
consisting of ‘those absolutely free, those deserving their freedom under British 
proclamation, those belonging to British subjects known to be their owners, and those 
strolling about without known masters.’35 Of course, this is, already a long way from 
both the straightforward equation of blackness and slavery that was supposedly the 
norm in British America, and the three-tiered caste structure of whites, other free 
people, and slaves, that proved more common in practice.36 
But if anything, East Florida seems to have presented a still more complex 
state of affairs than Lockey’s schema acknowledged. The legal position of African 
Americans who had been seized from American owners was notably ambiguous. By 
the terms agreed by Carleton and Leslie, such people should only have been 
evacuated, and hence should only have been in Florida at all, if they had been deemed 
‘obnoxious’. 
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Although Carleton had never provided clear instructions regarding the 
‘obnoxious’ and sequestered slaves from Georgia and South Carolina, African 
Americans in East Florida ‘without known masters’ were now effectively free, and 
might reasonably presume that the British government, in removing them from the 
jurisdiction of the United States, had acknowledged their entitlement to freedom. 
However, there were also American blacks who found themselves in the 
possession of Loyalists who were not known to be their owners, and even those held 
by people who, as Clitherall’s remarks indicate, were known not to be their owners. If 
the British authorities would not return slaves to American owners, they were left with 
the thorny question of  whether or not there was any legitimate basis for continuing to 
treat such people as slaves at all. Conversely, if it was acceptable for African 
Americans to be treated as the property of Loyalists who could offer no better 
justification than possession, there was little to prevent slaveholders from also making 
themselves the masters of black people who had come to East Florida without masters, 
regardless of their de facto freedom. 
In the absence of detailed records, Hume’s claim that proof of legitimate 
ownership could be provided for only one in six slaves in East Florida is largely 
beyond verification. It is still less possible to know how the status of the remainder 
broke down into the categories discussed above. But it does seem both plausible and 
likely that for a significant number of African Americans, the years of war, revolution 
and displacement had undermined the basis of their enslavement, both as a legal fact 
and a lived reality.  
Ultimately, the fate of these people would depend on the capacity of the 
interested parties to contest the reality on the ground in their favour. Inevitably, this 
would be a one-sided contest, in view of the Atlantic world’s asymmetric distribution 
of power along lines of race and class. But the outcome remained very much in the 
balance in the summer of 1783, as the residents of East Florida learned that they were 
to be uprooted once again, and contemplated the prospect of seeking ‘refuge on barren 
Islands’ that were ‘only at best a fit Asylum for Pirates and Wreckers and those fond 
of a marine Way of living’.37 
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II: ‘This hitherto obscure Colony’: the pre-Loyalist Bahamas 
 
The Bahamas were one of the oldest British settlements in the Americas; the first 
English colonists, the Eleutherian Adventurers of Bermuda, arrived in 1648, prior to 
both the conquest of Jamaica and the founding of Carolina. Nonetheless, by the 1780s 
the archipelago remained a ‘marginal non-plantation colony’, thinly populated and 
underdeveloped.38 For much of the eighteenth century, the Bahamas had largely 
‘escaped the attention of the British Government’, but from 1783 onwards, an 
assortment of visitors arrived, in part to investigate the colony’s potential as a home 
for Loyalist émigrés from Florida and elsewhere. Their observations, especially the 
account of the German Johann David Schoepf, who toured North America in the 
winter of 1783–4 after serving as a surgeon to the British army, furnish an unusually 
vivid impression of ‘these Islands, so long neglected by the European powers, and 
unexplored even by the English settlers and their descendants’, on the eve of the 
Loyalist influx.39 
 The Bahamas had last drawn such attention from the wider world as one of the 
foremost bases for Atlantic piracy. In the first decades of the eighteenth century, 
amidst the complete breakdown of metropolitan control, up to 1,000 pirates used the 
Bahamas as a ‘General Rendezvous & seem to look upon those Islands as their 
own.’40 Scorning ‘all those who will submit to be governed by laws which rich men 
have made [to]… rob the Poor under the Cover of Law,’ the pirates championed a 
lifestyle of ‘Plenty and Satiety, Pleasure and Ease, Liberty and Power.’ The impact of 
their depredations on the maritime commercial arteries of Atlantic capitalism, 
including the burgeoning Atlantic slave trade, prompted a ferocious response from the 
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imperial powers.41 The restoration of royal authority in the Bahamas by Governor 
Woodes Rogers, facilitated by the deployment of four naval vessels and a hundred 
soldiers, was marked by the execution of eight pirates in December 1718.42 
 Subsequently, the colony was subject to ‘some sort of Government, but by no 
means a regular or respectable one’. In the 1780s, Loyalist émigrés would refer to 
Bahamians as ‘the Offspring and Successors of the famous Black Beard the Pirate, 
who reigned here without Countroul long before his Majesty’, and it does seem that 
‘elements of the piratical ethos remained embedded in the Bahamian consciousness’.43 
None of Rogers’ successors were forcibly deposed by armed mobs, as his 
predecessors Elias Haskett and Charles Chillingworth had been, but many of them 
struggled to cope with ‘so lawless, profligate and turbulent a people’.44 The colonial 
state machine remained in a rudimentary condition in 1784, when the only public 
buildings in Nassau were ‘a church, a gaol, and an Assembly-house’ which doubled as 
the courthouse; the gubernatorial residence was a rented private house.45 
 At this point, the Bahamas contained around 4,000 people, 60 percent of them 
on the island of New Providence. Most of the remainder lived in the long-established 
settlements on Eleuthera and the adjacent Harbour Island, with a handful of relatively 
recent settlers on some of the other Out Islands.46 
 Nassau, the capital on New Providence, was described by Schoepf as a ‘little 
town’, populated by ‘a few royal officials, divers merchants, shipbuilders and 
carpenters, skippers, pilots, fishermen, and what laborers are needed’. The wooden 
houses were ‘lightly built and of simple construction’, with few glazed windows. Even 
the ‘one tolerably regular street’ was unpaved, and Samuel Kelly, another visitor in 
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1784, related how his ‘heels were often bruised and the feet injured on sharp rocks and 
small stones through the streets of Nassau’. Licit commerce was confined to the 
‘Bourse’, a building on the waterfront where people came ‘throughout the day’ both to 
transact business and ‘to hear or retail the news’.47 
 Few travellers of the early 1780s visited Harbour Island and Eleuthera, and 
they were largely ignored by the émigrés in favour of emptier (and often warmer) Out 
Islands. As late as 1790, it was reported that the inhabitants were ‘all Natives born in 
the two Islands’, and one Loyalist claimed that of 58 families on Harbour Island ‘only 
five different surnames are found’. The islanders were said to be ‘so poor that they are 
not able to pay’ the usual fees for ‘Marrying, Burying, & Baptizing’. Their clothes 
were simple and light, seldom consisting of ‘more than a frock Shirt, and Trousers’ 
and hats made of palm leaves. Shoes were generally worn only on Sundays. The 
Harbour Islanders had built a small church, although in 1786 it remained ‘without a 
pew or Seat of any kind’; Eleuthera had no church, and its 800 or so residents, mostly 
unable to read, possessed ‘but little knowledge of Religion’. Despite their poverty, the 
people of these islands were reputed to ‘hardly know what Sickness is’, and to be 
‘remarkable for their longevity’.48 
A 1785 report on the state of the Bahamas noted that ‘Planting was never 
hitherto an object of attention’, a view that outsiders had been echoing, and generally 
bemoaning, for much of the preceding century.49 Most observers had little doubt that 
the principal cause of the paucity of agricultural development in the colony was the 
Bahamians themselves, ‘an indolent set of Men, who never made it a first Object, or 
properly attended to it.’ Peter Henry Bruce, an engineer of Scottish and Prussian 
extraction employed in Nassau in the 1740s, observed that ‘it is their own fault if the 
inhabitants want any of the necessaries of life’, since ‘they neither sow nor plant more 
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than is necessary for maintaining their own families.’ Likewise, lieutenant John 
Wilson reported in 1784 that ‘the Bahamas have hitherto remained in an uncultivated 
state owing to the indolence of the inhabitants who pay no attention to the 
improvement of their land’.50 
 Woodes Rogers had complained in 1719 that Bahamians seemingly preferred 
to ‘live poorly and indolently with a seeming contentment’, since ‘for work they 
mortally hate it’. Little had changed by 1784, when Schoepf observed that ‘of severe 
work they know nothing and do not want to know anything.’ But he too believed that 
‘their poverty does not keep them from being heartily content’, since they preferred to 
‘drink up their gains and dance away the time’; Kelly remarked with more distaste that 
‘the inhabitants of Nassau were dissipated in the extreme…from night revels’.51 
 Bahamians’ willingness to ‘content themselves with whatever is produced by 
nature without being at any trouble to assist it’ owed something to the apparent natural 
abundance of the islands. Despite being thin and ‘everywhere rocky and stony’, the 
Bahamian soil’s surprising fertility was often commented on.52 Schoepf found that ‘in 
the wild state every spot is over-grown’, and a wide range of exotic fruits and plants, 
such as oranges, lemons, pineapples, bananas, figs, cocoa, grapes, and coffee beans 
‘of the best taste’, were said to ‘grow in these islands with very little trouble.’ The 
islanders supplemented their diet with an assortment of local wildlife, including birds, 
feral pigs, turtles, and iguanas up to three feet in length, in addition to fish and crab. 
Woods such as mahogany and lignum vitae grew extensively, and the salt ponds on 
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Turks and other Out Islands offered another valuable and readily marketable 
commodity.53 
 The longstanding inclination towards ‘a marine way of living’ in the Bahamas 
stemmed from the practicalities of exploiting these resources as well as longstanding 
cultural tradition. Bahamian ships ventured to the more remote Out Islands in search 
of the most abundant stocks of timber, game, fish, and salt, before carrying these 
articles both to New Providence and ports in America and the West Indies. Wrecking 
was another perennial pursuit of many Bahamian mariners. Recovering cargo from the 
many vessels that fell foul of the islands’ intricate and hazardous navigation offered 
the prospect of lucrative windfall gains. Although wreckers had thereby also ‘save[d] 
the lives of many people’, rumours of their unscrupulousness over the fate of stranded 
crews had always abounded; wrecking was also often said to be a thinly-veiled pretext 
for the sale of smuggled goods.54 
 Extensive viceregal powers over the Bahamas had been granted in 1670 to six 
of the Lords Proprietors of Carolina. Although the Proprietors’ interest in the colony 
quickly waned, in the 1780s their heirs remained the formal owners of most Bahamian 
land. In practice, this had given rise to extensive customary commoning rights, 
whereby, for instance, ‘every man can fell wood as it pleases him and wherever he 
finds it’. This state of affairs was also another impediment to sustained and intensive 
cultivation, since the majority of islanders who could claim ‘no other Title to their 
lands but that of Possession’ rarely bothered to ‘improve one Tract longer than two or 
three Years, when they explore some new Spot and cultivate the same, until it begins 
to grow impoverished’.55 
 Nonetheless, subsequent claims by Loyalist émigrés, boasting of their own 
‘uncommon exertions in Planting and Commerce’, that these had been ‘objects before 
little understood or wholly neglected’ in the Bahamas were overstated. In 1784, staple 
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foods such as corn, yams, plantains and potatoes were cultivated on all the settled 
islands, and the Out Islanders grew sugar cane for their own use. Citrus fruits, 
especially limes, were exported ‘in great quantity’ to North America, and one New 
Providence fruit plantation was said to have turned a profit equivalent to over £400 
sterling in a single year. Bahamian pineapples could fetch up to eight shillings each in 
London, and Schoepf reported that ‘many acres of land are every year set with this 
excellent fruit’.56 Cotton, which took ‘quick and strong hold of the rocky soil’, was 
already being grown with some success, especially on Cat and Long Islands.57 Many 
stories circulated of how ‘very poor’ people who had ‘attended to the cultivation of 
it… have in a few years, become wealthy’, such as Pennsylvanian Abraham Pratt, who 
had supposedly ‘acquired a Fortune of Five or Six Thousand Pounds’ through planting 
cotton on Cat Island in the 1770s.58 
 However, the extent of pre-Loyalist Bahamian agriculture should not be 
exaggerated. By one estimate, ‘at the utmost there were not 500 acres of cultivated 
land upon all these Islands’ in 1784. As well as manufactured goods, the colony relied 
on imports of meat, rice, wheat and butter from Europe and North America.59 Even 
the more commercially-oriented farmers on Long Island spent much of their time 
felling timber, while Schoepf reckoned that on New Providence, ‘the so-called 
planters work, all told, perhaps not more than two, at most three months in the year.’ 
A Georgian Loyalist who visited the colony in 1783 ‘to see, whether I could settle in 
this Country, with any prospect of advantage’ considered it ‘very doubtful, whether 
more than 8 or 10 Negroes, could be profitably employed on any one Plantation I have 
seen’.60 
 In the absence of the sort of large scale, export-oriented plantation systems 
found in the Caribbean and the American South, the Bahamas in 1784 were very 
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much a ‘society with slaves’, in which ‘slavery was just one form of labor among 
many’, and ‘no-one presumed the master-slave relationship to be the social exemplar.’ 
Ira Berlin observes that ‘superficially, slavery in such societies might appear milder’, 
and that ‘slaveholdings… were generally small, and the line between slave and free 
could be remarkably fluid, with manumission often possible’.61 
 Indeed, it was and is not at all clear how many of the roughly 2,300 Bahamians 
described as ‘people of colour’ in 1784 were slaves. Although most accounts state that 
‘a great proportion… were free’,62 the failure of almost all comprehensive Bahamian 
population counts up to this point to differentiate free and enslaved non-whites is 
surely revealing in itself. Notably, free people of colour had had to be arrested and 
whipped to enforce their compliance with the 1734 census, which had drawn such a 
distinction.63 Nonetheless, it seems likely that, at any rate, the Bahamas were a society 
with a lot of slaves, especially on New Providence, where the ratio of whites to blacks 
was around 9/5 in 1773.64 
 Berlin emphasises that ‘neither mildness nor openness defined societies with 
slaves’, and it should be stressed that there was nothing benign about pre-Loyalist 
slavery. The slave code enacted in 1767 sanctioned the death penalty for slaves 
convicted of damage or theft of property valued at six shillings or more. Slaves who 
assaulted whites were to suffer a whipping for a first offence, facial branding or 
mutilation for a second, and the gallows for a third. Whites who killed slaves ‘by 
accident’ were ‘not liable to any punishment therefore, but the owner’s action by law 
for the value of the Negro or other slave’. Black people were of course barred from 
testifying against whites, ‘except in matters of debt’. Manumitted non-whites were 
distinguished from those born free by being subject to the same criminal penalties and 
summary mode of trial as slaves; people of both categories could forfeit their freedom 
for harbouring runaways, or for non-payment of fines. Another statute of 1768 
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restricted manumission by requiring payment of a £90 bond for the good behaviour of 
freedpeople.65 
The extent to which these regulations were actively and consistently enforced 
is impossible to gauge, and many of the provisions might best be taken as a statement 
of intent on the part of the legislators. Overt acts of resistance, however, could 
certainly prompt an indiscriminate ruthlessness. Peter Henry Bruce relates an incident 
from the 1740s when a slave who had fired at and wounded an overseer ‘was hanged, 
and his innocent companion was also hanged, to bear him company.’ On Harbour 
Island and Eleuthera, masters largely enforced their own disciplinary and behavioural 
norms directly, without recourse to law. An Anglican missionary there was told by 
‘two or three of the principal Men in this place… that if they saw any of their Slaves 
with Books in their Hands they would cut them to pieces, for they were only made to 
work & serve them.’66 
 Nonetheless, the experience of black people in the Bahamas was contrasted 
favourably with that in the plantation societies by observers well acquainted with 
‘those many instances of oppression, extortion, and cruelty’ that characterised the 
latter. Olaudah Equiano had a brief sojourn in New Providence in the spring of 1767, 
after being shipwrecked en route to Georgia. During his stay, he ‘met with many 
friends’ among the island’s ‘free black people… who were very happy’, and ‘gave me 
encouragement to stay there with them.’ Indeed, he acknowledged that ‘had not my 
heart been fixed on England, I should have stayed, as I liked the place extremely.’ 
Schoepf had himself witnessed ‘the inhuman and cruel treatment’ meted out on ‘the 
rice plantations of the mainland’, and aired his disdain for Bahamians who were able 
to ‘live by the sweat of their slaves’. But he similarly claimed that ‘even the blacks 
here take part in the general contentment. They are everywhere of a better appearance, 
breathing happiness; strong, well-fed, and of a decent demeanour.’67 
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 In some respects, racial boundaries in the Bahamas could be notably imprecise 
and flexible. By the terms of the 1756 ‘Act to ascertain who shall not be deemed 
Mulattoes’, individuals who were ‘above three degrees removed’ in lineal descent 
from a ‘negro ancestor’ were entitled to ‘all the privileges and immunities of his 
Majesty’s white subjects’. Craton and Saunders argue that this law was principally 
‘designed to limit upward mobility and reinforce white dominance’, and it certainly 
both invoked and re-affirmed an existing hierarchy of phenotypical privilege. But it 
also provided at least some explicit legal confirmation of the civil and political rights 
of Bahamians who, elsewhere, would surely have been regarded as ‘people of colour’: 
it has been estimated that by the 1770s as many as one in five Bahamians ‘were 
neither unequivocally black nor white, and neither slave nor fully free.’68 
 With the frontiers of race so loosely defined, it was sporadically possible for 
things to happen that would have been almost inconceivable elsewhere in anglophone 
America, or indeed in the Bahamas themselves in the nineteenth century. From 1699–
1701, the colony was ruled by deputy Governor Read Elding, a ‘mulatto captain’ who 
had previously led expeditions against piracy.69 In June 1784, the House of Assembly 
passed ‘a Bill for granting certain privileges to John Kemp a Man of Colour’. This 
may well have been the same John Kemp who had been elected to the Assembly in 
April, but had not taken the ‘usual oaths’ administered to new members, and whose 
‘five prime Country Born Negroes’ where sold at auction after his death in 1790.70 
 More mundanely, Bahamian non-whites might ‘own houses and plantations, 
and others are even put in command of small vessels’. Many slaves in New 
Providence worked on self-hire conditions, under which ‘by paying a small weekly 
sum, they are left undisturbed in the enjoyment of what they gain by other work.’ 
They often made a living in the same way as ‘the poorer white inhabitants’, by 
fishing, hunting, cutting wood and wrecking.71 
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 The experience of labouring side by side at much the same kind of work could 
result in interactions between black and white Bahamians reminiscent of the kind of 
‘sawbuck equality’ that had often characterised race relations in the American South 
and elsewhere before the rise of the plantation complex.72 Nor were the Bahamas any 
exception to the pattern of an ‘Atlantic maritime culture’ incorporating ‘strong 
egalitarian impulses that frequently confounded the strict racial etiquette of slave 
societies’.73 Richard Nisbet, an idiosyncratic antislavery writer (and slaveholder) from 
St. Vincent, related an encounter with two Bahamian wrecking vessels whose crews 
‘consisted chiefly of about fourteen or fifteen active, robust, animated and intelligent 
Negroes’. He was much impressed by the ‘cordial congratulations and inquiries’ 
between them and ‘their old master’ as an instance of ‘the best affections of human 
nature, void of art and disguise’.74 
 Wrecking held out the potential of handsome gains for black sailors, and this 
was even more the case when imperial conflict presented opportunities for the 
unequivocally predatory maritime activities to which the islands’ location was ideally 
suited. Adjacent to the Gulf Stream and the major Atlantic trade routes, Bahamian 
mariners were well aware that ‘in time of War no part of the World is better calculated 
for annoying and distressing our Enemies,’ and that, moreover, privateering could be 
an incredibly lucrative pursuit. Governor John Tinker claimed in 1748 that it was 
possible for ‘a Common Seaman, nay a Negroe Slave,… [to] step on board a Privateer 
and in a Six week Cruise return often with a Booty of a hundred pound Sterling to his 
share.’75 
 Initially, this was very much the case when, from 1778, the intervention of 
continental European powers turned the American Revolutionary War into a global 
imperial struggle. Between June 1780 and April 1782 at least 127 prize vessels were 
condemned at Nassau’s vice-admiralty court. However, New Providence was poorly 
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defended, and the two week occupation in 1776 by an America expedition had shown 
that the colonists had little stomach for serious resistance against a superior invader. 
On 6 May 1782, Governor John Maxwell surrendered the Bahamas to a Spanish-
American invasion force led by the captain-general of Havana, comprising over 50 
warships and transports and 2,000 soldiers.76 
Although a substantial garrison was stationed in Nassau, the subsequent 
occupation’s impact was relatively limited. Most colonial officials remained in post, 
British courts continued to operate, and the Spanish presence in the Out Islands was 
negligible. It was never likely that Spain would permanently retain the islands, and 
their return to British rule was provisionally agreed upon in the preliminary articles of 
peace agreed in Paris in January 1783. However, as negotiations over the final treaty 
dragged on into the spring, Loyalists in East Florida impatient with the speed of ‘the 
great Engines by which Government is upheld’ decided to take matters into their own 
hands.77 
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III: The ‘Loyalist’ Migration to the Bahamas 
 
Andrew Deveaux, jr., variously ascribed the ranks of colonel, lieutenant colonel and 
major by different sources, was the son of a wealthy South Carolina planter, and 
sometime commander of a Loyalist unit called the ‘Royal Forresters’. Early in 1783, 
he assembled a motley band of about 70 East Florida Loyalist émigrés, who set out in 
six small ships on 1 April to seize the Bahamas from the 600 strong Spanish garrison 
commanded by Don Antonio Claraco y Sanz. Deveaux, ‘by an allowable artifice’, 
exaggerated his strength and bluffed Claraco into surrendering on 18 April. 
 This unlikely and largely bloodless victory undoubtedly made for a good story, 
one that even ‘attracted the King’s particular attention’. Of course, the reluctance of 
the Spanish troops to put up a serious fight probably owed less to ‘the intrepid and 
spirited conduct of Major Deveaux’ than to the fact that news of the treaty returning 
the Bahamas to Britain reached Nassau a few days before he did.78 
 In due course, this almost wholly inconsequential feat of arms would take on 
the status of ‘the central legend’ in Bahamian Loyalists’ mythicised version of their 
own history. For a long time, the historiography dutifully echoed the story of ‘this 
brilliant exploit’ as ‘a Loyalist victory’ conducted with ‘a degree of gallantry and 
address that have seldom been equalled.’79 Less convenient details were ignored or 
played down. The Bahamian contribution to the expedition, including ‘almost the 
entire male population and most of the local ships’ from Harbour Island, greatly 
outweighed the Loyalist element; many, perhaps most of these people were black, as 
indeed were at least some of the contingent from Florida.80 
 The white émigrés lost little time in framing their relocation to the Bahamas in 
similar terms, as a heroic narrative of Loyalists’ ‘voluntary sacrifice’ for the sake of 
their ‘most animated regard, and affection, for the parent state’, and their attachment 
to ‘the best of Kings’. They had ‘chose, to explore, unsettled and unknown countries, 
in quest of new habitations under her mild and equitable authority’. From their arrival, 
the Bahamas were to be ‘considered as altogether a New Country’, since it was ‘from 
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that period [that] their importance as a colony may be dated.’ There, ‘their exertions 
and industry’ were such that ‘in the term of no more than three years’ they had 
‘rescued the Bahamas from insignificance’.81 The blatantly self-aggrandizing nature of 
this account of the post-Revolutionary migration to the Bahamas will be readily 
apparent. As with Deveaux’s taking of Nassau, a rather complicated and many-sided 
process was reduced to a more straightforward story of white Loyalist agency that 
wilfully obscured the roles of various other factors and protagonists. 
 For the majority of émigrés who came to the Bahamas via East Florida, theirs 
was anything but a voluntary sacrifice, or even a willing one. By 1783, East Florida 
had become the focus of Southern Loyalist efforts to build new lives within the British 
empire.82 For many Loyalists, the decision to return the colony to Spain was ‘the 
severest shock our feelings have ever had to struggle with.’ They had come to regard 
their possession of East Florida as a due compensation for having ‘borne arms, 
exposed our lives and sacrificed our properties, encountering innumerable hardships 
in the service of Britain’. Now, they were ‘abandoned by their Prince’, and ‘plunged 
in the torrent of misery and despair’ by ‘the unprecedented cruelty of the British 
parliament’, who, it seemed, on finding ‘no further occasion for their services treat 
them with contempt and mock their sorrows’. For many Loyalists, it was not ‘the 
pleasing consolation, of having preferred our duty, to our interest’ that brought them 
to the Bahamas with ‘minds buoy’d up above the sense of sufferings’. Rather, it was 
the ‘satisfaction’ of recalling, as the young South Carolinian exile John Mulryne 
Tattnall put it, ‘that it was not I who deserted my King but my King that deserted me’. 
In a few years, Tattnall would be venting his resentments in violence against Nassau’s 
black community.83 
 Loyalists’ reluctance to leave East Florida also reflected the unattractiveness of 
the options for resettlement. Official confirmation that the colony was to be evacuated 
left many residents ‘quite at a loss how to dispose of themselves.’ Governor Tonyn 
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observed that ‘the unremitting heat of the climate is with many a formidable 
objection’ to going to the Caribbean, while conversely, Nova Scotia was ‘too cold a 
climate for those who have lived in the Southern Colonies’. The Bahamas were ‘mere 
rocks, fit only for fishermen, and the Inhabitants live chiefly by wrecking’.84 
 Aside from such climatic preferences, however, slavery was a key factor 
constraining Loyalists’ choice of destinations. Slaves were crucial to ‘the hopes of 
southern Loyalists for a continuation of their accustomed life in British America’. 
They were also the only readily moveable property that most émigrés possessed, and 
slave prices in East Florida collapsed in 1783–4 amid the rush to liquidate assets prior 
to departure.85 The sugar colonies demanded ‘a greater capital than in general they 
possessed’, and in June 1783, an address to Tonyn protesting the abandonment of East 
Florida was in no doubt that ‘neither Nova Scotia nor the Bahama Islands can answer 
for commodious habitations to the owners of Slaves.’86 
 The reports of Loyalists who visited the Bahamas in the summer of 1783 
largely confirmed this impression. Georgian Lewis Johnston’s ‘expectations’ as to 
whether enslaved labour might be profitably exploited there, ‘tho’ by no means 
sanguine’ were ‘cruelly disappointed’ by what he saw, leaving him ‘as much at a loss 
as ever where to direct my Steps’. In large part, it was the absence of ‘better 
prospects’ that left Johnston, like many of the other ‘Principal Inhabitants’ of East 
Florida who signed the June address, ‘obliged to return to this poor Country.’87 
 Despite the East Florida Loyalists’ sense of having been abandoned and even 
betrayed by Britain, their ‘distressed situation’ was a ‘matter of much perplexity and 
embarrassment’ to the imperial government. That around a quarter of the white 
émigrés eventually went to the Bahamas also owed something to the efforts of ‘the 
King’s Servants to provide an asylum for those unfortunate people.’ In September, 
Lord North recommended to the Council for Plantation Affairs that ‘if the Soil of the 
Bahama Islands was vested in His Majesty they would afford means of Settlement, 
Subsistence and Improvement to many of those meritorious Subjects’, singling out 
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cotton as ‘an Article that may be produced there in very considerable Quantities’. In 
the 1780s, cotton was largely an unknown quantity for émigrés from the lower South, 
but the prospects of free land and free transportation that North outlined in a letter to 
Tonyn of December surely helped make the Bahamas seem like slaveholders’ least 
worst choice for resettlement.88 
 Nonetheless, the evacuation was a protracted affair. By April 1784, when the 
first government transport sailed, up to a thousand East Florida émigrés had already 
arrived in the Bahamas, including the veterans of the King’s Carolina Rangers who 
established the settlement at Spencer’s Bight on Abaco.89 The last transport did not 
leave Florida until September 1785. Documentation of the migration is predictably far 
from complete: according to one partial return compiled at the point of departure, 
1,033 whites and 2,214 blacks had left East Florida for the Bahamas by 1786. These 
figures probably exclude people travelling via private shipping.90 Working from the 
opposite direction, using Bahamian demographic sources, raises other issues. As 
Craton and Saunders observe, ‘the population changes brought about by the Loyalist 
migration are difficult to assess with complete accuracy because of inefficient 
censuses and constant re-migration.’91 
But in some respects, the greatest problem for the 1780s is not so much a lack 
of evidence, as what amounts to almost a surfeit of apparently inconsistent 
information from various sources. Of these, two have been cited most often by 
modern historians. The first is the ‘State of the Population, Agriculture, &c. of the 
BAHAMA ISLANDS in June, 1788’ in William Wylly’s 1789 Short Account of the 
Bahama Islands, said to have been ‘carefully collected from particular Returns 
received from the particular Islands.’ The other source is the ‘Report of the Committee 
appointed to take into consideration the State of the Bahama Islands’, endorsed by the 
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House of Assembly in April 1789.92 Typically, the secondary literature acknowledges 
(and often directly reproduces) Wylly’s data, before asserting, with varying degrees of 
confidence and qualification, that 1,600 whites and 5,700 blacks settled in the islands, 
for a total of 7,300 Loyalist émigrés.93 These numbers are arrived at by simply 
aggregating the estimates of population increase since 1784 presented in the 1789 
report. 
Wylly’s data are rather more detailed than the report, providing figures for the 
distribution of the ‘old’ and ‘new’ colonists across the individual islands. 
Unfortunately, they are notably vague regarding the overall numbers of whites and 
free people of colour, and hence do not do not readily lend themselves to a clear 
reckoning of the total population in 1788. Nevertheless, Wylly only lists a total of 
3,762 ‘new’ slaves, which, even adding the 350 ‘people of Colour, either free, or 
pretending to be so’ mentioned in Wylly’s text, falls markedly short of the 1789 
report’s 5,700 black arrivals.94 In turn, even these numbers are far greater than those 
of the 1786 ‘Return of Persons who emigrated from East Florida’, according to which 
just 3,247 Florida evacuees went to the Bahamas.95 
However, with careful scrutiny and the use of some neglected additional 
sources, it is possible to largely reconcile these discrepancies, and arrive at a hopefully 
more accurate estimate of the number of Loyalists in the Bahamas. Firstly, let us re-
consider the 1789 report. This document states that there were 1,700 whites and 2,300 
blacks in the Bahamas in 1784, and that by 1786, 1,200 whites and 3,600 blacks had 
arrived. By 1789, there were said to be a further 400 whites and 2,100 blacks. Of this 
increase, only the first 1,200 whites are explicitly described as ‘Loyalists’.96 
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Considering that the evacuations of New York and East Florida were effectively 
complete by the end of 1785, with the last government transport leaving Florida by 
September, it does indeed seem eminently probable that the overwhelming majority of 
Loyalist émigrés from North America had reached the Bahamas by 1786.97 
Another important set of population statistics for the 1780s appears in a 
document entitled ‘A Circumstantial view of the Bahama Islands’, dating from the 
‘latter part of the year 1785, being twelve months after the accession of the Loyal 
Refugees from the province of East Florida.’ Although at least four versions of this 
document exist in various manuscript collections, all are anonymous, and only one has 
any explicit indication of the date of compilation; this may accounts for the minimal 
use historians have made of it.98 The ‘Circumstantial view of the Bahama Islands’ 
gives the ‘old’ population as 1,722 whites, and 2,333 ‘Coloured’, with 1,226 ‘new’ 
whites and 3,673 non-whites.99 In one version of the document, the number of ‘new 
Inhabitants’ is said to be ‘ascertained from the Ration and Donation Lists’, and that of 
‘the Old Inhabitants from the poll Tax, Old Muster Rolls and parish Registers.’100 This 
information was certainly available in the Bahamas during the 1780s; a 1789 
newspaper article presents the same totals of the old and new populations in 1785.101 
These numbers also correspond very closely with those in the 1789 report for the 
population in 1784 and 1786; quite possibly the committee of the House of Assembly 
that produced the 1789 report simply rounded the 1785 figures to the nearest hundred. 
A summary of Wylly’s ‘State of the Population’ in June 1788 was sent to the 
Secretary of State around 1790 by lieutenant John Mowbray, a naval officer and 
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planter who had spent ten months in the Bahamas before returning to England.102 
Although this version lacks any breakdown of the population by islands, it does 
include figures for the total white and free coloured populations, making it possible to 
calculate totals of 1,720 old whites, 2,324 old non-whites, and 1,320 new whites and 
3,912 new blacks. The first set of numbers is almost identical with those in the 1785 
‘Circumstantial View’, and the 1789 report, strongly suggesting a common source. 
What remains to be accounted for is the slightly larger ‘new’ population in the 
1788 data, and the bigger increase of 2,500 people between 1786–9 mentioned in the 
1789 report. While there may have been stragglers who stayed in East Florida until 
after the official evacuation had been completed, there were reportedly no more than 
1,500 British residents still in Florida by the time Governor Zéspedes arrived in June 
1784, and at least 500 of them stayed. Although individuals and family groups, 
including William Wylly himself, continued to arrive from Britain, Canada and 
elsewhere in the later 1780s, there is nothing to indicate any further mass migrations 
of Loyalists after 1785.103 
However, there were other substantial groups of immigrants in this period. In 
1787, a group of 187 evacuees from St. Andreas, on the Mosquito Shore, settled on 
Andros.104 These people can plausibly account for much of the difference in the 
numbers of ‘New Inhabitants’ between the 1785 ‘Circumstantial View’ and 1788 
‘State of the Population’; notably, the former does not include any new settlers on 
Andros, whereas the latter lists 132 slaves and 22 white families.105 
Crooked Island was apparently uninhabited in 1785, and is described as ‘newly 
settled’ in 1788, when there were 357 slaves but only 5 white ‘heads of families’. 
Cotton planters from Grenada had begun relocating to the island with their own slaves 
by 1789, and at least 700 people were reported to be living there in 1790. Similarly, 
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the Caicos Islands were first settled in 1787, and the 214 slaves there in 1788 had 
increased to 600 by 1790, partly augmented by migrating planters from Bermuda and 
Grenada.106 
 Finally, the Bahamas began to import slaves in substantial numbers from 1788. 
Almost 800 Africans arrived in 1788 and 1789 (along with several hundred more 
slaves from the West Indies). These are the ‘New Negroes Imported for sale’ who are 
explicitly described in the 1789 report as forming part of the 1786–9 population 
growth.107 
The bulk of that growth can be satisfactorily ascribed to these various post-
Loyalist arrivals. That a substantial portion of it was derived from the transatlantic 
slave trade also helps to explain the disproportionate increase in the black population 
after 1786. Therefore, the most plausible estimate of the overall scale of the 
immediate post-Revolutionary migration from the mainland is provided by the figures 
that appear in the 1789 report and the 1785 ‘Circumstantial View’, of around 1,200 
whites and 3,600 blacks. 
The white Loyalists, of course, were the immigrants who drew most attention 
to themselves, and who pronounced their arrival to be a singularly pivotal event in 
Bahamian history. Certainly, their settlement can plausibly be seen as a catalyst for 
much of the subsequent immigration from elsewhere. But in Bahamian historiography, 
a rather diverse assortment of immigrants during the 1780s, who came from Central 
America, the Caribbean and Africa as well as North America, has too often been 
lumped together with, and obscured by, the convenient formula of ‘the Loyalist 
migration’. 
Nor will the generally accepted view that, aside from the New York group, the vast 
majority of the African Americans who arrived in the Bahamas with the Loyalists 
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‘unequivocally remained chattel slaves’ bear much critical scrutiny.108 Although the 
handful of extant returns of the arrival of East Florida émigrés in the Bahamas (largely 
compiled, one assumes, either by or with the assistance of white Loyalists) do appear 
to support this interpretation,109 in the absence of complete records, it is a matter of 
plausible assumption rather than evidence. In view of the complexities and 
ambiguities attendant on the status of African Americans in East Florida explored in 
section I, it seems very reasonable to infer that a substantial proportion of the black 
émigrés were people for whom revolution and migration had offered an escape from 
the rigours of the mainland slave regime, or even a tantalising taste of life as free 
people. The very different, and often contradictory aspirations of émigrés and 
Bahamians, black and white, would be dramatically played out over the following 
years. 
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Chapter Three 
Rescuing the Bahamas from Insignificance: Transformations, 
Compromises, and Resistance in the 1780s 
 
The migrations of the 1780s profoundly affected the Bahamas. If the scale of the 
immediate post-revolutionary influx of Loyalists and African Americans has usually 
been overstated, its demographic impact alone was still enormous and far-reaching. 
Between 1783–5, the colony’s population more than doubled, and in 1789 the islands 
contained nearly three times as many people as in 1783. At that time, the ratio of 
white to ‘coloured’ inhabitants was almost even; by 1785, it was less than one to two. 
As well as rapidly increasing, the population’s distribution across the islands changed 
markedly. Nearly two-thirds of Bahamians had lived on New Providence before the 
migrations. In 1788, the proportion had fallen to about forty percent. The ‘old 
inhabitants’ largely stayed where they were, while three-fifths of the immigrants took 
up residence on Abaco and southern Out Islands that had previously been populated 
either sparsely or not at all.1 
But the Loyalist émigrés envisaged that the Bahamas ‘will soon prove, 
respectable’ in terms of far more than merely ‘the number of their inhabitants’. The 
islands were also to be their means of securing ‘those rewards, and that compensation, 
we have a right to expect from the justice, and benevolence of the nation’. The story 
of how the Bahamian Loyalists sought to realise their ‘driving ambition to remake 
their fortunes and to assume positions of leadership in the government’ has often been 
told.2 In doing so, reliance on their own words and documents, which constitute so 
much of the evidence that has come down to us, has been largely unavoidable. But the 
extent to which those words have been taken at face value is regrettable, in view of 
how readily Loyalists re-imagined their own history. 
 Moreover, most white Loyalists, including the Southerners from East Florida, 
were the kind of people described by Governor John Maxwell as ‘Clerks, Apprentices, 
Discharg’d Soldiers, Paupers, and Vagabonds.’ Historians have sometimes recognised 
the presence of ‘the poorer sort, who constitute by far the greatest part’ of the 1,200 or 
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so white émigrés.3 But the term ‘Loyalist’ is still routinely used as a shorthand for the 
hundred or so ‘White Male Heads of Families’, mostly from the lower South, who 
were fairly substantial slaveholders, and often from mercantile or professional 
backgrounds.4 This elitist bias reflects the content of the available sources. Like 
Maxwell, the ‘better sort’ of Loyalists regarded the plebeian majority as ‘the Dregs of 
an unfortunate and Licentious Army’. Insofar as people lacking ‘the Dignity & Rank 
of any Person of Character in an elevated Station of Life’ mattered at all, it was 
merely because their numbers lent credence to claims that ‘Loyalists constitute a large 
proportion of the population’. For now, it is rarely possible to do more than 
acknowledge how little is known about the fate of such people outside of the isolated 
and insular bastions of white separatism that later emerged on Abaco.5 
 The agenda of the Loyalist ‘aristocratic planter-merchant class’ for the future 
of the Bahamas corresponds closely to Ira Berlin’s outline of ‘the process by which 
societies with slaves in the Americas became slave societies’. In the first instance, this 
transition called for ‘the discovery of some commodity… that could command an 
international market’, and whose production demanded slave labour. As slavery came 
to dominate the economy, other classes were increasingly marginalised in favour of 
slaveholders. The Loyalists quickly settled on long staple cotton as the commodity 
that would work such wonders. The decade following their arrival saw the spread of 
plantation slavery across the Bahamian Out Islands. But the ‘critical event’ in such 
transformations was ‘the slaveholders’ seizure of power’. Here too, the elite Loyalists 
wasted little time. Loudly proclaiming the inadequacy of the governor, legislature, 
judiciary, state apparatus, and the general ‘want of a Respectable Government’, their 
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efforts to install themselves as the colony’s ruling class would dominate Bahamian 
politics for the rest of the century.6 
However, in the Bahamas, efforts to establish a plantocratic regime faced a 
third challenge in the decidedly ambiguous post-revolutionary status of the black 
émigrés. In 1789, a writer for the Bahama Gazette, the colony’s first newspaper, 
founded in 1784 by South Carolinian Loyalist John Wells, discussed the prospects of 
‘this young Colony, where so many new Settlers have embarked the wrecks of 
property saved from the late storms of civil warfare in America’.7 There is only one 
kind of property that fits this striking metaphor, and by the time it reached the 
Bahamas, ‘wreck’ was an apt description. If slaveholders were to harness the labour of 
African Americans in the Bahamas, they had to be unequivocally confirmed to be 
slaves, regardless of any claims of entitlement to freedom. Unsurprisingly, Loyalists 
generally did not draw attention to this drive to re-enslavement, and its extent and 
significance have not been fully appreciated. 
The first two sections of this chapter examine respectively the political and 
economic consequences of the Loyalist effort to turn the Bahamas into a fully fledged 
plantation slave society during the 1780s. They seek to show the substantive changes 
arising from these developments, but also the degree to which they were informed and 
complicated by a range of factors partly or wholly beyond the white Loyalists’ 
control, and particularly the issues arising from re-enslavement. 
The third section explores further how the development of the Bahamian slave 
regime and the arrival of the black émigrés simultaneously facilitated opportunities for 
individual and collective autonomy for non-white Bahamians. Their pursuit of such 
opportunities was very much at odds with Loyalist slaveholders’ agenda of re-
enslavement and plantocracy, resulting in a trajectory of increasingly direct and 
violent confrontation towards the end of the decade. 
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I: Building a Slave Society: Re-enslavement and ‘Respectable Government’ 
 
From their arrival, Loyalists made no secret of their contempt for Bahamians’ way of 
life, customs and institutions. They openly expressed disdain for a legislature that 
contained ‘neither a Merchant, nor a Lawyer, nor any man of respectable property’ 
and ‘a system of jurisprudence, the most ruinous and disgraceful that can well be 
imagined’. ‘Is it possible’, one émigré would ask, ‘that good Men could respect such a 
Government?’8 
 Initially, Loyalist agitation for the ‘Establishment of some kind of 
Respectability in the Government and Judicial Proceedings of the Country’ focused 
upon the person of John Maxwell, who had returned to the Bahamas in March 1784 to 
resume the governorship interrupted by the Spanish occupation of 1782–3. He soon 
found the newcomers so troublesome ‘such has been their Behaviour, that they can go 
but one Step further in my Opinion, which is, to take the Government from me.’ By 
July, Loyalists were organising to coordinate ‘their steady and united Exertions to 
preserve and maintain those Rights and Liberties, for which they left their Homes and 
their Possessions’.9 
The increasingly bitter and sometimes openly violent conflict between 
Maxwell and the ‘Board of American Loyalists’ in 1784 has been widely discussed in 
Bahamian historiography.10 But although the dispute’s events and chronology are 
reasonably well-established, what it was actually about has remained less clear. 
The usual approach has been to treat the discord as the playing out of 
essentially personal animosities, inflamed by the general stress and disruption 
attendant upon a situation in which émigrés were ‘setting themselves down, where 
they can; and without order’. Certainly, the mutual antipathy involved is not in 
question. One Loyalist claimed that Maxwell’s ‘Weakness, his Blunders, his badness 
of Heart as well as rancorous disposition of Mind, together with an Abhorrence of all 
in the Character of Loyalists has Concurred to render him despicable among the New 
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Inhabitants in general’. Over a hundred of them would later sign a declaration 
representing the prospect of ‘Mr. Maxwell’s return to this Country as the greatest evil 
that can possibly befall these Islands’. Maxwell in his turn found the Loyalists to be 
‘the most tormenting, dissatisfied People on Earth.’11 
When historians have looked for more concrete issues of contention, they have 
often resorted to more or less unqualified endorsements of Loyalist allegations of 
Maxwell’s incompetence, pusillanimity and venality.12 But although his enemies 
declared that ‘it would be endless, to recapitulate, all the instances of Mr Maxwell’s 
injustice and oppression’, expositions of Loyalist grievances are conspicuously long 
on invective, and short on detail, let alone supporting evidence. When the Board of 
American Loyalists petitioned the king for Maxwell’s recall in September 1784, they 
could come up with precisely three substantive charges against him. 
The first was that he ‘hath admitted American vessels, to trade, in our ports,’ 
contrary not only to ‘the laws of Trade and navigation’ but also, supposedly ‘the 
interests of the people’.13 Maxwell had indeed temporarily opened Nassau to 
American shipping, after the David, carrying food and other supplies from Britain, 
was wrecked off the harbour on 1 May 1784. The influx of refugees, most of them 
entirely lacking the ‘Necessaries of Life’, had caused severe food shortages, with the 
‘poorer sort’ of émigrés especially suffering ‘the most excruciating Distress’.14 
Notably, there is some evidence suggesting that leading members of the Board of 
American Loyalists had vested interests in the supply of the provisions issued to 
émigrés by the colonial government.15 But in any case the ‘monstrous offence’ that 
some Loyalists professed at the appearance of ‘the American Colours’ was hardly 
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sufficient in itself to render ‘the removal of Governor Maxwell as a point essential to 
their very existence as a people’.16 
The other two accusations in the Loyalist memorial refer to a more serious 
issue, albeit in a deliberately cryptic way. The governor had sent a ‘message’ urging 
the Assembly ‘to pass a law, to dispossess, the American Loyalists, of part of their 
property, without an appeal to the laws of their country, or the benefit of that 
inestimable right, the trial by Jury.’ Then, in a new paragraph, as a separate and 
distinct charge, his ‘influence’ is said to have led to the passage of ‘a law… to enslave 
those, whom the different commanders in chief in America, had manumitted for their 
zeal, and services, during the war.’17 
The wording of these charges was brazenly obfuscatory; Loyalists were 
imputing the blame for re-enslavement of black émigrés to Maxwell, having just 
denounced him, in a necessarily oblique manner, for having had the temerity to 
infringe their dubious property rights by trying to stop the practice. 
In May, Maxwell had called the Assembly’s attention to the widespread sale of 
blacks in the Bahamas by ‘Vendors [who] came to the possession of them in no other 
way than of Plunder or false promises’. He invited them to consider whether ‘the 
property in the Slave so acquired [is] legal?’, and if ‘Slaves so fraudulently obtained 
to the Disgrace of Christians’ should be returned to their original owners. Then, in a 
speech to both houses of the legislature, he reiterated more explicitly ‘that, altho’ the 
Loyalists do not avowedly take to themselves…  the Message I sent to the House of 
Assembly… yet,… the cap Fits a great many of them… without making their heads 
ache, though it ought their hearts.’ African Americans were being ‘sold’ by Loyalists 
who had no legal title to them ‘if not hustled off to their Plantations’, while 
slaveholders from the United States were ‘daily pestering’ Maxwell for the ‘right to 
recover their Property where they can find it’. But he expressed sympathy for ‘the 
poor slave [who] obtained his freedom by doing an Act, which all Nations protect: 
which is, most of these wretches deserted from their masters in the field’ and ‘our 
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Government gave them Instructions’, only for white Loyalists to ‘deceive them and 
pretend a bill of sale for them on Landing’.18 
Shortly after Maxwell presented these observations, the Assembly began 
consideration of a new version of the Bahamian slave code. The resulting ‘Act for 
Governing Negroes, Mulattos, Mustees and Indians’ was largely a verbatim re-
enactment of the 1767 law of the same name. The clauses addressing ‘the method of  
Trying Negroes… claims of Freedom’ empowered the colony’s Receiver General and 
Treasurer, along with two magistrates ‘at any time… to examine manumissions or 
passes of any Negroes… pretending to be free.’ If the latter could offer ‘no 
satisfactory proof of their being free’, or their documents were found to ‘be forged or 
otherwise insufficient’, they were ‘to be forthwith committed to the common Gaol’ 
prior to being auctioned for the benefit of the colonial treasury.19 
That these provisions were primarily intended to address the ‘Confusion of 
Property’ arising from the ambiguous status of African Americans arriving in the 
Bahamas is strongly suggested by the Bahamian manumission records. Of 49 
manumissions listed for 1783–4, 24 are ascribed to causes such as ‘Proclamation’, and 
certificates issued by General Archibald McArthur and Patrick Tonyn, respectively 
garrison commander and governor in East Florida, that clearly relate to African 
Americans who had been required to register or demonstrate their free status after 
coming to the Bahamas.20 In several cases there are copies in the Bahamian Registry 
Office Books of free passes issued in New York and St. Augustine.21 
The 1784 Act also reflected Bahamian law’s long established principle ‘that 
anyone who was unequivocally black… was presumed to be a slave unless proof to 
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the contrary was available.’22 Insofar as the burden of proof lay very much with non-
whites to provide clear evidence of their freedom, the new law might very well 
function, as the Loyalists charged, to deny African Americans the benefit of the often 
ambiguous entitlements to liberty offered during the American Revolution. 
But a great deal depended on the attitude of those responsible for considering 
such claims. In this respect, Loyalist slaveholders had good reason to bemoan the 
absence of ‘that inestimable right’, a jury of freeholders. The views of Receiver 
General George Barry echoed those of Maxwell. In 1786 he wrote of his ‘great Pain of 
Mind’ at ‘every day see[ing] the Negroes, who came here from America, with the 
British General’s Free Passes, treated with unheard of cruelty, by Men who call 
themselves Loyalists.’ According to Barry, in spite of ‘Promises of Freedom and the 
King’s Protection’, émigré African Americans were ‘every day stolen away.’23 
These allegations of re-enslavement were later repeated by John Matson, Chief 
Justice of the Bahamas from 1787. He claimed that a great deal of Loyalist ‘Property 
consisted in Negroes, many of whom had been manumitted by General Officers in 
America’. Moreover, African Americans who had been ‘deluded under false Ideas of 
Liberty to leave America, and to bind themselves for one or two years, were now 
claimed as the absolute Property of their Masters,’ sometimes on the basis of ‘forged 
or illegal Bills of Sale and letters of Attorney’.24 
Matson is certainly a questionable witness; he was later described, rather like 
Maxwell, as a ‘knave’, who had come to the islands ‘fill’d with prejudices and 
determined… to crush the Loyalists’.25 Documentary traces of this kind of illicit re-
enslavement are unsurprisingly sparse and fragmented. Nonetheless, there is detailed 
evidence for a few individual cases. 
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After the death of their owner, James Scriven, early in the Revolutionary War, 
Agar and her husband Sambo had agreed to work on the plantation of Georgia 
Loyalist Isaac Baillou in return for ‘their victuals and clothing.’ The couple 
accompanied Baillou to St. Augustine at the end of the war, but Sambo left for the 
Bahamas at the end of 1784. The following August Baillou, who by this time had 
established himself as a planter at Refugee Hill in the interior of New Providence, 
offered a reward for Sambo’s capture in the Bahama Gazette. The runaway 
advertisement notes that Sambo was ‘well known by the Negroes as a Baptist 
Preacher, calls himself a Freeman, and is often seen in Nassau.’ Sambo was eventually 
arrested in March 1790, and in the subsequent hearing, the Receiver General would 
find that Baillou had ‘not shown the least authority that can justify him in detaining’ 
either Sambo or Agar, who had remained in the Loyalist’s possession during her 
husband’s absence.26 
Unsurprisingly, Bahamian runaway slave advertisements did not usually 
advertise fugitives’ claims to freedom, but there are a few noteworthy instances where 
this happened. In May 1791, a Z. Allen advertised the flight from his plantation on 
Great Exuma (an island first settled by Loyalist émigrés) of ‘John, a fellow extremely 
artful and well known in Providence by the Appellation of Free John, and Sue his 
Wife, a very dark Mulatto.’ Sue may have been the Sue Allen who was freed by a 
‘Certificate of Justices’ in the same year.27 A $15 reward was offered in 1789 for ‘a 
Negro Wench named Nancy’, who had ‘worked about Town these two Years past, 
under the name of Free Nancy.’ Seven years later, John Ferguson promised ‘a 
handsome reward… to whoever apprehends’ another Nancy, who was ‘well known 
among the “free crew” that came from the Carolinas, by some of whom she is 
supposed harboured.’28 
There is also a range of evidence that gives some credence to Matson’s charge 
that African Americans who had been ‘prevailed upon to bind themselves for one or 
two years’ were subsequently ‘claimed as the absolute Property of their Masters.’ 
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Loyalists in Nova Scotia certainly re-enslaved Southern black veterans of the 
Revolutionary War in this manner, and it is possible that indentured servitude in the 
Bahamas was a Loyalist innovation. There is apparently no record of the practice prior 
to 1783, nor is it mentioned in the 1784 slave code.29 The free blacks who came to 
Abaco from New York in 1783 were listed in the ‘Book of Negroes against the 
‘names of persons in whose possession they now are.’ In at least one documented 
instance, these people were later forced to buy back their freedom.30 
There are also cases where the Receiver General and magistrates certified the 
freedom of people who were held on the basis of fraudulent or expired indentures.31 
Perhaps the most interesting of these is the case of the ‘Negro Man’ Tom Patrick, who 
claimed in 1786 to have ‘signed an Indenture to serve Charles Whitehead two years, 
which time [had] expired.’ At Patrick’s trial, Whitehead produced an indenture lasting 
seven years, witnessed by Isaiah Wallace. However, Thomas Willet testified that 
Wallace had subsequently ‘refused to prove the Identity of the said Indenture for 
Seven Years’, declaring ‘that he did sign a paper, as a witness, at the request of 
Charles Whitehead, but that Tom Patrick was not present at the time.’ Another 
deponent, Cornelius Blanchard, reported that ‘he saw an Indenture signed by Tom 
Patrick for two years only… and that the Indenture now produced for seven years 
service, he never saw until this day.’ William Wilcocks concurred that ‘he saw, on… 
Abaco, Tom’s Indenture to… Whitehead, dated in New York, and that it was only for 
two years.’ Wilcocks added that he also ‘saw Tom’s free pass; and that Tom 
complained… of Whitehead’s endeavouring to force him to deliver up the same with 
his Indenture for two years.’ The Court found in Patrick’s favour, and he would 
eventually receive a new free pass in 1787.32 Tom Patrick’s circumstances may have 
been fortunate, both in belonging to the group of New York émigrés whose freedom 
was a matter of established record, and in the willingness of whites to support his 
claim in court. But his case illustrates the vulnerability of indentured black people to 
the machinations of unscrupulous employers. Especially if illiterate, the former would 
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face great difficulty in challenging the validity of documents like that presented by 
Whitehead, and presumably few blacks would be able to marshal the formidable array 
of supporting testimony from which Patrick benefited. For people who had lost, or 
simply never possessed documentation like Patrick’s free pass, it would be still harder 
to satisfy the standard of proof demanded by the 1784 Act. 
That legislation also called upon the governor to issue proclamations 
‘commanding all Free Negroes… or that call themselves Free, to… appear before the 
Receiver General… that the validity of his or her Claim of Freedom may be legally 
tried.’33 There is no indication that such a proclamation was actually made in 1784, 
when a legal assessment of the status of all free people of colour in the Bahamas was 
scarcely feasible in view of the colonial government’s limited and overstretched 
resources. While Maxwell was preoccupied by the immediate problems occasioned by 
the migration and the émigrés’ ‘riotous proceedings’, Barry was fighting a largely 
losing battle simply to collect the colonial taxes.34 
Nonetheless, for Loyalist slaveholders, the prospect of such a general 
investigation was alarming in direct proportion to the uncertainty and tenuousness of 
their claims over the African Americans uprooted by the years of war and revolution. 
It was surely this issue, above all, that informed the Loyalists’ staunch opposition to 
Maxwell, and their uncompromising insistence that ‘Under his Government, they can 
never submit to live.’ But whatever Maxwell’s concern for the plight of the ‘poor 
slave’ returned to bondage in the Bahamas, he had no stomach for a protracted 
confrontation over this or any other issue. Exhausted by the Loyalists’ intransigent 
opposition to his authority, Maxwell left the Bahamas, never to return, in March 1785. 
In that year, the colonial authorities apparently accepted the claim to freedom of just 
one black émigré.35 
Lieutenant Governor James Powell, himself a Loyalist, took office professing 
his intention to unite Bahamians ‘in one common interest, that of Encouraging 
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Industry’.36 However, Maxwell’s last act was to dissolve the Assembly, resulting in a 
sharp and acrimonious polarisation of colonial politics between factions explicitly 
identifying with Loyalist and conch interests; the Bahama Gazette reported that ‘few 
Elections in England ever exhibited a keener struggle than what this did’.37 Amid 
allegations of fraud and irregularity on both sides, the Loyalist candidates failed to 
gain control of the new legislature. They declined to take up their seats, declaring 
themselves to be unrepresented by ‘the present rotten and unconstitutional majority in 
the House of Assembly’ and not subject to its laws. Powell’s condemnation of such 
actions, and above all his refusal to call new elections, were taken as clear proof that 
he had fallen ‘under the influence of the despicable faction, to insult and oppress his 
Majesty’s Faithful American Loyalists.’38 
The latter were now steeling themselves for ‘united exertions, for firmness, 
for… an unalterable determination not to yield’ in the face of ‘our enemies – for such 
there are here’. Although professing that ‘we will rejoice to see the Old Settlers 
emancipated from that state of thraldom in which they have been held’, Loyalists also 
belligerently warned that anyone opposing them ‘threatens to light up a torch of civil 
contest, which years may not extinguish’.39 
Overt manifestations of political conflict actually subsided somewhat over the 
following years, especially under the administration of John Brown, longstanding 
president of the Council, who served as acting governor after Powell’s death early in 
1786. This may have been because neither Brown or Powell showed any inclination to 
engage with the thorny issue of re-enslavement. When John Cruden, claiming to be 
acting under the auspices of his wartime position as commissioner of sequestered 
estates in the Southern colonies, called upon ‘all persons holding Negroes the property 
of the Inhabitants of the Southern States of America, that have either made their 
escape, or who have been brought away clandestinely’ to furnish him with a list of 
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such African Americans in the Bahamas, he apparently received predictably short 
shrift.40 By this point, secure possession of re-enslaved black émigrés had been 
rendered all the more important to Loyalist slaveholders by the terms for grants of 
crown land announced in 1785. Henceforth, ‘heads of families’ were entitled to 
twenty acres for every ‘white and black man, woman or child, of which such family 
shall consist’.41 
Nonetheless, William Wylly’s retrospective claim that ‘Party dissensions died 
away’ in this period, often uncritically echoed in Bahamian historiography, is some 
way from the truth.42 The events of 1784–5 were only the first phase of a protracted 
struggle to establish ‘regular, energetic, and stable government’ in the Bahamas.43 As 
we will see in chapter four, it was politically expedient for Wylly, writing in 1789, to 
dissociate the initial phase of that struggle from the ongoing efforts to secure the 
quiescence of both governor and legislature to the interests of the incipient 
plantocratic elite for which he was a leading spokesman. By then, the renewed ‘Party 
dissensions’ revolved quite explicitly around the issue of re-enslavement. 
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II: Building a Slave Society: Cotton and Compromise on the Out Islands 
 
Establishing a plantation economy was central to Loyalist designs for making the 
Bahamas a more ‘respectable’ place of settlement. For the émigré slaveholders, 
undertaking ‘to cultivate and improve’ the land was ‘necessary, to render these Islands 
serviceable to Great Britain, or beneficial to their inhabitants’, and was also the surest 
route to renewed ‘participation in the enjoyments, of a polished and cultivated society, 
and of the luxuries of modern refinement’.44 These assumptions reflected the more 
general discourse of agricultural ‘improvement’ that informed British conceptions of 
empire, but also a more specifically Southern ‘conviction that slavery laid a path to a 
modern, commercial economy’. Plantation agriculture was a tried and proven method 
of disciplining and profitably exploiting enslaved labour. The wealth generated by 
export staples would enrich the planters and fuel further expansion, raising slavery 
and slaveholders to a position of overwhelming economic pre-eminence and 
facilitating attainment of a corresponding social and political hegemony.45 
 The Loyalist migration was the catalyst for efforts to develop a Bahamian 
version of such an economy through the following decades. Unfortunately, in the 
almost total absence of detailed plantation records, this process is known largely 
through scattered anecdotal testimony and patchy quantitative sources. Evidence for 
the formative years of the plantation system in the 1780s is notably sparse. Inevitably, 
therefore, this critical phase has to be reconstructed and analysed in somewhat 
generalised and tentative terms, drawing in part on inferences and analogies drawn 
from later sources and studies of plantation slavery in other places. 
 The transition to plantation slave societies in the Americas ‘generally turned 
upon the discovery of some commodity… that could command an international 
market’. However, the peculiar circumstances of the Loyalist migration meant that the 
Bahamian experience was closer to that of the initial development of the Southern 
lowcountry at the end of the seventeenth century, when ‘Carolina settlers… had not 
even bothered to wait until they had a staple crop requiring chattel slavery; they 
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simply brought in substantial numbers of African slaves and expected a suitable crop 
to materialize.’46 
 Within a few years of their arrival, the émigrés generally identified ‘the 
Culture of Cotton’ as the crop that ‘will in all human probability answer the wishes of 
the Planter’. Thereafter, it would be many years before anyone in the Bahamas 
questioned the view that ‘their most valuable production is cotton’.47 But this 
consensus was not immediately so obvious as hindsight can make it seem, and nor did 
it emerge overnight. Although there were already large numbers of Loyalists from 
East Florida in the Bahamas by the beginning of 1784, the first significant cotton crop 
for export was not planted until the following spring.48 At this point, the Loyalists 
were ‘entire novices’ in the cultivation of cotton, which only began its rapid ascent to 
the status of the American South’s primary staple from the 1790s.49 Nor, at first, did 
cotton seem to be their only option: the ‘soil and climate’ of the Bahamas were 
repeatedly said to be ‘well calculated to produce’ a wide range of crops. One observer 
described ‘Indigo growing on the Island of Providence as fine as I ever saw in 
America’, and Lieutenant Governor Powell reported in 1785 that ‘the Tobacco plant 
grows Luxuriant and will it’s thought richly reward the Planters pains’.50 
 There is little specific evidence for the decisions of individual planters not to 
pursue these more familiar Southern staples. But it is possible to discern how a range 
of more general factors may have converged to make cotton seem the most plausible 
prospect of success. Notwithstanding the émigrés’ enthusiasm for planting, they 
professed themselves ‘unable to find persons of tried and undoubted experience to 
direct them’ in a colony where it was ‘surprising how ignorant the people here are 
with respect to the Soil of the many Islands that surround them’. However, cotton was 
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certainly already grown on a modest scale in the Bahamas, and there were alluring, if 
perhaps apocryphal, reports of successful commercial cultivation a few years earlier. 
Thus, with Loyalists in the Bahamas uncertain as to ‘whether they are at all capable of 
affording any staple articles’, cotton could well have seemed like the least unsafe 
bet.51 
Moreover, the burgeoning British textile industry seemed to offer cotton a 
bright future as a lucrative export crop. During the 1780s, ministers hoped that 
promoting West Indian production would make the empire self-sufficient in cotton, an 
aim that Lord North had in mind when suggesting the Bahamas as a possible 
destination for Loyalists as early as 1783.52 
These issues have received most attention when historians have sought to 
account for the Loyalists’ focus on cotton.53 But the slave plantation was as much a 
mode of labour organisation as a form of agriculture and commerce, and other 
considerations emerge when the rapid growth of Bahamian cotton production is 
considered from this perspective. Establishing a new plantation economy in an 
unfamiliar location was always a delicate manoeuvre in the ongoing process of 
negotiation and contestation between masters and enslaved workers, a moment when 
‘renegotiating the rules of the game put everything at risk.’54 This was all the more so 
in the Bahamas, where the process was intimately bound up with the drive to re-
enslavement. Subjecting black émigrés to the rigorous routine of plantation labour at 
once represented both a means and the ultimate end of confirming that such people 
were indeed ‘undoubted property’. But by the same token, such an undertaking ran 
directly counter to black aspirations fuelled by the experience of slavery’s disruption 
during the American Revolution. 
 The plantation regimen of the lower South had been severely compromised by 
the effects of the Revolutionary War. Especially during the turbulent period of British 
occupation from 1778, slaves were said to be ‘ungovernable’, ‘quite their own 
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masters’, and ‘under little or no Subjection to Overseers’.55 If anything, relocation into 
the chaotic situation prevailing in post-war East Florida only exacerbated the 
breakdown of labour discipline, not least among those African Americans convinced 
of their entitlement to freedom. Such people were hardly promising candidates for a 
plantation workforce in the Bahamas, where the organisation and infrastructure of 
intensive commercial agriculture had to be improvised largely from scratch in less 
than propitious conditions. 
 During the mid-1780s, Georgia Loyalist Colonel John Douglas, surveying the 
then uninhabited Crooked Island along with ‘two or three negroes’, found himself ‘for 
some days totally alone in the wilderness’, with no means of getting off the island. 
Many years later, Douglas would insist that he had ‘felt… not the least apprehension 
for the fidelity of his slaves, who must have been conscious of his helpless situation’. 
For Daniel McKinnen, who recorded Douglas’s reminiscences, this story was 
evidence both of ‘the courage and humanity of the master’, and of how ‘that 
superiority of faculties which the negro perceives in the white man overcomes every 
thought of independence’.56 But this anecdote also provides a stark illustration of the 
precarious position of whites on the hitherto ‘unsettled and unknown’ Out Islands, 
where population ratios were comparable to those of the most monocultural sugar 
islands. In such circumstances, where direct coercion was potentially explosive, 
slaveholders surely had little choice in favouring a more ostensibly consensual 
approach to the organisation of production wherever possible.57 
 In this respect, it is notable that cotton was a familiar crop to lowcountry 
African-Americans. It had always been a mainstay of their provision grounds as a 
means of supplementing masters’ sparse issues of clothing. During the American 
Revolution, moreover, cotton ‘briefly characterized slaves’ wartime liberation from 
planters’ full authority’ as the breakdown of labour discipline in the lower South 
facilitated a temporary collapse in staple production in favour of the expansion of the 
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slaves’ economy. Where plantations continued to function as such, they frequently did 
so by shifting towards a subsistence economy. Planters found that enslaved workers 
who could not be induced to produce rice and indigo would grow food and cotton, 
crops raised largely for the slaves’ own use and on their own terms.58 
 The techniques – or lack of them – employed in the early years of the 
Bahamian cotton economy were later recognised by planters to have been seriously 
flawed. Clearing ground by burning damaged the thin topsoil, exacerbating the 
exhaustive effects of failing to rest land by systematic fallowing and field rotation. 
Neglecting to destroy old plants and unwanted seed encouraged the spread of insect 
pests that could devastate an entire crop unless immediately dealt with. These 
mistakes may well have reflected the initial inexperience, not to say incompetence, of 
the planters themselves. But if such methods were inappropriate for commercial 
planting, they were perfectly reasonable in the context of the kind of small-scale, 
shifting cultivation familiar to both slaves’ provision grounds and the pre- (and post-) 
Loyalist Bahamas.59 Thus, in opting for cotton cultivation, the Loyalists may well 
have been in part deferring to the experience and perhaps the preferences of black 
émigrés. This view is all the more credible in light of the extent to which the 
plantation system that emerged in the Bahamas demonstrably did devolve a 
substantial degree of personal autonomy and control over production to the enslaved 
workers. 
 The principal mode of labour organisation adopted in the Bahamian cotton 
economy was the task system. Groups of two to four workers were allotted a daily 
labour requirement, or ‘task’, reckoned in terms of an area of land to be worked; by 
the nineteenth century, the daily task unit in the Bahamas seems to have been more or 
less standardised at a quarter of an acre, ‘usually marked out by permanent stations in 
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every field’. When their task was completed, slaves’ time was, in the words of a Long 
Island plantation overseer, ‘totally their own to due what they please’.60 
 The task system was probably directly carried over to the Bahamas by the 
émigrés from the Southern lowcountry, where task working had become a deeply-
embedded customary norm in plantation agriculture by the mid-eighteenth century. In 
1823, Bahamian whites would claim that ‘the system of task-work’ had ‘been, within 
the memory of the oldest of us, the uniform system of our planters.’61 This was 
something of an exaggeration, insofar as tasking is best understood as representing 
one end of a continuum of plantation labour systems.62 At times ‘when it would hardly 
be possible to assign set tasks’, such as when planting seed cotton and picking the 
finished crop, Bahamian slaves often worked along lines closer to the gang labour 
organisation more commonly employed by cotton planters in North America and the 
Caribbean. Nonetheless, the evidence available from the supposedly peak years of 
Bahamian cotton production before 1800 consistently indicates that tasking was 
considered the normal method to be used whenever possible in this period, when 
planters routinely reckoned the size of their workforce in terms of the number of 
‘taskable hands’.63 
 In the lower South, the task system had long proved highly effective as a 
means of organising the gruelling but relatively straightforward routine of rice culture. 
For planters inclined to partial absenteeism, it facilitated the exaction of a prescribed 
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and measurable quantity of labour from slaves working with limited supervision.64 A 
similarly arms-length management style was common in the Bahamas, where the 
owners of many of the largest plantations spent much of their time in Nassau pursuing 
parallel careers as merchants, lawyers, politicians and government officials. 
Absenteeism was sufficiently rife for residents of Long Island to petition the 
legislature for ‘a Law to oblige proprietors of plantations under cultivation on which 
they do not actually reside to keep at least one white person thereon’. One observer 
stated explicitly that ‘the reason they set tasks in the Bahamas to the Negroes is that 
there are so few in a gang in these Islands that it is not worth a white man’s expence 
of time to be constantly overlooking them’.65 
 Such attitudes were perhaps informed by the common assumptions that ‘the 
business of a cotton planter’ was ‘very simple and easy’, and that ‘no field labour in 
any country where the plough is not in use, can possibly be lighter than that of our 
plantations’.66 But while cotton was certainly a less physically demanding crop than 
sugar or rice, many cotton planters elsewhere considered tasking an inefficient system 
that afforded slaves too much autonomy. Most found that the simple, repetitive 
operations involved in cotton cultivation and the need for careful attention in the 
weeding and pruning stages were better suited to the regimentation and close scrutiny 
facilitated by gang labour organisation.67 
But even when they were present, Bahamian masters and overseers could seem 
remarkably unconcerned with the detailed workings of their estates. Visiting his 
Andros plantation ‘to see what appearance of a Crop of Cotton my fields afforded, but 
meeting nothing very pleasing in that way’, James Brisbane ‘took the opportunity of 
retirement’ to compose a lengthy essay on trigonometry for the Bahama Gazette. 
James Ledekin, in a 1,200 word letter home to England describing his unlikely new 
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career as overseer of a Long Island cotton plantation, managed to include only a single 
sentence on his charges’ work ‘in Felling wood Cutting down Cotton and weeding’, 
which was ‘generally done by the Task’.68 
 As well as affording slaves a measure of freedom to work at their own pace 
without close supervision, the task system allowed them independence to dispose of a 
substantial portion of their labour and time for their own benefit. Historians have 
tended to see the emergence of a substantial proto-peasant slaves’ economy in the 
Bahamas as a principally nineteenth-century phenomenon, occurring in tandem with 
the failure of the cotton industry.69 However, the salient characteristics of that 
economy are all clearly in evidence in the previous century. Enslaved cotton workers 
are described as routinely completing their daily tasks ‘by three often before two 
o’clock in the afternoon’. It was said to be customary for them to receive ‘small 
portions of land’ for their own use in 1788. The slaves on the Long Island plantation 
managed by Ledekin in the 1790s had ‘ground alow’d them to raise what Roots and 
vegetables they please and the liberty of raising Hogs and poultry as many as they 
please’.70 As well as cultivating their provision grounds, enslaved rural workers were 
able to engage in traditional Bahamian commoning practises such as gathering wild 
fruit and vegetables, woodcutting, fishing, turtling and hunting; they were said to 
display ‘much ingenuity’ in the pursuit of alligators, a quarry that ‘required 
considerable address and some courage to destroy’.71 
Earlier testimony endorses William Wylly’s remark of 1815 that it was 
proverbial in the Bahamas that ‘“No Negro ever eats his own food or kills his own 
pig” – they sell them all’. Denys Rolle observed in 1793 that his slaves at Exuma 
‘tilled and rais’d much Corn for sale’, and spoke of their ‘Property’ or ‘Riches gain’d 
by Extra Labour and Stock’. Likewise the workers on Ledekin’s plantation were ‘well 
stock’d’ with ‘Hogs and poultry’, and were able to ‘sell a great many and purchase 
Sugar, Tea, Rum &c.’ In 1798, Ledekin’s employers supplied him with over £200 
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worth of consumer goods, including several hundred pounds of sugar and tobacco and 
twenty gallons of rum and brandy as well as tableware, ‘Muslin Neckerchiefs’ and 
‘Hair Ribbons’.72 
 Bahamian plantation slaves were able to market so much of their own produce 
because the slaves’ economy was not expected to carry the principal weight of their 
subsistence needs. As in the lowcountry task system, slaveholders provided clothes 
and weekly allowances of corn or similar staple foods.73 Of course, this was scarcely a 
difficulty in a region where rice was the primary export crop. It was another matter in 
a colony that had never produced enough food for its own consumption, and whose 
population more than doubled between 1784–6. In the immediate aftermath of the 
Loyalist migration, planters would have had little choice about supplying their slaves 
with provisions that were necessarily mainly imported.74 
 As early as the end of 1785, it was claimed that ‘most Planters are firmly 
persuaded that they will make all their own Provisions this Year’. However, although 
many Bahamian estates seem to have raised some food crops alongside cotton, the 
extent of the cotton economy’s continuing reliance on imported food would be starkly 
illustrated when external supplies were disrupted in the 1790s.75 
For many planters the case for greater self-sufficiency was seemingly 
outweighed by ‘a notion, that the produce of a field of cotton, would purchase three 
times as much corn, as the same field would if planted with corn’.76 Yet West Indian 
and North American planters generally found that cotton’s uneven seasonal labour 
requirements left the workforce sufficient time to also meet its own subsistence needs. 
Indeed, corn was particularly favoured because its flexible growth cycle could easily 
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accommodate the needs of the cotton harvest.77 As we have seen, there is clear 
evidence of such a surplus labour capacity in Bahamian cotton production. But there, 
the task system placed it largely out of the planters’ reach, facilitating its appropriation 
to the slaves’ economy. Moreover, tasking’s clear demarcation of what was labour for 
the masters and how much of it they were entitled to expect was probably an obstacle 
to efforts to shift the burden of subsistence to the provision grounds. If completion of 
the day’s task represented a slave’s obligation to the master, then the latter’s 
reciprocal obligation was to provide the customary allowance of food. Whatever else 
slaves might do or not do during the day was a matter for ‘their private concerns’.78 
 None of this seemed to matter very much to slaveholders during the 1780s, 
when cotton seemed to be a runaway success. After the initial crop of 124 tons from 
2,476 acres was picked in 1786, output and acreage nearly doubled over the next two 
years. By 1788, when the cotton frontier had reached hitherto ‘totally uninhabited’ 
Crooked Island and Grand Caicos, there were over 8,000 acres in cultivation. These 
two islands alone could boast around 7,000 acres of land ‘actually under cultivation or 
cleared for it’ by the early 1790s.79 This breakneck expansion generated another 
sequence of migrations, both within and into the Bahamas. Around 1,200 of the non-
white émigrés probably moved from New Providence and Abaco to the cotton 
producing Out Islands between the end of 1785 and June 1788.80 In that year, the 
colony saw the first ‘New Negroes Imported for sale’ since the 1750s; almost 800 
enslaved Africans were brought to the Bahamas by the end of the decade. In the same 
period, the availability of free land and reports of the bright prospects for cotton 
production induced further immigration by slaveholders. A group of 187 people from 
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the Mosquito Shore, ‘said to be extremely industrious, and perfectly skilled in the 
cultivation of cotton’, arrived in 1787. Crooked Island was partly settled by planters 
relocating with their slaves from Grenada.81 
 By the end of the decade, planters were in no doubt that ‘the Culture of Cotton 
presents a vast field for Increase and Improvement.’ With the vice president of the 
Board of Trade confidently advising the House of Commons ‘that the Bahama Islands 
promised, in a little time to be able to supply Great Britain with nearly all the cotton 
her manufactures might require,’ it briefly seemed plausible to assert that the Bahamas 
‘must henceforth… be considered among the most important of our remaining 
Colonies’. For Loyalists, establishing ‘the Culture of a Staple Commodity which 
promises… material Advantage, as well to the manufacturers as the trade & 
navigation of the mother Country’, was a way of reaffirming both their British identity 
and their continuing value and significance to the empire.82 
Furthermore, cotton would become increasingly central to the émigré 
slaveholders’ claims about the future of the Bahamas, and their own place in that 
future as the natural governing class. As one Loyalist petition for new elections starkly 
put it, the existing legislature had too many members who ‘are no ways interested in 
Cotton Planting and they are therefore very unfit persons to make Laws for the 
Internal Government of this Colony’, where cotton ‘ultimately must become the 
staple’. In 1789 William Wylly elaborated that the Assembly contained only ‘four 
(very inconsiderable) Planters’, while ‘the only Member of the Council, who has an 
Acre of Cotton, is an American Loyalist, and that he possesses nearly as many Slaves 
as all the rest of his Brother Counsellers put together’. Of course, ‘from a legislature 
composed of such persons,’ he concluded, ‘it would be absurd to expect much 
wisdom, or any regular System of local law.’83 
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Such claims necessarily rested on the premise that cotton had been ‘a 
discovery left for the industry of the American Loyalists’. This assertion neatly 
encapsulated the émigrés’ contempt for the society and people to which they had 
come ‘in quest of new habitations’. But it also tidily elided the rather messy 
conjunction of multiple protagonists and influences that had shaped the origins and 
form of the cotton economy. For Loyalists looking both ‘to remake their fortunes’ and 
make the Bahamas a slave society, it had seemed imperative to establish a stable 
rhythm of plantation labour as quickly as possible. With the attitudes of Bahamians 
and African-American émigrés ranging from ambivalence to outright hostility, 
planters may well have had little choice in making concessions regarding their direct 
power over the daily life and labour of formally enslaved workers. Such an 
arrangement was easily arrived at because it largely took the form of a mode of labour 
organisation that already had the force of custom for both black and white émigrés. In 
large part, slaveholders accepted compromise because it seemed to be no more than 
business as usual for ‘the industry of the American Loyalists’.84 
It may not be entirely fortuitous that these defiant effusions of self-
congratulation coincided with the first significant setback for the nascent plantation 
economy. Almost 400 tons of cotton had been expected from the crop planted in 1788, 
but by the following April, it seemed that nearly three quarters had been destroyed by 
‘the ravages of a most distructive insect’, the chenille caterpillar. Although ‘bugs’ 
were henceforth a recurring hazard, output more than recovered the following year, 
and faith in cotton did not seriously falter until the end of the following decade.85 In 
the meantime, the prevalence of this glib narrative of Loyalist agency made it all the 
harder for the planters to appreciate how far they had compromised their own interests 
by the terms of enslavement settled on while they remained ‘in a great measure in the 
dark’ about the nature and potential of cotton culture.86 In contrast to American cotton 
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planters’ nigh-on obsessive concern with every aspect of labour management, 
discussion of the relative merits of tasking and alternative forms of organisation by 
slaveholders in the Bahamas is virtually non-existent.87 Eventually, it would become 
impossible to ignore how vulnerable the cotton economy was to fluctuations in the 
price and supply of the food that planters had failed to produce for themselves. But as 
we will see in chapter five, the continuing influence of revolutionary crisis in the 
Atlantic during the 1790s would leave planters worse placed than ever to contemplate 
renegotiating the compromises of the 1780s. 
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III: Building a Black Society: Enclaves of Independence in Nassau 
 
At least by comparison with the Out Islands, far more is known about black life in 
New Providence, and Nassau in particular, during the 1780s. There are serious 
limitations to the sources available: they tend to be anecdotal and somewhat 
fragmented; almost invariably, they were produced by white people, commonly those 
who enjoyed at least a degree of power and influence, and who were often 
slaveholders. There is surely a great deal that they provide only the faintest inklings 
of, if at all.  Nonetheless, they do afford a distinct impression of the various ways in 
which non-white Bahamians managed to exercise a considerable measure of 
autonomy and independence within the context of the Loyalists’ drive to establish a 
fully plantocratic society. 
 One aspect of this autonomy was economic. As we saw in chapter two, the 
system of self-hire known as ‘working out on wages’ was already well-established in 
Nassau by the 1780s. By the terms of this arrangement, enslaved people who paid a 
fixed ‘wage’ to their masters were effectively at liberty to fend for themselves 
economically. They could either sell their labour power to an employer, or seek to 
make a living on their own account.88 
Although there is no way of precisely quantifying the prevalence of self-hire 
relations in this (or any other) period, it is clear that there was no shortage of 
opportunities in both fields. The sudden growth of Nassau’s population after 1783 
increased the demand for all kinds of labour; there are references to slaves working as 
‘porters’, bakers, shoemakers, barbers, and seamstresses, as well as many sailors and 
carpenters.89 
 The 1784 Slave Code declared it illegal for non-whites to ‘sell, Barter or carry 
about for sale or Barter… Wares or Merchandise of any kind Whatsoever’. Such items 
could be lawfully seized by any white person, while the possessor was liable for 
‘Twenty lashes on the bare back’. In practice, however, there were much-repeated, but 
apparently ineffectual complaints regarding ‘the total neglect of enforcing the law 
                                                 
88
 See generally Johnson, Slavery to Servitude, 17–23, 33–46. 
89
 Presentments of the Grand Jurors, 30 August 1785, Bahama Gazette, 1 July 1785; runaway 
advertisements from the Bahama Gazette for: Daniel, 8 April 1786; Ben, 23 July 1785; Castalio, 12 
February 1785; Sue, 17 November 1785. See also Roderick J. MacIntosh, ‘Trades and Occupations of 
Runaway Slaves in the Bahamas 1784–1834’, Journal of the Bahamas Historical Society, 6:1 (October 
1984), 7–14. 
 137
which prohibits the huckstering and retailing of dry goods, groceries, and liquors, by 
negroes and mulattoes’. Much of their merchandise was the produce of the rural 
slaves’ economy in New Providence and beyond.90 Throughout this period, slaves also 
continued to exercise the customary commoning rights upon ‘lands not the Property of 
their Owners’, foraging, hunting and cutting wood ‘which they sell to raise Money to 
pay their Wages’.91 
 Such arrangements afforded urban black people the wherewithal to exercise a 
degree of control over other aspects of their lives. By the mid-1780s, an explicitly 
black suburb known as the ‘Negro Town’ had appeared on the southwest fringe of 
Nassau, in the area between the hospital on West Hill Street and ‘Government House’ 
on Mount Fitzwilliam a few hundred yards to the east. The timing and dynamics of 
this area’s emergence are somewhat vague, not least because so little is known with 
any certainty about housing patterns before 1783, although it has been plausibly 
construed to be a result of ‘the new pressures on space in downtown Nassau, and of 
the more rigorous concern for racial separation which came in with the American 
Loyalists’. Nonetheless, the ‘Negro Town’ offered its inhabitants a degree of 
‘residential independence’ from slaveholders’ interference in their daily lives and 
domestic arrangements.92 
 Non-whites were also enthusiastic participants in a lively and extensive 
plebeian social culture revolving around drinking, gaming, and dancing.93 As well as 
‘Taverns, Punch Houses and Grog Shops’, Nassau boasted a ‘great number of 
Tippling Houses, unlicensed Billiard and other Gaming Tables’, and plenty of people 
engaged in ‘retailing Spirituous Liquors Without a License… to Slaves not having 
tickets’.94 One such individual was Timothy Cox, jr., a ‘free Negro’ who attracted the 
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ire of the Grand Jury for selling spirits, ‘keeping a Public House’ and ‘entertaining 
Slaves and Free persons of colour at unseasonable Hours.’ Non-whites prone to 
‘getting drunk and raising disturbances especially during the night time’ could also 
enjoy the hospitality of Mary Bowman’s ‘disorderly home, frequented by negroes and 
seafaring people’, or try their luck at the ‘shuffle board’ kept by Samuel Barnet.95 
 ‘Riotous and tumultuous assemblies’, conducted in the streets or at private 
homes, were the most public and dramatic expression of black sociability in Nassau. 
According to the Grand Jury, these ‘frequent noisy and disorderly meetings of 
Negroes at unseasonable hours in the night’ were a cause of ‘the great annoyance and 
disturbance of the Inhabitants.’96 As with so many of the Jurors’ longstanding 
grievances, these practices continued unabated, and if anything seem to have grown 
more elaborate over time. By 1795, ‘Negro and Mulatto Dances’ were being ‘held 
almost every Night in this Town’, involving ‘people of Colour of all conditions’. As 
well as entailing supposedly extravagant spending ‘for the support of Dress and other 
Expences’ involved, masters feared that such events led slaves to jeopardise ‘their 
health by sitting up late and intemperance of every kind.’97 
Moreover, many non-white Bahamians could lay some claim to a degree of 
personal free status within the context of the slave regime. Unfortunately, the evidence 
for these people is, if anything, even patchier than that for the enslaved. They seem to 
have been concentrated on New Providence, although there were also substantial 
numbers of free non-whites on Harbour Island and Eleuthera. Precisely what 
happened to most of the 400 or so free but indentured African Americans from New 
York who initially came to Abaco remains unclear. By 1788 there were reportedly less 
than 200 black people on the island, all of them slaves. 
 There are no reliable data on the number of free non-whites in this period. 
Most demographic sources merely give general totals of ‘blacks’, ‘negroes’ or 
‘coloureds’. William Wylly’s 1788 tabulation only systematically provides figures for 
slaves and whites. Those he generally terms ‘people of Colour’ are rather haphazardly 
confined to marginal notes and vague estimates; we are told for instance that there 
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were ‘also 21 Families of Colour’ on Long Island, and that ‘besides the Inhabitants 
within enumerated, there are… about three hundred and fifty people of Colour, either 
free, or pretending to be so.’ Wylly’s overall figure of 500 ‘people of Colour’ is 
clearly no more than a rough estimate.98 
 This literal marginalisation reflected the mindset and ambitions of Loyalist 
slaveholders like Wylly. Even more so than in the sugar islands, masters in the 
colonial South regarded black people who were free as an undesirable anomaly, one 
that, until the Revolution, they had sought with some success to eliminate.99 They 
were surely the section of Bahamian society that had least to gain and most to lose 
from the Loyalists’ plantocratic agenda. 
 But it was also certainly true that during the 1780s, sorting out the non-white 
population into categories of ‘slave’ and ‘free’ would have been a formidably 
complicated business. Many Bahamians whom North Americans regarded as 
‘coloured’ were legally white until 1802.100 The available sources offer few clues as to 
how many such people there were, or how they racially self-identified. The printed 
version of Wylly’s Short Account omits several notes that appear in the manuscript, 
including one stating that two of the three conch ‘planters’ owning ten or more slaves 
on Andros were ‘coloured’.101 
 The status of people below such individuals in the Bahamian hierarchy of race 
and class fell somewhere within a complex and often confused range of de facto and 
de jure categories. Free born non-whites suffered less legal discrimination than those 
who had once been enslaved. Those who were indentured to a former master or other 
employer were in effect subject to a theoretically temporary unfree status that could 
prove difficult to escape from. Conversely, as Howard Johnson observes, in practice 
‘there was little to distinguish slaves on the self-hire system from freedpersons in the 
Bahamian context’, other than the economic disadvantage of paying wages to an 
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owner.102 The unresolved post-war status of African-American émigrés muddied the 
waters further. On the one hand, there were those who were ‘claiming Freedom and 
receiving wages, as if they were their own masters’, but who had never been legally 
freed from their American owners, or whose ‘free passes’ had been lost through 
accident or foul play.103 Then there were people whose formal legal status might be 
similar, but who were held and claimed as property by slaveholders in the Bahamas. 
Most African-American émigrés probably fell somewhere between the two extremes 
of documented proof of freedom and possession by a master with documented proof 
of title, and of course this ‘confusion of property’ offered myriad opportunities for 
deception and fraud on all sides. 
 In such a context, the notion of a distinct free non-white ‘caste’ entails 
considerable qualification and elaboration. Direct transitions from slavery to the 
fullest possible extent of legal freedom, and vice versa, were usually relatively 
uncommon, though they could and did happen. Movement between the various 
intermediate categories discussed above is harder to trace, but probably happened far 
more often.104 In Nassau, as we have seen, there is clear evidence of free and enslaved 
people living alongside one another, socialising together, and doing the same kinds of 
work on similar terms.105 
 Nonetheless, some free people of colour were independent and prosperous 
members of late eighteenth-century Bahamian society, who owned land, slaves and 
other property. Men of colour comprised two companies of the New Providence 
militia, 120 strong. Free African-American preachers like Sambo Scriven introduced 
distinctively black versions of Christianity, establishing their own churches and 
schools by the 1790s.106 As well as selling liquor to slaves, Timothy Cox, jr. was 
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successful enough in his shipbuilding business to buy slaves and a house in Nassau.107 
He also secured the manumission of his son Jerry, his brother ‘Thomas Cox 
commonly called… Tom Farr a black Man’, who had ‘lately’ been sold to William 
Farr, a planter on the Caicos islands, and at least three other people.108 
 Such visibly successful individuals inherently ‘upset the racial stereotype that 
was at the heart of the slave society’. Their very existence was both a barrier to 
plantocratic ambitions to render the ‘two words, Negro and Slave… Homogenous and 
Convertible’, and a ubiquitous reminder that routes out of enslavement remained open 
in Bahamian society.109 
 Whether or not these aspects of black Bahamian life can or should be 
considered in terms of resistance to slavery is a rather open-ended question, whose 
answer depends very much on the meaning attached to that hugely loaded term. 
Michael Craton has suggested that ‘in the last analysis, the effectiveness of slave 
resistance could be judged… by the degree to which those enslaved were able to 
overcome the constraints of the masters’ system to “make a life of their own.”’ By this 
criterion, the kinds of partial autonomy that non-whites achieved in Nassau (and 
elsewhere) in the 1780s might plausibly be regarded as forms of ‘resistance’ in their 
own right. There is surely a danger here, however, of falling into the tendency to ‘to 
portray almost every action, or inaction, on the part of the slaves as a form of 
resistance’.110 
 In this respect, at least insofar as resistance implies agency, and agency implies 
volition or intent, the nature of the evidence imposes a need for caution. The available 
sources were produced exclusively by whites, and mainly by slaveholders. Not much 
can be known with certainty about the motivation of actual, individual black people, 
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and even when some of their behaviour was recorded, it is filtered through a prism of 
assumptions and prejudices, and abstracted from contexts that might well have seemed 
very relevant to the actors themselves. Analogies and insights from other places and 
times can offer invaluable suggestions as to how the many blanks might be filled in. 
But without sufficient caution, such an approach can start to look worryingly like 
interpreting evidence to conform to (and thus confirm) an a priori pattern. Resorting to 
impressionistic generalities is to some degree unavoidable, for even the selection of 
more specific examples implies their broader significance. There is an ever-present 
risk of tacitly overstating the coherence, homogeneity and even intelligibility of a 
‘community’ whose subjectivity is accessible, at best, as a series of fleeting, 
fragmented and distorted glimpses. 
 Insofar as these ‘enclaves of independence’ can plausibly indicate any 
consistent tendency on the part of black Bahamians, it was merely to minimise their 
direct contact with and dependence upon the authority of slaveholders, often in ways 
that had a potential functionality for the slave regime. Self-hire, for instance, gave 
slavery as an institution the flexibility of alternative modes of exploitation, as well as 
freeing masters from the immediate responsibilities of subsisting and profitably 
employing their slaves.111 More generally, it can easily be imagined that the degree to 
which Bahamians were capable of ‘creating conditions worth living in as slaves’, and 
even of discerning the possibility of future freedom, might serve to lessen the 
likelihood of their seeking to directly challenge the regime.112 
As the lowcountry task system shows, masters themselves could be 
comfortable with what can seem like a surprising level of slave autonomy, where they 
could discern a benefit to themselves. In the Bahamas, however, it seemed to many 
slaveholders that this autonomy had a subversive tendency to shade into and even 
facilitate more illicit and less tolerable behaviour and attitudes. Black people who 
chose to ‘assemble together in any noisy, riotous or tumultuous manner’, to drink, 
gamble, and sell goods in the streets not only flouted the regime’s standards of 
                                                 
111
 For an argument that historians have tended to over-state the benefits of self-hire for slaves see 
Jonathan D. Martin, Divided Mastery: Slave hiring in the American South (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 174–8. 
112
 Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll, 594. Stephen Whitman argues that slaveholders in Maryland 
‘employed offers of delayed manumission in the ongoing management of slave workers, as an incentive 
to spur more production while reconciling future freedpeople to temporary bondage’ in ‘Diverse Good 
Causes: Manumission and the transformation of urban slavery’, Social Science History, 19:3 (Autumn 
1995), 333–70 (quotation at 334).  
 143
acceptable conduct (and the law). They did so in a very public way, drawing attention 
to how far ‘the Laws made for the Government of negroes &c. in these Islands are 
greatly neglected’.113  
Grand Jurors believed that the black social culture was funded by ‘recourse to 
the most villainous practices by stealing and otherwise’. Hawking was similarly said 
to ‘encourage Robbery and Theft by affording a specious and safe opportunity of 
selling stolen Goods’.114 Reporting the burglary of a Nassau store in 1786, the 
Bahama Gazette observed that ‘instances of this sort were, till of late, very rare here; 
but the Frequency of them now, demands the serious consideration of every 
inhabitant.’ Enterprising slaves were certainly imaginative in finding ways to make 
money via ‘illegally appropriated goods’, as John Wells discovered when he ‘received 
Information of Newspapers being sold by a Negro Fellow of his’.115 
The illegal appropriation that gave masters most cause for concern was, of 
course, that of (and by) slaves themselves. But ‘running away’, or (petit) marronage, 
can be a deceptively reductive term, that lumps together a rather diverse and 
heterogeneous assortment of behaviours into a single category. The precise aims and 
motives of runaways like John, ‘an old Offender in this Way’ who ‘obtained Pardon 
for twelve Months absence’ only to take flight again in 1789, when he was ‘imagined 
to be lurking in the Neighbourhood of this Town’ must ultimately remain obscure. 
Nonetheless, it seems doubtful whether they had very much in common those of the 
African Americans Pindar and her husband Peter, who ‘went off in a new Luggage 
Boat’ from a Long Island plantation with their four sons and three other slaves.116 
Whether or not it actively encouraged runaways, they could readily take 
advantage of the prevalence of the self-hire system. The regularity with which owners 
cautioned against ‘harbouring or employing’ fugitives suggests how readily ‘artful and 
plausible’ blacks could obtain work in Nassau with few questions asked, especially if 
they were as versatile as Jack Clark, who had variously ‘worked out as a Jobbing 
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Carpenter, Wall Builder or labourer’. Carpenters in particular seem to have found a 
ready market for their skills. Many runaway artisans followed the example of 
Polydore, ‘a Stout well made Mulatto Man… by trade a Carpenter and Boat Builder’, 
who had ‘lately carried away two new sets of tools, necessary for such business.’117 
Slaveholders also often suspected that extensive social and kinship networks, 
sometimes stretching to North America, enabled fugitives, especially women, to 
remain at large for extended periods. Despite being ‘well known about Town’, 
Charlotte and her three children were able to elude Thomas Forbes for at least four 
months in 1793, apparently thanks to her being ‘harboured by some of her numerous 
Acquaintances in this Island.’ In 1789 Alexander Inglis reported the flight of a 
‘sensible and very artful woman’ named Dumba from Charleston. He believed she had 
gone to join her ‘many acquaintances in Georgia, and New-Providence’, where she 
might ‘attempt to pass for a free Woman’ by the name of Bella.118 Loyalist ‘Negroe 
Driver’ Thomas Commander offered a rather lavish reward of 50 guineas in 1785 for 
the return of five African Americans who he supposed to have gone to New 
Providence, where Sue, ‘a tall slim made wench of a yellowish complexion’, had once 
lived, and where her mother still resided. They had originally run away in South 
Carolina six years earlier.119 
Although hard evidence of their active complicity was rarely forthcoming, the 
presence of ‘prodigious numbers’ of free non-whites in Nassau was widely seen by 
slaveholders as facilitating marronage. In particular, ‘the settlement of free Negroes 
behind the Government house’ was regarded ‘as a most enormous nuisance in 
harbouring Runaway Slaves, and insulting several people who have gone in search of 
their Property.’120 
Thomas Rigby advertised for the return of Binah, a woman described only as 
‘very black’, very tall and ‘well known’, in 1788 following a six week absence during 
which she had ‘been frequently seen about the Negro Town’.121 Similarly, Jackson, ‘a 
stout made Negro Fellow’, was said to have ‘associated himself with several Runaway 
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Negroes, who are encamped in the bushes somewhere behind the Hospital’ when he 
ran away in October 1785 for at least four months. For his pains, he would be fitted 
with ‘a large chain and iron collar fastened with a double bolted padlock around his 
ankle’. Nonetheless, in November 1786, this rather colourful figure escaped once 
more from his owner, Loyalist merchant and planter John Morris. Jackson, by now 
said to possess ‘the looks of a compleat villain’, had made directly for what Morris 
now referred to as ‘that harbour for villains, the Negro Town behind the Hospital’.122 
Hence, William Wylly’s matter of fact observation that Bahamian ‘people of 
Colour… are mostly however runaways from the American States’ was no more than 
a commonplace assumption for Loyalist masters.123 In the context of the drive to re-
enslavement, this casual elision of free people with fugitive slaves takes on a rather 
sinister aspect. But at the same time, what gave such thinking credibility was the 
ability of so many people to evade or defy the power that slaveholders and the regime 
claimed over their lives. 
Of course, the distinctiveness of the situation in Nassau during the 1780s 
should not be over-stated. As we saw in chapter two, such phenomena as the 
prevalence of the self-hire system, the substantial free coloured population, and a 
rowdy nocturnal sociability, are very much in evidence in Schoepf’s account of the 
Bahamas on the eve of the Loyalist migration. There are also clear parallels with the 
experience of slavery in other urban settings, calling to mind Frederick Douglass’s 
well-known observation that ‘a city slave is almost a freeman, compared with a slave 
on the plantation.’124 In cities and towns around the Atlantic, enslaved people were 
able to earn money, live apart from their owners and maintain an independent social 
culture. Slaveholders routinely denounced the autonomy of urban black people as 
excessive and subversive, but rarely succeeded in curbing it; South Carolina passed 
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three separate laws prohibiting self-hire during the eighteenth century, without 
managing to suppress the practice.125 
Indeed, port cities in particular were widely regarded as hotbeds of disorder 
and  lawlessness in the eighteenth-century Atlantic. The anonymity, economic 
opportunities and mobility that such places offered were attractive for runaway slaves, 
free people of colour, and ‘masterless’ people of all descriptions. For elite whites and 
colonial authorities, it seemed that the bounds of race, nationality and private property 
were in continual danger of subversion in the urban environment. Some historians 
have discerned a trend of increasing concern with problems of social control in cities 
across English-speaking America in the wake of the American Revolution, and 
Nassau would certainly seem to fit such a pattern.126 
Likewise, marronage was a ubiquitous feature of Atlantic slavery, a fact of life 
that masters everywhere had to contend with. Running away is a relatively well-
documented aspect of resistance to slavery in the Bahamas, thanks largely to the 
advertisements for the return of runaways that appear in the Bahama Gazette. This 
material constitutes an important, not to say invaluable resource; it sheds a unique 
light not only upon a practice rendered inherently obscure by its clandestine nature, 
but on many other aspects of black life besides. Unfortunately, however, what it does 
not provide is any reliable indication of how many slaves actually ran away. 
The fairly extensive scholarship on marronage has convincingly shown that 
‘advertised runaways represent only the most visible tip of an otherwise indeterminate 
iceberg’. Historians have made considerable efforts to provide ‘independent checks on 
the degree and significance of running away… through the use of planter 
correspondence, plantation accounts, and inventories’, but even with a relatively 
abundant supply of such evidence, estimates of the extent of the phenomenon can 
claim no greater precision than orders of magnitude. For the eighteenth-century 
Bahamas, where additional sources of this kind are scarce to say the least, efforts ‘to 
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rescue the problem of runaway numbers from the realm of naked guesswork’ have 
little prospect of success.127 
 Moreover, there are good reasons for doubting that the individuals described in 
advertisements constitute a representative cross-section of the people who ran away. 
The likelihood of flight resulting in a runaway advertisement may have been 
influenced by a host of factors, such as the value of an absentee, and a calculation of 
the cost and difficulty of advertising against the probability of its being successful, 
which in turn would depend upon the master’s reckoning of why someone had run 
away, where they had gone, and the chances of their voluntary return.128 
One illustration of this issue is the apparent under-representation of the Out 
Islands in the Bahamian advertisements. The latter are variously described as 
containing between a third and three-fifths of the total non-white population during 
the 1780s. But only 21 of the 112 fugitives advertised between 1784–9 are identifiably 
from the Out Islands. It is entirely plausible that Out Island slaveholders were less 
likely to go the trouble of advertising for absentees in the Bahama Gazette, and 
certainly there are anecdotal reports of extensive marronage on some islands that 
apparently did not translate into runaway notices.129 On the other hand, there is also no 
way of discounting the possibility that slaves on New Providence were indeed more 
likely to run away, and of course these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. 
 Indeed, the disparity may be largely illusory. For almost a third of these 112 
runaways, the advertisements provide no indication of where they lived at all. In the 
face of so many uncertainties and unknown factors, and in the absence of further 
evidence, there is little prospect of resolving such questions. Unfortunately, there is a 
similar degree of unevenness about more or less all the information available from the 
runaway advertisements. Details of fugitives’ appearance, background, occupations 
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and supposed motives do appear, but, aside from gender, not with any consistency.130 
The semblance of precision provided by quantifying the occurrence of such attributes 
would be misleading, insofar as any resulting analysis would be of an arbitrary (and 
small) sample of the advertised runaways, who are themselves merely an arbitrary 
selection of the total number of absentees. Furthermore, even granting the very 
doubtful assumption that such a sample is representative of runaways in general, there 
is little or no contemporary evidence for the prevalence of most such traits in the 
overall slave population. Interpretive generalisations about Bahamian marronage 
based upon such doubtful and incomplete evidence would surely amount to no more 
than the most tentative speculation. 
 Still another difficulty is that so many of the advertisements themselves are 
missing. There are only two extant issues of the Bahama Gazette from 1788, and none 
at all from 1787. Strikingly, however, just these two issues contain advertisements for 
23 fugitives – more than were advertised in the whole of 1786, and comparable to the 
totals for 1789 and 1790.131 One again, this isolated fragment of evidence does little 
more than pose questions to which definitive answers are not forthcoming. The notion 
that Bahamian marronage may have escalated starkly in those years is broadly 
consistent with the impression conveyed by other sources, as will be discussed below. 
On the other hand, it may be simply an anomaly. 
Nonetheless, the conditions of the 1780s can hardly have alleviated the generic 
difficulties associated with managing urban slavery in Nassau. Even aside from the 
general confusion and disruption caused by the arrival of the Loyalists, the 
consequences of such a relatively large and sudden influx of people must have been 
considerable. By 1785, the non-white population of New Providence had rather more 
than doubled. Over the next few years, the island’s demography remained very much 
in flux, with new émigrés continuing to arrive at the same time as substantial numbers 
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of people were relocated to the Out Islands to build the new plantation economy.132 
Craton and Saunders observe that during this period ‘Nassau must have seemed very 
much a frontier town, bursting at its seams and constantly changing’. Unfamiliar faces 
would have been a routine sight in a port where immigrants outnumbered ‘old 
inhabitants’, and which saw continual traffic with both the Out Islands and the wider 
Atlantic, especially after the 1787 Free Port Act opened Nassau to trade with the 
French and Spanish colonies.133 
 Certainly, slaveholders expressed concern and growing frustration at what 
seemed to them the manifest failure of the colonial state, and of Bahamian society 
generally, to effectively address these heightened problems of social control. The 
Grand Jury complained repeatedly of the ‘want of the most essential regulations of 
police in this town’, apparently to minimal effect.134 Lieutenant Governor Powell 
urged the Assembly to pass ‘a Patrole Act to secure us from those who may become 
internal foes’ in 1785. Four years later the Bahama Gazette repeated the call for ‘the 
establishment of a night watch, or patrole, to guard the properties of the inhabitants 
against the depredations of run-away negroes and other banditti’, but no action was 
apparently taken until the 1790s.135 The Nassau constables were repeatedly criticised 
for their ‘total neglect of enforcing the Salutary Clauses of the several Laws of these 
Islands, for the Government of Negroes and other Slaves’. In 1790, the Grand Jury 
went so far as to specifically censure six named officers ‘for refusing to assist John 
Lewis Frazer in the Execution of his Duty in dispersing riotous Negroes in the 
Night’.136 
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A recurring complaint concerned the ‘ruinous situation of the Court House and 
Prison’, from which inmates, usually slaves or free people of colour, regularly 
escaped. In the absence of ‘a Proper Work-House… for the Punishment and for the 
confinement of disorderly and criminal Negroes’, the authorities were under the 
necessity of ‘promiscuously confining under the same roof… unfortunate debtors, 
abandoned criminals, and dissolute slaves’.137 
The Grand Jurors’ view that ‘nothing, we apprehend, can be more improper’ 
than this practice may have reflected broader concerns regarding the attitude of white 
Bahamians. While the latter may have taken slavery and the racialisation of social 
status for granted, they were apparently largely indifferent towards Loyalist demands 
for a drastic tightening and intensification of race and class discipline. Unsurprisingly, 
there was little conch enthusiasm for ‘laws… designed… to convert the entire white 
community into an extensive police force’, primarily for the benefit of a would-be 
plantocratic elite.138 
For slaveholders, these circumstances made dealing with marronage at once 
harder and all the more imperative. By dramatising the weakness of the regime, slaves 
who successfully escaped or remained at large for extended periods necessarily 
undermined it further. The same was true of individuals like Boston Love, a ‘Negro 
Fellow’ who managed to ‘forcibly break Prison’ while ‘under Sentence of 
Transportation’, and who was considered ‘so notorious an Offender’ by Governor 
Powell that his recapture was a matter ‘of the utmost Consequence to the 
Community’.139 
By 1786, slaveholders on New Providence had to contend with a ‘Gang of 
Runaway Negroes’ who had ‘for some months past committed many thefts with 
impunity’, and had established a ‘Camp on the Blue Hills in the interior part of this 
Island’. In the apparent absence of any effective response from the state, a ‘party of 
Woodsmen’ were ‘sent in quest’ for this maroon band, managing to kill one of them 
and capture two more. However, the Bahama Gazette’s ‘hope soon to have it in our 
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power to give a good account of the rest of these banditti’ was not fulfilled. In 1789, it 
was still the case that ‘every theft or burglary is attributed to the run-away Negroes’, 
and there would remain a ‘considerable Body of Negroes… collected together in the 
interior Parts of this Island’ into the 1790s and beyond.140 
On Abaco, as early as 1785 Loyalist settlers were struggling to cope with 
extensive maroon activity. Cornelius Blanchard wrote to Powell on behalf of the New 
York émigrés, pleading for aid, after ‘a Number of Negroes had taken the Wood, and 
have so Robbed the Places, that they have now no support left’.141 Unfortunately, this 
fragment of testimony exists in virtual isolation, as a tantalising suggestion of how 
little is known of what was happening on the Out Islands. We hear no more about 
events on Abaco until an equally brief report of a more serious incident over two years 
later, discussed below. There is no indication of what support, if any, Powell was able 
to provide, and notably, but perhaps unsurprisingly, there is only a single definitely 
Abaconian runaway advertisement from the 1780s.142 
 Blanchard’s letter does not refer explicitly to slaves, and of course the African 
Americans who came to Abaco via New York were free people who had been 
indentured to the white émigrés accompanying them. Conflicts over the terms and 
duration of this imposed servitude may well have underpinned what happened on 
Abaco in 1785, and it is clear that such indentures were sometimes extended by 
dubious means, as in the case of Tom Patrick discussed above.143 
 This raises the more general question of the relationship between Bahamian 
marronage in the 1780s and the unclear legal status of African Americans. Certainly, 
the presence in the Bahamas of ‘Negroes, the property of the Inhabitants of the 
Southern States of America’ who were living, openly or otherwise, as free people 
added a further layer of ambiguity to the messy and complicated frontier between 
freedom and enslavement. Such uncertainties could offer opportunities for resourceful 
individuals like Jemmy, who was able to pass ‘for a free man by a false pass, which 
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has been proved, under the name of John Collins, struck out, and George Greenhill 
interlined.’144 
 On the other hand, it was all too easy for unscrupulous slaveholders to exploit 
the situation, using allegations of ‘false passes’ and the like to support dubious 
property claims at the expense of black émigrés. Unfortunately, there is little firm 
evidence regarding to what extent, if any, running away was a direct response to re-
enslavement. The runaway advertisements are usually silent concerning motives for 
flight, and indeed even clear indications of fugitives’ backgrounds are uncommon. Of 
the 113 runaways mentioned in extant advertisements from the Bahama Gazette from 
the years 1784–9, only 27 are explicitly identified as African Americans. Nonetheless, 
it is striking that of the remainder, 53 are associated with owners, former owners and 
employers who are known to be Loyalists. Just 10 runaways are described in ways 
that clearly preclude a North American origin, such as ‘country born’ or ‘new 
negroes’.145 
 In view of the uncertainty of so much of the data and the relative smallness of 
the sample, the pattern suggested by these figures should, of course, be treated with 
caution. Even assuming that most of these runaway advertisements were for African 
Americans, a higher incidence of flight among the latter is far from being the only 
way of accounting for such a pattern. There are various plausible reasons why Loyalist 
slaveholders may have been more likely to advertise for runaways. They may have 
been less tolerant of absenteeism, or less likely to believe that slaves would return of 
their own volition. North Americans may simply have been more accustomed to 
advertising in a newspaper, which was after all a recent innovation for Bahamians. 
 Aside from runaway advertisements, however, anecdotal evidence conveys a 
strong impression of mounting tensions in the later 1780s, manifested in increasingly 
direct and violent confrontation between slaveholders and non-whites. Lord Dunmore 
arrived as governor of the Bahamas in October 1787, to be met with reports of how ‘a 
Number of Negroes have for some time Absented themselves from their owners or 
employers, and were plundering and committing Outrages upon the Inhabitants of 
[New Providence] and several of the other Islands.’ On Abaco, where ‘numbers of the 
                                                 
144
 Bahama Gazette, 14 January 1786; Bahama Gazette, 24 June 1786. 
145
 The number of Loyalists includes only those advertisers whom I was able to positively identify as 
such, using the various prosopographical sources discussed at p. 37 above. In the absence of 
comparable resources for other Bahamians, definitively identifying individuals as non-Loyalists is 
relatively problematic, so this figure should very much be regarded as a lower limit. 
 153
outlying Negroes went about with muskets and fix’d Bayonets, robbing and 
plundering’, the whites ‘had collected themselves in a body, and having come up with 
the Negroes had killed, wounded and taken most of them Prisoners’. Around the same 
time, the appearance of a transport with orders to embark the garrison ‘caused a very 
general alarm… among all ranks of people, as well with respect to their property as 
the support of Civil Government.’ Dunmore refused to allow the troops to leave, and 
garrison commander General McArthur observed to Secretary of State Lord Sydney 
that ‘it has happened pretty fortunately that they were detained, considering the daring 
behaviour of the Negroes’.146 
 By now, the ‘Negro Town’ in Nassau was regarded not merely as ‘an Asylum 
for runaways and Negro Offenders of every description’. William Wylly claimed that 
‘no white Person dares make his appearance within it, but at the risk of his life. Many 
have been assaulted, and nearly destroyed there’.147 It was also the target for 
intimidatory violence from Loyalist slaveholders. According to Dunmore’s account of 
one episode in December 1787: 
 
five or six Gentlemen with swords & Pistols went in the night to the House 
of a Free Mulatto woman with seven or eight children, broke open the doors 
by breaking the locks & bolts all to pieces, beat the poor Old Woman, cut in 
the head one of her daughters & otherwise abused or alarmed the rest of the 
Family… 
 
Woken by ‘cries of Murder’, Dunmore sent his servants to intervene. The attackers’ 
leader, John M. Tattnall, then Searcher of Customs for the colony, defiantly informed 
one of the governor’s men that ‘he neither cared for His Majesty or any other man.’ 
Arraigned before a magistrate the next day, the men claimed to have been looking for 
runaways, whom they suspected the free coloureds of harbouring. The unrepentant 
Tattnall ‘swore he would burn every House belonging to the Free Negroes in that 
quarter of the Town.’ 
 Faced with a situation that had already escalated to the point where ‘excesses 
of every kind appear here as perfect trifles’, Dunmore professed his resolve that ‘such 
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outrages shall not if in my power to avoid it go unnoticed’.148 As we will see in the 
next chapter, he quickly became convinced that the only way to restore order was by 
addressing the unresolved issues surrounding the freedom and re-enslavement of the 
African-American émigrés. 
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Chapter Four 
‘Disentangled from the Disgraceful Shackles of Slavery’: Lord 
Dunmore and State Manumission in the Bahamas, 1787–1793 
 
The previous three chapters have sought in part to show how the dynamics of 
revolution facilitated the ability of thousands African Americans to wholly or partially 
disengage themselves from the confines of the North American slave regime, and how 
the repercussions of this were played out in the Bahamas during the 1780s. The 
British state, through the actions of imperial officials like Lord Dunmore, had played a 
central role in this process. This chapter explores how and why, as governor of the 
Bahamas from 1787, Dunmore became involved in the competing aspirations of black 
and white émigrés regarding freedom and re-enslavement. It firstly traces a trajectory 
of escalating intervention by Dunmore in the status of African Americans in the 
Bahamas and the ensuing political confrontation between the governor and white 
Loyalist émigrés. The second section presents both new and previously neglected 
evidence of how hundreds of black émigrés were ‘disentangled from the disgraceful 
shackles of Slavery’ as a result.1 The final section goes on to argue that these events 
can best be understood by situating Dunmore very much in the context of the wider 
ideas about slavery, freedom, and empire discussed in chapter one. 
 
                                                 
1
 ‘Sketch of a report &c.’ [1791], Add. MSS 38350, f. 220; on this document see p. 139, n. 98 above. 
 156
I: ‘To give these poor people redress’: Dunmore, Re-enslavement, and Freedom 
in the Bahamas 
 
‘An Hesitation as to Means is not one of the Defects of his Character’ 
   Lieutenant Governor John Forbes on Lord Dunmore, 17972 
 
On his arrival as governor of the Bahamas, as we saw at the end of the previous 
chapter, Lord Dunmore found himself in a colony where ‘Disorder of every kind has 
long prevailed’. He would soon conclude that the unrest ‘has taken such deep root’ 
that drastic measures would be necessary. His first despatch to the Secretary of State 
related the worrying extent of marronage in the islands, especially on Abaco, where 
enslaved black people were either on the brink of, or actually in, a state of open 
insurrection. Dunmore then went on to observe of Bahamian runaways that ‘many of 
them claim their freedom under the Proclamations issued by the Commanders in Chief 
of His Majesty’s forces in America during the late war’, and that ‘I have ordered 
enquiry to be made into the nature of their Claims.’ He added the somewhat guarded 
remark that ‘this enquiry has given umbrage to some persons here, who had detained 
several of these poor unhappy people under various pretences & in a State of 
Slavery.’3 
 Some months later, in March 1788, Dunmore elaborated upon this theme in a 
private letter to Evan Nepean, Undersecretary of the Home Department. Here, he 
stated that that the same ‘malcontents of this Colony’ who had previously opposed 
Governor Maxwell ‘have again set all their engines to work if possible to obstruct 
every measure of Government in these Islands.’ Dunmore was ‘now convinced’ that 
sinister motives lay behind renewed Loyalist agitation for dissolution of the 
Assembly. He asserted that Loyalist slaveholders were seeking 
 
to pass such acts as would secure to them the property of a great number of 
them poor Blacks who deserted from their Rebel Masters, and came into the 
British Lines, on the British Generals issuing their Proclamations promising 
those freedom that did so, these fellows… holding a great proportion of their 
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property by decoying these poor Creatures from the different Towns, when we 
evacuated them on the Continent of America, under pretence of saving them 
from the Hands of their Old Masters,… and have Held them in Bondage till 
my arrival here.4 
 
Much the same thing had been said before by people like Receiver General 
George Barry and Governor Maxwell.5 But where Maxwell had recoiled from the idea 
of a showdown with the Loyalists, if anything, Dunmore seemed to relish such a 
prospect. Virtually his first act as governor, taken only a day after he assumed the 
office, was to proclaim ‘His Majesty’s most gracious and free Pardon’ to ‘Negroes 
[who] have for a considerable Time absented themselves from their Owners or 
Employers.’6 
A second proclamation in November extended the deadline allowed for 
runaways to give themselves up to the authorities. But it also noted that ‘many of the 
said Negroes may be apprehensive of surrendering themselves lest they may be still 
deemed Slaves, notwithstanding their claiming their Freedom.’ Such people were 
directed to apply to the Receiver General, who was ‘to enquire into the nature of such 
claims of freedom’, and would ‘give a Certificate of such freedom’ where those 
claims were found to be ‘properly founded.’7 
 Shortly afterwards, two slaveholders opened lawsuits against Receiver General 
Barry and various magistrates ‘for their Judicial Proceedings, in liberating two 
Negroes.’ Dunmore was probably already contemplating the need for ‘new laws’ in 
response to these actions when, in December, Loyalists took matters into their own 
hands via the vigilante assault on Nassau’s ‘Negro Town’ discussed in chapter three 
above. Shocked by the violence of this episode, and by the perpetrators’ open defiance 
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of his authority, Dunmore was now determined to ‘do everything in my power to give 
these poor people redress’.8 
His resolve was manifested in the form of the ‘Act for explaining and 
amending’ the 1784 slave code, which received the governor’s assent on 25 February 
1788, and was published the following day. Considering that it generated an explosion 
of criticism loud enough to be registered in the pages of the London Times,9 this short 
piece of legislation has received surprisingly little attention in Bahamian 
historiography. In fairness, however, the significance attributed to the measure by 
contemporaries is difficult to infer from the wording of the Act, framed by Chief 
Justice John Matson;10 at first glance, it scarcely represents a radical departure from 
either the spirit or the letter of the 1784 slave code.  
For the most part, the 1788 amendment merely elaborates on the previous 
Act’s provisions for the Receiver General and two magistrates to ‘Assemble… for the 
purpose of hearing and determining the Claims or Applications of Negroes… who 
shall or may claim to be intitled to… their freedom.’ Those officials were to meet on 
the first Monday of each month, and were ‘authorized and required… to examine the 
Manumissions, Passes, Certificates, Bills of Sale and other Deeds and writings to be 
produced at any such meetings, and to examine any… persons upon Oath’, and to 
report their findings to the governor. For each such case heard, the magistrates and 
Receiver General were to receive payments of sixteen and thirty-two shillings 
respectively. Severe penalties were now prescribed for attempts to subvert the 
operation of what would become widely known as the ‘negro court.’ Individuals 
found to have claimed blacks as property on the basis of fraudulent documents were to 
be fined £30. Anyone removing non-whites from the colony while their claims of 
freedom were pending would be liable to a £300 fine.11 
The new law’s crucial innovation was to empower the governor ‘to give a 
Certificate under his Hand and Seal from time to time to any Negro… ajudged to be 
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Free’ that was to ‘be deemed… as a full proof of the freedom of the Negro.’ Thus, 
what had been a purely judicial process was now linked to and buttressed by the 
authority of the executive branch, and ultimately that of the Crown, as represented in 
the colony by the governor. While ostensibly merely clarifying the legal provisions 
approved by Maxwell in 1784, Dunmore had secured a central role for himself in the 
adjudication of freedom. The governor’s opinion as to the primary purpose of that 
process had already been signified by his proclamation of November 1787. A further 
indication was provided by the stipulation that those ‘ajudged to be free in 
consequence of any Proclamation issued by any of His Majesty’s Officers or 
Commanders during the late disturbance in America’ were to be exempt from the £90 
bond that was still theoretically due from Bahamian freedpeople. For it was no secret 
to Loyalist slaveholders or African Americans that the first of those commanders to 
issue such a proclamation had been none other than John Murray, earl of Dunmore.12 
The catalyst for the eventual outburst of explicit condemnation of the 1788 
Act, and of Dunmore’s governorship in general, was the ostensibly trivial quarrel 
between Chief Justice Matson and William Wylly, who had recently arrived in the 
Bahamas from New Brunswick.13 
Matson had initially courted Wylly as a potential ally of the governor against 
‘the malcontents of this Colony’, securing his appointment as Solicitor General and 
entreating him to accept command of a militia company. The two men fell out over 
the vacant position of judge of the Nassau vice-admiralty court, and after resigning as 
Solicitor General on 31 March 1788, the next day Wylly called Matson ‘a Damned 
Liar’ in the street. Matson then prevailed upon Dunmore to have Wylly arrested and 
arraigned, on the somewhat dubious grounds of having brought the office of Chief 
Justice into disrepute. Wylly was released without charge the next day, and on 3 April 
his attorney Robert Johnston issued a writ against Matson for wrongful arrest. The 
Chief Justice departed for England five days later, leaving ‘with a degree of secrecy 
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and adroitness that would have outwitted half the Myrmidons of Bow Street’, 
according to Wylly.14 
For protagonists on both sides, this seemingly rather petty and essentially 
personal dispute reflected larger grievances and antagonisms. To Wylly, his arrest 
clearly showed ‘how completely the dearest Privilege of the People, the Right of 
Personal Liberty, is trifled with in this miserable country.’ In court, the two judges 
were subjected ‘to the most gross and abusive language that can possibly be 
conceived’ by Robert Johnston for having been a party to ‘an Act of the basest 
Tyranny and Oppression.’15 Dunmore claimed that the Chief Justice had been 
compelled to leave when it became ‘unsafe for him to continue longer here.’ Matson 
himself suggested that he had been singled out for persecution because of his role in 
framing the 1788 Act, for which he had ‘incurred the Displeasure of a lot of People 
who held Negro Property upon very disputable Grounds.’ To the governor, the whole 
affair was another example of the iniquitous conduct and aims of ‘the Incendiaries of 
this Island.’ Dunmore now suspended the operation of the General Court, thus 
circumventing the legal proceedings against both Matson and the Receiver General. 
Convinced that his opponents would ‘stick at  nothing to attain their ends, which… are 
of the darkest nature’, he implored London to allow him implement martial law.16 
In May 1788, reports reached Nassau from the settlement of Spencer’s Bight 
on Abaco that ‘a Number of Negroes, were lying out in the Woods… many of whom 
are armed and have committed various depredations… some claiming their 
freedom.’17 Dunmore wasted no time in asserting his undimmed personal resolve to 
investigate the legitimacy of such claims to freedom. With the Receiver General too ill 
                                                 
14
 Wylly to Stokes, Rye, Sussex, 6 July 1789, CO23/29/219–222; Affidavit of William Wylly, 
Nassau, 2 April 1789, CO23/27/139–40; Dunmore to Sydney, Nassau, 21 April 1788, CO23/27/131–2; 
Wylly to Menzies, Nassau, 31 March 1788, CO23/29/237; Affidavit of John Matson, Nassau, 1 April 
1788, CO23/27/134; Warrant for Wylly’s arrest, 1 April 1788, CO23/27/135; Proceedings of the 
General Court, Nassau, 2 April 1788, CO23/27/137; General Court Minutes, 2 April 1788, BDA, 
S.C.1/2; Johnston to Menzies, Nassau, 3 April 1788, CO23/29/240; Wylly to Stokes, Rye, Sussex, 10 
July 1789, CO23/29/226 (‘Myrmidons of Bow Street’). Johnston, originally from Charleston, had 
figured prominently in the Loyalist agitation against Maxwell. As well as practising law, he owned a 
plantation on Cat Island. See Sabine, Biographical Sketches, 441; Bahama Gazette, 3 June 1786. 
15
 Letter from Wylly, 3 April 1788, Bahama Gazette, 5 April 1788 (at CO23/31/246); Dunmore to 
Sydney, Nassau, 21 April 1788, CO23/27/131; Edwards to Dunmore, Nassau, 18 April 1788, 
CO23/27/144–5 (emphasis in original). 
16
 Dunmore to Sydney, Nassau, 8 April 1788, CO23/27/122; ‘An Account of the present Situation of 
Affairs in the Bahama Islands’, c. 1788, CO23/28/156; Dunmore to Nepean, Nassau, 21 April 1788, 
CO23/27/156–7. 
17
 Journals of the Council, 20 May 1788, CO23/28/26. 
 161
to travel, Dunmore went to Abaco himself, and with the authority of a special 
commission from the colonial Council, adjudicated the cases of thirty of the Abaco 
runaways himself.18 
 As discussed above, precisely what happened at Spencer’s Bight, and why, is 
impossible to establish with certainty.19 If it really ‘had been judged expedient to kick 
up among the Negroes’ some kind of rebellion or disorder, Abaco was certainly the 
place to do it, and the behaviour of the crew of Dunmore’s schooner was undoubtedly 
provocative. But Wylly, our main source, was careful to avoid an explicit claim that 
Dunmore had personally instigated the affair, while leaving his audience in no doubt 
as to what he meant. The only evidence we have from an actual participant is very 
circumspect. Richard Pearis said only that Dunmore’s men had ‘spread such 
Confusion among our Negroes’, who claimed to their masters that captain Mackay 
‘told them he had the Governor’s Authority to carry them to Nassau, and that all the 
Rebel Property Negroes would be made free.’ All of this sounds notably reminiscent 
of the way that African Americans had behaved during the American Revolution. 
Then, as discussed in chapter one, slaves exaggerated and probably wilfully 
misinterpreted reports of British emancipatory designs to serve their own purposes, 
often in ways that then gave retrospective credence to rumours of ‘instigated 
insurrections’.20 
 Ultimately, it mattered relatively little whether or not the more shocking 
rumours were true, or that Dunmore supposedly decided that all but one of the thirty 
were legitimately enslaved, or even that the Spencer’s Bight planters themselves 
thanked him for ‘the fair, candid, and impartial, Trial which has been Afforded to our 
Runaway Slaves, and the quiet and peaceful Restoration of most of them to their 
Lawfull Owners.’21 From a more general slaveholding perspective, the Abaco blacks 
were rebels and outlaws, with a history of insurrectionary activity stretching back 
several years. The proper role of the colonial state was to crush them with all the force 
at its disposal, without mercy or hesitation. For the governor instead to acknowledge 
the possibility of their having acted out of legitimate grievances, and to offer even a 
façade of legal protection and due process, was quite outrageous enough. 
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Henceforth, there could be no prospect of reconciliation with Dunmore’s 
governorship for many Loyalist slaveholders. Although continuing to seek the 
dissolution that might establish a Loyalist majority in the Assembly, they would be 
ultimately satisfied only by the governor’s recall. Furthermore, in Wylly, the Loyalists 
now possessed an articulate and legally proficient spokesman who had become one of 
Dunmore’s most implacable enemies. During the summer of 1788, Wylly collected 
signatures for a memorial addressed directly to Prime Minister William Pitt, that 
declared the Bahamas to be ‘oppressed by all the evils of a bad Administration’, and 
subjected to ‘impolitic and oppressive laws.’ It went on to assert that  
 
under colour of Law, our Slaves, the principal property in this Country are 
daily seduced and harboured from their Masters,… and that a Rebellion 
among these people must soon be a Necessary consequence of the indecent 
manner in which they are supported against their lawfull owners.22 
 
 In the following years, Bahamian Grand Juries would similarly present ‘as a 
most alarming Grievance the Existence of an Act of the Legislature of this Country 
which authorises three Justices to determine on the Claims of People of Colour to 
Freedom.’ A succession of Grand Jurors complained that in dispensing with the 
operation of a jury, the 1788 Act was ‘subversive of the rights of British Subjects, and 
contrary to the spirit of our happy Constitution.’ It was further alleged that as a 
consequence, ‘negroes are encouraged to elope from their masters under pretended 
claims of freedom.’ The 1791 Grand Jury initially opted for high-minded language, 
whose legalistic obliqueness perhaps sounded a somewhat defensive note, when it 
identified ‘a direct Tendency to deprive the Subject of what is declared Property by 
the Colonial Customs and Laws, and considered as such by the various Laws of the 
Mother Country without a Trial by Jury.’ As if belatedly concerned that their subtlety 
had been excessive, they concluded by bluntly declaring that ‘We mean Negro 
Property.’23 
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Wylly went to England towards the end of 1788 to deliver the memorial to 
Pitt, and spent much of the following year lobbying the government, London 
commercial interests, and Bahamian colonial agent Anthony Stokes. In the course of a 
series of letters, memorials, and his 1789 pamphlet, A Short Account of the Bahama 
Islands, Wylly elaborated by far the most comprehensive statement of Loyalist 
grievances against Dunmore’s governorship. Wylly’s extensive and wide-ranging 
critique of the ‘negro court’ deserves close attention, as it clearly illustrates both why 
that institution so antagonised Loyalist slaveholders, and the degree to which it was 
perceived as a dangerous departure from ‘Colonial Customs and Laws.’ 
 In part, Wylly questioned the legal propriety of the court, asserting that the 
presiding magistrates ‘proceed upon no established principles; and that their practice 
is governed by no certain or known rules.’ The trials, he claimed, were ‘in every 
respect of the most summary kind, – seldom taking up more than an hour or two’, and 
were notable for accepting evidence amounting to ‘a mockery of proof.’ He further 
echoed the Grand Jurors’ complaint that ‘by this Law, the Trial by Jury is 
unnecessarily and wantonly taken from the subject.’24 
 However, Wylly did not shy from addressing the substantive issue involved: 
that, ‘under colour of this law, the Planter has… been robbed of his property, by 
arbitrary decisions.’ He was prepared to concede that ‘that many Negroes… conveyed 
to the Bahama’s… are now held in slavery by People who have no right to them.’ 
Nonetheless,  he insisted that, in Bahamian and British law, ‘Negroes and certain other 
people of Colour, are declared to be Slaves and are prima facie to be considered as 
such.’ Thus, it was very much ‘contrary to this established rule of Colonial Law’ even 
to allow the enslaved to initiate legal proceedings of any sort against their masters. 
The most alarming innovation was that ‘the Justices, upon these Trials, begin with 
putting the Owner or Claimant to prove his Title (a thing which is often… 
impracticable)… in which if he fails the Negroe is of course declared free.’ Wylly 
argued that the Assembly, in approving such legislation, had effectively ‘ventured to 
declare all Negroes free, who at any time during the Rebellion in America found 
means to escape from their Owners, and get within the British Lines.’25 
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Still more than this, however, the 1788 Act could be construed as a threat to 
the fundamentals of slave law. In placing the burden of proof of enslavement so firmly 
upon masters, it strongly implied the principle that any slave might be free, and in 
some respects should be presumed so until it could be proved otherwise. Hence, those 
who were notionally mere chattels were anomalously empowered to confront their 
owners in a court of law (and, in another departure from established norms, to testify 
against them). Many years later, Bahamian slaveholders would vociferously insist 
that, were slaves generally permitted to bear witness against their masters, ‘in less 
than twelve months, there would be no Slavery to ameliorate, not a single Slave to 
enfranchise, within the range of the West Indies.’26 
 This was happening, moreover, at a moment when slaveholding interests in the 
English-speaking world seemed very much on the defensive. In Britain, abolitionism 
had gained momentum and support with startling speed since the foundation of the 
Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1787. In August 1789, the 
Bahama Gazette carried a special supplement covering the parliamentary debate on 
the slave trade, where Loyalists could read that Wilberforce had delivered ‘one of the 
most animated, perspicuous, methodical and ably argued speeches ever heard on a 
copious and comprehensive subject.’27 It was no secret that in societies with slaves, 
judicial decisions might so undermine the legal basis of slavery as to render the 
institution untenable. The Mansfield judgement had effectively done this in England, 
and the 1780s saw similar rulings in Massachusetts and New Hampshire; by the end of 
the decade it seemed that the end of slavery in the United States north of the Mason-
Dixon line was only a matter of time.28 
Even if, as Wylly assumed, ‘it would be absurd to expect much wisdom’ from 
a legislature without ‘any man of respectable property’, it is hard to believe that the 
members of the Assembly had placed such a construction upon the bill they had 
passed in 1788. In any case, Wylly had no doubt as to the real culprit: Lord Dunmore, 
a man he characterised as being ‘obstinate and violent by nature; of a capacity below 
mediocrity, and little cultivated by education; ignorant of the Constitution of England, 
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and of the Rights of British subjects.’29 Wylly left room for some ambiguity in his 
assessment of the governor’s motivation. He repeatedly alluded to ‘shameful 
purposes’, including allegations of outright corruption, but also acknowledged the 
possibility that Dunmore had ‘proceeded from the purest motives of humanity towards 
the Negroes.’30 Regardless of the reasons, Wylly was certain that ‘Lord Dunmore’s 
personal interference’ had been central to an intensified process of judicial 
manumission in the Bahamas. He claimed that ‘the trials depend for the most part 
upon the Governor’s pleasure.’ It could ‘not be doubted’ that Dunmore’s involvement 
‘had a manifest tendency to influence the Magistrates… Many Negroes have 
accordingly been declared free upon the most frivolous evidence.’ In Wylly’s account 
of the Abaco affair, Dunmore, in response to the slaves ‘having taken up arms’, had 
presided over ‘a Court illegally constituted, and gave a general invitation to the 
Negroes to come in and claim their freedom.’31 
 For Loyalist slaveholders such as Wylly, among the most worrying 
consequences of Dunmore’s policy was its effect on black Bahamians, and especially 
African-American émigrés, who were supposedly quick to exploit the opportunity it 
presented to renegotiate their ambiguous post-Revolutionary status in their favour. 
Like the Grand Jurors, Wylly contended that it had now become ‘the simplest thing in 
the world, for a Negroe to elope from the service of his master, claim his freedom, go 
next day to trial, and obtain a decision in his favour.’ But the issue was not simply the 
ability of individual non-whites to obtain freedom, but rather, the degree to which 
‘much confusion [had] been excited by this Act among a host of the Slaves in the 
Bahama Islands.’ In the first instance, the result of this confusion was that ‘every 
Negroe in the Bahama’s now thinks himself entitled to his freedom, who happened at 
any period of the War to be employed about any of the works or departments of our 
Army.’ Most alarming of all, however, was Wylly’s assertion that ‘the Slaves in the 
Bahama Islands (who greatly outnumber the whites) encouraged by this Act, by this 
Court, by Proclamations, and by other means, have broke out into some Acts of open 
rebellion.’32 
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As we saw in chapter three, the suggestion that a previously quiescent slave 
population was inflamed by Dunmore lacks credibility. But Wylly’s exposition of 
Loyalist grievances clearly indicates the multiple levels on which Dunmore and his 
project of state-sponsored manumission were perceived to threaten the security of 
slave property in the Bahamas. The ‘negro court’ posed an immediate problem for the 
many individual Loyalists who held African-American émigrés as slaves on the basis 
of tenuous claims of ownership. The legislation on which the court’s existence rested 
was, at the very least, anomalous when set against the principles of the larger legal 
framework underpinning racial slavery. The governor’s conduct threatened to make an 
already troublesome slave population still more assertive, and might ultimately pose 
concerns for the physical security of the regime. 
 In terms of mounting an effective challenge to Dunmore’s policy, however, 
Wylly’s efforts largely proved to be in vain. Secretary of State Lord Sydney 
demanded an explanation of Wylly’s charges in December 1788. By the time 
Dunmore’s twenty-five page reply reached London the following August, Sydney had 
himself been replaced by William Wyndham Grenville. During April and May 1789, 
the London Times had stated with increasing confidence that ‘Lord Dunmore will be 
immediately recalled to answer the charges exhibited against him’, but the basis of 
these reports is unclear; their source may well have been Wylly himself.33 It has been 
suggested that only ‘the intercession of Anthony Stokes, colonial agent for the 
Bahamas, saved Lord Dunmore’s position,’ but nothing indicates that London ever 
seriously contemplated recalling Dunmore in 1789. Grenville merely acknowledged 
receipt of the governor’s answers to Wylly’s accusations without further comment in 
September. Wylly himself left England for the Bahamas towards the end of February 
1790 with his mission incomplete.34 
However, while Wylly was making his apparently fruitless representations to 
the Secretary of State, what was ultimately to prove a far more dangerous challenge to 
Dunmore was taking shape from within the House of Assembly. Ever since the 
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bitterly contested general election of 1784–5 had failed to produce a Loyalist majority, 
the latter had complained loudly of ‘the present rotten and unconstitutional majority in 
the Assembly’, refusing to take their seats and demanding a fresh dissolution. But by 
the time of Dunmore’s arrival as governor, many Loyalists were reconsidering their 
initial decision to boycott the legislature, and a series of by-elections over the 
following years saw a growing number of émigré members returned to the 
Assembly.35 In 1789, the Assembly was already some way from being the ‘duped and 
enslaved’ bulwark of ‘a most oppressive and contemptible oligarchy’ described by 
Wylly.36 
 The struggle between Dunmore and the Assembly during the 1790s has 
already received substantial attention in Bahamian historiography. Their dispute 
turned upon several issues, and was to some extent simply a conventional colonial 
clash over the demarcation of powers between a legislature of elected representatives 
and a governor who could never be accused of much sympathy for democracy.37 What 
has been hitherto unrecognised, however, is the extent to which the conflict was 
driven by the Assembly’s dim view of Dunmore’s self-appointed role as champion of 
state-sponsored manumission in the Bahamas. 
 A commission appointed by the Assembly to inspect the Receiver General’s 
record books voiced its concern to the House in March 1789 regarding the ‘Charge in 
the Publick Accounts amounting to upwards of £400 incurred for the trial of the 
freedom of Negroes.’ The commissioners professed their alarm at this ‘continued 
extraordinary and unnecessary expense’, although the Assembly had predictably fewer 
reservations regarding the £60 payments frequently made to slaveholders as 
compensation for slaves who were executed or transported. Rather, their real 
grievance was that the ‘expense incurred has been without the smallest advantage to 
the Publick,’ the benefits thereof being confined to those beyond the racial frontier of 
civil society. In terms increasingly distant from the commission’s ostensible remit, 
they added that ‘the Powers and Authorities given the Court for the trial of Negroes 
freedom was so unlimited that the most valuable Property of the Inhabitants of these 
Islands is absolutely at their Disposal’, and further opined ‘that therefore… nothing 
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can render the continuance of the Law establishing such Court in anywise 
expedient.’38 
In April, the Assembly passed a bill suspending the 1788 Act, only to be 
somewhat brusquely informed a few weeks later that the Council had rejected the 
measure.39 Such direct challenges had little prospect of success while the upper 
chamber was largely composed of individuals drawn from the ‘vortex of Characters’ 
that ‘His Lordship has collected… about him, whose opinions and whose fiats seem to 
be regulated by his will and pleasure.’40 The Council had no more hesitation in 
disposing of subsequent suspension bills sent up by the Assembly in June 1791 and 
July 1792.41 
However, although these attempts to repeal the 1788 Act thereby met with 
frustration, the Assembly enjoyed greater success in curtailing the proceedings of the 
‘negro court’ by restricting the funding of the ‘extraordinary and unnecessary 
expense’ of sixty-four shillings that was payable to the Receiver-General and 
magistrates for each case heard. For most of his governorship, Dunmore periodically 
authorised these payments with the rest of the public accounts in the sessions of the 
Executive Council. The sums involved, never amounting to more than £30 at a time, 
and usually rather less, hardly represented an enormous drain on the treasury, but they 
presumably did (and were intended to) provide an incentive for the recipients to 
process as many claims to freedom as possible.42 
In June 1789, the Council returned the annual Revenue Bill to the House, with 
the observation that ‘the Clause… wherein the allowances to Justices &c. sitting on 
the Trial of Negroes… is altered, it is conceived does not correspond with the Title of 
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the Bill.’ After a division, the Assembly refused to retract this clause, and the bill 
received Dunmore’s assent a few days later.43 
The 1791 Revenue Bill would again include ‘several clauses regulating the 
conduct of the Receiver General and his Deputies.’ But this measure went 
considerably further, with the Assembly now determined to assert 
 
the undoubted and sole right of this House as the Representatives of the 
people sanctioned by Parliamentary usage to direct[,] limit and appoint in 
such Bills the purposes[,] considerations[,] limitations and qualifications of 
such Grants and sums of Money.44 
 
The success of this Bill would see the Assembly ‘assume… to itself, when 
sitting, the sole power of “Ascertaining, Adjusting, and paying Accounts and demands 
against the Public”’, and of appointing a Committee wielding similar authority at 
other times.45 Given the House’s established attitude to the ‘negro court’, such a fiscal 
straitjacket would probably mean the termination of funding for that institution. 
 Attacking the court through the terms of the Revenue Bill was potentially a 
very potent strategy. The well-established colonial and British precedents regarding 
‘money bills’ offered a way around the upper chamber’s veto over other legislation. 
The Assembly could be far more confident of presenting a relatively united front in a 
dispute with the governor and Council over the Assembly’s prerogative on such 
legislation. Members who might be ambivalent regarding repeal of the 1788 Act 
would find it much harder to remain neutral regarding what was easily represented as 
the defence of ‘the best and most sacred Interests of themselves and constituents’ 
against the arrogance of executive power.46 
By stubbornly resisting the Assembly’s initial attempts at direct repeal, 
Dunmore and the Council had helped to escalate their differences with the House into 
a larger constitutional battle over the distribution of authority between executive and 
legislature. The Council found the 1791 Revenue Bill ‘subversive of a Government 
                                                 
43
 Journals of the General Assembly, 17–26 June 1789, CO23/30/88–93. 
44
 Journals of the Council, 19 October 1791, CO23/31/57; Journals 1791–4, 9th session, 20 October 
1791, 22. 
45
 Journals of the Council, 19 October 1791, CO23/31/56. 
46
 Journals 1791–4, 9th session, 20 October 1791, 24. 
 170
founded on Monarchical principles’, a measure that would effectively ‘wrest from the 
Crown all the efficient powers of Government’, and ‘almost entirely annul all 
responsibility in the King’s Representative, and the persons acting under his 
immediate authority.’47 With the House resolving that even to enter into debate 
regarding the Council’s objections ‘might appear a Diminution of those Inherent 
Rights from which the General Assembly will never recede’, neither side appeared 
willing to countenance any sort of compromise over the issues at stake.48 
For Dunmore, who in the midst of the crisis had also to contend with ‘a severe 
fit of Sickness’, the prospects were not encouraging.49 By repeatedly proroguing the 
Assembly, he dragged the impasse on until the summer of 1792, but with funds drying 
up, it was clear that the deadlock could not continue indefinitely. In his speech 
opening the July 1792 session, Dunmore noted ‘the bad consequences that have 
ensued… from the want of an efficient Revenue’, and warned that ‘any further 
extension of them must multiply the distress of the Inhabitants, and abridge the 
constitutional functions of Government.’50 He resorted to presenting the House with 
an extract of a letter from Henry Dundas, by then Secretary of State, heavily edited so 
as to indicate unequivocal support for the governor and Council’s position. The only 
result of this rather dubious stratagem was to earn Dunmore a stinging rebuke from 
Dundas when the latter received word of it.51 The governor’s only alternative was a 
dissolution of the Assembly, a step he had consistently resisted since his arrival; if 
anything, a general election threatened to return an even more hostile legislature. On 3 
August, Dunmore finally conceded defeat, informing the House that ‘I shall give my 
Assent to this [Revenue] Bill from a thorough knowledge of the Great evils and 
discredit the want of one for so long a period has thrown upon this Country.’ But he 
continued to insist that the Bill ‘contains Clauses dissonant to His Majesty’s 
Instructions’, and ended with a defiant note, warning that those instructions ‘will in 
future invariably be my Guide be the Consequences what it may.’52 
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The Assembly would not meet again until July 1793, when they were 
unimpressed by their examination of the Treasurer’s books on the 24th, noting with 
disapproval the ‘many accounts… paid by the Treasurer for several contingencies 
which… were irregular.’ The House resolved ‘that the Treasurer be directed not to pay 
any such accounts in future until they are examined and passed by the General 
Assembly.’ They singled out for criticism ‘an overpayment made to Thomas Smith 
Esquire amounting to £120.’ Although the nature of this ‘overpayment’ is not 
explicitly stated in the journal of the House, the only payments made to Smith in the 
public accounts paid by the Council were those for ‘the Trial of Negroes.’53 
A month later, after Dunmore had already assented to a new Revenue Act, the 
Assembly passed ‘An Act for the appropriation of certain sums of money… for and 
towards defraying the expences of this Government.’54 When the Council refused to 
consider this measure without copies of the relevant vouchers and accounts, the House 
simply declared once more their ‘undoubted and Sole right’ to frame money bills, 
insisting that the latter ‘ought not to be changed, altered or interfered with in any 
manner by the Council.’ A personal demand from the governor for the accounts was 
met with a resolution that it was ‘unsanctioned by Parliamentary usage and 
incompatible with the principles of the Constitution for the General Assembly to 
furnish Documents and Vouchers to other branches of the Legislature for the passing 
of Money Bills.’55 Another brief standoff ensued, but the ‘critical Situation of affairs’ 
created by the outbreak of war with Revolutionary France made the need for revenue 
far more urgent than it had been in 1791–2.56 Dunmore signed the Appropriation Bill 
on 16 September, and with it permanently yielded control of Bahamian public 
finances to the Assembly.57 
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II: ‘Every Negroe in the Bahamas now thinks himself entitled to his freedom’: 
State Manumission under Dunmore 
 
Historians of the Bahamas have generally been every bit as scathing as their American 
colleagues in their interpretation of the fourth earl of Dunmore. He has been variously 
described as ‘a hot-headed and licentious boor’ who was ‘outstandingly inept’ as well 
as ‘narrow-minded, indiscreet, obstinate and violent’. Dunmore’s ‘methods were 
illegal’, and moreover ‘motivated solely by greed’.58 The substantive charge sheet 
against him includes accusations of ‘shamelessly exercising patronage’, ‘speculating 
in land’, and an ‘obsession with building new forts’. The latter is said to have driven 
his ‘demands for extraordinary expenditures’, that had the effect of ‘uniting all local 
whites in a party against his government.’59 In short, he was probably ‘the worst 
governor the islands ever had.’60 
The ‘negro court’ has rarely, if ever, been the subject of detailed investigation, 
but in the context of this broader narrative, it has proved easy to regard it with 
cynicism. In a brief discussion of the Abaco affair, Sylvia Frey observes that although 
Dunmore was ‘still posing as the Great Liberator’, he was primarily ‘anxious to lull 
the planters’ fears and calm the growing racial tensions.’61 Craton and Saunders 
suggest, apparently with little supporting evidence, that the ‘negro court’ ‘was seen by 
whites and blacks alike as a means of re-enslavement.’62 
 The prevalence of such interpretations of both Dunmore and the court is, in 
one sense, a powerful testament to William Wylly’s considerable gifts as an advocate 
and polemicist. But Wylly’s case against the ‘negro court’ rested in part on his 
insistence that although accusations of re-enslavement by Loyalists ‘may, in some 
very few instances, be true’, reports that the practice was widespread had ‘very little 
foundation in fact’.63 That Bahamian historiography has effectively tended to give 
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Wylly the benefit of the doubt on this cautiously imprecise claim reflects the degree to 
which the ambiguous de jure and de facto status of so many African-American 
émigrés has gone unnoticed. Likewise, some historians have uncritically echoed the 
allegation that slaves ‘in general’ had claimed their freedom only ‘upon their being 
encouraged after several months absence from their owners, to be harboured and 
employed upon the plantation of Lord Dunmore’.64 Wylly produced precisely one 
example to substantiate this claim, and even here Dunmore could produce evidence 
that he had acted without impropriety.65 
 The clinching point has usually been that, after all, of the 30 slaves tried at 
Spencer’s Bight, Dunmore ruled 29 to be slaves and restored them to their masters. 
This is presumably the basis of Craton and Saunders’ claim that ‘a large proportion of 
the cases went against the black claimants.’66 Let us ignore for the moment that there 
is only Wylly’s word for this, and that in the absence of any record of the proceedings, 
nothing is known of the basis on which these 29 claimed their freedom.67 The 
argument that that the ‘negro court’ actually functioned primarily as a mechanism for 
re-enslavement sits very awkwardly indeed with the other elements of Wylly’s 
critique, which have rarely been examined in detail: that this was a shocking violation 
of fundamental premises of colonial slave law at the expense of slaveholders’ property 
rights, and moreover, as a result, virtually every black émigré in the Bahamas ‘now 
thinks himself entitled to his freedom’.68 
 The 1788 Act instituting the ‘negro court’ called for records of its proceedings 
to be entered into a book kept by the Receiver General. In 1789, the Assembly called 
for ‘the Commissioners appointed to preside on the Trials of Freedom of Negroes… to 
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lay before this House the Book containing the Records of such Trials’.69 The contents 
of this book would obviously help enormously to cut through the fog of partisan 
rhetoric and shed some clear light on what the court was actually doing. It is 
mentioned as being extant as recently as the 1960s, and Lydia Austin Parrish 
apparently quoted material from it.70 Since then it seems to have disappeared. It is not 
in the Bahamian Department of Archives, or among the eighteenth-century record 
books still housed in the Registrar General’s Department. 
 What do still exist are Bahamian manumission records. The best known source 
for eighteenth-century manumissions is a slim manuscript volume, currently preserved 
at the Department of Archives in Nassau, bearing the (modern) title, ‘Register of 
Freed Slaves Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century.’ This document provides a tabular 
list of freedpeople up to 1834, with dates of manumission, names of the persons 
responsible, a brief (usually a single word) description of how they were freed, and a 
source reference. 
 Unfortunately, many pages of the ‘Register’, roughly those covering names 
beginning with the letters G to R, are missing. Partly because of this, scholarship on 
Bahamian manumissions has largely focussed on the nineteenth century, where 
parallel information is available from the extensive documentation produced under the 
terms of the imperial Slave Registration Acts.71 
 Happily, however, there also exists in the Bahamian Archives, as an unlisted 
addendum to the contents of a reel of microfilm labelled ‘Executive Council Minutes’, 
a thirty-seven page document with the apparently contemporary title ‘Negro 
Freedoms’. The front page of ‘Negro Freedoms’ bears the stamp of the old Nassau 
Public Record Office, but the document is not listed in the Department of Archives 
finding aids, and to my knowledge it has never been cited by any historian. In layout, 
‘Negro Freedoms’ is very similar to the Register, and where their contents overlap 
chronologically, they are almost identical. It has the appearance of a rough draft or 
working copy, and contains no entries later than 1826. But, crucially, ‘Negro 
Freedoms’ seems to be complete for the time span that it covers; it enables the gaps in 
the ‘Register of Freed Slaves’ to be filled in. 
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 Almost every entry in these two sources has a reference to further 
documentation in the record books of the colonial Registry Office, from whose 
contents both the ‘Register’ and ‘Negro Freedoms’ were presumably compiled. Not all 
these books are extant or safe to handle; many entries in the manumission documents 
refer to the seemingly lost book of ‘Trials’ or ‘Tryals’ discussed above. Nonetheless, 
at least nine containing relevant material survive, either in the original or as microfilm 
copies made in the 1950s.72 
From the ‘Register’, ‘Negro Freedoms’ and the Registry Office Books, it is 
possible to identify a total of 451 individuals who were freed between 1782 and 
1799.73 
The ‘Register of Freed Slaves’ includes summary reasons for the manumissions it 
lists, under the headings of ‘by whom made free’ and ‘How’ or ‘Causes of freedom’. 
Some of this information is more or less self-explanatory; it seems reasonable to 
assume that the name of a private individual accompanied by ‘Manumission’, 
‘Bequest’, or ‘Last Will’ indicates the freeing of a slave by an owner.74 ‘Negro 
Freedoms’, a less clearly presented document generally, provides only a single 
explanatory column, that frequently contains merely a name. Collation of the more 
than 160 entries appearing in both documents indicates that this represents a ‘normal’ 
manumission. 
However, for over two-fifths of the 211 entries from the ‘Register’ for 1782–
99, ‘Proclamation’ is entered in the ‘causes of freedom’ heading, and expressions such 
as ‘claim of Right’, ‘Military Service’ and ‘within Br[itish] Lines’ also occur.75 These 
manumissions by ‘proclamation’ are variously described in the ‘by whom made free’ 
heading as the actions of military officers and ‘Commissioners of Claims’, or as the 
result of ‘Certificates’ issued either by ‘Justices’ or (most commonly) the governor. 
Again, where individual entries from ‘Negro Freedom’ can be identified with those in 
the ‘Register’, these descriptions are duplicated, although the term ‘proclamation’ is 
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often absent.76 Combining all these categories, the state, in its various judicial, 
executive and military capacities, is described as being responsible for 237 of the 451 
manumissions recorded from 1782–99. 
Forty of these state manumissions are dated to the first part of this period, and 
where corresponding entries in the Registry Office Books can be traced, they are 
mostly copies of certificates of freedom issued outside the Bahamas. Presumably, 
therefore, as discussed in chapter three, such entries are not records of people freed in 
the Bahamas, but rather of newly arrived émigré African Americans who were 
registering their recently obtained legal freedom with the authorities.77 
The documentation available for the 54 manumissions ascribed to a 
‘Certificate of Justices’, however, suggests that these were indeed usually African 
Americans who successfully claimed their freedom in the ‘negro court’. Jenny and her 
four children were declared free in 1786 on the basis of testimony from William 
Tebbs that ‘she took protection within the British Lines at Charleston… and that he 
saw her free pass signed by… Major Fraser Town Mayor of Charleston’.78 Thomas 
Smith, ‘lately in the possession of Henry Wiles’, was found in 1787 to be ‘absolutely 
and to all intents and purposes free and acquitted… from all obligations of slavery or 
servitude.’79 In 1788, the court declared that ‘a Negro Woman calling herself Sarah 
Moultrie’, who had belonged to the American general William Moultrie, was ‘not nor 
ever was the Slave or property of… John Martin’.80 
A few cases offer rather more detail, like that of James Green, ‘a Mulatto Man’ 
who was claimed as a slave by Richard Pearis in 1785. Green claimed to have served 
during the war first in the ‘Engineer Department’ and later in a cavalry unit, before 
going to St. Augustine, where, according to several witnesses ‘he was always 
considered as a free man’ and ‘was never claimed as a slave by any person’. In 
Florida, he signed on as a sailor aboard the Whitby Warrior, where his ‘free papers… 
were utterly defaced and destroyed by the water.’ Eventually, he joined Andrew 
Deveaux’s expedition against the Spanish, and so came to the Bahamas. Pearis did not 
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support his claim, and Green was pronounced ‘to all intents and purposes a 
freeman’.81 
Of the 128 state manumissions listed for the years 1788–93, 95 are by 
‘Governor’s Certificate’. Nearly half of them have corresponding Registry Office 
Book entries, but very few of them provide much detail. A typical example is the 1793 
certificate issued to Abraham Collins, which states simply that ‘whereas it appears to 
me from good and sufficient Evidence that the bearer hereof Abraham Collins is a free 
Black Man. I do therefore certify and confirm the freedom of the said Abraham 
Collins.’82 What is notable, however, is that all are signed by Dunmore, and that the 
‘Governor’s Certificate’ formulation occurs only three times for entries dated prior to 
1788. 
These documents are surely those that Dunmore was authorised to issue ‘under 
his Hand and Seal… to any Negro… ajudged to be Free… as a full proof of the 
freedom of the Negro’ by the terms of the 1788 Act.83 Moreover, the chronological 
distribution of state manumissions of all categories is wholly consistent with the 
political trajectory outlined in section I. There were 128 in 1788–93, almost double 
the number in the preceding six year period, and three times the total from 1794–99. 
After 1793, when the Loyalist opposition finally wrested control of colonial finances 
from Dunmore, the level of state manumissions fell off dramatically: after an annual 
peak of 47 in 1793, just 8 are recorded for the following two years. 
All of this was decidedly unusual. In most sites of Atlantic slavery, 
manumission was in the first instance a private matter. Owners made decisions to free 
enslaved people, most commonly the illegitimate children of slaveholders by enslaved 
women, but also other slaves for whom owners felt particular regard, affection or 
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gratitude. Some societies also permitted slaves to purchase themselves from amenable 
masters, but manumission was normally the prerogative of individual slaveholders.84 
State intervention in this process primarily took the form of legal regulation, 
often designed to buttress the barrier between slavery and freedom with restrictions 
and limitations. This was the case with the 1768 Bahamian Manumission Act that 
required freed slaves to provide a £90 bond as security for their good behaviour and 
financial self-sufficiency.85 Short of abolishing slavery itself, governments generally 
only emancipated individuals in unusual and relatively rare situations, for instance as 
a reward to slaves who betrayed insurrectionary conspiracies to the authorities. Within 
the British empire, the freeing of large numbers of slaves by the state occurred almost 
solely on grounds of military expediency or emergency.86 Clearly, many African 
Americans in the Bahamas could lay a reasonable claim to ‘their freedom under the 
Proclamations issued by the Commanders in Chief of His Majesty’s forces in America 
during the late war’.87 But in peacetime, nearly a decade after the war’s end, there was 
little or no precedent for government to liberate hundreds of people, ostensibly on 
grounds of principle. It seems clear that only the personal support of Dunmore made 
this possible. But this raises the question of why Dunmore was prepared to expend so 
much political capital in the interests of the enslaved, even at the cost of permanently 
alienating much of the white Bahamian elite, and eventually of surrendering a major 
slice of his executive authority. To answer this question, it is necessary to examine the 
figure of Dunmore in more detail. 
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III: Lord Dunmore as Liberator? Dunmore, Slavery and Empire 
 
It is not hard to see why the judgement of history has not been kind to Dunmore. 
There seems little doubt that he was a haughty, arrogant individual who made enemies 
easily and often. His extravagance, overbearing manner and frequent disregard for 
strict constitutional and legal propriety arguably made him ill-suited to the roles of 
politician and administrator. An enthusiastic land speculator in both Virginia and the 
Bahamas, he certainly took full advantage of the potential that his governorships 
offered for patronage, nepotism and self-enrichment.88 
Dunmore has also suffered through his incompatibility with conventional 
historiographical boundaries. His life straddles a range of what are all too often still 
treated in practice as parallel but separate branches of historical inquiry: eighteenth-
century British politics and the incorporation of the Scottish aristocracy, colonial New 
York and Virginia, the American Revolution, and finally the Bahamas. Consequently, 
even on the rare occasions when Dunmore has been deemed a worthwhile subject of 
study in his own right, such work has been tightly focused upon specific points in time 
and space, rather than the overall trajectory of his life and career.89 
This fragmentation of Dunmore’s personal history has facilitated scholarly 
scepticism, not to say cynicism, as to his attitudes and motives. Considered, as they 
generally have been, as isolated and atypical or anomalous episodes, it can seem 
eminently reasonable to conclude that initiatives such as the Virginia proclamation 
and the Bahamian ‘negro court’ were of only limited significance in the story of a 
largely conventional and not especially interesting imperial official. 
By considering Dunmore’s imperial career as a distinctive trajectory in its own 
right, a particular attitude and approach to the situation of enslaved black people is 
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discernible, from both his sporadic remarks on the subject, and, above all, his 
actions.90 In North America, as we saw in chapter one, he had been struck by the 
military possibilities inherent in Virginian slaves’ desire ‘to revenge themselves’ as 
early as 1772. After exploring this potential in practice in 1775, he went on to 
formulate a plan for raising a new army of former slaves in the lower South that went 
far beyond what any Revolutionary War British commander had previously 
contemplated.91 
In the Bahamas, complaining to London about the inadequacy of the regular 
garrison, he suggested that he might once more be ‘obliged to Arm some Negroes’.92 
He did manage to employ a small multi-racial force (in which non-whites and whites 
seem to have received the same pay) as the crew of his schooner, the Shearwater. 93 
When not in use by the governor himself, this vessel was primarily employed in what 
was ostensibly an effort to control smuggling in the Out Islands. According to Wylly, 
‘the approach of so many Algerine Rovers could not have struck greater terror into the 
minds of the Inhabitants, than they were filled with when the Governor’s Cruizers 
visited their defenceless Islands.’94 On occasion, as at Spencer’s Bight, these men 
cheerfully engaged in what looked very much like a deliberate effort to subvert 
master-slave relations. 
In each of these examples, Dunmore’s principal concern was to address 
problems of imperial governance, from the fundamental crisis of the American 
rebellion to the comparatively trivial irritant of illegal trade in the Bahamas. To some 
degree, his support for state manumission can also be understood in this light, as a 
pragmatic response to the mounting disorder and violence in Nassau and at Abaco. 
With just four depleted regular companies to garrison the whole colony, the coercive 
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options for dealing with ‘the daring behaviour of the Negroes’ – and of men like John 
Tattnall – were limited.95 
But Dunmore’s solutions to these problems consistently involved an impulse 
to mobilise black people in the service of the empire, on a voluntary and reciprocal 
basis, entailing obligations on his part that he took at least as seriously as had Guy 
Carleton in New York. He tried to identify points at which imperial and black interests 
and aspirations might coincide, and where cooperation might be to their mutual 
advantage. 
Most obviously, Dunmore grasped the potential of appealing to aspirations to 
freedom; in Virginia, the ‘Ethiopian Regiment’ wore the motto ‘Liberty to Slaves’ on 
their uniforms. In South Carolina, Dunmore stressed the necessity of an unequivocal 
promise of eventual freedom to slaves who joined the proposed new black regiments. 
Moreover, in his use of black people, Dunmore repeatedly found it expedient to 
‘encourage them to revenge themselves’ via roles entailing direct confrontation with 
slaveholders. The rebellion of the Southern plantocrats was to be crushed by African-
American soldiers. In the Bahamas, Richard Pearis was subjected to the humiliation of 
watching helplessly as the ‘armed Negroes’ from the Shearwater took over his 
plantation and seized his property, while his guests and house slaves looked on. 
Hints of sympathy for the enslaved can also be discerned in Dunmore’s 
answers to the Parliamentary enquiry into slavery of 1788–9. He reported with 
apparent satisfaction that slaves in the Bahamas enjoyed the same life expectancy as 
whites, and that the slave population’s ‘Natural increase in these Islands is at least 
equal to that of the whites’, with a ‘nearly equal’ ratio of males to females among the 
enslaved. He further stated that Bahamian slaves were not subjected to any labour that 
whites were ‘constitutionally’ incapable of undertaking, adding pointedly that ‘we 
grow no sugar and I hope we never will.’ The image of slavery in the islands presented 
by Dunmore in this document was somewhat rose-tinted, as in his claim that enslaved 
Bahamians ‘are in general taken very good care of by their Masters whose interest it is 
to do so’.96 But he clearly found the Bahamian version of slavery more palatable than 
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the ruthless exploitation of the enslaved in the plantation societies, and especially in 
the sugar islands. 
To be sure, there is nothing to suggest that Dunmore ever envisaged an end to 
slavery as an institution, and still less anything resembling racial equality. In Virginia, 
he owned dozens of slaves, and would buy more on coming to the Bahamas.97 He 
expressed little interest in the British abolitionist movement, let alone support for it, 
except to report that it had made no discernible impression on Bahamian slaves.98 But 
he apparently did believe that blackness and bondage need not necessarily be 
synonymous. Any number of individual non-whites might demonstrate that they were 
worthy of freedom. Moreover, it should be entirely within the prerogative of the state, 
both to dispense such freedom, and to determine who was to be entitled to it. As we 
have seen, Dunmore had few qualms over violating the sanctity of property rights, at 
least in human beings. 
At one level, this was a distinctly personal approach to black people. No other 
eighteenth-century royal governor displayed such a sustained enthusiasm for arming 
slaves, and still less for freeing them in peacetime. A parallel might be drawn with the 
Superintendent of Honduras, Colonel Edward Despard, who, like Dunmore, 
antagonised a local elite by championing the interests of poor black and coloured 
people in an obscure outpost of empire during the 1780s. But it would be misleading 
to think of Dunmore as a maverick figure in the sense that Despard undoubtedly was. 
In 1790, Despard’s egalitarian land distribution scheme cost him his job in 
Honduras.99 In contrast, and despite the fervent lobbying by Wylly and others, London 
never criticised Dunmore for his manumission policy (though he was censured with 
increasing severity by successive Secretaries of State for a wide range of other 
transgressions). Rather, Lord Sydney went so far as to advise him in 1788 that  
 
the Measures you have pursued… for affording Protection to such [African 
Americans] as may have been unjustifiably deprived of the Freedom they 
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had acquired from their Services during the War in America, meets with His 
Majesty’s Royal approbation.100 
 
 In most respects, Dunmore’s career as soldier, politician and governor seems 
to have been thoroughly conventional. Whereas Despard would be hanged and 
beheaded as a traitor in 1803 for his part in a revolutionary republican conspiracy, 
Dunmore sat in the House of Lords for nearly thirty years.101 John Selby has observed 
of his conduct in Virginia during the 1770s that ‘fundamentally, there was no 
difference between his attitude and London’s. It was his kind of people who then ruled 
the British Empire.’102 Dunmore was very much within the orbit of mainstream British 
thought and practice regarding empire, and it is there that we must look to make sense 
of his apparent unorthodoxy regarding slavery. 
The idea of the ‘mainstream’ calls for qualification, insofar as even the notion 
of an overall British imperial policy was only just beginning to emerge in the later 
eighteenth century. With metropolitan oversight of the colonies diffused across a 
bewildering array of agencies and officials, whose responsibilities and jurisdictions 
were not necessarily demarcated in any very clear or rational manner, much depended 
in practice upon local initiatives. For the most part, imperial ‘policy’, not unlike the 
empire itself, amounted to a piecemeal assemblage of ad hoc solutions to specific 
problems, devised by people who commonly ‘had no coherent philosophy of empire’, 
or even much sense of how their actions fitted into a larger ‘imperial system.’103 
Nonetheless, it is possible to trace the development of distinct patterns of ideas 
and assumptions within this mosaic. As we saw in chapter one, one such current was 
the conception of paternalistic imperial subjectship that increasingly informed the 
governance of non-British peoples from the 1760s onwards. This ‘discourse of 
colonial governmentality’ was reflected by the various initiatives designed to both 
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protect the interests of such peoples, and to more effectively incorporate them within 
the empire as loyal and useful subjects of the crown.104 
A parallel tendency was the drive to strengthen metropolitan power and 
control over the empire, manifested in measures such as the novel initiatives in the 
direct rule of overseas territories, assertions of parliamentary sovereignty over the 
colonies, and efforts to curb the autonomy of the existing colonial assemblies. The 
conjunction of these two trends had potentially profound ramifications for the position 
of slavery within the empire. They informed the proposals for gradual emancipation 
formulated by people such as Maurice Morgann and James Ramsay, and the early 
antislavery activism of Granville Sharp. They also provided a frame of reference for 
the British soldiers, officials and politicians who contemplated the subversion of 
North American slavery during the Revolutionary War, and later for many of the early 
leaders of the British abolitionist movement.105 
Although there is no firm evidence that Dunmore was familiar with either the 
texts or the authors of the early antislavery schemes of the 1760s and 1770s, there are 
striking parallels between the ideas of people such as Morgann and Ramsay and 
Dunmore’s own attitude to slavery. Like Morgann, Dunmore was prepared to view 
black people ‘as potential allies rather than internal enemies’, and both believed that, 
by treating them ‘as subjects of the crown rather than the property of slaveholders,’ 
the empire might be strengthened.106 
Indeed, Dunmore’s own career exemplified the integrative potential of the 
imperial paternalism that informed Morgann’s scheme. His father, William Murray, 
the third earl, had supported Charles Edward Stuart in 1745, when the young John 
Murray had briefly been a page to the Young Pretender. The family had almost lost 
their title as a result. But in the subsequent decades, like much of the Scottish nobility, 
Dunmore embarked upon a journey of self-incorporation within the British 
establishment, becoming a loyal servant of the House of Hanover, and reaping the 
consequent rewards of political patronage.107 
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Dunmore certainly appreciated the power of more traditional modes of 
paternalistic authority. A telling illustration is the case of the 78th Seaforth Highland 
Regiment, recruited from people who spoke only Gaelic, and whom James Boswell 
described as being ‘as black and wild in their appearance as any American Savages.’ 
In 1778, on hearing rumours of their being ‘sold’ for service in Asia with the East 
India Company, the Seaforth Regiment mutinied at Edinburgh, ‘bidding defiance to 
all the force in Scotland.’ Dunmore, acting on his own initiative and drawing upon his 
influence as a Scottish nobleman, helped to reassure the soldiers and quell the mutiny. 
While the rank and file ‘agreeably accepted his assumption of authority and trusted his 
professions of friendship’, the disgruntled officers of the regiment would complain 
that ‘he was never desired to interfere… and we believe, acted without any authority 
whatever’.108 The paternalistic appeal to disaffected subjects, over the heads of those 
with formally designated claims of power over them, is clearly reminiscent of 
Dunmore’s approach to slavery. 
Likewise, the complaints of the officers of the 78th echo the outraged response 
of the Loyalists. Dunmore’s indulgence towards soldiers and slaves was mirrored by a 
seemingly almost casual willingness to antagonise those higher up the social scale. It 
was probably inevitable that a large-scale policy of officially sponsored manumission 
would arouse the ire of slaveholders. But where disorderly and rebellious slaves were 
placated and conciliated, Dunmore responded to opposition from the white elite with 
stubborn intransigence, and even, perhaps, with deliberate provocations. He refused to 
hold new elections to the Assembly, a body he routinely prorogued when it had the 
temerity to disagree with him. He sanctioned Wylly’s arrest, essentially for insulting 
one of his friends, and suspended the courts after they failed to convict him. The 
‘armed negroes’ who crewed his schooner seized the property and allegedly subverted 
the slaves of Loyalist planters. John Selby observes that ‘Dunmore actually seemed to 
want war’ in the final months before hostilities commenced in Virginia; much the 
same could be said of his relationship with Bahamian Loyalist slaveholders.109 
Wylly contended that Dunmore’s ‘principles of Government are such as might 
be naturally expected from the Lordly despot of a petty Clan.’110 Scots, of course, 
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were routinely ‘tinctured with notions of despotism’ in English and American 
opinion.111 But it has been suggested that Scottish imperial officials with Jacobite 
backgrounds ‘perhaps… were more prone to take a strong line in suppressing colonial 
disorder, and more unapologetic in devising new and efficient forms of central 
control.’112 Dunmore certainly had Jacobite antecedents, and, as we have seen, he 
coupled a jealous defence of executive authority against incursions by the 
‘Representatives of the people’ with a scant regard for inconvenient legal niceties. 
For Dunmore, however, paternalism towards ‘them poor Blacks’ and 
aggressively authoritarian handling of ‘the Incendiaries of this Island, who pretend to 
call themselves Loyalists’ were not simply two distinct facets of his ‘principles of 
Government.’113 The two were dialectically linked, and neither can be fully 
understood without an appreciation of this connection. In this respect, it is 
illuminating to compare the thinking of another Scottish critic of slaveholding, James 
Ramsay. As discussed in chapter one, for Ramsay, rolling back colonial autonomy, 
and checking the colonists’ tendency ‘to exalt the individual at the expence of the 
community,’ were also necessary pre-requisites to any serious effort to reform or 
abolish slavery.114 Dunmore may not have believed that the ownership of slaves, in 
and of itself, represented an abuse of colonists’ freedoms. But he surely shared 
Ramsay’s view of ‘a natural inequality… among men’, and of an organically 
hierarchical social order in which ‘each man takes the station for which nature 
intended him; and his rights are fenced round, and his claims are restrained, by laws 
prescribed by the Author of nature’, so that ‘the feelings and interests of the weaker, 
or inferior members, are consulted equally with those of the stronger or superior.’115 
Hence, when the slaveholders of Virginia attempted to ‘throw of[f] all 
Allegiance to the Best of Sovereigns and Connections with the State that has fostered 
them with the most Parental Care,’ they exceeded the proper role allotted to them 
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within the community, and so forfeited the privilege generously afforded them of 
depriving others of their liberty. As the embodiment of ‘properly constituted 
authority’, it was entirely within Dunmore’s prerogative to set about ‘reducing this 
Colony to a proper Sense of their Duty’ by elevating slaves to the status of British 
soldiers.116 
In the Bahamas, the re-enslavement of the very people who had been promised 
their freedom in the king’s name, including some who had risked life and limb 
fighting for Britain, could not but be seen by Dunmore as the grossest defiance of the 
very highest authority. He was not concerned merely ‘to give these poor people 
redress.’117 By denying African Americans their own liberty, Loyalists, like the rebels, 
had overstepped their own rights and freedoms, and they too had to be restored ‘to a 
proper Sense of their Duty.’ State manumission was a remedy that simultaneously 
punished the guilty and gave redress to those wronged, just as the Virginia 
Proclamation had rewarded loyalty and punished rebellion. 
When Loyalist slaveholders angrily denounced the governor’s actions as an 
outrage against ‘the Rights of British Subjects, and contrary to the Spirit of our happy 
Constitution’, and resorted to terrorising defenceless women and children, Dunmore 
only became more convinced that ‘the Reigns of Government should not be relaxed.’ 
As far as he was concerned, ‘the sole cause’ of Loyalists’ incessant demands for ‘their 
right in common with all British subjects’, to what they considered ‘a Free and Equal 
Representation of the People’ was their need ‘to pass such acts as would secure to 
them the property’ of re-enslaved African Americans. In turn, for Loyalists, the 
governor’s repeated refusal to dissolve the Assembly was further evidence of his 
despotic disregard for the principles of representative government.118 
Dunmore soon discerned a more direct parallel between the Loyalists and the 
Virginian rebels. Chief Justice Matson claimed to have heard the former declare ‘that 
a Governor of the Bahamas ought to and shall be nominated by those who have 
emigrated to that Country under the Description of American Loyalists.’ Both he and 
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Dunmore aired suspicions that some Loyalists were planning Bahamian independence 
from Britain. After Matson was driven out of the colony in 1788, Dunmore openly 
recommended to London that martial law was necessary, ‘to effectually eradicate the 
seeds of Rebellion,’ and ‘make a perfect clean sweep… [of] these miscreants.’119 
Such claims are probably best understood not as a reflection of genuine fears 
of Loyalist insurrection, but rather of the depth of Dunmore’s outrage and disgust at 
the émigrés’ conduct. Loyalist resistance to his measures to liberate African 
Americans compounded what he already considered a flagrant infraction of their 
status as subjects of the crown. The result was a cumulative escalation of the mutual 
antipathy between governor and Loyalists, in which compromise very quickly became 
impossible. Any concession on Dunmore’s part would not only be an abrogation of his 
responsibility to the black émigrés; it would also be a dereliction of his own duty to 
uphold the king’s authority as he perceived it. Quite possibly, the latter had become 
more important to him than the former by 1793, as the standoff with the Assembly 
ground towards what had by then become its inevitable conclusion. The next chapter 
explores how this dynamic of mutual hostility outlived the issue that had catalysed it, 
serving as a persistent barrier to the fulfilment of Loyalist designs for ‘a Revision of 
the Laws of these Islands, for governing Slaves and Free People of Colour’.120 
Remarkable as Dunmore’s actions in the Bahamas were, it is important to 
acknowledge that his sympathy for enslaved people was always hedged with limits 
and qualifications. Indeed, it is arguable that Dunmore was persistently willing to 
champion the cause of non-whites precisely because of his unwillingness to recognise 
their capacity for independent agency. In Virginia, he does not seem to have 
envisaged the prospect of African Americans seeking to ‘revenge themselves’ on their 
own account. Rather, the danger was that slaves would be ‘ready to join the first that 
would encourage them’ in the event of ‘an attack upon this Colony’. Likewise, in the 
Bahamas, Dunmore spoke of ‘them poor Blacks’ or ‘these poor unhappy people.’ All-
but helpless in the face of re-enslavement, their only hope was ‘the mercy and favour 
extended towards them’ by the governor. Even when black people openly defied the 
authority of slaveholders by running away, they were usually mere ‘Delinquents’, who 
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would quickly see the error of their ways on the dispensation of ‘his Majesty’s 
Mercy.’ Dunmore had little doubt that, even when faced with a more serious incident 
like that at Spencer’s Bight, his personal intervention would speedily restore ‘the 
utmost harmony’, just as it supposedly had among the Seaforth Highlanders.121 
Of course, this was scarcely consistent with the degree to which Dunmore’s 
overtures to the enslaved in both colonies came in response to prior black initiatives. 
Indeed, it seems entirely plausible that Dunmore’s attitude owed something to the 
efforts of ingenuous slaves who correctly gauged that the Scottish aristocrat would 
respond favourably to their adoption of the well-documented pose of child-like loyalty 
and dependency.122 
But Dunmore’s perception of Africans as idealised paternalistic subjects – 
loyal, simple, and lacking initiative and agency – had much in common with the 
discourse of British abolitionism, exemplified by Josiah Wedgewood’s famous motif 
of the kneeling slave appealing for redress. Many abolitionist leaders, such as 
Wilberforce and Ramsay, were themselves very much concerned with the need ‘to 
preserve traditional notions of deference and paternalism’, and could view antislavery 
as a vehicle not simply for the moral redemption of Britain and Britishness, but also 
‘for an explicit vindication of the English social order.’ In 1792, as the initial 
parliamentary campaign against the slave trade appeared to be on the verge of a 
decisive breakthrough, Wilberforce made no secret of his view that slaves were ‘not 
capable’ of ‘True Liberty… the child of Reason and Order’, and that ‘the soil must be 
prepared for its reception.’123 
Indeed, it is striking how closely the trajectory of Bahamian state manumission 
under Dunmore corresponds to that of early abolitionism. Both emerged in the late 
1780s, and appeared to gather rapid momentum before abruptly faltering in the 1790s. 
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Nonetheless, what happened in the Bahamas under Dunmore should not be 
misconstrued as representing ‘a forgotten moment in early Anglo-American 
abolitionism.’124 It might, perhaps, be regarded as the manifestation of an alternative 
version of empire, in which blackness could be partially dissociated from slavery via 
the operation of an authoritarian but benevolent paternalism. If so, however, it was a 
vision that was becoming obsolete even as it came into being, as the rise of the 
antislavery movement raised the more ambitious prospect of an Atlantic without 
slavery. By the time state manumission was abruptly curtailed in 1793, however, the 
ongoing dynamic of Atlantic revolution had thrown up entirely new possibilities in 
Saint-Domingue. It had transpired that Africans were able to ‘revenge themselves’ 
after all. 
                                                 
124
 Brown, Moral Capital, 288. 
 191
Chapter Five 
‘The  Dread of our Country Becoming the Theatre of such Horrors’: 
the Haitian Revolution and the Bahamas, 1791–1797 
 
Executions 
The morning of 14 September 1797 saw the enactment of a gruesome and brutal 
judicial ritual in Nassau. A week earlier, three black men, Baptiste Perpall, Baptiste 
Tucker, and Police Edgcombe, had been ‘found guilty of treasonable and seditious 
Practices,’ in the shape of ‘a most hellish plot’, aimed at ‘the Destruction of… the 
white Inhabitants of these Islands,’ and sentenced to death. On the appointed day, 
while a guard of militia dragoons and artillery paraded, supported by the heavily 
depleted regular garrison, the condemned men ‘ascended the Gallows with the most 
perfect Indifference.’ All three declined to confess, and seemed quite ready to ‘Meet 
death without Dismay.’1 By one account, ‘the principal ring leader’, almost certainly 
Baptiste Perpall, was heard to remark ‘that he was content to die, as he had murdered 
many a white man in his time.’2 Once dead, their corpses were ‘cut down, and Hung 
in Chains at the point commonly called Hog Island Point.’ A few days later, President 
of the Council and acting Governor Robert Hunt was pleased to report that ‘the 
Execution… took place on the day appointed without any tumult or Commotion 
whatever’, voicing his opinion that ‘the public tranquillity is happily re-established.’3 
 Michel Foucault has observed that ‘the public execution is to be understood 
not only as a judicial, but also as a political ritual.’ It was intended ‘to bring into play, 
as its extreme point, the dissymmetry between the subject who has dared to violate the 
law and the all-powerful sovereign who displays his strength.’ The importance of such 
‘an emphatic affirmation of power and of its intrinsic superiority’ was perhaps all the 
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greater to the rulers of the Atlantic world, always conscious that ‘a colony of slaves is 
a town under threat of attack; one walks on powder kegs.’4 
Thus far, it would seem that the events of September 1797 in the Bahamas 
conformed to a pattern common to virtually all sites of Atlantic slavery; one of 
periodic episodes of exemplary judicial killing in response to a perceived threat of 
violent, collective resistance on the part of slaves. Such occurrences may not have 
been routine, but they were certainly common enough to become one of the norms of 
the governance of slave societies. The inception of a plan to revolt among the 
enslaved, except in the extremely unlikely event of its success, made the subsequent 
round of denunciations, trials and executions all but inevitable.5 
In the Bahamas, however, such events were unusual, to the extent that what 
happened in 1797 is very nearly unique in Bahamian history. Indeed, executions of 
any sort seem to have been relatively uncommon in the Bahamas during the period of 
formal slavery. In 1784, in the midst of the Loyalist migration, the sailor Samuel 
Kelly observed ‘at the entrance of the harbour on Hog Island… a negro hung on an 
oblique pole, for murder,’ but did not elaborate upon the nature or timing of the 
offence or the execution. Reporting the executions of two black men in 1791, one for 
murder, the other for theft of a ‘sailing boat’, the Bahama Gazette noted that ‘these 
two executions are the only ones that have taken place here during six years.’6 
The judicial killing of slaves convicted of engaging in acts of rebellion or 
conspiracy was even more of a rarity. The first documented insurrectionary plot in the 
Bahamas, involving a plan ‘for the slaves to take over the island [of New Providence], 
killing all the white men, beginning with the governor’, was uncovered in 1734. 
Strikingly, even the execution of Quarino, an African runaway whose confession 
revealed the conspiracy, and who killed a soldier before being captured, is a matter of 
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supposition rather than record.7 As we saw above, when African-American émigré 
maroons on Abaco took up arms against the whites in the 1780s, slaveholders took it 
upon themselves to suppress and summarily execute the rebels.8 
In May 1795, Lord Dunmore reported to London the discovery of ‘a Plot… 
formed by some French Negroes to destroy the Town by fire, liberate the French 
Prisoners and Massacre the Inhabitants.’ The nature and significance of this somewhat 
shadowy undertaking, which in many respects constituted a direct prologue to the 
more serious conspiracy in 1797, are discussed further below. For now, however, what 
is notable is that the official response, as in 1734, seems to have been remarkably 
muted. Dunmore advised London that ‘the Ring leaders [were] apprehended and now 
in custody’, but their fate was apparently not considered a matter of sufficient 
seriousness to merit discussion in the Council or mention in the governor’s subsequent 
despatches.9 However, Peter Edwards, one of the magistrates who presided over the 
trial of the 1797 conspirators, mentioned that the man by whom ‘the present alarm has 
been occasioned’ was ‘a French fellow, a Slave who was accused of the same crime 
two years ago but turning King’s evidence – he escaped the Sentence of 
Transportation.’10 These remarks suggest that, at most, the other men arrested in 1795 
were transported, rather than hanged. 
What becomes clear from all this is twofold. Firstly, in the eighteenth century, 
the outright rebellion of enslaved people in the Bahamas, if far from unheard of, was 
distinctly uncommon. Secondly, the Bahamian state seldom sanctioned the capital 
punishment of slaves for such behaviour. Against this backdrop, the events of 1797 
are thrown into sharp relief. A partial explanation of the relative ferocity of the official 
response can be found in the nature of the conspiracy, as the authorities perceived it. 
For, at least according to the trial testimony against them, the aim of Perpall et al. was 
quite explicitly ‘to Fight and take the Country from the White People’, in order ‘to put 
themselves in the same situation the black people were in at the Cape [Français, in 
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Saint-Domingue].’11 This amounted to a plan for an insurrectionary, if not 
revolutionary challenge, not only to slavery, but even to the colonial regime itself, that 
is without parallel in Bahamian history. 
As will be explored more fully below, the evidence that has survived is not 
without its problems and ambiguities. As with all slave conspiracies, in the final 
analysis only the fact of an actual rising would provide incontrovertible verification 
that black Bahamians in 1797 seriously considered open rebellion to be a desirable 
and feasible undertaking. At a time when an ongoing discourse about rebellion, 
revolution, and freedom was circulating around the full extent of the black Atlantic 
diaspora, it can plausibly be argued that Perpall, Tucker and Edgcombe were guilty of 
no more than a lack of discretion. It may well be the case that the claims about the 
scale of the conspiracy made at their trial were exaggerated. Ultimately, of course, the 
‘true’ motives and intentions of the conspirators, the meanings that shaped and 
informed their ideas, and the vision, if any, of social transformation that inspired them 
are largely beyond historical reconstruction. While their broken bodies might be made 
to serve as a continuing emblem of state power, their minds offered nothing that could 
be of use to the slaveholders, not even the confessions that could validate the act of 
their destruction. Nonetheless, the fact remains that in 1797, Bahamian authorities and 
slaveholders firmly believed in the existence of such a challenge. Furthermore, they 
were quite sure that it was a potential threat to their regime, a threat serious enough to 
provoke the ceremony of terror and power that was staged on 14 September. How 
could this happen, and why did it happen in 1797? 
Referring to the first slave trade abolition bill, debated by parliament in 1788, 
in July the same year, Lord Dunmore could reassure London that ‘there has been no 
kind of disturbance whatever, amongst the Negroes on these Islands in consequence of 
the reports of an Abolition of the Slave Trade, nor do they seem in the least anxious 
about it.’ Four years later, Dunmore was still confidently advising Secretary of State 
Henry Dundas that ‘there is not the least appearance of any disorderly behaviour 
among the Slaves in this Government.’12 Exaggerated as these claims of tranquillity 
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were, in 1792, no-one in the Bahamas apparently considered a slave insurrection an 
imminent or likely prospect. 
Over the next five years, the Bahamian government and ruling class would 
perceive a rising threat to their regime from slave resistance, and show increasing 
willingness to deploy the coercive power of the state to curb this challenge. Growing 
white fears of slave rebellion from 1792 onwards owed a great deal to the 
contemporaneous development of the Haitian and French Revolutions.13 There has 
been little systematic and sustained analysis of the Bahamian repercussions of the 
revolutionary crisis of the 1790s, although its effects were substantial and direct.14 
In this respect, the significance of the simple fact of war between Britain and 
Revolutionary France from 1793 should not be ignored. If the causes of that conflict 
were principally European, the imperial nature of both powers made it almost 
inevitable that the fighting would spread beyond Europe, as had happened virtually 
without exception during the previous century of occasional and short-lived peace 
between the two. 
It was hardly a new experience for Bahamians, or for any other residents of 
British America, to find themselves arbitrarily involved in war with neighbouring 
colonies. But the conflict that unfolded in the Caribbean during the 1790s was not 
simply a traditional imperial contest for the redistribution of colonies. The ill-fated 
British invasion of Saint-Domingue has been variously interpreted as both a defensive 
and aggressive move. It can also be seen as either a largely improvised response to 
peculiar and unprecedented circumstances, or as part of a larger imperial grand 
strategy, the culmination of long-harboured designs against the ‘Pearl of the 
Antilles’.15 Regardless, British troops entered Saint-Domingue with the mission of 
occupying it and crushing French forces loyal to the Revolution, but also to bring 
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order to the colony and restore its vast pre-Revolutionary economic output. More and 
more, therefore, and explicitly so after the Jacobin government’s decree of 16 
Pluviôse abolishing slavery, Britain found itself fighting to defend enslavement in the 
face of French revolutionary emancipationism. A war of this kind rendered the British 
Atlantic, including the Bahamas, all the more vulnerable to shockwaves from the 
seismic eruption of revolution in Saint-Domingue. 
Revolutionary war, as Bahamians had good reason to be aware, facilitated the 
intensified circulation of both people and experience around the Atlantic. The kind of 
war waged in the West Indies inevitably generated extensive new patterns of human 
contact across the arbitrary lines of nationality and sovereignty. Specifically, the 
Haitian Revolution and the accompanying Anglo-French conflict drew black people 
from the French islands into British colonies like the Bahamas, whether as the 
property of refugee French slaveholders, as contraband of war, seized aboard foreign 
prizes, or as prisoners of war, as free men captured while fighting in the name of 
liberty, equality and brotherhood. 
War might have still further material consequences for the British slave 
colonies. For islands like the Bahamas, dependent upon imports of food and other 
basic necessities, enemy control of the seas was an alarming prospect. Food shortages 
might have disastrous effects, economically and socially, and the threat of invasion 
could never be entirely discounted. Historically, the Bahamas’ primary defence 
against direct attack had been their insignificance in the larger scheme of imperial 
rivalry, but this also meant that more valuable colonies like Jamaica took precedence 
in the allocation of military and naval resources. 
The bulk of this chapter explores how all these factors together made possible 
the Bahamian slave conspiracy of 1797. In order to show their complex interplay and 
cumulative effect, the arrangement of what follows is principally chronological. After 
surveying the state of the Bahamas at the start of the 1790s and initial Bahamian 
perceptions of the outbreak of revolution in France and Saint-Domingue in Section I, 
the following two sections examine how war and revolution impacted on the islands 
up to 1797, before the events of that year and their consequences are considered in 
more detail in Section IV. 
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I: ‘The Crowd of Unlooked For Events’: Bahamian Perceptions of the French 
and Haitian Revolutions to 1793 
 
The early 1790s were a period of relative stability in the Bahamas. The various social 
and political tensions that had produced dramatic scenes of conflict during the 1780s 
were still simmering, but a delicate equilibrium briefly emerged. 
 Such evidence as exists suggests a slowing of the tempo of overt resistance to 
slavery after 1789. There was no reprise of the violent, quasi-insurrectionary 
confrontations seen on Abaco in 1787–8. The number of runaway advertisements, 
aside from a brief flurry in the first half of 1790 that slaveholders largely blamed upon 
‘the protection and encouragement afforded in the Spanish Colonies to our Runaway 
Slaves’,16 declined markedly from the levels of the 1780s. Likewise, although 
runaways lived as maroons in the interior of New Providence well into the nineteenth 
century, there is apparently no evidence of their presence or activity between 1790 and 
1797.17 
 Slaveholders certainly did not desist from condemning the behaviour of slaves 
and free non-whites, or from demanding more stringent regulation and policing of 
such delinquency. The Grand Jury’s presentments maintained their monotonous 
complaints of the ‘disorderly behaviour’ of black people, the need for reform of the 
laws for their ‘government’, and the inadequate enforcement of the existing 
legislation.18 However, for all their grumbling, slaveholders apparently did not resort 
to vigilantism and extra-legal violence in the early 1790s as they had on Abaco and 
New Providence in the 1780s; John M. Tattnall never made good his threat to ‘burn 
every House belonging to the Free Negroes.’19 
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 A definitive explanation of this period of relative tranquillity is probably 
beyond the limits of the available sources. But it is at least plausible to hypothesise 
that the process of state manumission, which reached its highest levels in these years, 
played a significant part. As well as going some way towards addressing the peculiar 
grievances of African-American émigrés in the Bahamas regarding re-enslavement, 
state manumission offered potential runaways an alternative route to freedom. The 
woman who called herself ‘Free Nancy’, for instance, ran away in 1789, after being 
‘lately ajudged a Slave by the Court appointed to ascertain the Freedom of Negroes’.20 
 What is not in doubt, as we saw in the previous chapter, is that during the 
1790s the ‘Negro Court’ remained a major focal point for political conflict between 
Loyalist slaveholders and imperial authorities, in the form of Lord Dunmore. But the 
critics of state manumission now seem to have been more willing to air their concerns 
and seek redress through the established institutional channels of the Grand Jury and 
the House of Assembly. In the 1780s, Loyalists had despatched fervent memorials to 
the king and the London government, written angry letters to the Gazette, and even 
resorted to public demonstrations and open violence. What had changed? To some 
extent, the sense of impending social crisis that animated this vigorous activism seems 
to have dissipated. 
 In turn, the comparative equanimity of Bahamian slaveholders in these years 
may well have owed something to the rapid recovery and progress of the cotton 
economy after the crisis of 1788–9. It was clear by 1790 that cotton would not succeed 
on Abaco or New Providence, but this was more than offset by the rapid development 
of warmer islands to the south, such as the Caicoses and Crooked Island.21 In that 
year, almost 500 tons of clean cotton were exported, considerably more than had been 
expected from the 1788–9 crop destroyed by the chenille, and more than double the 
level of annual production actually achieved in the 1780s. Output continued to rise 
over the following years, apparently reaching around 750 tons sometime before 
1796.22 Such figures obscure the extent to which cotton continued to prove a 
frustratingly inconsistent crop for individual planters. In 1790, the Gazette related the 
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‘curious and important fact, that some fields which were wholly neglected, and other 
that were never topped, have been productive; while several, on which much labour 
and attention have been bestowed, yielded scarcely anything.’ A year later, it was 
observed that ‘many Planters who made good Crops last Year, have failed this.’23 But 
in general, confidence in cotton’s long-term success remained high; in 1792, John 
Wells could write of ‘a Spirit of Improvement – the sure indication of rising 
prosperity’, noting that ‘the Planters are in high Spirits from the Prospect of an 
abundant Crop.’24 
 With the benefit of hindsight, a far more serious structural weakness of the 
Bahamian cotton economy was the extent of its continuing reliance on imported food 
to sustain the enslaved workforce. The potential benefits of self-sufficiency had been 
repeatedly extolled, but most planters seem to have either lacked the inclination or 
capacity to revise the improvised Out Island labour settlement of the 1780s, or simply 
preferred to expand their cotton acreage instead.25 The acute vulnerability to 
unpredictable external conditions that this practice entailed would be starkly exposed 
by the storm of war and revolution that was to engulf the British Atlantic from 1793. 
 However, at least initially, there is nothing to indicate that the white Bahamian 
elite identified any potential threat to themselves in the demise of the ancien regime. 
Notwithstanding the observation in a letter from London of October 1789 that ‘the 
situation of France is truly deplorable’, the Bahama Gazette’s first issue of 1790 
merely noted that ‘the spreading of the generous Flame of Freedom’ to France would 
be ‘highly interesting to every Class of Reader’, and that this ‘Prospect of Events’ was 
surely ‘the most important that has occurred in modern Times.’ An October 1789 
‘Review of European Politics’ reprinted by the Gazette in February 1790 spoke of 
how ‘Liberty… returns and raises her standard in the very centre of the civilised 
world.’26 Indeed, the National Assembly’s legislation of March 1790, simultaneously 
exempting France’s colonies from the national constitution and the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man, whilst also specifically precluding any colonial interference with the 
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regulation of transatlantic commerce, including the slave trade, was met with 
predictable approval in the Bahamas. The Bahama Gazette observed that 
 
This question may now be considered as finally decided by the commercial 
nations. If the Legislators of France, in all their boldness of innovation, rage 
for freedom, and fervour of philanthropy shrink from the discussion as 
pregnant with peril, the British Senate cannot be insensible to the absurdity 
and impolicy of turning such a stream of opulence to their rivals – The Planter, 
the Merchant, and the Manufacturer may therefore now securely dismiss all 
apprehensions of their interests being sacrificed to the wild dreams of 
visionary reformers.27 
 
 Tentative enthusiasm for France’s ‘rage for freedom’ rapidly paled as the 
Revolution’s radicalising trajectory became apparent. By the start of 1791, the Gazette 
noted with unconcealed distaste that ‘the National Assembly have adopted with 
enthusiastic ardour, the wildest speculations of Democratic Theorists, the irreligious 
prejudices of Modern Philosophers, and the selfish schemes of needy, unprincipled 
Adventurers.’ A few months later, a review of Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the 
Revolution in France declared that work to be ‘among the most useful and the most 
splendid of those discourses on liberty and government… of the last hundred and fifty 
years.’ A correspondent to the Bahama Gazette ventured to suggest that at times, 
some political reform might be necessary, and even desirable, but was at pains to 
stress both his general admiration for Burke, and his ‘[perfect] accord with his 
opinions respecting many things lately done in France.’28 
 The Gazette also carried extensive coverage of the violent turn taken by race 
relations in several of the French islands during the early 1790s. As early as 
November 1789, there were reports of ‘attempts to alienate the minds of the People of 
Colour’ on Saint-Domingue. These were shortly followed by accounts of the mulatto 
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rebellion led by Vincent Ogé, and its bloody repression, and the ‘confusion and 
uproar’ prevailing in the French West Indies.29 
However, for all that Bahamian slaveholders viewed the radicalisation of the 
French Revolution with concern, there is nothing to suggest that they initially 
discerned any dangerous implications for the British colonial slave regimes. 
Considering that the National Assembly had explicitly disavowed any intention of 
interfering with slavery, it is scarcely surprising that it simply did not at first occur to 
Bahamians that the enslaved might be able to draw inspiration or support from the 
Revolution. If any European development presented a potential danger, it was British 
abolitionism. Indeed, the Gazette printed claims that the parliamentary debates over 
the slave trade had ‘been translated into… French… and distributed in the islands of 
Martinique and Dominica’, giving rise to unrest in the former and insurrection in the 
latter.30 
Such complacency must have been badly shaken by the massive slave revolt 
that began in Saint-Domingue’s North province in August 1791.31 The vague accounts 
of ‘a very bloody Scene… recently acted in St. Domingo’ that had reached the 
Bahamas by early September were initially associated with the ongoing political 
turmoil on the island between multiple factions of whites and free people of colour, 
and treated with a degree of scepticism. The details that gradually emerged over the 
following weeks in reports from Cuba, Jamaica and Saint-Domingue itself 
progressively amplified the magnitude of what had happened. On 11 October, the 
Bahama Gazette spoke for the first time of ‘a very alarming insurrection of the 
mulattoes and negroes’ that had destroyed as many as sixty-four plantations, but could 
reassure its readers that ‘their ravages were, however, put a stop to in a few days’. A 
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week later, ‘dreadful intelligence’ arrived via Kingston that the slaves of Saint-
Domingue were still ‘carrying destruction and bloodshed throughout the country.’32 
In the same issue, the Gazette printed a translation of the letter of Paul 
Cadusch, president of the Saint-Domingue Assembly, to the Jamaican legislature. 
Begging for aid and support, Cadusch also observed that ‘the same spirit of delusive 
Philanthropy, which, equally repugnant to your system of regulation as to ours, may 
occasion the same calamities among you as among us, if the evil is suffered to proceed 
to the utmost excess’.33 Shocking as this news must have been for Bahamian 
slaveholders, Dunmore assured London in April 1792 that there were no signs of slave 
unrest, ‘and that we have very little communication with any of the French West India 
Islands.’34 
Indeed, Dunmore’s dispatches do not even mention Saint-Domingue, the 
French colonies, or the possibility of unrest in the Bahamas again before 1793. There 
is certainly no Bahamian parallel to the extensive evidence that Jamaica was on the 
brink of a major uprising in the winter of 1791–2.35 It is notable that the Bahamian 
Assembly’s proposed tariff of duties on slave imports for 1792, clearly designed to 
restrict the entry of potentially subversive blacks and creoles generally, includes no 
specific provisions concerning French or ‘foreign’ slaves.36 But if it was initially 
possible for Bahamians to largely disregard the ramifications of what was happening 
in Saint-Domingue, the French Republic’s declaration of war on Great Britain on 1 
February 1793 would quickly make such a stance untenable. 
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II: ‘Amid the Din of War and the tumult of innovation’: 1793–4 
 
On 5 February 1793, colonial agent George Chalmers wrote to the Bahamian 
Assembly’s Committee of Correspondence from London, advising them that ‘a War 
with France seems to have begun, though hostilities have not actually commenced.’ 
This state of phoney war was to persist for some time in the Caribbean, at least on the 
part of the British, partly because ‘primacy was always afforded to the war in Europe’ 
by the government. Nonetheless, the idea of aggressive action against France’s 
Atlantic colonies was clearly in circulation in London as early as the start of February, 
when Chalmers hinted that ‘there is reason to think that the French Islands in your 
vicinity will ‘ere long change their Masters.’37 
However, a definite political decision for intervention in Saint-Domingue was not 
made until April, and the necessary military orders were issued only two months later. 
The first substantial reinforcements of British regulars would not depart for the West 
Indies until November, and even this expedition, of 6,000 men, was pitifully small by 
the scale of the European war. By the summer of 1793, the British navy could boast 
only two frigates on the Jamaica station, whose responsibilities nominally included the 
defence of Bahamian waters. As David Geggus has remarked, for most of the first 
year of war, ‘the contemporary picture of Britain as a maritime colossus whose fleets 
and armies would storm through the Caribbean was ironically unrealistic.’38 
 However, the very fact of war with France had inescapable consequences for 
Britain’s West Indian colonies, including the Bahamas. Indeed, even before the 
declaration of war, Chalmers had suggested to the Commissioners in January that ‘it 
may be of great use to watch over all Foreigners, who may come into the Bahamas on 
whatever pretence; & to attend to such Books as may be circulated among Servants 
and Slaves.’ He reiterated in his letter of 5 February the importance of ‘precautions 
that ought to be taken with regard Foreigners, and… all seditious persons, who may be 
disposed to incite your Slaves to disobedience.’39 
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 The French declaration of war was reported in the Bahama Gazette on 16 
April, but official confirmation from London took far longer to arrive. As late as June, 
Dunmore was complaining to Secretary of State Henry Dundas that he had received 
no official communication from London since October 1792.40 Well before then, 
however, the governor had been compelled to respond to the situation on his own 
initiative. On 11 April, the Council considered ‘the present high prices of provisions’, 
expressing concern that the existing stocks of food were ‘totally inadequate even for a 
very short space to the support of the number of consumers’, and that ‘the quantity [of 
food] expected in the usual mode from the United States, and from Europe, could by 
no means afford an adequate supply.’41 
Although the reasons for this shortage are not explicitly stated in the Council 
Minutes, Dunmore would receive word shortly afterwards from George Miller, the 
British consul at Charleston, that a French frigate, the Embuscade, had arrived at the 
city on 8 April. The Embuscade had ‘taken several prizes’, and had ‘block[ed] up this 
harbour completely.’ More French privateers were ‘fitting out here’, with two light 
vessels of six guns each putting to sea sometime before 4 May. By June, Dunmore 
reported that all Bahamian merchant ships carrying provisions ‘have been Captured by 
French Privateers fitted out at Charleston,’ with only ‘American vessels bringing in 
food.’42 The food crops planted on the Out Islands were ‘totally destroyed’ by ‘a 
Severe gale of Wind’ during October. In December, the governor would claim that 
‘not one British Vessel has attempted to Sail from these Islands to America, since 
those that were captured by the French.’43 
Thus, by May at the latest, French privateering was seriously affecting the 
supply of food to the Bahamas. Dunmore’s solution was to prohibit the export of food, 
and to admit imports of provisions in foreign shipping. Of course, this action 
contravened the Navigation Acts, earning the governor a stern warning from Dundas 
that it was ‘a Step not only illegal but which in time of war may open a 
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Communication highly dangerous to the Islands under your Government.’44 
According to the minutes of the Council for 11 April, ‘the Governor felt every 
repugnance to a step so very strong, and the Council were extremely averse to advise 
it without the most pointed and incontrovertible necessity.’ However, there was a 
general consensus that ‘in the course of the debate on the subject… this necessity’ had 
been ‘most certainly demonstrated.’ 
The nature of this ‘most pointed and incontrovertible necessity’ is what 
principally concerns us here. The Council minutes baldly state that ‘if a scarcity [of 
provisions] should take place, a revolt of the Slaves would probably ensue.’45 How did 
the men who were effectively the government of the Bahamas arrive at such a 
conclusion? It is difficult to understand why they might have assumed that food 
shortages, in and of themselves, would automatically, or even ‘probably’ lead to 
insurrection. There was little precedent for such a presumption in Bahamian history, 
or in the experience of British slavery more generally. Most recently, disruption to the 
supply of imported food from North America during the American Revolutionary War 
had caused famine and starvation in the West Indies, but not a wave of slave 
rebellions. The Jamaican Hanover Parish conspiracy scare of 1775 had been the most 
significant such incident in the British Caribbean, but even this incident occurred 
before shortages became acute.46 
It is possible that Dunmore and the Council deliberately exaggerated the 
potential consequences of a Bahamian food shortage in 1793 for reasons of their own. 
At least one Councillor, John Miller, was a merchant who might have stood to gain 
from a decision to open Nassau to foreign shipping.47 But no contemporary ever 
suggested that either Dunmore or his cronies on the Council benefited from the 
admission of foreign shipping. Given just how much corruption Dunmore was accused 
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of, it seems hard to sustain an unverified assumption of venal motivations in this 
case.48 
It is perhaps more plausible to suggest that the Council invoked the spectre of 
servile revolt to justify their prioritising of Bahamian interests at the expense of 
imperial ones, at least as London perceived them. The situation in Saint-Domingue 
and Jamaica certainly gave metropolitan officials and politicians reason to be more 
than usually concerned by the temper of the enslaved labour force in the British West 
Indies. But Dunmore, in his reply to Dundas’ rebuke, claimed that ‘an insurrection of 
the Negroes… was apprehended before ever I consented to the opening of the Ports 
for foreign Vessels.’49 The nature of this ‘apprehension’ is unclear. The minutes for 11 
April mention that ‘the Board resumed consideration of… the papers laid before them 
yesterday by His Excellency’s order’, but there are apparently no records of 
proceedings for the previous day, or any indication of the content of these ‘papers.’ 
Nor does there seem to be any firm evidence for fears of imminent insurrection before 
April 1793.50 
In any case, the Bahamian government’s professed concern at the possibility of 
slave rebellion in 1793 was novel, and their ‘apprehension’ was taken seriously in 
London. In December, Dunmore warned Dundas once again that ‘if our Ports are 
shut… the greatest distress must insue, and the total desolation of these Islands take 
place’, since ‘an insurrection… in the present distressed State of the Country is still 
more to be dreaded’.51 The Secretary of State did not press the point further. 
If Dunmore’s prophecies of impending ruin were somewhat hyperbolic, the 
anxious tone of the Council’s deliberations reflected the inherent vulnerability of 
island plantation colonies during wartime. Concentration on the production of export 
staples meant reliance upon markets and sources of essential supplies that might be 
hundreds or thousands of miles away. If command of the sea were lost, such colonies 
faced financial and material strangulation. Moreover, the archipelagic plantation 
economy that had been constructed in the Bahamas amounted to a microcosmic local 
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reproduction of these characteristics. As the Committee of Correspondence explained 
to George Chalmers in 1796, 
 
Nassau is the depot to which almost the whole Produce of the Colony is sent 
for Exportation to the Mother Country and from which the Planters upon the 
Out Islands receive almost every Article of Extraneous supply. 
 This employs a number of Dragging vessels, who never venture out to Sea, 
but carry on a Sort of Island Trade, which is… of absolute necessity to 
ourselves…52 
 
Dependence upon this short-range, inter-island traffic rendered the Out Islands 
especially vulnerable to privateering. The intricate web of narrow channels between 
the Exumas, Long Island and Crooked Island in particular proved to be rich hunting 
grounds for French raiders. 
 As early as May 1793, planters on those islands petitioned Nassau for 
assistance, reporting that ‘several Vessels of the Enemy for several days past have 
infested the Coasts of Exuma,’ and that the French had ‘landed at Mr [William] 
Telfair’s Western Plantation and carried off what Negroes they could catch.’ The Out 
Islands lacked ‘any regular defence’, and ‘few of the Inhabitants… possessed… any 
kind of Arms for self defence.’ All the Council could do was order the distribution of 
200 muskets between the five largest islands, leaving just 400 guns in the Nassau 
magazine. As the paltry issue of 36 rounds of ammunition per weapon made clear, the 
colonial government simply did not have the military resources to effectively defend 
the 100,000 square miles of land and sea encompassed by the archipelago.53 
Nassau’s apparent impotence in the face of French attacks led many Out 
Islanders to appeal directly to London for protection. A group of Exuma planters 
lobbied the ‘Merchants of London trading to the Bahama Islands’, warning that ‘the 
defenceless state of this & the neighbouring Islands will subject them to insults and 
depredations from the enemy… unless some aid is given them by Government.’54 
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Denys Rolle, the absentee planter whose Exuma estates were among the largest 
slaveholdings in the colony, wrote directly to Dundas in August to urge that ships be 
provided for the defence of the Out Islands. He considered the situation so serious as 
to warrant ‘the Necessity of my Negroes on Exuma being armed,’ claiming that his 
slaves had ‘expressed Great Gratitude to their Master and would protect his Property 
as well as their own… Riches gain’d by Extra Labour and Stock.’55 However, these 
appeals to London produced little effect. For all that the Bahamian elite continued to 
boast of ‘the Importance of the Bahama Islands to the Commerce and Manufactures of 
Great Britain,’56 there were far more pressing claims upon British naval resources. 
If the exposure of Out Island plantations to raiding was a relatively novel 
development, the strategic value of the Bahamas as a base for aggressive naval 
operations had been well-established as long ago as the seventeenth-century heyday of 
Atlantic piracy. Despite of the lack of formal instructions from London, Dunmore 
reported on 25 May that, following the example of Jamaica and other British colonies, 
he had ‘been induced to grant Letters of Marque, as well for Annoying the Trade of 
the Enemy as for the protection of the Islands under my Government, having no Ships 
of War or Armed Vessels of any kind here.’ Bahamian wreckers, a ‘bold adventurous 
Set of Men, most of them Blacks’, had always been quick to take up privateering 
during wartime, and many Loyalist émigrés also engaged in this highly lucrative 
pursuit. By November, as many as 157 prize ships had been sent into Nassau.57 
However Bahamian privateering was overwhelmingly geared towards private 
gain, and in some respects it may even have exacerbated the problems caused by the 
French raiders. In July, John Wells wrote that the Bahamian privateers, ‘now twenty-
five in number, and carrying a thousand men, have been very successful.’ Almost fifty 
ships had been captured, and Wells estimated that their value ‘exceeds one million of 
Dollars.’ However, he acknowledged that most of the prizes had been American 
vessels, and suggested that ‘in the event of an American War, our own Privateers will 
                                                 
55
 Rolle to Dundas, n.d. [received 28 August 1793], CO23/32/261–3. 
56
 Committee of Correspondence to Chalmers, 7 July 1796, Committee of Correspondence Letters to 
George Chalmers, Colonial Agent 1796–1817, microfilm in BDA, f. 2. 
57
 Dunmore to Dundas, Nassau, 25 May 1793, CO23/32/105; Attorney General Moses Franks to 
Dundas, Nassau, 22 September 1794, CO23/33/126; ‘List of Vessels Sent as Prizes into the Port of 
Nassau from the 1st of April 1793’, enclosure in Dunmore to Dundas, Nassau, 17 February 1794, 
CO23/33/67–9. 
 209
be doubled in number.’58 Many Loyalists doubtless welcomed the opportunity to settle 
old scores, and the succour that French privateers reportedly received in Charleston 
and Philadelphia provided a further animus.59 But at a time when food and other 
imports were supposedly in such desperately short supply, seizures of American 
shipping can scarcely have encouraged imports from the United States. And of course, 
every Bahamian ship on the hunt for prizes was one that was not carrying much-
needed provisions. 
In the context of what was happening in Saint-Domingue, privateering created 
further difficulties for Dunmore and Bahamian slaveholders. The status of the crews 
and passengers of captured French ships who began to accumulate in Nassau proved 
intensely problematic. Dunmore reported to Dundas in June that he had received ‘a 
number of French Prisoners, several of whom have been in confinement at St. 
Domingo for their Loyalty and Attachment to their Sovereign’, and admitted frankly 
that ‘I am really at a loss what to do with them.’60 
In July 1793, word reached Nassau of ‘the most melancholy Event that has yet 
marked the Outrages of the French Revolution in the West Indies’, the ‘total 
destruction of that once Beautifull and populous City Cape Francois’ in fighting 
between the forces of Governor François-Thomas Galbaud and the Republican 
Commissioners Léger Felicité Sonthonax and Etienne Polverel.61 On 22 and 23 June, 
Polverel and Sonthonax had recaptured Le Cap with the aid of several thousand black 
insurgents, recruited on a promise of freedom and ‘all the rights belonging to French 
citizens.’62 
Dunmore issued a proclamation ‘restraining the Admission of French 
Mulattoes and Free Negroes into these Islands’ on 16 July, and he assured London 
that all French free non-whites ‘such as have been brought here, in Vessels captured 
by our Privateers… have been confined aboard the Prison Vessels in the Harbour.’63 
Slaves, however, were a different matter. As property, they could apparently be freely 
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condemned at the Nassau vice-admiralty court, and few privateers had any great 
scruples regarding the sale of free foreign blacks as slaves.64 
The situation was further complicated by an influx of refugees who had fled 
Le Cap in their thousands in the wake of the fighting. A few of these émigrés 
expressed interest in settling in the Bahamas ‘if they could obtain Lands’. But while 
many Bahamian whites found it easy to sympathise with ‘French Gentlemen’ who had 
supposedly been ‘obliged to abandon their Country on Account of their Loyalty and 
attachment to their Sovereign,’ accommodating the slaves who accompanied them 
was a rather more troubling notion.65 
 With the benefit of a few years’ hindsight, Bahamian slaveholders would 
vigorously condemn Dunmore for not acting earlier and more decisively to deal with 
‘the incredible Number of French Prisoners and passengers’ that arrived in the islands 
from 1793 onwards.66 But if Dunmore’s initial response to the complex and volatile 
situation in Saint-Domingue in mid-1793 was in some respects uncertain and 
ambivalent, so was that of many other people. The Assembly passed a new Militia Act 
as well as ‘An Act for laying certain Rates, Duties and impositions on all French 
Negroes and other French persons of Colour, now within these Islands or who may 
hereafter be brought within the same.’ But in August, the House also declared itself to 
be ‘penetrated by motives of Compassion and Humanity towards the unfortunate 
French people, who are daily brought in here by the Armed Vessels fitted out from 
these Islands.’ Since many were ‘destitute of the common Necessaries of Life’, the 
governor was urged to provide some kind of relief for them.67 
John Wells wrote in July that ‘human nature stands appalled at the late 
dreadful Scenes of Conflagration & Murder which have desolated the most valuable 
Colony that ever belonged to an European Nation.’ With some prescience, he declared 
that ‘the Idea of a Sable Republic in St. Domingo’, in which ‘People of Colour’ would 
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‘combine their Efforts for the attainment of Emancipation and Independence, strikes 
my mind as neither a very improbable nor very distant Event in this Age of 
Revolutions.’ But Wells was decidedly equivocal about such a prospect. He 
considered there to be ‘among the Coloured people of St. Domingo… many 
Characters of superior… Intelligence [whose] Minds have been highly cultivated; and 
whose general Conduct in private and public life give an earnest of promptitude[,] 
ability and firmness.’68 
Dunmore might also have claimed in mitigation the lack of instructions from 
London during the critical months. He received official circulars dated up to March 
sometime between the end of June and 17 July, and apparently did not see Dundas’s 
letter of 10 August until December.69 Indeed, the British government’s own 
uncertainty and confusion regarding the situation in Saint-Domingue arguably 
contributed to the long delays in formulating and implementing a policy of 
intervention. In particular, the status of Saint-Domingue’s increasingly influential free 
coloured population, granted full French citizenship in 1792, posed a thorny problem. 
Their support, especially in the Southern and Western Provinces, might well prove 
essential to the success of a British occupation. But Dundas also gave weight to the 
profound concerns expressed by West Indians such as Bryan Edwards as to the 
potential effects upon British colonies like Jamaica of acknowledging the civil rights 
of free people of colour in Saint-Domingue. Moreover, the European theatre always 
had priority over the Caribbean, and the situation in Flanders and elsewhere may also 
have served to divert a divided cabinet’s attention. Continental concerns were 
certainly central to the reduction of the projected 10,000 strong West Indian 
expedition under Sir Charles Grey to a mere 6,000 men.70 
While London vacillated, British policy was overtaken by events in Saint-
Domingue. On 29 August, Sonthonax issued a decree abolishing slavery in the 
Northern Province, with Polverel shortly following suit in the south and west of the 
colony.71 The same day, Toussaint Louverture, still styling himself ‘General of the 
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Armies of the King’, proclaimed to the enslaved that ‘I have undertaken vengeance. I 
want Liberty and Equality to reign in Saint-Domingue. I work to bring them into 
existence. Unite yourselves to us, brothers, and fight with us for the same cause.’72 
Confronted with the spectre of ‘revolutionary emancipationism’, the 
representatives of the Jamaican plantocracy approved Governor Sir Adam 
Williamson’s decision to attempt an aggressive solution through military intervention. 
600 redcoats left Jamaica on 9 September, landing at Jérémie in the Southern Province 
on 20 September to shouts of ‘Vivent les Anglais.’ Two days later, French officers 
surrendered the crucial Môle Saint Nicolas naval base at the western end of the North 
Province to a token British force without a fight. These and subsequent British 
successes at the end of 1793 prompted Dundas to order two further regiments to Saint-
Domingue in mid-December.73 
White Bahamians were generally delighted and not a little surprised by the 
news. Wells found the spectacle of ‘the Inhabitants of St Domingo placing themselves 
under the protection of England’ to be ‘one of the most striking’ of all ‘the Crowd of 
unlooked for Events that mark the present Times.’ His earlier prophecy of a ‘Sable 
Republic’ apparently forgotten, he now looked forward to the ‘immediate prospect of 
Emolument’ that would be presented by ‘the Event of St. Domingo becoming a British 
Colony.’ Writing to congratulate Dundas, Dunmore expressed the hope that the Môle 
Saint Nicolas ‘will never be given up. It is the Key to the whole Island and may be 
called the Gibraltar of the West Indies.’74 
However, the expedition’s initial success rapidly had unforeseen consequences 
for the Bahamas. The initial British landing in September was made possible by the 
dispersal of the French naval squadron at Saint-Domingue in July and August.75 
Towards the end of the latter month, Dunmore received reports from Philadelphia 
‘that an Attack is meditated on the Islands under your Lordships Government, by the 
whole or a part of the French Fleet from Cape Francois now in the ports of the United 
States.’ By October, he was reporting that ‘the force intended against this place’ 
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consisted of 2,000 men to be embarked on over a dozen vessels, including two 74-gun 
ships of the line.76 
Dunmore quickly became thoroughly preoccupied, and seemingly invigorated 
by the ‘constant expectation of a visit from them damned restless republicans’. He 
eagerly set about ‘making every exertion in my power for the Safety and protection of 
this place’, commandeering privateers in port and mustering the militia, of whom he 
proudly wrote that ‘I never saw people turn out with more alacrity, or take more pains 
to make themselves perfect in Military Discipline.’ Even after recalling a company 
stationed at Turks Island, the regular garrison at this point consisted of ‘only 230 Men 
of the 47th Regiment.’ Nonetheless, Dunmore judged that ‘had we a Sufficient 
Number of small Arms… we should be able, when the Privateers returns into port, to 
Muster about 1200 Men Whites and free Blacks, exclusive of the Regulars.’ By the 
end of September, he was confident that ‘we shall be able to give the Enemy a pretty 
warm Reception.’77 
Dunmore had many reasons to overplay the threat of French attack. The 
prospect of battle undoubtedly appealed to his pugnacious temperament, offering him 
both a share of the glory that seemed imminent elsewhere in the West Indies, and the 
chance to redeem his military reputation after the Virginian fiasco. He had spent much 
of the last twenty years in conflict with republicans, and he was well aware that many 
of his old enemies in America sympathised with the French. But in addition, the 
‘considerable alarm’ induced by the prospect of invasion offered opportunities to 
strengthen his position as governor of the Bahamas. The emergency could be offered 
to Whitehall as a post hoc justification for the spiralling cost of his lavish programme 
of military fortifications, as well as affording an excuse for pressing on with his 
‘Works’ regardless of increasingly stringent instructions to the contrary. The lucrative 
contracts for these projects were at the heart of an extensive network of patronage 
through which Dunmore sustained his base of support in the colony.78 Above all, of 
course, ‘the dread of our country becoming the theatre of such horrors as have been 
witnessed in St Domingo’ might be expected to induce (almost) ‘all ranks of 
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inhabitants’ to put aside their political differences, at a time when the Loyalist 
opposition in the Assembly had just succeeded in wringing the first major concessions 
from the governor.79 
However, the French onslaught never materialised. At the end of November, 
Dunmore rather curtly advised London of news that the expedition had been 
abandoned following a mutiny in the French fleet. Without concrete evidence from 
French sources, it is impossible to entirely dismiss the invasion scare. But, as Wells 
noted at the time, it is hard to give much credence to the idea that so many resources 
were to be diverted to the Bahamas at a time when Republican forces in Saint-
Domingue were hard pressed, and a major British taskforce was embarked for the 
French Windward Islands.80 
 The potential for Dunmore to extract political capital from the invasion scare 
was in any case undermined by the impossibility of sustaining an atmosphere of 
perpetual crisis into the following year. In 1794, both domestic and external prospects 
would seem relatively bright for the Bahamian elite. With the arrival of Grey’s 
expedition, British military success in the Caribbean continued. Between March and 
May, Martinique, St Lucia and Guadeloupe were occupied. In Saint-Domingue, a 
combined land and naval assault saw the capitulation of Port-au-Prince on 3 June.81 
By May, Dunmore had received instructions ‘for opening a Commercial Intercourse 
with such parts of the Island of St. Domingo as are, or shall be’ under British control. 
In June, American provision ships began to appear once again in Nassau, alleviating 
the problem of food shortages.82 Although it is difficult to believe that the problem 
entirely disappeared, complaints about French privateering in 1794 are notably scarce 
by comparison with the previous and subsequent years. 
 Simultaneously, developments in France and the Caribbean had generated an 
intense political backlash in Britain against abolitionism. Wilberforce refrained from 
presenting a general abolition bill in 1794, and his proposal for prohibiting the supply 
                                                 
79
 Bahama Gazette, 18 October 1793. 
80
 Dunmore to Dundas, Nassau, 27 November 1793, CO23/33/1; Wells to Chalmers, Nassau, 12 
October 1793, Correspondence of George Chalmers, Add. MSS 22900, ff. 197–8. 
81
 Geggus, Slavery, War, and Revolution, 114; Michael Duffy, ‘World-Wide War and British 
Expansion, 1789–1815’, in Marshall, ed., British Empire, 2:188. 
82
 Dunmore to Dundas, Nassau, 21 May 1794, 11 June 1794, CO23/33/88, 99. 
 215
of slaves to foreign colonies met with no success.83 Chalmers advised his Bahamian 
employers in June that ‘the back of the business had been already broken’ by ‘a great 
and decisive majority [in the House of Lords] who were adverse to the Abolition.’ A 
few months later he was still more forthright, confidently declaring that ‘amid the Din 
of War and the tumult of innovation we no longer hear any thing of the Slave Trade – 
… a Subject, which no longer interests the World.’84 
 Likewise, the fear of slave rebellion appears to have temporarily vanished, or 
at least faded into the background, in the perspective of Bahamian whites during 1794. 
But without the distraction of external or internal challenges, it was not long before 
the colonial elite’s political tensions and conflicts resurfaced. Dunmore had 
thoroughly alienated the new Chief Justice, Stephen DeLancey, and Attorney General 
Moses Franks and Secretary of the Council Adam Chrystie were both criticising the 
governor to London in increasingly explicit terms. Dundas repeatedly censured his 
conduct, and became particularly frustrated by the seemingly endless delays and ever-
increasing expenditure involved in Dunmore’s various construction projects.85 In 
February 1794, Dunmore was alarmed by the contents of two anonymous letters sent 
from London to Bahamian merchants, warning that the governor was very much out 
of favour with the Secretary of State, and that payment of his Bills upon the Treasury 
was ‘very doubtfull.’86 
 As discussed in chapter four above, Dunmore had effectively admitted defeat 
in his bitter battle with the legislature over control of the public revenues in September 
1793, and thereafter the level of state manumissions fell off dramatically. Now, his 
opponents sought to realise their other longstanding demand, for a dissolution of the 
Assembly that had been originally elected during John Maxwell’s governorship in 
1785. A ‘Bill to Limit the Duration of Assemblies’ had passed in 1792. Although the 
King had vetoed this measure by Order in Council, Dundas had made it clear that a 
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subsequent bill would be acceptable provided it did not impose a maximum term of 
less than seven years.87 With such a step seemingly only a matter of time, Dunmore 
finally dissolved the Assembly in September 1794.88 It is an exaggeration to suggest 
that the subsequent election ‘removed all traces of a pro-Dunmore faction in the 
House’:89 members such as John O’Halloran, Samuel Mackey, and Thomas North 
were consistent supporters of the governor. But the composition of the new legislature 
certainly confirmed that the balance of political power in the colony was swinging in 
favour of explicitly plantocratic interests. 
 Controversy immediately ensued over the legitimacy of the elections held on 
Long Island and Abaco. The outcome of a series of narrow votes was that two 
members ‘particularly attached to the violent party in the House of Assembly’ were 
admitted, whereas three others ‘of very different sentiments’ were not permitted to 
take their seats. The result was ‘a decided Majority’ for Dunmore’s opponents, and he 
dissolved the Assembly once more just ten days after it first met. In familiar terms, his 
message to the House expressed his ‘infinite concern… that the Steps adopted by this 
present Assembly… have had a tendency to produce Effects injurious to the 
Constitution and the People at large.’ The legislators had ‘invaded the Prerogative of 
the Executive Power… and… daringly usurped to themselves the most sacred and 
important Rights of the Crown.’90 
 For most of the next twelve months, Dunmore simply governed without an 
Assembly, evading the expiry of the annual Revenue Act via the novel expedient of a 
‘perpetual Revenue Bill’ passed during the reign of George II. But this step precluded 
any legislative initiative, and did little to shore up his waning credibility. The votes of 
the Assembly had been published in the Bahama Gazette, and rumours circulated that 
an order for Dunmore’s recall was either imminent or had actually been issued.91 
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 In December, George Chalmers wrote to the Duke of Portland, who had 
replaced Dundas as Secretary of State, presenting a bleak summary of the situation in 
the Bahamas: 
 
The Charges which were incurred, for putting those Islands in a State of 
defence remain ever unprovided for. The revenue for the Support of the 
government no longer exists. The temporary Laws are now expired. The 
Governor and the Delegates, whom the people chose, and in whom they 
Confide, are at open Warfare on popular rights. And confusion having thus 
commenced is leading on to Anarchy, with all its miseries.92 
 
By the beginning of 1795, therefore, internal conflict had resulted in political 
paralysis. The Bahamian colonial regime was singularly ill-equipped to deal with the 
crisis it was about to face. 
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III: ‘The most dreadful Alarms’: 1795–6 
 
1795 was a disastrous year for Britain, in terms of both the European struggle with 
France and the Atlantic empire. By May, British forces had been expelled from 
continental Europe, and the success of French arms destroyed the First Coalition soon 
after, with the United Provinces conquered, and Prussia, Spain and Sweden making 
peace.93 
 Notwithstanding the apparent successes of Grey’s expedition in 1794, the tide 
was already turning in the West Indies by the end of the year. In February, the Parisian 
National Assembly had enthusiastically embraced the arguments of a multi-racial 
delegation from Saint-Domingue ‘for the role of emancipation in the larger epic battle 
of Republican France against its enemies.’ Sonthonax’s emancipation decree was 
endorsed and extended, with the declaration ‘that slavery is abolished throughout the 
territory of the Republic… all men, without distinction of color, will enjoy the rights 
of French citizens.’94 As news of this development reached the Caribbean in the 
second half of 1794, the character of the war was transformed. The thinly spread 
British forces struggled to cope with the novel and potent French weapon of 
revolutionary emancipationism. 
 In Saint-Domingue, Toussaint Louverture and his 4,000 veteran troops had 
finally come over to the Republican side in mid-1794.95 Disease was taking a serious 
toll on the British forces, and for much of 1795, it was all that newly-appointed 
Governor Sir Adam Williamson could do to hold on to the areas the British 
controlled.96 
 A small expedition led by Victor Hugues landed at Guadeloupe in April 1794, 
and by December British troops had been expelled from the island and slavery 
abolished. In March 1795, Republican landings prompted revolts in Grenada and St 
Vincent, and St Lucia was recaptured by the French in June. With the rising of the 
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Trelawney Maroons of Jamaica in August, a general crisis of Britain’s West Indian 
empire seemed imminent.97 
For the Bahamas, this sharp reversal of British fortunes manifested itself 
initially in a marked intensification of French privateering. Guadeloupe now became a 
major base of operations for the ‘Republican Corsairs’ that destroyed or captured 
1,800 vessels from 1794–8.98 By October 1794, the British naval contingent on the 
Jamaica Station was under-strength by 600 men, and was struggling to protect the 
ports of Jamaica and Saint-Domingue, let alone Nassau and the far-flung Bahamian 
Out Islands.99 
 In the same month, the Somerset, carrying the whole of Exuma’s cotton crop, 
had been taken ‘in sight of [Denys Rolle’s] Plantation House’ by a privateer 
commissioned at Guadeloupe and fitted out at Charleston ‘for this very Purpose’. 
Immediately prior to this exploit, the privateer had rode at anchor off the northern end 
of Long Island for three days, where it had captured a fishing boat containing two or 
three ‘negroes’, presumably slaves, and a free coloured man named Jerry Stuart. All 
but one of the blacks were ‘dismissed’, before a party of islanders led by ‘Colonel 
Deveaux’ surprised a landing party and captured five of the ship’s crew. Deveaux 
promptly sent ‘a message… to the Captain of the Privateer, demanding the other 
Negro, and threatening to hang every French-man on the beach in case of refusal.’ But 
although ‘the Negro was restored immediately’, his mind had apparently been 
‘poisoned and contaminated’ by his exposure to ‘the enthusiastic emissaries of the 
new philosophy’; that night, he ‘carried off two other boats from another quarter to the 
Privateer.’100 
In January 1795, Rolle wrote to Dundas that the Out Islands were ‘infested’ by 
as many as twenty French privateers, imploring that the Bahamas receive ‘Protection 
necessary for their existence as a Colony.’ Chief Justice DeLancey had recently been 
captured at sea, ‘deprived of all his Cloathes except those he wore’, and set adrift ‘9 
miles from Land in an open Boat.’ In view of the ‘great Scarcity of White 
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Inhabitants’, Rolle’s overseer had been ‘obliged to keep a strict Watch every Night of 
several Negroes.’ Another privateer had been seizing slaves from Long Island, and 
Rolle was sure that a ‘small force might strip all the Out Islands of their Negroes.’101 
 A memorial received by Portland in March painted a similar picture. The 
‘exposed and defenceless’ Out Islands were ‘frequently reduced to great distress for 
want of provisions,’ since ‘Communications between the different Islands’ had been 
‘in a great degree stopped.’ French privateers had made ‘numberless Captures… the 
Plantations have been pillaged and the Slaves carried off.’102 
 By April, Crooked Island was subject to what amounted to a virtual blockade. 
A French ship, believed to be the Delaware from Charleston, prowled in the channel 
between Crooked Island and Long Island each day, before anchoring at night in the 
bay opposite James Moss’s plantation house. After this vessel took four prizes in as 
many days, the planters of Crooked Island wrote to both Dunmore and Rear Admiral 
Ford at Saint-Domingue, pleading for support. Moss feared that ‘this Privateer 
meeting with such success will soon send us a swarm of them’, and a further memorial 
addressed to the governor in May spoke of ‘the Enemy’s Cruisers… almost 
continually appearing.’ Since, in the absence of a British warship, ‘it would be 
madness to risque any Vessel or property to this Island’, Moss wondered ‘when we 
may see another Vessel from Nassau.’103 
 The financial and material impact of war on the Out Island plantation economy 
is impossible to quantify, but it should not be understated. In February 1794, a group 
of ‘Planters, Merchants and others’ had warned that without ‘the supplies and 
Provisions and Lumber which these Islands have been accustomed to receive from the 
Continent of North America… it is impossible for the Inhabitants to subsist their 
Slaves, and carry on the business of their Plantations having been cut off… by the 
French Cruizers and Privateers.’ Their stark conclusion was that ‘the Planters of this 
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Colony have been saved from Ruin’ by foreign imports of food.104 But even when 
available, such imports came at a high and growing cost. Food prices had already risen 
sharply during the 1780s. In 1794, one planter was bemoaning that ‘We all want to 
make a great crop, to get rich at once, and leave the d__d country. It is seldom 
considered that when such crops are made, they are applied to the purchase of pork at 
30 dollars the barrel, corn at 12s the bushel’; since 1790, the price of corn had 
increased by half, while that of pork had almost doubled.105 
Nor was this a propitious moment to contemplate extracting more labour from 
the enslaved workforce in the interests of self-sufficiency, with Out Island planters 
‘exceedingly alarmed’ by the prospect ‘of a descent being made and an Insurrection 
excited among their Slaves.’ Although there is no evidence that the French ever made 
a serious attempt at ‘raising a Ferment among’ Out Island slaves, slaveholders there 
had good reason to be apprehensive. If communication with Nassau was cut off, the 
handful of poorly-armed whites would have had little chance against a determined 
rising. Dunmore candidly admitted in May that ‘the present State of our Stores does 
not admit of my granting any supply for the defence of the Out Islands’ against both 
external and internal dangers.106 
Many Out Island residents and proprietors complained that the security of New 
Providence was unfairly prioritised at their expense. But ultimately, the Bahamian 
state simply did not have, and had never had, anything like the resources required for 
effective protection of the entire archipelago, and by this time, Nassau had very real 
security concerns of its own. 
 On 17 April, Dunmore advised the Council that he ‘had last night received 
information of a very alarming nature, respecting an insurrection likely to be 
attempted by the French Negroes on this Island.’107 Even by Bahamian standards, the 
details of the 1795 insurrection scare are sketchy. A few weeks later, the governor 
wrote that ‘some French Negroes’ had planned ‘to destroy the Town by fire, liberate 
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the French Prisoners and Massacre the Inhabitants.’108 In another account, forwarded 
to Chalmers by Josiah Tattnall, the conspirators had ultimately planned ‘to take the 
Property & Shipping to St Domingo’ after laying waste to Nassau. Although by the 
17th, the ‘Ringleaders’ had been ‘apprehended’, and were ‘now in custody in order to 
be examined’, very few further details of the plot were apparently forthcoming. Peter 
Edwards, who on 21 April was ‘taking examinations respecting the circumstances’ 
reported that these ringleaders were part of a group of ‘about twenty or thirty brought 
in… by one of our Privateers.’ According to Tattnall’s anonymous correspondent, 
they had been ‘Active in St. Domingo’ before being allowed to ‘become private 
Property’ in the Bahamas. A second letter forwarded to Chalmers by Tattnall adds the 
detail that the conspiracy ‘was discovered by one of our own Negroes who was asked 
to Join them in the attack.’109 
 These rather vague reports, some of questionable reliability, represent all that 
is known about the circumstances of the alleged conspiracy of April 1795. In some 
respects, the very silence of the sources seems loaded with significance, albeit of a 
kind that is very difficult to interpret. After relating what had happened in a mere sixty 
words on 10 May, Dunmore’s despatches to London do not mention the incident 
again. There seems to be no trace in the official records of the round of interrogations, 
trials and executions that might be expected to follow the discovery of a slave 
conspiracy, especially in the heightened atmosphere of the time. The only reference of 
any kind to any such proceedings comes in a letter written fully two years later, when 
Edwards recalled that one of the men involved had ‘escaped the Sentence of 
Transportation’ by ‘turning King’s evidence.’110 
 However, the evidence, such as it is, does allow us to infer something of the 
incident’s profound impact on the mindset of white Bahamians. For John Wells, 
writing at the end of April, it had seemed that ‘we were exempted in these Islands so 
far, from the Distress which afflict some of our Sister Colonies. But in the present 
unsettled time, it is difficult to form any Estimate of how long this Indulgence is to be 
allowed us.’ To others, it seemed that time had already run out. A sense of impending 
crisis is evident in the tone of the letters written to Tattnall, two months after the 
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discovery of the plot. There was ‘very Little Communication with Our Out Islands, 
Owing to the number of French Privateers that Swarm about Us – the Crops that are 
made Cannot be brought to Market for the most of our small Craft are already taken 
by them.’ Nassau itself was still ‘subject… to the most dreadful Alarms’, so that ‘we 
are now obliged, Regulars (the few we have…) and the Militia to be upon Duty every 
Night.’111 
 The Bahamian elite were rudely awoken from their previous complacency 
regarding the influx of French-speaking blacks since 1793, and in particular the 
indiscriminate seizure of such people by privateers looking to have them condemned 
as slaves at the vice-admiralty court. Edwards was not alone in suddenly realising that 
‘French Negroes… have been very impoliticly admitted into this Country.’ In May, 
the Grand Jury complained of ‘the continual importation and influx of French 
Negroes’.112 Dunmore now required ‘all Persons… possessed of French Negroes to 
deliver into the Secretary’s Office… an exact list of all such Negroes’, but 
nevertheless, the view that ‘We are to thank Our Governor for all our Misfortunes’ 
apparently gained wide currency. With the benefit of hindsight, Dunmore was 
condemned for having ‘Contrary to advice and good Sense Suffered the French 
Negroes… to Land Here, & become private Property.’ Since the governor had ‘also 
thought proper to deprive this Country of [an Assembly]’, there was currently no legal 
body with the ‘Power to get rid of them.’113 As was discussed above, there is little 
evidence that anyone in the Bahamas expressed much concern about the lucrative 
practice of selling captured ‘French Negroes’ before April 1795. Nevertheless, yet 
another charge had been added to the long list of Bahamian slaveholders’ grievances 
against Dunmore. 
 In any case, what was perhaps most disturbing for Bahamian slaveholders 
about the situation in mid-1795 was not simply the presence of a relatively small 
group of Francophone blacks harbouring ‘atrocious designs’. Only ‘Ring leaders’ and 
‘principals’ had been arrested: the full extent of the conspiracy, and the degree to 
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which it had involved the wider black community were unclear. If the plotters had 
been betrayed by one of ‘our Negroes’ who had been ‘asked to Join them in the 
attack’, then perhaps they had approached others with more success.114 
 Slaveholders were surely being wilfully naïve when they insisted that ‘we 
were happy in Our Slaves ‘till those French Negroes landed among us.’ There had 
been fears of insurrection at least two years earlier, and black Bahamians had hardly 
been quiescent in the 1780s. But even this disingenuous narrative of how ‘those 
French Wretches have infused the Idea of Freedom among a Set of Innocent Slaves, 
who were Contented in their Station, & thought themselves happy here’ revealed 
growing concerns at what seemed to be a qualitative change in the mood of the 
English-speaking black majority. At the end of May, the Grand Jury warned that the 
‘seditious discourses’ of ‘French Negroes… tend to corrupt the manners of, and to 
disseminate their wicked and dangerous example and practice among our own Slaves 
and other People of Colour in this Country.’115 
The situation in Nassau was further exacerbated by the presence of ‘so many 
French Prisoners… confined on board the Prison ships in this Harbour.’ The identity 
of these ‘French Prisoners’ is somewhat enigmatic, but they included ‘Men whose 
conduct in their own country, requires a strict guard be kept on them while in this’, 
and ‘many… were either Blacks or Mulattoes’. By early 1796, they had managed ‘to 
escape and carry off Vessels from the Harbour’ at least twice. In February, when ‘one 
of the Prison Ships was attempted to be set on fire by the Prisoners on board’, the 
Assembly moved an Address to the governor bemoaning ‘the state of alarm in which 
the Inhabitants of this Town are kept arising from the dread of those Prisoners.’116 
After the prison ships were lost or damaged in a severe storm on 3 October 
1796, the ‘seventy-six French prisoners of War’ were temporarily kept on shore, in ‘a 
House… so badly circumstanc’d in point of Security, as to create a great Alarm 
among the Inhabitants, that their Negroes should be corrupted by an Intercourse with 
                                                 
114
 Dunmore to Portland, Nassau, 10 May 1795, CO23/34/45; ‘Extracts of a letter from the Bahama 
Islands dated Nassau, 22 June 1795’, ‘Extract of another letter of the same date’, Chalmers Papers, 
JCBL, reel 1. 
115
 ‘Extracts of a letter from the Bahama Islands dated Nassau, 22 June 1795’, Chalmers Papers, 
JCBL, reel 1; Presentments of the Grand Jury, 26 May 1795, Bahama Gazette, 29 May 1795. 
116
 Journals of the House of Assembly, 19 February 1796, CO23/34/260; Bahama Gazette, 30 July 
1795; Forbes to Portland, Nassau, 13 November 1796, CO23/35/34–5; see also Presentments of the 
Grand Jury, 26 May 1795, Bahama Gazette, 29 May 1795. 
 225
the Prisoners.’117 Despite repeated efforts to exchange these captives for British 
prisoners of war, their numbers continued to increase; by July 1797, the Commissary 
of Prisoners reported that ‘there were now more than 150 persons of that description 
on board the prison ships.’ By this stage, many of the prisoners were Spanish rather 
than French, and it is notable that liberating the prison ships apparently did not feature 
in the plans of the conspirators of 1797.118 Nevertheless, the continued proximity of 
enemy combatants ‘rendered in a great degree desperate from the Atrocity of their 
lives’ must have provided yet another source of chronic anxiety for Nassau’s white 
citizens.119 
When the Assembly was finally recalled on 6 October 1795, its members 
‘proceeded… with unexampled unanimity and dispatch’, displaying an ‘industry [that] 
has seldom been equalled.’ By the time Dunmore prorogued the House in March 
1796, 34 new statutes had been enacted, and several major bills remained to be 
passed.120 Unsurprisingly, the legislature was very much concerned with the 
implications of war and revolution in the Atlantic for the Bahamas. Along with the 
rather belated suspension of the ‘act for the encouragement of foreigners and strangers 
settling in these islands’, the most direct response to the alleged conspiracy was a 
measure to prohibit the sale and hire of slaves currently or previously owned by 
citizens or residents of France and its colonies. The preamble to this Act bluntly stated 
that ‘it is necessary, for the safety and tranquillity of these islands, that all 
communication between the slaves thereof and [such foreign] slaves and people of 
colour… should as much as possible be prevented.’ The owners of French slaves 
imported since February 1793 were required to register them with the Receiver 
General within three months, and any free non-white French person faced arrest and 
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imprisonment ‘until he or she shall cause himself or herself to be transported at his or 
her own expence.’121 
A great deal of the new legislation addressed more general issues of external 
and internal security. With Bahamian whites now inclined to the view that ‘in a Period 
like the present, too much caution cannot be observed’, there was far less resistance to 
Loyalist slaveholders’ longstanding demands for ‘the most essential regulations of 
police’ and ‘a Revision of the Laws of these Islands, for governing Slaves and Free 
People of Colour’.122 Provision was made for the building of gaols and appointment of 
constables on the Out Islands for the first time. A new Police Act empowered the 
governor to deploy the militia as a night patrol, who were to ‘prevent… all tumultuous 
Meetings of Negroes and People of Colour’, as well as enforcing a 9 o’clock curfew 
on non-whites.’ Perhaps in view of Dunmore’s known penchant for flouting 
plantocratic norms of law enforcement, further clauses specified that men from the 
coloured militia companies might patrol only in the day, under the supervision of a 
constable, and were to have no powers of arrest over whites.123 
The completion of this ‘revision’ of the legal apparatus of repression and racial 
control was to be obstructed, for a final time, by the governor. Dunmore had 
prorogued the Assembly in December when it called for the dismissal and prosecution 
of Receiver General and Treasurer Philip Dumaresq. On reconvening in February 
1796, the House drove Dumaresq out of office and eventually had him arrested and 
committed to gaol for contempt. Another adjournment soon followed, leaving bills for 
a comprehensive revision of the Bahamian slave code and the construction of a new 
prison and workhouse in Nassau in abeyance. However, by then, the Assembly had 
passed a series of resolutions directing colonial agent George Chalmers to deliver a 
detailed statement of their grievances against the governor to the Secretary of State, 
and also as a Humble Address to the King-in-Council. The order for Dunmore’s recall 
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was signed in July, and his replacement, the former Irish MP John Forbes, arrived in 
Nassau as lieutenant governor on 17 September.124 
Notwithstanding his professed intent to ‘Conciliate all Parties’ and persuade 
them to ‘bury their political Animosities in Oblivion’, Forbes openly sided with 
Dunmore’s enemies, appointing prominent Loyalists to seats on the Council and 
government posts.125 On 11 May 1797, he gave his fulsome approval to the 
comprehensive overhaul of Bahamian slave law that William Wylly had first 
introduced in the Assembly back in November 1795, commending its ‘wise and 
salutary Provisions’.126 
The somewhat misleadingly titled ‘Act to consolidate and bring into one Act, 
the several Laws relating to Slaves, and for giving them further Protection and 
Security…’ was apparently closely modelled on Jamaica’s 1792 Consolidated Slave 
Act, reproducing many clauses from the latter almost verbatim, albeit at times 
providing for more severe punishments.127 Overall, the penal aspects of the 1797 
statute were probably no harsher than those of the 1784 slave code, and there was 
certainly more of a semblance of due process attached to the infliction of capital 
punishment.128 But the far greater length and scope of the new regulations clearly 
signalled an intention to exert increased scrutiny and control over the lives of enslaved 
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people, to ensure that they remained ‘in proper subordination to the white inhabitants 
in general’. As well as a predictably extensive set of provisions for dealing with 
runaways, specific clauses targeted slaves’ independent economic activity, and 
criminalised such forms of sociability as gaming, drinking, and ‘riotous unlawful 
drumming or other noise’.129 
Notably, whereas the 1784 Act did not directly mention rebellion, the new law 
stressed how ‘absolutely necessary’ it was ‘that opportunities of committing rebellious 
conspiracies should as much as possible be taken away’. Now, ‘rebellious 
conspiracies, compassing or imagining the death of any white person’ were 
specifically identified as capital offences.130 
Manumission was not explicitly mentioned in the Consolidated Slave Act. Nor 
did it repeal the 1788 statute establishing the form of the ‘negro court’ that had 
presided over the peak years of state manumission from 1788–93. But the suspension 
of the 1784 slave code, to which the Act of 1788 was an amendment, left the legal 
status of the latter ambiguous at best. In any case, with the increasing political 
ascendancy of the ‘Gentlemen of Character & Property’, and the executive branch 
sympathetic to their agenda, there was little danger of renewed state interference in the 
legal status of enslaved Bahamians. 
But although Loyalist slaveholders had made major political and legislative 
breakthroughs by 1797, they remained some distance from having constituted 
themselves as an unchallenged plantocratic elite. At this point, it must be emphasised 
that, contrary to the established view that Dunmore ‘united almost all assemblymen in 
opposition’ to his governorship,131 he was actually able to count on a substantial and 
consistent base of political support, especially from among the poorer conch whites of 
Eleuthera and Harbour Island. None of the Assembly’s resolutions of March 1796 
censuring Dunmore secured a majority of more than three votes, and the final one, 
explicitly calling for his replacement, did not pass at all. Hence, Forbes reported that 
‘at my arrival here I found Twelve on each Side of the House opposed to each other & 
the Speaker for my administration’. His predecessor had so successfully ‘packed the 
Assembly… with Common Carpenters, Shippers, & Masters of Wrecking vessels in 
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exclusion of Gentlemen of Character & Property’ that only procedural manoeuvring 
prevented the passage of ‘an Address in the House of Assembly To His Lordship 
thanking him for his wise & upright Administration & censuring the Measure of his 
recall.’132 
Forbes wrote at some length about how ‘his Lordship at great Expence to the 
British Treasury (concealed under the Items of Fortification, Gallies, &c. &c.)’, to the 
extent of £150,000 ‘of British Money’, had ‘acquired a Considerable Influence in this 
Island. Among the lower Class Principally; by the Extinction of this system of 
Peculation About three Hundred Persons in Nassau of different Characters[?] & 
Colours are deprived of Advantages, considerable to them.’133 Over the following 
months, Forbes would see his efforts to reform ‘Lord D’s corrupt System’ repeatedly 
confounded by these ‘Contemptible low Fellows’. The lieutenant governor boasted 
that ‘all the respectable Men of the Colony with scarce an Exception are in my 
Support’, but nonetheless Dunmore’s sinister influence seemed to have ‘pervaded 
every Grade & Rank’; singled out for particular criticism were ‘the lower Order of 
Whites here’. In a revealing passage, he characterised the latter in the same terms used 
by Loyalists in the 1780s, as ‘rather a lawless Crew; the Descendants of Pirates they 
have not departed from the Principles of their Ancestors…; between my Predecessor 
& these People a sort of Reciprocity of Abuse was established’.134 
The ensuing ‘Party Contentions’ were as fierce as anything seen since 1783, 
and one episode in particular deserves further attention. Discovering that ‘Lord 
Dunmore had packed the Military Department in the same Manner which he had the 
Legislature, and that there were not Any [senior] Officers… on whom, in Case of 
Emergency, I could rely’, Forbes decided to combine the two existing militia artillery 
companies into a new regiment, to be commanded by William Wylly. However, after 
petitioning against Wylly’s appointment, on the grounds that they had traditionally 
enjoyed the right of electing their own officers, ‘the Members of this Artillery Corps 
had the Presumption to intimate that sooner than obey Mr Wylly they would lay down 
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their Arms on the Parade’. To prevent such a public protest, Forbes postponed the 
militia’s quarterly muster scheduled for 31 December 1796. In response, and 
supposedly with the encouragement of ‘Lord Dunmore’s Party’, captain Joseph 
Hunter ‘published a Manifesto… under the Pretence of Company’s Orders against my 
Authority as Governor, or rather an Invitation to Sedition and Mutiny’. According to 
Forbes, the acting commander of the militia, Robert Hunt, also President of the 
Council, had connived with Hunter’s protest by calling the muster in the first place, 
and could be expected to constitute a court martial so as to guarantee his acquittal.135 
Three days later, Forbes instead convened a general court martial to try 
Hunter, who assembled ‘the greatest Parts of the Members of His Company… in 
order, by their outrageous behaviour, to intimidate the Court’. On being discharged by 
the court martial, ‘Hunter, in his Uniform, marched through Nassau at the Head of his 
Corps, behaving… in a most riotous Manner; and after huzzaing for some time before 
Lt Colonel Hunt’s Door, proceeded to do the like before Lord Dunmore’s House’. 
Hunt soon afterwards resigned his commission, supposedly to avoid having to preside 
over another court martial, and Hunter’s company was disbanded.136 
This rather farcical episode was a stark illustration of how bitterly divided 
Bahamian whites remained by 1797. Moreover, it indicated, in a very public and 
dramatic fashion, how far these tensions had impacted on the cohesion and discipline 
of the colony’s military forces. It was readily apparent that the militia might well 
prove neither very reliable nor efficient in enforcing the new ‘regulations of Police’. 
The state of the regular garrison was even more problematic. By February 
1797, the 47th regiment was down to 110 men fit for duty, and their commanding 
officer was ‘greatly impaired by his Attachment to the Bottle’.137 But the arrival of 
their replacements later that month only presented new and more serious difficulties. 
In the second half of 1795, Dundas had assembled an unprecedented projection 
of British military might overseas in an attempt to remedy the deteriorating situation 
in the West Indies. But despite successes elsewhere, the ‘great expedition’ of 1796 
proved unable to win the war in Saint-Domingue, where 4,700 British troops died, 
mainly of disease, in that year alone. From September the redeployment of units from 
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Saint-Domingue contributed to the spread of a circum-Caribbean pandemic of what 
was probably yellow fever.138 In November 1795, the 32nd regiment had been 954 
strong. When they arrived in Nassau from Môle Saint Nicolas in February 1797, only 
380 men remained, of whom a quarter were ill.139 
In spite of the Bahamian climate’s salubrious reputation, the troops remained 
‘wretched beyond description’, and the ‘dreadful distemper’ spread to the general 
population in May, killing over 200 people by September, when less than 40 soldiers 
were ‘capable of doing duty’. One of the first casualties was Forbes, who died on 3 
June, leaving Robert Hunt as acting governor.140 
 Hunt was said to be an old man, ‘not very well adapted to any Exertion’, who 
‘had never heard an Enemy shot fired’, and ‘did not possess much Influence over the 
Inhabitants’. Eighteen months before, Dunmore had made him Chief Justice, only for 
Portland to veto the appointment.141 His recent quarrel with Forbes can only have 
further undermined his legitimacy as governor to Loyalists. 
 Thus, in the summer of 1797, with the colonial regime wracked by political 
conflict and disease, lacking an effective military force, and now seemingly leaderless, 
the Bahamas may well have seemed ripe for insurrection. 
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IV: ‘To Fight and take the Country’: the Conspiracy of 1797 
 
Word of the conspiracy of 1797 first reached Nassau whites on the evening of 
Saturday 19 August, when a ‘Negro Man’ told Francis Montell, an officer in the 
Volunteer Engineer Company of the New Providence Militia, that ‘he had been asked 
by a number of Negroes to join them in a rising against the white people, and to put 
themselves in the same situation the black people were in at the Cape’. On Sunday 
afternoon, the informant spoke to Montell again, reporting some details of the planned 
insurrection, and agreeing to lead him to the place where the conspirators intended to 
assemble that night. However, when Montell went to meet the man, he said that the 
would-be rebels had already met and dispersed. Because only twenty had come to the 
rendezvous ‘instead of Seventy or Eighty who were expected – they had parted 
without doing any thing; but had agreed to meet on Monday night.’142 
Montell told Thomas North, the captain of the Engineers, about this on Sunday 
afternoon, and probably also several other militia officers.143 For reasons that are not 
clear, North did not inform Governor Hunt until the night of Monday 21 August, and 
it was only then that a general alarm was raised. Hunt appraised Captain Mansergh, 
commander of the 32nd regiment garrisoned at Fort Charlotte, of the situation, 
‘requesting him to be vigilant, and if possible to double his Centinels’. The Militia 
were ordered ‘to keep up constant Patroles all Night, from one end of the Town to the 
Other’, and guards were stationed at the gaol. Two gunboats were positioned in the 
harbour to enfilade the Ordnance Stores should they be attacked. On the following 
day, the Council approved Hunt’s proposal to employ from the militia ‘a party of 
twelve or fourteen trusty men; to mount Guard every Evening, at Sunset at Fort 
Charlotte, and to do duty until Sun-rise.’144 By then, however, the leaders of the 
conspiracy were under lock and key. 
Sometime on Monday evening, the anonymous informant reported to Montell 
that he had again met with the conspirators, who now believed that ‘the white people 
had got information of their intention’, having overheard their owner, Alexander 
Wildgoos, mention the matter. Shortly after the informant had left, a group of blacks 
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passed Montell’s home, and told him that the plotters had gone to a ‘House hired by a 
Mulatto Fiddler, named Stephen in the Western Suburbs’. Montell went there with 
five men from the Engineer Company, and found a ‘party of Negroes consisting of 
Seven Men and one Woman,’ who were ‘alarmed’ when Montell entered the house, 
and concealed something under a bed. A search of the house revealed ‘a fuse and a 
Musket or sword hid under the bed and a powder horn,’ and the blacks were arrested 
and ‘secured… in the Common Gaol.’145 
Two weeks later, Perpall, Tucker and Edgcombe went on trial, along with Tom 
Bethune and Tom Lockhart, in the manner prescribed by the new Consolidated Slave 
Act, before a five-man jury and two justices of the peace. All five were found guilty 
and sentenced to death, but Hunt subsequently commuted the sentences of Bethune 
and Lockhart to transportation.146 In the absence of confessions, the convictions were 
based on the testimony of other slaves that they had been entreated by one or more of 
the accused men to join the planned insurrection. 
According to these statements, Perpall ‘gave a Feast’ attended by ‘a great 
number of other Negroes’ on Sunday 6 August at the house he rented from the fiddler, 
Stephen Rogers. This event was ostensibly to celebrate his ‘making up a Quarrel 
between him and his Wife’, but also served as cover for inviting potential recruits to 
the conspiracy to a more select gathering the following Sunday. Over the course of the 
following week, slaves were approached individually by Bethune, Lockhart, 
Edgcombe and Perpall himself. By some accounts, Perpall and Tucker ‘were the 
principal leaders, and the two Captains who consulted together’, though the most 
detailed statement refers to Perpall as ‘the Principal Leader’ and Tucker as ‘the next 
Captain’.147 
The conspirators’ declared intention was no less than ‘to fight and take the 
Country from the White People’, and by mid-August at the latest, a detailed plan for 
the insurrection had been formulated.148 Between thirty and a hundred rebels would 
assemble, and attempt in the first instance to board ships in the harbour to seize arms 
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and ammunition.149 They would then break into the ordnance otores situated adjacent 
to the abandoned Fort Nassau in the centre of the town, despatching any sentries ‘in 
the most secret manner’, and at a stroke commandeering virtually all the munitions 
available in New Providence.150 Reporting a year later on the state of the island’s 
defences, Captain Rutherford of the Royal Engineers noted with grave concern that 
‘An Enemy… would find in that Store nine Hundred stand of Arms, with Guns, 
Entrenching Tools and other Stores.’151 Having taken what they needed and destroyed 
the remainder, including the artillery, the rebels would proceed against the 
fortifications built at great expense by Dunmore. Tucker and Bethune would direct the 
capture of Fort Fincastle, while Perpall led the attack on Fort Charlotte, to the west of 
Nassau, where the regular garrison were quartered.152 
Reports of what was to happen next are somewhat vague, but the plotters were 
said to have been in contact with armed runaways established in the interior of New 
Providence, who were expected to join the rebellion. Bethune and Lockhart had 
claimed that ‘there were near Three hundred ready to join when the Attack should be 
made’, meaning, presumably, once the forts and the magazine had been taken.153 Hunt 
stated that the conspirators intended to ‘set fire to the East End of the Town, in order 
to divert the attentions of the inhabitants’, and would claim several months later that 
their ‘horrid design’ encompassed ‘this Island, and consequently the whole Colony, in 
all the calamities attendant on Insurrection and Anarchy.’154 However, there is nothing 
to indicate that after burning Nassau the French conspirators intended ‘sailing off in a 
captured ship.’155 
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The reality, or lack of it, that lay behind slave conspiracy scares is notoriously 
elusive, and this one is no exception. The court record, consisting as it does of ‘revised 
versions of the words witnesses uttered, filtered through ears and pens belonging to 
one or more unknown clerks’, is deeply problematic.156 In many respects, the evidence 
is meagre, and full of conspicuous gaps and silences. There is no record of any 
investigation in the interval between the arrests and the trial. Indeed, the eight people 
arrested are never explicitly identified; in light of where they were captured, it is 
likely that two of them were Baptiste Perpall and his wife. At least two other unnamed 
men were evidently never brought before the court, unless they testified for the 
prosecution. Nothing at all is known for sure about the initial informant, who 
approached Montell on the promise of anonymity. Beyond bland assurances from their 
owners as to their honesty, the motives of the trial witnesses can only be matter for 
speculation. 
The background of the conspirators themselves is also frustratingly obscure. 
They are routinely described as ‘French Negroes’, and the Bahama Gazette claimed 
that the executed men ‘had all been Brigands in St. Domingo’.157 The suspiciously 
anglophone names of Tom Bethune and Tom Lockhart may well have helped save 
them from the gallows. According to Peter Edwards, the ‘artful fellow’ who had 
masterminded the plot, presumably Perpall, had been ‘accused of the same crime two 
years ago’, when he had avoided being transported by testifying. Since then, he had 
changed owners several times, moved from New Providence to Cat Island and back 
again, and had been ‘practising as a Negro Doctor for some time’; newspaper reports 
claimed that one of the executed men had professed ‘Skill in Necromancy and 
Witchcraft’.158 
Nonetheless, the story of the conspiracy presented in the trial testimony is at 
least coherent and generally consistent. The plan was convincingly detailed as to the 
rising’s opening moves, without going into elaborate and speculative detail about what 
was to happen later. Moreover, in light of the ‘weak and enfeebled state’ of the 
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garrison, that plan was audacious, but certainly not unfeasible, assuming that a 
reasonable number of armed, determined and competent fighters could be 
assembled.159 If a group of slaves in the Bahamas, possibly with some military 
experience from Saint-Domingue, really had resolved to ‘fight and take the country’, 
this might well be the sort of plan they would have come up with, and they would 
never get a better opportunity to carry it out. 
The account we have of the conspiracy of 1797 could be the truth, or 
something close to it. Equally, it might be a plausible fiction, concocted or heavily 
embroidered by the informers, with or without the direct connivance of senior figures 
in the colonial government. There is no hard evidence to support the latter notion that 
the real conspiracy was directed against the supposed rebels, but none of these 
scenarios can be entirely discounted. 
 What can be said with some confidence is that the story was plausible, and that 
no one appears to have disputed its veracity. That plausibility owed a great deal to the 
continuously escalating and radicalising trajectory of revolution in the Atlantic since 
1791. But revolution was far more than merely a context; its manifestations in the 
Bahamas were tangible and material. Fears of invasion, the arrival of ‘French 
Negroes’ and prisoners of war, and the attacks of privateers interacted with more local 
conflicts and dynamics in complicated and unpredictable ways, fuelling an uneven but 
relentless growth of anxiety and tension. By 1797, the effects of local and broader 
factors were so thoroughly intertwined that it seems futile to try to disentangle them. 
The military weakness of the colonial regime at this particular point in space and time 
made insurrection an unusually threatening or alluring possibility, but that weakness 
owed a great deal to the British army’s failure in Saint-Domingue, and the 
transmission to the Bahamas of the disease that was itself a major cause of that failure. 
Everyone was certain that the conspiracy stemmed from the ‘wicked intentions’ of the 
‘French Negroes’; but what made such people dangerous was their integration within 
the wider non-white community, and the opportunities that that milieu apparently 
afforded for the clandestine circulation of ‘seditious discourses’ and ‘atrocious 
designs’. 
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 In such an atmosphere, the idea that black Bahamians might try to ‘fight and 
take the country from the white people’ had a compelling, urgent, and lethal 
credibility that had seemingly been lacking even in 1795. The ensuing ‘spectacle of 
the scaffold’ was simultaneously ‘a stage on which to present the might of the state’, 
and a ‘theater of white power’ intended for the benefit of both blacks and whites. On 
the one hand, as Peter Edwards blandly put it, it was to be ‘hope[d] the Example will 
have a good Effect – the Negroes are getting to a terrible degree of insolence’. But for 
the white community public executions were also a cathartic and affirmatory 
performance of their own unity and cohesion.160 
 Despite Governor Hunt’s insistence that ‘that the conspiracy was confined 
solely to the French Negroes’, witnesses repeatedly stressed that the plotters had 
intended ‘that the French and English Negroes were to be intermixed at the two 
Forts’.161 Moreover, the details presented at the trial incriminated virtually all of the 
‘enclaves of independence’ that non-white Bahamians had maintained and developed 
in the interstices of the slave regime since 1783. In Nassau in particular, both slaves 
and free people of colour had sufficient money, freedom of movement, and free time 
to participate in a vibrant and extensive social culture that was largely beyond white 
scrutiny. The conspirators, all slaves, had the wherewithal and personal autonomy to 
rent rooms and houses, and to repeatedly entertain ‘a great number of… Negroes’ at 
‘Feasts’ where potential recruits were plied with drink. Notably, Perpall, who had 
supposedly been in the Bahamas only a few years, lived with his wife in his own 
home. That his house was rented from a free man of colour, Stephen Rogers, who was 
himself a ‘fiddler’,162 surely served to confirm white suspicions about the subversive 
nature of the intercourse between the free and unfree sections of the non-white 
community. And, to cap it all, the maroons in the interior of New Providence were 
directly implicated in the plot. 
Now the political initiative passed almost automatically into the hands of the 
people who had insisted since 1783 that the level of autonomy enjoyed by black 
                                                 
160
 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 32; James Sidbury, Ploughshares into Swords: Race, rebellion 
and identity in Gabriel’s Virginia, 1730–1810 (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), 126, 120; Edwards to 
Chalmers, Nassau, 10 September 1797, Chalmers Papers, JCBL, reel 2; see also Wyatt-Brown, 
Southern Honor, 402–12; da Costa, Crowns of Glory, 242–5. 
161
 Hunt to Portland, Nassau, 20 September 1797, CO23/36/117; Jack’s Testimony, ‘Record of 
Conviction’, CO23/36/121. Cf. Yengee’s Testimony, ‘Record of Conviction’, CO23/36/121. 
162
 Yengee’s Testimony, ‘Record of Conviction’, CO23/36/121; Minutes of the Council, 22 August 
1797, CO23/36/110. On Stephen Rogers see also Johnson, Race Relations, 71 
 238
people in the Bahamas was both wrong and dangerous. In the face of ‘the dread of our 
country becoming the theatre of such horrors as have been witnessed in St Domingo’, 
there was suddenly no room for ambivalence or dissent among white Bahamians. 
Peter Linebaugh observes that public executions were ‘one of the few occasions 
(coronations were another) that united the several parts of government’: the 
executive’s military and police apparatus carried out the mandate of the judiciary, 
which in turn interpreted and applied the statutory code laid down by the legislature. 
This may have been the largest group hanging in the Bahamas since 1718, when the 
deaths of eight pirates had symbolised Woodes Rogers’s reassertion of royal 
authority.163 Likewise, the ‘getting rid’164 of Perpall, Tucker, and Edgcombe served to 
herald the long-delayed ascendancy of the ‘Gentlemen of Character & Property’. 
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Conclusion 
 
I: Leaving the Eighteenth Century 
 
By the end of the eighteenth century, with Dunmore and Baptiste Perpall safely 
departed, one to retirement in Ramsgate, the other to the scaffold, the challenges they 
had respectively represented to the Bahamian slave regime appeared to have been 
successfully contained. During the 1790s, the local and Atlantic political context had 
been transformed by the French and Haitian revolutions, severely curtailing the 
potential for efforts to interfere with slavery to emerge from the British political 
establishment. Just as Wilberforce had deemed it impolitic to submit a slave trade 
abolition bill to parliament in 1794,1 Dunmore might well have opted to quietly 
withdraw his support for Bahamian state manumission, even had the process not been 
effectively curbed by his reluctant cession of financial control to the Assembly. He 
certainly considered the French to be a real and immediate threat, and the measures to 
enhance internal security after 1795 mostly met with his approval. 
 Nevertheless, while he remained governor, Dunmore’s entrenched and bitter 
antipathy formed a permanent obstacle to the plantocratic aspirations of the Loyalist 
slaveholders. From their perspective, he had consistently declined to enforce 
appropriate standards of racial and class discipline, and shown a disturbing inclination 
to use the executive power against the self-styled men of ‘respectable property’.2 
Moreover, Dunmore acted as a focal point for wider resistance to the Loyalist project. 
The ‘lower Order of Whites’ had always been suspicious of the émigrés’ grand 
designs for transforming the Bahamas. Even after Dunmore’s recall, the strength of 
their opposition to the ‘reconstituted oligarchy’ of planting and mercantile interests 
‘threatened to impede materially’ Bahamian ‘progress to Commercial Importance’ and 
‘respectability’.3 
 But however contentious the issues at stake between conchs and Loyalists, 
their significance paled in the face of the ‘most hellish plot’ of 1797. In its aftermath, 
new Governor William Dowdeswell, who was well-informed about the years of 
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conflict, observed that although some bitter personal antagonisms lingered, ‘all 
appearance of Party has subsided’.4 Precisely because Perpall’s conspiracy appeared 
to connect the irruption of the ongoing revolutionary crisis of Atlantic slavery with the 
whole pattern of Bahamian race-relations since 1783, it made a seemingly 
unanswerable case for the further augmentation and refinement of the enhanced 
apparatus of repressive state power installed in the wake of 1795’s ‘unpleasant alarm’. 
In November 1797, after a vote of thanks to the militia and regular garrison for 
their ‘Alertness and Zeal in suppressing the late attempts of the French Negroes in 
their intended Insurrection’, the Assembly appropriated £2,000 for the construction of 
a new ‘common-gaol, work-house, and house of correction’.5 Over the following 
years, a steady stream of legislation added to the machinery of social control. In 1798 
the Police Act was re-enacted, along with a new law constituting a ‘Nassau Night 
Guard’, who were empowered to enter any ‘negro houses, negro yards, or other places 
where… meetings or assemblies shall be held on any pretence whatsoever, whether 
civil or religious, and immediately to seize and apprehend all… slaves, and other 
disorderly persons’. The Vagrancy Act of 1799 was not explicitly racialised in its 
targeting of ‘rogues, vagabonds, beggars and other idle and disorderly persons’. But 
Grand Juries had complained for many years of ‘Slaves and other People of Colour’ 
engaging in activities the Act marked out for particular condemnation, such as 
‘playing or betting at unlawful games or plays’, unlicensed pedlars, and ‘persons not 
in holy orders but going about as preachers of the Gospel’. Any member of the public 
was now authorised to arrest such individuals, who might then be subjected to up to 
six months’ hard labour.6 
As we have seen, the process of state manumission had already been sharply 
curtailed in the 1790s, and in 1799 slaveholders finally succeeded in abolishing 
Dunmore’s ‘negro court’. Although William Wylly would assert that ‘the laws of 
these islands provide an effectual remedy by which any man of colour, who has claim 
to freedom, may assert his right to it, with but little delay, and without either expense 
or personal procedure’, the 1799 Act confronted such claimants with a markedly more 
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formal, elaborate and longwinded procedure. They were required first of all to state 
their case to ‘some Council or Attorney’ who would then report in writing to the 
General Court ‘whether the claim appears to him to be valid and well founded’. If the 
Court approved this report, it would then appoint a ‘guardian’ to prepare a suit on the 
claimant’s behalf. Moreover, the Act directed that anyone ‘claiming his, or her 
freedom… shall forthwith be committed to the common gaol, workhouse or other 
place of safe custody, there to remain so long as the suit shall be pending’. 
Unsurprisingly, by 1812 there had been just seventeen such suits.7 
A parallel series of measures were designed to consolidate the new political 
order, in part by clarifying and hardening the notoriously hazy Bahamian colour line. 
An Act of 1799 explicitly confined voting rights to white males who were either 
freeholders or had paid £50 worth of duties to the colonial treasury in a given year. 
Membership of the Assembly was restricted to ‘Gentlemen of Character & Property’ 
amounting to 200 acres of land or a value of £2,000. In the same year, four new seats 
in the legislature were created, representing the Caicoses, Turks, Crooked and Watling 
Islands, all newly-settled since the mid-1780s, overwhelmingly by Loyalist planters 
and their slaves.8 The law of 1756 rendering Bahamians with relatively distant African 
ancestry legally white was suspended for fifty years in 1802. Henceforth, a North 
American legal standard of race would apply in the Bahamas; as William Wylly 
bluntly put it, ‘one drop of black blood’ was now sufficient to disqualify an individual 
from white status.9 The principal aim of ‘An Act to suspend an Act, entitled, “An Act 
to ascertain who shall not be deemed Mulattoes’ was surely to curb the political 
influence of the phenotypically ambiguous ‘Lower Class’ of indigenous Bahamians, 
the kind of people described to this day as ‘Long Island whites’.10 Disenfranchisement 
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of those with ‘a dash of dark blood in their veins’11 would leave a more manageable 
residuum of the most racially reliable elements, who might be co-opted by the regime. 
At the same time, work commenced on the suite of new public buildings at the 
east end of Bay Street that would eventually house the Assembly, General Court and 
all the major offices of colonial government. These impressive structures would offer 
a physical counterpart to the establishment of an enlarged, more coercive state 
apparatus, in the service of a more rigid and hierarchical socio-political order. As an 
unmistakeable visual manifestation of the break with the past, they were a fitting seat 
of power for the new oligarchy.12 
On the face of it, then, everything that Loyalist slaveholders had called for 
since their arrival in the Bahamas had been achieved. In the teeth of dogged 
resistance, the legal and political framework for sustaining a plantocracy had finally 
been put into place. What remained less clear was how far this formal hegemony 
would translate into the power to shape the everyday realities of Bahamian life. 
During the 1780s, Loyalists had proudly boasted of how their ‘uncommon 
exertions in Planting and Commerce’ had ‘in the term of no more than three years 
rescued the Bahamas from insignificance’.13 Through the deus ex machina of cotton, 
the émigrés would enrich themselves, and simultaneously transform the Bahamas. But 
by turn of the century, such claims were looking increasingly hollow. To many 
people, in the face of erratic and steadily declining crop yields, falling profits and 
mounting debts, it seemed that ‘as a planting Colony, our all is at stake’ on what had 
turned out to be ‘the desperate game’ of ‘the deceitful speculation of planting 
cotton’.14 
In the absence of any credible alternative crop, if cotton failed, there would be 
no plantocracy after all. Strangely, it remains the case that ‘no in-depth study of cotton 
cultivation in the Bahamas exists’,15 but this has not prevented cotton’s decline from 
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taking on great significance in Bahamian historiography. For Craton and Saunders, it 
serves as one of those ‘common environmental and ecological factors’ that ultimately 
proved decisive in ensuring that ‘the Loyalists were as much changed by the Bahamas 
as vice versa’. For Howard Johnson, ‘the collapse of cotton production’ was the 
‘catalyst’ for ‘the restructuring of the relationship between slaves and their owners, 
along lines commonly associated with the post-slavery years’.16 
 The trajectory of the Bahamian cotton economy is a more complicated issue 
than is often realised, and one that cannot be fully addressed here. But it is important 
to note that there is room for doubt as to whether cotton will satisfactorily bear the 
load of interpretive significance that has been heaped upon it. The much-rehearsed 
formula of a ‘crisis in production’, caused by natural disasters, insect pests, and above 
all, the erosion and exhaustion of thin Bahamian soils depends heavily on an uncritical 
and sometimes selective use of narrative sources produced by the planters and their 
sympathisers for specific purposes.17 The quantitative evidence, often carelessly 
handled, has never been fully collated.18 Of course, exaggerated claims of land’s 
declining fertility were a time-honoured staple of the ‘groans of the plantations’ 
throughout the Atlantic.19 Bahamian planters testified at length from 1799 onwards 
concerning ‘the exhausted state of our soil’, at least when new grants of crown land 
were in the offing. But somehow they managed never to provide quite enough specific 
information to calculate actual yields, for which there seem to be no hard numbers 
later than 1788.20 Indeed, patchy as it is, the quantitative evidence suggests that cotton 
production in the Bahamas peaked no earlier than the later 1790s, with a level of 
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output as late as 1814 that remained well above what was achieved during the 
supposed boom years of the 1780s.21 
 Thus, insofar as the planters’ outpourings of fin-de-siècle angst reflected a real 
crisis in the cotton economy, it seems more constructive to view it as much in terms of 
a crisis of profitability as one of production. That is to say, planters began to stop 
planting cotton when they no longer expected to make money from doing so. There is, 
to be sure, very little concrete evidence for profitability, about which almost nothing 
can currently be said with any confidence. But approaching the issue in this way raises 
the possible significance of other factors – such as the financial and material impact of 
war during the 1790s, the vicissitudes of international cotton prices, and the 
concessions made to enslaved workers in the relations of production that were hastily 
improvised in the 1780s. 
 This is not to suggest that soil exhaustion and other problems of production 
were not important, perhaps even critically so. But, in the absence of a systematic 
evaluation of their significance relative to other issues, the causal priority that 
historians have so readily assigned to environmental factors remains ultimately 
speculative. 
Likewise, the argument that the ‘disintegration of the short-lived plantation 
economy’ led to ‘a process of restructuring of the relations between slaves and their 
owners… that prefigured the labor arrangements of the postemancipation years’ is a 
tentative hypothesis at best.22 The trouble is that the phenomena cited as the results of 
this restructuring – the hire and self-hire systems in Nassau, enslaved participation in 
the market economy, the protopeasant activity facilitated by the task system and 
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provision grounds – were all already well-established in the 1780s.23 Nor has any 
concrete evidence been presented that they were more prevalent after the 
‘disintegration’ of the cotton economy,24 the timing of which is left conveniently 
vague. Johnson alone has variously written of ‘the collapse of cotton production in the 
Bahamas by 1800’, or that ‘production virtually ceased after 1800’, or that ‘by 1815 
the Loyalist dream of establishing a plantation economy in the Bahamas had faded’.25 
Thus, insofar as ‘these developments constituted a slow and extended abolition’ or 
‘the decline of formal slavery’,26 it is equally plausible to trace that process back to the 
1780s. 
What Johnson’s work does clearly show is the extent to which the new regime 
proved unable to do more than contain the forms of economic and social 
independence that non-white Bahamians had managed to establish during the previous 
decades. The Grand Jury complained in 1799 of ‘Negroes … monopolizing all Fruits 
Roots and Vegetables’ for sale in Nassau, while self-hiring slaves were ‘extorting 
unreasonable Wages, and keeping the greatest Part of the same to themselves’. Such 
activities continued to afford their protagonists ‘the Means of indulging in every kind 
of Dissipation’, with the ‘negro dances’ developing into elaborate and expensive 
‘subscription balls’ for which written invitations were distributed. At Christmas, the 
streets of Nassau were filled with the sound of ‘bad music on hoarse cracked drums & 
fifes’ into the small hours.27 
The supposed involvement of runaway slaves based in the interior of New 
Providence in the 1797 conspiracy had given fresh impetus for action against this 
longstanding thorn in the side of the regime. A proclamation offering a $50 reward for 
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the apprehension of such fugitives, as well as an amnesty for those who voluntarily 
surrendered within three months, was issued even before the trial of the conspirators. 
A notice published at the same time calling for owners of runaways to submit ‘a List 
of their Names and particular Descriptions’ to the Police Office implied a plan for 
more systematic measures, but there is no evidence of their being carried into effect.28 
By 1801, according to the London Times, runaways on New Providence had ‘become 
exceedingly formidable to their masters’ under the leadership of ‘a Chief who was 
known by the name of King Caesar’, and who ‘had been a Prince in Africa’. Caesar’s 
death, ‘celebrated as an occasion of general joy’, may have occurred during one of the 
several operations against runaways conducted by the coloured militia companies in 
the early 1800s. Nonetheless, maroons remained established on the island into the 
1820s, when a group of them exchanged fire with soldiers of the Second West India 
Regiment.29 
The preamble to a law of 1800 addressing the runaway problem rehearsed the 
longstanding complaint that ‘the protection afforded them by the free people of 
colour, greatly tends to encourage desertion’. These two groups shared the distinction 
of being the most overt manifestations of non-white autonomy, and the ‘Act for the 
more effectually to prevent the desertion of Slaves’ seemingly sought to compensate 
for the regime’s inability to eradicate the one by punishing the other. It required free 
non-whites not only to register their names, ages and addresses at the police office, but 
also to ‘provide themselves with a silver medal of the size of a dollar’, inscribed with 
their name, a registration number issued by a magistrate, and the word ‘FREE’. This 
device was to ‘be worn at all times… exposed to public view’, on pain of arrest.30 
As well as such indignities, free non-white Bahamians were also subjected to 
much of the new regimen of racial control and repression directed principally at the 
enslaved. Nonetheless, during the nineteenth century, they would be both relatively 
prosperous, and increasingly numerous. According to Wylly, writing in 1812, free 
coloured ‘heads of families are in general freeholders; some of them opulent planters’. 
As early as 1803, Governor John Halkett was worrying that ‘in New Providence too 
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many of our blacks have obtained their freedom’.31 In 1788, there were supposedly 6 
whites for every free person of colour. Two decades later, despite the efforts to close 
down one legal route out of slavery, there were less than 2.5, and by 1834 the ratio 
was almost even, with the free non-white population having increased more than 
eightfold since the 1780s.32 
For Bahamian slaveholders, free people of colour were generally characterised 
by ‘an invincible aversion to all regular labour,… idleness and profligacy, sometimes 
combined with fanaticism’. From the perspective of the colonial American South, the 
transition to plantocracy entailed the marginalisation, and preferably the 
disappearance, of this ‘species of population of little use’; in Ira Berlin’s words, ‘the 
growth of a slave society and the degradation of free people of African descent were 
part of the same process of making slavery and making race.’33 Conversely, for 
Loyalists, the thriving state of the free non-white community was a constant reminder 
of how far their grand designs for the Bahamas had gone awry. 
Moreover, recent history offered clear evidence of the perils entailed by the 
co-existence of slavery with people who were neither white nor enslaved. The 
Assembly warned in 1817 that ‘the fate of Saint Domingo, and the present distracted 
state of the Spanish continental colonies… afford a dreadful and impressive lesson of 
the danger of a large free coloured population in slave colonies.’34 
The Bahamian ruling class would continue to invoke the example of the 
Haitian Revolution, sometimes alluding to the direct threat it had supposedly posed to 
themselves, in reaction to virtually any challenge to slaveholding interests. When 
black troops from the Fifth and Sixth West India Regiments arrived in Nassau in 
1801, Robert Hunt, again acting as temporary governor, assured London that ‘the 
agitation of the public mind could not have been greater had Toussaint himself come 
with all his force.’35 Arguing in 1815 against metropolitan proposals to make slaves’ 
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testimony admissible as evidence against whites, a committee of the Assembly noted 
that ‘evil-disposed negroes’ who existed ‘in all our Colonies’ had already used their 
‘extraordinary talents for intrigue’ to ‘spread carnage and conflagration through one of 
the most flourishing Colonies in the West Indies: Nor, perhaps, is there a single 
Colony, in which alarming conspiracies, with similar views and a like fatal tendency, 
have not been at some time or other detected.’36 
By the nineteenth century, then, the Bahamas were presided over by a ruling 
class at once firmly entrenched and everywhere confronted by the limits of its own 
power. Haunted by both the failed dream of a Bahamian cotton kingdom and the 
lingering nightmare of descent into the Haitian ‘abyss of anarchy’, the elite retreated 
into an uncompromising commitment to ‘the only system which… can possibly keep 
the knife from the throats, and the faggot from the roofs, of all the white inhabitants of 
the West Indies.’37 Members of the elite who deviated to any extent from the mores 
and mindset of a slave society, as William Wylly would do after converting to 
Methodism, were subjected to relentless and sometimes violent persecution.38 
Although professing their disinterestedness ‘in the Sugar question’, Bahamian 
slaveholders unequivocally echoed the ‘recalcitrance and siege mentality’ of their 
Caribbean ‘brother planters’ in their dogged resistance to metropolitan initiatives for 
the regulation and amelioration of slavery.39 Their increasingly strident denunciations 
of abolitionism warned that the ‘inflammatory Appeal’ of ‘the humane Mr. 
Wilberforce and his tender-hearted associates’ was ‘but too well calculated to… 
produce the same tragical effects, which similar publications and similar measures in 
France, produced in St. Domingo’. In such a case, there could be no doubt that the 
‘London philanthropists would gladly dance, in spirit at least, round the smoking ruins 
of every thing valuable in the West Indies, until a sufficiency of blood were spilt to 
quash the conflagration.’40 
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Although exercising ‘wonderful ingenuity’ in adapting their regime to post-
slavery conditions, the Bahamian oligarchy would maintain their ‘Bourbonese 
colonial conservatism’ for over a century. In the process, they earned a reputation as 
‘perhaps the most narrow-minded ruling class in the entire English-speaking 
Caribbean’, and made the colony infamous for ‘excessive racial discrimination’. In the 
meantime, the black majority were consigned to ‘a grim struggle for existence’ by 
continuing economic stagnation and a ‘machinery of class slavery’ that remained 
‘untouched in its essentials until the 1960s’.41 
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II: The Bahamas and the Revolutionary Atlantic 
 
This was not the outcome that anyone had really wanted, nor one that could be 
confidently predicted from any static assessment of the state of the Bahamas in 1783. 
It was the result of a convoluted, erratic and often fortuitous trajectory, initiated by the 
disruption of slavery during the American Revolutionary War that had uprooted 
thousands of slaveholders and enslaved African Americans. The physical migration of 
these people is relatively easy to track, compared with their various social, legal and 
psychological routes beyond the bounds of the Southern slave regime. The direction 
and destination of those routes remained very much in the balance on reaching the 
Bahamas. There, the Loyalist migration imposed further strains on already rather 
ramshackle structures of state power and race and class discipline. Over the following 
years the resulting gaps and weak points in this edifice would offer black émigrés new 
opportunities to continue the pursuit of independence and control over their own lives 
that had dislodged them from the world of the mainland plantocracy. Simultaneously, 
the  Bahamian slave regime’s plentiful interstices facilitated the evasion and 
subversion of Loyalist slaveholders’ efforts to plot a direct course back towards that 
world. Inasmuch as they were cast as willing or unwilling fellow travellers in such a 
journey, everyone in the Bahamas was unavoidably embroiled in what amounted to 
conflicts over their future way of life. 
 These struggles were further complicated by the arrival of Dunmore, who 
opened up a legal route to freedom that was not only a direct challenge to the Loyalist 
drive to re-enslavement, but also, it seemed to slaveholders like William Wylly, a 
threat to the legal foundations of slavery itself. The issue of state manumission thus 
precipitated a further round of political infighting that left white Bahamians more 
bitterly divided than ever. 
 In this situation, neither the nascent planter class nor the colonial state were 
well-equipped to meet the fresh challenges posed by the return of revolutionary crisis 
to the Atlantic world in the 1790s. French attacks, combined with wartime inflation 
and shortages, threatened to unravel the working of the precarious compromise that 
was the Out Island plantation economy. Meanwhile a new round of forced migration 
brought with it the prospect of a very different way out of enslavement for non-white 
Bahamians. It was only the nightmare of insurrection that ‘agitated the Public mind’ 
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sufficiently to render Bahamian politics the kind of racialised zero-sum game at which 
Loyalist slaveholders were the most accomplished and effective players. 
 This is manifestly not a trajectory that can be wholly or principally understood 
in terms of patterns of continuity immanent to the Bahamas. The wave of revolution 
that swept the Atlantic world from the 1770s onwards is a critical factor, but nor is 
this a sequence of events that are easily reduced to a straightforward account of the 
impact of an irresistible tide of upheaval from outside. At one level, this study has 
unavoidably involved an argument for the need to rethink the relative importance 
afforded to ‘external’ and ‘internal’ influences in Bahamian history. But it has also 
sought to show the arbitrariness of those categories, and to question the utility of the 
tacit assumption of their easily defined and readily apparent nature for a period when 
everything points to the fuzziness of the distinction. In the late eighteenth century, 
when John Wells would probably have found the notion of the Bahamas as an 
independent nation rather less plausible than ‘the Idea of a Sable Republic in St. 
Domingo’, the very question of precisely who counts as Bahamian is not easy to 
answer. 
More importantly, in these years, ostensibly external and internal ‘factors’ 
regularly come bound together in complex and reciprocal patterns, within which their 
influence and significance largely reside; separating them out, where it is even 
possible, effaces what makes them matter. Hence, it is often impossible to clearly 
differentiate African-American émigrés from other black people in the Bahamas, 
especially in Nassau, the place from which there is by far the most evidence of their 
behaviour. Dunmore’s project of state manumission was the culmination of personal 
and imperial trajectories spanning the breadth of the Atlantic and beyond. In a more 
immediate sense it was clearly unfinished business from the American Revolution. 
But it also reflected from the limited options of the colonial state in addressing an 
increasingly unstable situation in the Bahamas. The conspiracy of 1797 was so 
alarming, as that of 1795 apparently was not, precisely because the spectre of Saint-
Domingue was seemingly manifested within the framework of black life in Nassau. 
Indeed, if anything, the specificity, the uniqueness, of what happened in the Bahamas 
becomes all the more evident when viewed not as being distinct from, but rather as 
part of, the wider history of the revolutionary Atlantic. 
Furthermore, the Bahamian case illustrates the limitations of any 
straightforward or linear model of the relationship between the Age of Revolution and 
 252
the contemporaneous challenges to slavery. Studies of revolution have often been 
informed to varying degrees by one or another theoretical schema, the seemingly self-
evident teleologies of national histories, or the effort to come to terms with 
participants’ own very real sense of being propelled by larger forces beyond their ken 
or control. Embedded somewhere in all such approaches is an account of revolution as 
the course of a tide of progress impeded to a greater or lesser degree by sandbanks of 
reaction and conservatism. And the impulse of the Age of Revolution, whether 
conceptualised as the rise of liberty or democracy, the triumph of capitalism and the 
bourgeoisie, or the making of modernity, has been routinely construed to be 
something ultimately and essentially inimical to slavery. Hence, Eric Hobsbawm 
believes that by 1848 ‘it was… inevitable that sooner or later legal slavery or 
serfdom… would have to go’; Bernard Bailyn describes how African slavery was 
forced upon the agenda of the American Revolution by a ‘self-intensifying… 
movement of thought [that] was rapid, irreversible, and irresistible’; Eugene Genovese 
thinks that the ‘developmental dead end’ of Atlantic slavery ‘inevitably conflicted 
with one or more elements of the emerging bourgeois ideology’, whose decisive 
breakthrough came with ‘the conquest of state power by the representatives of the 
consolidating bourgeoisie in France’.42 Interpretations of this kind have been, and 
remain, hugely influential. But they are problematic for several reasons. 
Firstly, there was indeed a logical (and pretty obvious) contradiction between 
the existence of African slavery and revolutionary ideologies that were professedly 
about things like liberty and equality, although the significance of this fact for ‘a 
social order which gloried in inconsistency’43 can easily be over-stated. But there were 
also very real contradictions between the same revolutionary principles and 
antislavery, or at least any kind of antislavery strategy beyond the moral suasion of 
individual slaveholders. Hence George Washington could with all sincerity brand 
Dunmore ‘that Arch Traitor to the Rights of Humanity’.44 In formulating their 
statements of principles, revolutionaries often preferred to pretend that slavery and its 
victims did not exist, or at any rate to avoid mentioning them by name. Until quite 
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recently, their modern admirers tended to follow suit, addressing slavery only as it 
was abolished, and for exactly as long as it took to give their heroes the credit for it. 
What is clear is that the lines of battle drawn up between revolutionaries and 
conservatives did not correspond to those between opponents and defenders of slavery 
with anything approaching consistency. Dunmore, a man regarded as a reactionary 
even by his fellow counter-revolutionaries the Loyalists, is a very striking example of 
someone who subverted slavery in an effort to maintain the existing political order. 
Many other people arrived at antislavery positions via a comparably conservative, 
paternalistic politics, such as William Wilberforce and James Ramsay. Slavery’s most 
consistent enemies were the enslaved themselves, and they also frequently turn up on 
what by rights should be the wrong side of revolution, fighting for their freedom in the 
name of kings both real and fictitious.45 Conversely, the actions, or rather lack of 
them, of slaveholding American patriots like Washington and Jefferson speak louder 
than their sporadic and often private expressions of antislavery sentiments; nor is the 
track record of French revolutionaries much better before 1794. As Michel-Rolph 
Trouillot bluntly puts it, ‘the Haitian Revolution was the ultimate test to the 
universalist pretensions of both the French and American revolutions. And they both 
failed.’46 
Of course, expediency was a factor in the actions of all these protagonists. 
When Dunmore freed slaves in Virginia, he thought it was to Britain’s advantage to 
do so, and most abolitionists of the 1780s probably believed the same thing about their 
cause. It was manifestly in pursuit of their own interests that the authorities in Spanish 
Santo Domingo armed rebel slaves, and that Toussaint Louverture became a ‘General 
of the Armies of the King’. But exactly the same can be said of Sonthonax in 1793, 
and of the Jacobin regime’s sudden conversion to revolutionary emancipation in 1794, 
quite aside from the inconsistent and particularist way that these new-found principles 
were actually expressed in practice. 
A second issue is that the outcomes and effects of revolution might just as 
easily expand or strengthen slavery as undermine it. As we have seen, the American 
Revolution precipitated Loyalist efforts to force the Bahamas more fully into the 
sphere of the Atlantic plantation complex, as well as tripling the size of the slave 
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population. In the Bahamas, the most concrete lasting consequence of the revolutions 
of the 1790s was the political ascendancy of the slaveholders. More generally, 
American independence resulted in a constitutional settlement that allowed Southern 
slaveholders to dominate national politics and largely preclude federal interference 
with the ‘peculiar institution’ for over half a century.47 In Britain, the French and 
Haitian Revolutions produced a mood of ‘chauvinist rictus’. As abolitionism stalled 
during the 1790s, prodigious amounts of blood and treasure were expended on the 
acquisition of yet more prime plantation real estate in the circum-Caribbean, whose 
development was fuelled by the arrival of over 300,000 African captives in British 
ships.48 The collapse of Saint-Domingue left a huge gap in the world sugar market, 
spurring a dramatic expansion of plantation agriculture in hitherto marginal areas such 
as Cuba.49 The ‘final test’ of the Haitian Revolution, the frustration of Bonaparte’s 
grand design for the restoration of slavery, opened the way to the development of 
another new ‘empire for slavery’ on the North American mainland.50 
Of course, American colonists did not take up arms in the 1770s to send 
enslaved African Americans to the Bahamas, any more than the people who would 
soon be called Haitians resisted Leclerc’s expedition with the intention of opening up 
a different cotton frontier in the Louisiana Territory. But to start discounting the 
significance of revolutionary outcomes on grounds of fortuitousness is to embark 
down a very slippery slope indeed.51 For one thing, those involved in ‘such periods of 
revolutionary crisis’ all too often opted to ‘conjure up the spirits of the past to their 
service and borrow from them names, battle-cries and costumes’. As Gordon Wood 
observes, the United States ‘was not the society the revolutionary leaders had wanted 
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or expected’. ‘Had they not all been royalists in 1789…?’, Hannah Arendt’s pithy 
comment on the extraordinary political trajectory of the French revolutionaries, could 
also be applied to 1791 and the insurgency in Saint-Domingue.52 The results of the 
Age of Revolution in North America, France, Haiti, and the Bahamas, were very often 
a long way from what any of the people responsible for them had intended or 
foreseen. 
By this point, from the historian’s perspective, it is reasonable to ask ‘but is 
this revolution really such a desirable thing?’53 Moreover, in the context of a more 
general ‘incredulity toward metanarratives’, it is easy to suspect the ‘Age of 
Revolution’ of being ‘a gigantic effort to domesticate revolts within a rational and 
controllable history’, an inevitably Eurocentric discourse that subsumes and occludes 
subaltern voices and actions.54 In dealing with the history of enslavement and 
resistance, one way of addressing such concerns has been to focus instead upon 
questions of ‘what the slaves really wanted and how they planned to achieve it’, and 
more generally to assign eristic priority to local factors and internal dynamics. But the 
Bahamian case illustrates at least the possibility of telling a story about the Age of 
Revolution and slavery that avoids the sort of zero sum debate that ‘counterposes 
those who see the Haitian Revolution and related instances of slave resistance as part 
of a western worldwide movement and ideology, and those prepared to grant a 
separate ideology of resistance to the slaves.’55 
The continuing influence, within and beyond the academy, of the idea of 
revolution as one or another kind of progress owes a great deal to certain 
consequences of the Age of Revolution whose continuing, and increasingly global 
influence has made their significance seem manifestly self-evident. One such 
consequence was the triumph of the nation state, which can reasonably be argued to 
have ‘learned most, and ultimately benefited most, from the ideological turmoil of the 
years after 1780.’ The revolutionary construction of new nations and re-casting of 
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existing polities in national terms in this period was a phenomenon ‘felt to be 
something absolutely unprecedented, yet at the same time, once in existence, 
absolutely reasonable.’ It gave rise to an increasingly normative ‘“model” of “the” 
independent national state’ that has been hugely successful in exercising ‘the power to 
narrate, or to block other narratives from forming’. Edward Said observes that ‘nations 
themselves are narrations’. Moreover, they function within these narratives as both 
assertion and demonstration of their own status as the central touchstone of 
significance and meaning for what they claim as ‘their’ past.56 
As a result, it is hard to consider what happened in revolutionary North 
America, or France, or Saint-Domingue, without reference to ‘ultimate’ outcomes like 
the United States, or ‘la grande nation’, or Haiti, and the national metanarratives these 
names have been made to signify. But, largely because of their relative obscurity and 
assumed insignificance, the Bahamas offer a prism for viewing things in a rather 
different light. From the Bahamian perspective, we can see how the impact of all these 
revolutions was transmitted beyond the ostensible limits of such outcomes by multiple 
and intertwined circum-Atlantic networks – such as those of war, empire, and capital 
– that propelled the movement of people, commodities, ideas and experience. 
Moreover, these volatile and diverse trajectories intersected and fed back on one 
another, as in the Bahamas, where the continuing struggles over enslavement impelled 
by the American Revolution were complicated by the arrival of émigrés and 
discourses of self-liberation derived from the upheavals in the French Caribbean. In 
this sense the Age of Revolution can indeed be seen as a single, over-arching process, 
albeit one that consists of ‘the massively knotted and complex histories of special but 
nevertheless overlapping and interconnected experiences’.57 
The often spectacularly explosive and mercurial aspect of that process, the 
sense that ‘society is at boiling point and therefore fluid’ owed a great deal to this 
intensely tangled, circuitous and polygenetic character. Amid the dense web of 
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connections that enmeshed the Atlantic world, it was all the more true that ‘what 
people don’t know is what what they do does.’ Their actions could be loaded with 
tangential consequences that generated far-reaching chains of unintended side-effects. 
In turn, the latter might draw new protagonists and issues into contention within an 
increasingly complex matrix of interactions whose results were chaotically 
unpredictable. The intricate course of one such sequence of inadvertent causes and 
effects, slavery’s irruption into the dynamics of the American Revolution, was traced 
out in chapter one. We have also seen how that process was itself the point of 
departure for other ‘vectors of revolution’, not the least unlikely of which was that 
played out in the Bahamas after 1783.58 
For those who lived through it, the way in which this ‘Crowd of unlooked for 
Events’ might suddenly and with little or no warning make established structures, 
alignments and relationships of all kinds seem protean and contingent could be at once 
a bewildering and disorienting, but also an empowering experience, opening up 
beguiling new vistas of possibility. An Atlantic without slaves had appeared a far-
fetched notion indeed in the early 1770s, when Maurice Morgann had whimsically 
observed that ‘the time may come, at least the speculation is pleasing’; variously the 
stuff of utopian fantasy, earnestly unworldly moral stricture, and the cultural trope that 
Paul Gilroy has termed the ‘turn towards death’.59 Over the following years, 
conceptions of ‘the auspicious æra of universal freedom’ would come to seem 
increasingly plausible: not only for enslaved people considering how they might 
‘finish the business themselves’ and ‘their zealous friends’ in the antislavery 
movements, but also for those who looked on ‘the prospect of existence under such 
circumstances’ as ‘a subject of disgust rather than of desire.’60 
Variations on these themes informed the projects of substantive transformation 
that people in the Bahamas sought to realize, individually and collectively, in the 
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years after 1783: African-Americans trying to make freedom the ultimate destination 
of their journey out of the mainland plantation system; Loyalist slaveholders looking 
to recapitulate in ‘this hitherto obscure Colony’ the kind of slave regime from which 
‘nothing escaped, nothing, and no one’; Dunmore, idiosyncratically pursuing a largely 
unarticulated ideal of an authoritarian paternalism under which the slaveholder might 
be ‘kept in awe by a higher and stronger hand, that would instantly crush him, should 
avaricious views of private emolument tempt him to dishonour or endammage the 
community.’61 
None of these projects proved successful within the scope of the lives of those 
who had undertaken them. Their results were frequently very different, and indeed 
sometimes almost completely contrary to what was intended, so much so that they can 
now seem anomalous, contradictory or irrelevant. Non-white Bahamians had not 
developed their ‘enclaves of independence’ in the 1780s with a view to facilitating the 
formulation of plans ‘to put themselves in the situation’ that ‘the black people’ were 
not yet in in Saint-Domingue, any more than the unlikely design of persuading them 
to ‘Fight and take the Country’ was meant to reaffirm the power of the slaveholders. 
But these unrealized possibilities nonetheless matter a great deal in terms of 
historians’ more conventional concern with what did happen. Accounting for how the 
Bahamas had turned out by 1800 entails tracing out the multiple and layered 
contingencies of the complex, polyhedral interplay of the various efforts to fulfil these 
visions of how the future might be made different from the past. In doing so, it 
becomes rather easier to appreciate how much the outcomes of the Age of Revolution 
can more generally be seen as products of ‘the connections, encounters, supports, 
blockages, plays of forces, strategies, and so on, that at a given moment establish what 
subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal, and necessary.’62 
A long time ago, Atlantic slavery was designated a ‘subject one must study in 
detail, to see what the bourgeoisie makes of itself and of the labourer, wherever it can, 
without restraint, model the world after its own image’. The first part of this injunction 
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has certainly been taken up over the last few decades. The idea that ‘capitalist, racial 
slavery’ is ‘internal to modernity and intrinsically modern’ has been much more 
sporadically pursued until quite recently, and its implications are still to be fully 
explored and digested.63 Exposition of the extent to which the Age of Revolution’s 
‘genesis, process, outcome and influence’ were bound up with the lived experience of 
enslavement, ‘something that marked out blacks as the first truly modern people’, 
remains very much an unfinished project.64 Nor, in some ways, has it been made any 
easier by recent trends in revolutionary historiography. Rejection of ‘static social 
categories and mechanistic explanations’, and an increasing pessimism as to ‘the 
difficulty – nay, the outright impossibility – of knowing “the social” in any sort of 
unmediated fashion’ has meant that ‘the relationship between rhetorical meaning and 
social experience seems as elusive as ever’. In practice, this can easily mean that the 
latter is compartmentalised off from what ends up looking worryingly like ‘a 
revolution (and a modernity) only of the few’.65 
One attraction of the kind of approach I have tried to pursue here is the scope it 
opens up to present unashamedly big stories about the Age of Revolution that have 
important and at times pivotal roles for the agency of protagonists who have been 
marginalised by history in both senses of the word.66 Insofar as it entails cutting across 
temporal, spatial and conceptual boundaries and hierarchies, it also hopefully evades 
the kind of recuperation whereby, for instance, ‘historians… have incorporated the 
history of the rebels who were willing to risk their lives to escape from American 
history into a part of that history.’67 
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In the Bahamas, of course, the casualties of the ‘victory of nations’68 have 
included people like Dunmore and the Loyalists. Their byzantine and often tiresome 
political infighting becomes more intelligible, and hopefully rather more interesting to 
twenty-first century historians, when it is appreciated how far non-white and enslaved 
people shaped the terms of reference, process and outcome of those struggles. Such 
elite white men would be ironic beneficiaries of an approach that entails trying to 
engage with subaltern initiatives and agendas on their own terms whilst recognising 
their wider significance. But it will be very apt if the experience of Bahamians can 
serve to facilitate a perspective that would surely be directly relevant to their own 
interests as a nation. 
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Appendix 
Bahamian Manumissions, 1782–1800 
 
No# Date Name Remarks 
How Freed/ By 
whom Source 
1 1782 Philis   Will of J. Butler of S. 
Ca. 
RFS, NF, M, 
284 
2 1782 Andrew child of #1, 
husband of #5 
Will of J. Butler of S. 
Ca. 
RFS, NF, M, 
284 
3 1782 Anthony child of #1 Will of J. Butler of S. 
Ca. 
RFS, NF, M, 
284 
4 1782 Sally child of #1 Will of J. Butler of S. 
Ca. 
RFS, NF, M, 
284 
5 1782 Mary wife of #2 Will of J. Butler of S. 
Ca. 
RFS, NF, 
M,284 
6 1782 Illinois, Samuel   Cert. of John Hunt NF, N, 62 
7 1782 S_____? Esther possible duplicate. 
of #16 
Governor’s Certificate NF 
8 1782 Edinburgh   William Baldwin RFS, NF  
9 1782 George purchase £40 
sterling 
Alex. McBeth RFS 
10 1782 Gene?   General McArthur RFS, NF, O, 58 
11 1782 Brown, 
William 
“Military Service” Commissioners of 
Claims 
RFS, NF 
12 1782 Brown, Ben “Military Service” Commissioners of 
Claims 
RFS, NF 
13 1782 Billy   purchase: Charles 
Goodwin 
RFS 
14 1782 Castleton   Abraham Adderley RFS 
15 1782 Scottowe, 
Betty 
  Thomas Scottowe RFS 
16 1782 Scott, Esther   Governor’s Certificate RFS 
17 1782 Tucker, Duarh?   Joseph Tucker RFS 
18 1782 Celia “mulatto woman” Daniel Bough M, 210 
19 1782 Phillis child of #18 Daniel Bough M, 210 
20 1782 Bob child of #18 Daniel Bough M, 210 
21 1782 Milly child of #18 Daniel Bough M, 210 
22 1782 Sylvia “mulatto woman” Hopkins Pi___e? M, 102 
23 1782 John child of #22 Will of Thomas Butler RFS, M, 284 
24 1782 Philis child of #22 Will of Thomas Butler RFS, M, 284 
25 1783 Slater, Nancy   Thomas Slater RFS, NF 
26 1783 Smith, Mary 
aka Gow 
  James Gow NF 
27 1783 Gould, Hannah bequest James Gould NF 
28 1783 Thompson, 
Dinah 
bequest Ben Thompson RFS, NF 
29 1783 Tyrone “within British 
Lines”; FP NY 
Proclamation RFS, NF, O, 54 
30 1783 Williams, 
Seabod 
  Proclamation NF 
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31 1783 Williams/ 
Wilkins, Philis 
  Proclamation RFS, NF 
32 1783 Wilkins, 
Kabod? 
cert. Major E. 
Williams, Abaco 
Proclamation N, 297 
33 1783 Willoughby   Fa[aithful] Ser[vice]: 
James Gordon 
NF, O, 118 
34 1783 Williams, 
Charles 
  Proclamation NF 
35 1783 Galphin, Cyrus   Justices’ Certificate NF 
36 1783 Galphin, 
Charlotte 
  Justices’ Certificate NF 
37 1783 Galphin, 
Clarinda 
  Justices’ Certificate NF 
38 1783 Galphin, Chloe   Justices’ Certificate NF 
39 1783 Galphin, Jamo?   Justices’ Certificate NF 
40 1783 Galphin, Cyrus   Justices’ Certificate NF 
41 1783 Galphin, 
Charlotte 
  Justices’ Certificate NF 
42 1783 Hagar   Proclamation NF 
43 1783 Hall, Henry   Proclamation NF 
44 1783 Powell, 
Susannah 
  Certificate NF 
45 1783 Powell, Joseph   Certificate NF 
46 1783 Caesar purchase £25, Fla. Thomas Brown RFS, NF, M, 
383 
47 1783 Corant, 
Henrietta 
  Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF 
48 1783 Beck purchase 
£118.10.4 
Samuel Hunt Jenkins? RFS, NF, V, 
113 
49 1783 Tom son of #48 Samuel Hunt Jenkins? RFS, NF, V, 
113 
50 1783 Diana   Dr. John Lorimer RFS, NF, M, 
244 
51 1783 Secundo sailor, age 48  John Baldwin RFS, M, 483 
52 1784 Lundy, Becky   St. Augustine, 
Certificate  
NF 
53 1784 Rocke, Nancy   St. Augustine, 
Certificate  
NF 
54 1784 Richards, Jesse   Governor’s Certificate NF 
55 1784 Ratteen?   Governor’s Certificate NF 
56 1784 Steward/ 
Stewart, James 
free man in N Ca. 
before war 
Certificate NF, M, 101 
57 1784 Peggy also 10s. purchase Fa Ser: James Hume NF, M, 325 
58 1784 McKenzie, 
J__? 
  George McKenzie NF 
59 1784 Nanny “within Br. Lines” 
– McArthur 
Proclamation NF, M, 147 
60 1784 Anwhit?, 
Peggy 
  Certificate of her 
mother 
RFS, NF 
61 1784 Nan   Proclamation NF 
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62 1784 Carter, James born free in 
Virginia. “Came 
with col. 
Deveaux”. 
Cert. of John Boyd, JP RFS, NF, M, 
47 
63 1784 Bob “within Br. Lines”, 
St. Augustine, 
June 1784 
Cert. from Gen 
McArthur 
RFS, NF, M, 
69 
64 1784 Amos free pass, St. 
Augustine, August 
1785 
Proclamation/Gen 
McArthur 
RFS, M, 157 
65 1784 Amos, Caesar   Proclamation/Gen 
McArthur 
RFS, M, 157 
66 1784 Amos, Prince   Proclamation/Gen 
McArthur 
RFS, M, 157 
67 1784 Amos, Judy wife of #64 Proclamation/Gen 
McArthur 
RFS, M, 157 
68 1784 Amos, Elsey   Proclamation/Gen 
McArthur 
RFS, M, 157 
69 1784 Amos, Rachael   Proclamation/Gen 
McArthur 
RFS, M, 157 
70 1784 Amos, Lizzey   Proclamation/Gen 
McArthur 
RFS, M, 157 
71 1784 Willis, Hester Abaco, £25 NY 
currency 
John Cameron, 
purchase 
M, 338 
72 1784 Jack St. Augustine. 
Tonyn/ McArthur 
Proclamation NF, M, 215 
73 1784 Cox, Jerry “my son” Timothy Cox RFS, NF, V, 
280 
74 1785 Kate purchase, 50 
pieces of eight 
Joseph Thompson RFS, NF, M, 
198 
75 1785 Thompson, 
Benjamin 
child of #74 Joseph Thompson RFS, NF, M, 
198 
76 1785 Thompson, 
Kitty 
child of #74 Joseph Thompson RFS, NF, M, 
198 
77 1785 Thompson, 
Juliet Granville 
child of #74 Joseph Thompson RFS, NF, M, 
198 
78 1785 Weaver, Maria   Fa Ser: James Gordon RFS, NF, O, 
120 
79 1785 Allick purchase from 
James Gould 
Lt. Alexander Chisholm NF, M, 242 
80 1785 Nanny   Fa Ser: Alexr. 
Roxburgh 
NF, M, 262 
81 1785 Sarah   Fa Ser: Alexr. 
Roxburgh 
NF, M, 263 
82 1785 Hodgson, 
Judith 
  Dugald Evans NF 
83 1785 Kemp, Priscilla purchase, 100 
pieces of eight 
Wm. Kemp NF, M, 204 
84 1785 Kemp, Cluny? child of #83 Wm. Kemp M, 204 
85 1785 (Thompson), 
Kate 
  pur. Of Jo. Thompson NF 
86 1785 Nero, John   Fa Ser: Thomas Graham NF 
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87 1785 Cox, Dim purchase, 775 
pieces of eight 
George Tucker RFS, NF, M, 
180 
88 1785 Cumba purchase, S. Ca., 
1778 
Samuel Carson M, 177 
89 1785 Green, James   Justices’ Certificate N, 291 
90 1786 Knowles, 
Molly 
  William Gibson NF 
91 1784 Mitchell, Bess certificate from 
Thomas Brown/ 
McArthur 
Proclamation NF, M, 136 
92 1786 W___?   Lord Dunmore 
[incomplete line] 
NF 
93 1786 Newton, Maria bequest ___? Newton NF 
94 1786 Robinson, 
Mary 
false indenture Justices’ Certificate NF, M, 343 
95 1786 Romeo   Justices’ Certificate NF 
96 1786 Evans, James husband of #97 Justices’ Certificate NF, M, 335 
97 1786 Evans, Harriett wife of #96 Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF, M, 
335 
98 1786 Evans, George child of #96–7 Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF, M, 
335 
99 1786 Evans, 
Clarinda 
child of #96–7 Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF, M, 
335 
100 1786 Essex   Mary Sanders RFS, NF 
101 1786 Frazier, Jemmy   Justices’ Certificate NF 
102 1786 Frazier, Lydia   Justices’ Certificate NF 
103 1786 Frazier, Betty   Justices’ Certificate NF 
104 1786 Frazier, Polly   Justices’ Certificate NF 
105 1786 Frazier, Bristol   Justices’ Certificate NF 
106 1786 Patrick,Tom expired indenture Justices’ Certificate NF, M, 497 
107 1786 Jenny “British lines”, 
Charleston 
Justices’ Certificate NF, M, 340 
108 1786 Lydia child of #107 Justices’ Certificate M, 340 
109 1786 Betty child of #107 Justices’ Certificate M, 340 
110 1786 Polly child of #107 Justices’ Certificate M, 340 
111 1786 Bristol child of #107 Justices’ Certificate M, 340 
112 1786 What   Benjamin Ingram N, 4 
113 1787 Sturrup, Jane   James Sturrup NF 
114 1787 Scotland   Jehordan Turner RFS, NF, O 
290 
115 1787 Smith, Thomas   Justices’ Certificate NF, N, 225 
116 1787 Smith, Thomas   Justices’ Certificate NF, O, 423 
117 1787 Williams, Dick   Fa Ser: Tylston 
Woollam 
NF, N, 290 
118 1787 Glormer?, Sam   Proclamation NF 
119 1787 Knowles, 
Rebecca 
“my true loving 
and faithful wife or 
House Keeper” 
Love & aff. Joseph 
Knowles 
NF, N, 30 
120 1787 Knowles, 
Rebecca 
daughter of  #119 his Child Joseph 
Knowles 
NF 
121 1787 Bell, Anne   ? NF 
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122 1787 Bell, James   William Moss: 
Certificate 
RFS 
123 1787 Carolina   Commissioners of 
Claims 
RFS 
124 1787 Green, James born free; New 
York free pass 
Justices’ Certificate N, 223 
125 1788 Brown, James indentured for 3 
years in 1783 
Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF, O, 7 
126 1788 Bush, William   Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF 
      
127 1788 Green, James   Commissioners of 
Claims 
NF 
128 1788 McKenzie, 
Flora 
  purchase, John Miller NF 
129 1788 Wallace, Eve   Thomas Wallace RFS, NF 
130 1788 Rankin, 
Mathias 
  Justices’ Certificate NF 
131 1788 Young, Jenny   Thomas Ross NF 
132 1788 H__p__y?   Commissioners of 
Claims 
NF 
133 1788 Howe, Patty   Governor's Certificate NF 
134 1788 Lambert, John   Justices’ Certificate NF 
135 1788 Kelly, James   Governor’s Certificate NF 
136 1788 Mathias   Justices’ Certificate NF, N, 291 
137 1788 McDonald, 
___? 
  Lord Dunmore  NF 
138 1788 Moultrie, Sarah   Justices’ Certificate NF, O, 7 
139 1788 Quash   Justices’ Certificate NF, N, 228 
140 1788 Bob “claim of Right” Governor's Certificate RFS, NF, O, 
134 
141 1788 Dixon, John   Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF, O, 
157 
142 1788 Grant, 
Henrietta 
“mustee” woman Justices’ Certificate N, 293 
143 1788 Romeo   Justices’ Certificate N, 297 
144 1788 George, 
Thomas 
freed from 
indenture 
Justices’ Certificate O, 54 
145 1789 Charleton, John   Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF 
146 1789 Charleton, Joe   Justices’ Certificate NF 
147 1789 Charleton, 
Amoretta 
  Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF 
148 1789 Charleton, John child of #145 Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF 
149 1789 Charleton, Jane   Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF 
150 1789 Charleton, 
Maria 
  Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF 
151 1789 Charleton, Sue   Commissioners of 
Claims 
RFS 
152 1789 Sentry, George   Justices’ Certificate NF 
153 1789 Sephard, Mary 
Ann 
  Baptised in 
Westminster 
RFS, NF 
154 1789 Green, Lucy   Governor’s Certificate NF 
155 1789 Green, George   Governor’s Certificate NF 
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156 1789 Green, Caesar   Governor’s Certificate NF 
157 1789 George   Justices’ Certificate NF 
158 1789 Frank expired indenture Certificate of Thomas 
Brown 
RFS, NF, O, 
299 
159 1789  ––ne?   Justices’ Certificate NF 
160 1789 Cox, Member   Edward Cox RFS, NF 
161 1789 Barry, Bob   Fa Ser: George Barry RFS, NF 
162 1790 Scriven, Sambo   Justices’ Certificate NF 
163 1790 Scriven, Agar   Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF 
164 1790 Roberts, ____? bequest John Roberts NF 
165 1790 Will   Proclamation NF 
166 1790 Wilson, Will   John Wilson NF 
167 1790 Esther   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
168 1790 Jimmy   Governor’s Certificate NF 
169 1790 Micklethwaite, 
Sarah 
  Henrietta Micklethwaite NF 
170 1790 Barry, Thomas   Fa Ser: Joseph Saunders RFS, NF 
171 1790 Booby aka 
Hall, Sarah 
  Joseph Hall: gift RFS, NF 
172 1790 Chatham, Moll   Governor's Certificate RFS, NF 
173 1790 Chatham, 
Thomas 
  Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
174 1790 Bob “Good Evidence” Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
175 1791 Charleton, 
Pompey 
  Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF 
176 1791 Spencer, Will   Sam Spencer NF 
177 1791 Thompson, 
Joan 
  Fa Ser: Joseph 
Thompson 
RFS, NF 
178 1791 Turner, Dinah   Gravesend Shoulding RFS, NF 
179 1791 Shestal? 
Archibald 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
180 1791 Wishfull, Isaac   Governor’s Certificate NF 
181 1791 Williams, 
George 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
182 1791 Williams, John   Governor’s Certificate NF 
183 1791 Allen, Sue   Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF 
184 1791 Elliot, Samuel   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
185 1791 Elliott, Thomas   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
186 1791 Elliott, Sarah   Governor’s Certificate NF 
187 1791 Elliott, Priscilla   Governor’s Certificate NF 
188 1791 Elliott, Jenny   Governor’s Certificate NF 
189 1791 Elliott, Sally   Governor’s Certificate NF 
190 1791 Frank, John   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
191 1791 Hannah   Governor’s Certificate NF 
192 1791 Jack, John   Governor’s Certificate NF 
193 1791 ___?, Johnston   Governor’s Certificate NF 
194 1791 [John]son?, 
Harry 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
195 1791 Lane, Edinbro'   Governor’s Certificate NF 
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196 1791 Martin, 
William 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
197 1791 Baldwin, Juba   Jeremiah Tinker RFS 
198 1791 Falconer, 
Clarinda 
  Susanna Falconer RFS 
199 1792 Roberts, Nancy   Governor’s Certificate NF 
200 1792 Roberts, Mary   Governor’s Certificate NF 
201 1792 Rachel   Governor’s Certificate NF 
202 1792 R___?, Tom   Governor’s Certificate NF 
203 1792 Rumer, Robert   Fa. Ser.: Robert Rumer NF 
204 1792 Thomas/ 
Thompson, 
Sarah 
  Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
205 1792 Thomson, John   Governor’s Certificate RFS 
206 1792 Sharpe, Peter   Governor’s Certificate NF 
207 1792 Sandy, Dianah   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
208 1792 Sandy, Judy   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
209 1792 Susannah   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
210 1792 Harriet   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
211 1792 St__?, Thomas   Governor’s Certificate NF 
212 1792 Webb, Thomas   Governor’s Certificate NF 
213 1792 Hall, 
B_h_g_h?? 
  B__y? Hall NF 
214 1792 Hunter, Mary   Governor’s Certificate NF 
215 1792 Jones, Sarah   Governor’s Certificate NF 
216 1792 Lewis, 
Clarinda 
  Judith Lewis NF 
217 1792 Keizer?, Jean   Governor's Certificate NF 
218 1792 Kelbon?, 
Bristol 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
219 1792 Affey?, Matty?   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
220 1792 Affey, Rebecca   Proclamation/ Dunmore RFS, NF 
221 1792 Affey, Nanny   Proclamation/ Dunmore RFS, NF 
222 1792 Bob   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
223 1792 Broadfield, 
Peggy 
  Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
224 1792 Carter, Aaron   Governor’s Certificate NF 
225 1793 Dixon, Bob   Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF 
226 1793 Cuffee, Bisson 
[?] 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
227 1793 Cuffee, 
Benila[?] 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
228 1793 Baits, Cuffee   Governor’s Certificate RFS, V, 172 
229 1793 Cuff son of #228 Governor’s Certificate RFS, V, 172 
230 1793 Betty former property of 
Dunmore 
William Barton £10 
purchase 
RFS, NF, P2, 
516 
231 1793 Clarinda   Fa Ser: Denniston & 
Taylor 
RFS, NF 
232 1793 Collins, 
Abraham 
  Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF D2, 
176 
233 1793 Miller, Thomas   Governor’s Certificate NF 
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234 1793 Murray, 
Thomas 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
235 1793 S___up? Davey   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
236 1793 Sarah   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF, W, 
513 
237 1793 Sara possible duplicate 
of #236 
Governor’s Certificate NF 
238 1793 Barry, Bu__?   ___? Barry NF 
239 1793 Watkinson, 
Lydia 
  Thomas Watkinson NF 
240 1793 Tanyard, Tom   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
241 1793 Thompson, 
John 
  Governor’s Certificate NF, V, 141 
242 1793 Tucker, Betty “my wife” Castle Duncorne RFS, NF 
243 1793 Sl__w?, James   Governor’s Certificate NF 
244 1793 Williams, 
Prince 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
245 1793 Williamson, 
Jack 
  Thomas Williamson NF 
246 1793 Williamson, 
Elizabeth 
bequest Thomas Williamson RFS, NF 
247 1793 Williamson, 
Sarah 
bequest Thomas Williamson RFS 
248 1793 Williamson, 
Venus 
bequest Thomas Williamson RFS 
249 1793 Ruth   Fa Ser: Martha Albury RFS, NF, V, 
264 
250 1793 Evans, James   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
251 1793 Green, John   Governor’s Certificate NF 
252 1793 Grimmage?   Governor’s Certificate NF 
253 1793 Graham, 
Brutus 
  Governor’s Certificate NF, V, 141 
254 1793 Graham, Sally? wife of #253 Governor’s Certificate V, 141 
255 1793 Gunn, Sally “my Mulatto 
child” 
George Gunn NF, V, 155 
256 1793 Flora   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF, V, 
198 
257 1793 Kingston child of #273 Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF, V, 
198 
258 1793 Heather child of #273 Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF, V, 
198 
259 1793 Rankin child of #273 Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF, V, 
198 
260 1793 Francis, John   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
261 1793 Hall, James   Governor’s Certificate NF 
262 1793 Hall, William   Governor’s Certificate NF 
263 1793 Hall, Joseph   Governor’s Certificate NF 
264 1793 Jackson, 
Anthony 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
265 1793 Lambert, John   Governor’s Certificate NF 
266 1793 Lightbourn   Governor’s Certificate NF 
267 1793 Lucker, Cuffee   Governor’s Certificate NF 
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268 1793 McPherson, 
Ben 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
269 1793 McPherson, 
Grace 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
270 1793 McPherson, 
George 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
271 1793 Murray, 
Thomas 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
272 1793 Phillips, 
Charlotte 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
273 1793 Anthony, John husband of #274 Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF, V, 
142 
274 1793 Anthony, 
Susannah 
wife of #273 Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF, V, 
142 
275 1793 Beah, Cuffee   Governor’s Certificate NF 
276 1793 Bath, Thomas   Governor’s Certificate/ 
military service 
RFS, NF 
277 1793 Cox, James   Governor’s Certificate NF 
278 1793 Chatham   Governor’s Certificate NF 
279 1793 Duncorne, Will   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
280 1793 Amoss, Jeanie   Manumission RFS 
281 1793 Armstrong, 
Jane 
  Proclamation RFS 
282 1793 Allen, Lucy 
Smith 
  Justices’ Certificate RFS 
283 1793 Beak, Cuffee   Dunmore’s Certificate/ 
military service 
RFS 
284 1794 McDough, 
Cato 
  Governor’s Certificate NF, W, 512 
285 1794 Butler, Miley   James Butler NF, W, 525 
286 1794 Mason, Silvia   John Mason NF 
287 1794 Mason, 
Alexander 
  John Mason NF 
288 1794 Gamble, Jenny bequest William Gamble NF 
289 1794 Gamble, 
Edward 
bequest William Gamble NF 
290 1794 Gamble, Becky bequest William Gamble NF 
291 1794 Thompson, 
Roller? 
  Fa Ser: Robert 
Thompson 
NF 
292 1794 Venus, 
Catherine 
  Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF, P2, 
243 
293 1794 Lewis, James   Judith Lewis nf 
294 1794 Cox, Thomas "my brother" Timothy Cox RFS, NF, V, 
255 
295 1794 Bonamy, 
Nanny 
bequest Broomfield Bonamy RFS 
296 1794 Falconer, Lucy   Thomas Smith RFS 
297 1794 Falconer, Lucy 
jr. 
  Thomas Smith RFS 
298 1794 Falconer, Nelly   Thomas Smith RFS 
299 1794 Thompson, 
Peter 
  Richard Thompson RFS 
300 1794 Essex   Governor’s Certificate V, 264 
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301 1795 Harry   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF, W, 
387 
302 1795 Cox, Anthony   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF, W, 
521 
303 1795 Cox, Rebecca   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF, W, 
522 
304 1795 Cox, Hannah   Timothy Cox RFS, NF 
305 1795 Ferguson, John   Ansell Ferguson NF 
306 1795 Lowe, Jack   Benjamin Low NF 
307 1795 Tattnall, Dye   Fa Ser: Josiah Tattnall RFS, NF 
      
308 1795 Taylor, 
Lucinda 
  Good Causes Alex. 
Taylor 
RFS, NF 
309 1795 Waring, Sarah   Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF 
310 1795 Johnston, 
Peggy 
  Anthony Roxburgh NF 
311 1795 Martin, 
William 
  Governor’s Certificate NF, W, 388 
312 1795 Bremner, Lucy bequest Alexander Bremner RFS 
313 1795 Bremner, 
Maria 
bequest Alexander Bremner RFS 
314 1796 Bunn, Jim   Fa Ser: Denniston & 
Taylor 
RFS, NF 
315 1796 Card, Sarah   Fa Ser: Hugh Deane RFS, NF 
316 1796 Card, Will   Fa Ser: Hugh Deane RFS, NF 
317 1796 Sands?, Peter   William Sands NF 
318 1796 Perpall, Jose   John Perpall NF 
319 1796 Perpall, Jack   John Perpall NF 
320 1796 Roworth, Elsey   Governor's Certificate NF 
321 1796 Ross, Sylvia   Fa Ser: Lord Dunmore NF 
322 1796 Routledge, 
Wilkins 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
323 1796 Routledge, 
Mary 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
324 1796 Rankin, Jenny   Governor’s Certificate NF 
325 1796 Ross, Jenny   Henry Yonge NF 
326 1796 Turner, 
Pompey 
  Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
327 1796 Francis, 
Rebecca 
  Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF, Z, 
233 
328 1796 Francis, John   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF, Z, 
233 
329 1796 Francis, David 
Darrall 
  Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
330 1796 Francis, Joseph 
Darrall 
  Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
331 1796 Johnston, 
Sylla? 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
332 1796 Ferguson, John   Anscott Ferguson RFS, NF 
333 1796 Keel, John   Fa Ser: Lord Dunmore NF 
334 1796 Mitchell, Sally   Governor’s Certificate NF 
335 1796 Mitchell, Beck   Governor’s Certificate NF 
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336 1796 Phillis   Governor’s Certificate NF 
337 1796 Deane, Betty  mother of #338-
342 
Fa Ser: Hugh Deane RFS, NF 
338 1796 Deane, Nanny daughter of. #337 Fa Ser: Hugh Deane RFS, NF 
339 1796 Deane, Polly daughter of #337 Fa Ser: Hugh Deane RFS, NF 
340 1796 Deane, Jenny daughter of #337 Fa Ser: Hugh Deane RFS, NF 
341 1796 Deane, 
Charlotte 
daughter of #337 Fa Ser: Hugh Deane RFS, NF 
342 1796 Deane, Robert son of #337 Fa Ser: Hugh Deane RFS, NF 
343 1796 Dean, Ann   Celia Lord RFS 
344 1796 Stephens, 
James Josiah 
  Governor’s Certificate RFS 
345 1796 Stephens, 
Martha 
  Governor’s Certificate RFS 
346 1797 Baillou, 
Thomas 
  Grant & Baillou RFS, NF 
347 1797 Begbie, Harriet   Ser. Alexander Begbie RFS, NF 
348 1797 Barnett, Joe   Jonathan Barnett RFS, NF 
349 1797 Cain, James   Governor's Certificate RFS, NF 
350 1797 Spatcher??, 
John 
  John Spatcher? NF 
351 1797 Spatcher??, 
James 
  John Spatcher? NF 
352 1797 Sh_p_? 
Thomas? 
  Justices’ Certificate NF 
353 1797 Doll   Stephen Haven RFS, NF, D2, 
107 
354 1797 Thompson, 
Jenny 
  John Thomas 
Thompson 
RFS, NF 
355 1797 Thompson, 
Flora 
  John Thomas 
Thompson 
RFS 
356 1797 Bowman, 
Warwick 
  Justices’ Certificate RFS, NF 
357 1797 Williams, 
Joseph 
  Certificate NF 
358 1797 Wallace, 
Thomas 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
359 1797 Emester?, 
Joseph 
  Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
360 1797 Esther   Ser: John Tull NF 
361 1797 Hunt, Jacob   Governor’s Certificate NF 
362 1797 Hudson, Joe   Purchase NF 
363 1797 London   Fa Ser: Sarah 
Thompson 
NF 
364 1797 Lucy   Governor’s Certificate NF 
365 1797 Lee, Rachel   Governor’s Certificate NF 
366 1797 Lane, Jack   Ed. Lane NF 
367 1797 Quash, Cato   Governor’s Certificate NF 
368 1797 Dalkeith, 
Sylvia 
  Fa Ser: John Dalkeith RFS, NF 
369 1797 Dalkeith, 
Anthony 
  Fa Ser: John Dalkeith RFS, NF 
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370 1797 Dalkeith, Tina   Fa Ser: John Dalkeith RFS, NF 
371 1797 Wilson, Nan   John Thomas 
Thompson 
RFS 
372 1797 Wilson, 
Rosetta 
  John Thomas 
Thompson 
RFS 
373 1797 Wilson, Jane   John Thomas 
Thompson 
RFS 
374 1797 Robert   Justices’ Certificate Z, 337 
375 1798 Bejot, Felicite   Archibald McKenzie RFS, NF 
376 1798 Brown, 
William 
  Fa Ser: Susannah 
Brown 
RFS, NF 
377 1798 Cox, Rose   Edward Cox RFS, NF 
378 1798 Cox, Nan   Edward Cox RFS, NF 
379 1798 Cox, Rosette   Edward Cox RFS, NF 
380 1798 Cox, June   Edward Cox RFS, NF 
381 1798 Hall, William   Wm. George Hall NF 
382 1798 Jack   John Perpall NF 
383 1798 Jones, Mary   Fa. Ser: R. Jones NF 
384 1798 Jourdaine, 
Mary 
  Fa Ser: Aug Jordaine NF 
385 1798 Ingraham, 
James 
  good causes: James 
Ingraham 
NF 
386 1798 Martin, Nancy   Purchase James 
Webster 
NF 
387 1798 Martin, George   Purchase James 
Webster 
NF 
388 1798 Moxey, Cato   Will Martin NF 
389 1798 Saffold, Jess   Governor’s Certificate D2, 57 
390 1798 Spe__rer?, Bob   notar: Certificate NF 
391 1798 Sterling, Wal? 
Jeffrey 
  Fa Ser: WG Hall NF 
392 1798 Scott, John 
Petty 
  John Petty NF 
393 1798 Campbell, 
Lucy 
bequest Archibald Campbell RFS, NF 
394 1798 Campbell, 
Phillis 
bequest Archibald Campbell RFS, NF 
395 1798 Campbell, 
Lucy 
bequest Archibald Campbell RFS, NF 
396 1798 Campbell, 
Libby 
bequest Archibald Campbell RFS, NF 
397 1798 Gray, Peggy bequest George Gray NF 
398 1798 Gray, Polly bequest George Gray NF 
399 1798 Nielson, Mary bequest James? Nielson NF 
400 1798 Nielson, 
Phoebe 
bequest James? Nielson NF 
401 1798 Nielson, Jack bequest James? Nielson NF 
402 1798 Nielson, Peggy bequest James? Nielson NF 
403 1798 Young, Prince bequest James Young RFS, NF 
404 1798 Tattnall, Maria 
Cattell 
  Fa Ser: Josiah Tattnall RFS, NF 
405 1798 Elliott, Rachel   Will of Samuel Elliott RFS, NF 
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406 1798 Hunt, Tom    pur. Nath. Owens? NF 
407 1798 Hay, John   Governor's Certificate NF 
408 1798 Lyneh, Flora   Governor's Certificate NF 
409 1798 Leah   Fa Ser: T. A. Halliday NF 
410 1798 Merillar, 
Martena 
mother of #411-
412 
Fa Ser: __? Merillar NF 
411 1798 Merillar, 
Disor? 
child of #410 Fa Ser: __? Merillar NF 
412 1798 Merillar, 
Daniel 
child of #410 Fa Ser: __? Merillar NF 
413 1798 Neeler, 
Benjamin 
  Governor’s Certificate NF, W, 513 
414 1798 Dickinson, 
James 
  Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF, D2, 
58-9 
415 1798 Spencer, 
Robert 
  Governor’s Certificate D2, 319 
416 1799 Bush, Isaac   Governor’s Certificate RFS, NF 
417 1799 Barry, Robert   Fa Ser: Lord Dunmore RFS, NF 
418 1799 Castilano, 
Joseph/George 
  Purchase RFS, NF 
419 1799 Cunningham, 
Patience 
aka Heather Purchase NF 
420 1799 Campbell, Joe   Duncan Taylor NF 
421 1799 Jane   Purchase, Timothy Cox RFS, NF 
422 1799 Joan [?]   Cert. from Duncan 
Taylor 
NF 
423 1799 Molly aka 
Peggy 
  M Akers [?] purchase NF 
424 1799 McNaughten, 
Jane 
  John McNaughten NF 
425 1799 McNaughten, 
Judith 
  John McNaughten NF 
426 1799 McNaughten, 
Jane 
  John McNaughten NF 
427 1799 McBride, 
Chloe 
  Alexander McBride NF 
428 1799 Miller, Dinah   Wife of Jubos? Miller NF 
429 1799 McKenzie, 
November 
  Purchase by Timothy 
Cox 
NF 
430 1799 Simms, 
Priscilla 
  Fa Ser: Paul & Tho 
Simms 
RFS, NF 
431 1799 Smith, Amelia   daughter of John Smith RFS, NF 
432 1799 Stevens, Will   John Stevens NF 
433 1799 Wilson, Beck   Governor's Certificate RFS, NF 
434 1799 Wallace, 
Anthony 
  Exort? Of James 
Wallace 
NF 
435 1799 Wallace, Delia   Thomas Wallace RFS, NF 
436 1799 Tattnall, Mary   Fa Ser: Josiah Tattnall RFS, NF 
437 1799 Ellis, Ann   Will of Charles Ellis RFS, NF 
438 1799 Ellis, John bequest Will of Charles Ellis RFS, NF 
439 1799 Grant, 
Theodore 
  purch. Sarah Grant NF 
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440 1799 Gaskin, Nancy   Executors of Wm. 
Gaskin 
NF 
441 1799 Gaskin, 
William 
  Executors of Wm. 
Gaskin 
NF 
442 1799 Gaskin, Bella   Executors of Wm. 
Gaskin 
NF 
443 1799 Forbes, Jenny   Fa Ser: Dugald Forbes NF 
444 1799 Forbes, Hannah purchase Executors of Colin 
McKenzie 
RFS, NF 
445 1799 Hasting?, Joe   Governor’s Certificate NF 
446 1799 McKenzie, 
Hannah 
  Colin McKenzie NF 
447 1799 Newbold, 
Elenor 
  Regard: Charles 
Fr_her? 
NF 
448 1799 Quasheta   Stephen Haven NF 
449 1799 Dean, Rosanna   Celia Lord RFS 
450 1799 Dean, ?   Celia Lord RFS 
451 1799 Ferguson, Dim   John Cox RFS 
452 1800 Clarke, Jack   Alexander Taylor: 
purchase 
RFS 
453 1800 Clarke, Sarah   Purchase NF 
454 1800 Cox, Edward   Pur. By his Father Ed. 
Cox 
RFS, NF 
455 1800 Clarke, 
Thomas 
  Ann Clarke (his Sister) RFS, NF 
456 1800 Cox, Castleton   Timothy Cox RFS, NF 
457 1800 Johnston, 
Fanny 
  By her daughter Ann 
Clark 
NF 
458 1800 Johnson, Doe   Governor’s Certificate NF 
459 1800 McKenzie, 
Felicity 
  Alexander McKenzie NF 
460 1800 Marshall, 
Grace 
  David Marshall NF 
461 1800 Smith, Fortune   Fa Ser: Eliza Smith RFS, NF 
462 1800 Stewart, Alex   Anthony Stewart NF 
463 1800 Stewart, 
William 
  Anthony Stewart NF 
464 1800 Saunders, Joe   John Saunders NF 
465 1800 Smith, Rosette   Eliza Smith RFS, NF 
466 1800 Sutherland, 
Chloe 
  Purchase RFS, NF 
467 1800 Tattnall, Jane 
Phillis 
  Maria Francis Tattnall RFS, NF 
468 1800 Wells, Harriet   Fa Ser: John Boothe RFS, NF 
469 1800 Wallace, 
Stephen 
  Governor’s Certificate NF 
470 1800 Watson, 
Suckey 
  George Watson RFS, NF 
471 1800 Robinson, John   Certificate NF 
472 1800 Rumer, Nelly   Robert Rumer NF 
473 1800 Lane, Sambo   Purchase NF 
474 1800 Pinder, Sarah   Purchase NF 
 308
475 1800 Evans?, John   Joseph Evans? RFS 
476 1800 Smith, 
Margaret 
  James Gow RFS 
 
 
Key to Sources: 
RFS: ‘Register of Freed Slaves, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century’, BDA 
NF: ‘Negro Freedoms’, in ‘Executive Council Minutes’ microfilm, BDA 
Other references are to the lettered Registry Office Books, RGD, followed by the 
relevant page number. 
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(adapted from The World Factbook 2009 (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2009) <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/graphics/ref_maps/pdf/central_america.pdf>) 
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